

# The formation of American exceptional identities: A three-tier model of the “standard of civilization” in US foreign policy

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## Abstract

The dominant structuralist/materialist schema in International Relations accords little importance to the domestic ideational base of the state in its concern to explain the pattern of foreign policy. In contrast, my article, following the tenets of unit-level constructivism, asks how American identity was formed, contested, and manifested through its interaction with two significant others — the European empires and the Native Americans — in the USA’s formative era in order to understand the origins of American liberal internationalism and popular imperialism. I argue that the US identity was constituted in two different ways: as a transformative state against the Westphalian system and as a civilizing force over “barbarian” natives. The two main US foreign policy orientations — the Jeffersonian tradition and the Jacksonian tradition — were produced by these ambivalent American selves. In this context, a hierarchical, tripartite model of the “standard of civilization” in the American security imaginary emerged at the turn of the 19th century: the USA at the top as a revolutionary vanguard in human history; European international society, which should be negotiated and reformed in America’s own image later, in the middle; and the “Rest” at the bottom, which need to be removed or assimilated.

## Keywords

Constructivism, discourse, English School, foreign policy, identity, international history

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## Introduction

This article asks how American exceptional identities were formed, contested, and manifested through their interaction with two significant Others — the European empires and the Native Americans — in the USA's formative era (circa 1754/56–1823/31). I argue that the US identity, informed by its European discursive heritage — republicanism, Christianity, and the Enlightenment — was constituted in two different ways: as a transformative state against the Westphalian system and as a civilizing force over “barbarian” natives. The two main US foreign policy orientations or contending conceptualizations of the national interest with American characteristics — the Madisonian/Jeffersonian tradition (the origin of liberal internationalism) and the Jacksonian tradition (the origin of popular imperialism) — were produced by these ambivalent American selves.

In this context, a hierarchical, tripartite model of the “standard of civilization” in American foreign policy emerged at the turn of the 19th century. First, it defines the nature of the international system, as well as the place of the nation in the world. Second, it produces a particular American attitude toward the outside: the US at the top as a revolutionary vanguard in human history; European international society, which should be negotiated and reformed in America's own image later, in the middle; and at the bottom, the “Rest,” non-white Others that need to be removed or assimilated.

My study aims to offer an alternative hypothesis on US foreign policy by constructing a causal/constitutive mechanism between American exceptional identities, interests, and practices. It is a competing argument against the conventional structuralist/materialist understanding of US diplomacy in that America's foreign behaviors will be illustrated as the outcome of its socially constructed identities and not as the logical products of an anarchic international structure. Furthermore, the examination of the multiple, contested American identities and, consequently, their contending foreign policy traditions will offer a new outlook on a variety of important historical junctures in American foreign affairs. Through the prism of identity–interest–policy contestations and mixtures, the USA's contradictory, differentiated attitudes towards the West and the “Rest” will be explained. That is, America's non-liberal approach to the non-European world, as opposed to its liberal internationalist posture to the Atlantic world, would be understood not as a simple aberration or blunder, but as a tragedy that is related to its fundamental racist/militarist identity based on its own expansionist experiences.

## The theoretical framework: The politics of identity/difference in early-modern America

The reason I focus on the national identity variable is that it is a critical link mediating interstate structure and state interest/policy in the social sphere (Jepperson et al., 1996: 59). This approach is in direct opposition to the conventional understanding of state behavior in International Relations (IR). Regarding American diplomacy in particular, the mainstream structuralist and materialist schema has accorded little importance to the domestic and ideational base of the US in explaining the pattern of its foreign policy. Indeed, revolutionary states that “have plans totally to reorder world affairs in a way incommensurate with their ‘objective’ capacities” are ignored as “irrational” actors that

would soon perish under the structural pressure of brutal anarchy (Smith, 2012: 397). Thus, the American exceptionalist tradition is categorized either as “‘idealistic’ or ‘utopian’ thinking” (Smith, 2012: 395) according to a realist caricature of American foreign policy. For a long time, realists have tried “to ‘normalize’ America, urging it to act like other great powers do” (Ruggie, 1998: 216).

Perhaps we can concede that typical powers have been historically assimilated to the normal real-state model and have succumbed to the necessity of survival. Nevertheless, we should note that, contrary to structural realist assumptions, a unique and ambivalent American self-image, as both revolutionary and imperialist, has not been socialized by systemic pressure. Indeed, America’s revolutionary republican (sometimes along with popular imperialist) project has silently progressed for over 200 years despite the homogenizing effect of modern international society, which defeated the transformative ideals of the French and Russian Revolutions. Therefore, it is significant to analyze the domestic foundation of American external behavior, as well as to pay serious attention to the identity/agency of the US, which has changed the modern international order and constructed a new world order based on the American style. To bring this to light, Michael Lind (2006: 7) suggests that the “American Creed” should be examined to understand the “American way of life” that has guided American grand strategy from its conception. Following Anatol Lieven (2004), I would add that the “*Anti-American Creed*” is another factor that explains the ambiguous trajectory of American foreign policy, which has oscillated between liberal internationalism and illiberal unilateralism.

Although numerous internal/external factors shape national identities, the present study concentrates on the dialectics between Self and Others. US nationhood will be analyzed as a social construct in relation to various types of alterity, which is against essentialist conceptualizations of national identity. Following the lead of William E. Connolly’s (2002) seminal work *Identity/Difference*, postmodernist constructivists such as David Campbell (1998) and Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney (2004) have focused on the process of “othering,” or the act by which difference is constructed as an inferior Other, as the main mechanism of creating and maintaining identity.

An antagonistic relationship between the Self and alterity is important to understand the original constitution of US identity. The politics of identity/difference in the context of modern nation-building and nationalism mainly rested upon the “friend” and “enemy” binary (Lebow, 2008: 474–478). The long dialectics between war-making and state-making in the Westphalian system (Tilly, 1985) constituted the historical seedbed of the exclusionary and dichotomized logic that demarcated the boundary between the orderly “inside” and the dangerous “outside” through the principle of sovereignty (Walker, 1992). Since the founding of the US, the country was also situated in a turbulent period of modern international relations, marked by a series of interstate and colonial wars — from the Seven Years’ War to the War of 1812 — and of revolutions such as its own and the French Revolution. Thus, the process of American identity formation was no exception to the logic of negative “othering.”

In addition, I will focus not only on the elite intellectual discourse, but also on the area of “common sense” embedded in popular communities. Ted Hopf (2013: 319–324) calls for a neo-Gramscian “common-sense constructivism” that focuses on the contestation between popular habits of thinking and elite ideas and policy outcomes as its product. In

this new theoretical schema, it cannot be naturally assumed that a “discursive fit” between the elite discourse and people’s traditional conception of the world exists all the time. Although the ruling group pursues the establishment of hegemony, there is always a possibility that common sense in civil society would resist and defeat the elite hegemonic project.

Daniel Deudney’s (2013: 19) statement that almost every aspect of “American foreign policy has been contested within the United States” can be understood through this neo-Gramscian theoretical perspective. The conflict between “liberal internationalism” and the alliance of “imperialism and military adventurism” has marked the key debates in America surrounding the major wars of aggression (Deudney, 2013: 19). The opposition provided by Lieven (2004) between the “Thesis” and the “Anti-Thesis” in the American Creed, the distinction by Bruce Cumings (2009) between “Atlanticism” and “Continentalism,” and the comparison made by Hendrickson (2009) between the “Unionist paradigm” and the “nationalist/imperialist paradigm” point to the same issue: the great bifurcation in US identity and foreign policy based on different social groups.

In this vein, we need to explore the origins of a contestation over the construction of a hegemonic consensus on American national identity and foreign policy between the liberal internationalism of the East-Coast intellectual elite and the Jacksonian imperialism of the anti-intellectual frontiersmen. This schema stresses the existence of two antagonistic social forces, two different symbolic universes, and, consequently, two contending identities/interests/foreign policies from the earliest years of the US. How the contrasting European discursive heritages and experiences with Others shaped the two distinct groups’ security imaginary will be traced through their successive historical developments.

Concerning the research materials, this article relies mainly on two revisionist readings of US history. Both “republicanism” and “the New Western History” are against the dominant liberal-nationalist consensus that depicts the trajectory of America as an ongoing march of liberal values or a triumphalist monologue of a Lockean Self that has few interactions with the outside world. Indeed, these two intellectual rebellions attempt to restore various dialogues between the American ego and Others and reveal the discursive (re)production of the US. First, the so-called “germ theory,” which argues that almost all American cultural characteristics are merely transplants of the European Enlightenment, was a prevailing interpretation of American political thought. Therefore, what makes America exceptional is its socio-economic condition as a “born liberal” state, which was conducive to building a liberal society *par excellence* (Hartz, 1991). By contrast, republican revisionists seek to explain American exceptional identity by illuminating America’s multiple relationships with historical and contemporary Others, ranging from Rome to the British Empire.

Second, the New Western History movement (along with the frontier-borderlands approach) notes that early-modern America should be reread in the context of transnational/inter-imperial relations on the continent, as opposed to the dominant nationalist narrative that has regarded present US borders as being constant and sacrosanct. The movement particularly emphasizes that the interior of early-modern North America was the genuine transnational sphere in which a variety of European empires, Euro-American colonies, and native nations competed and allied in both equal and hierarchal manners. Relations between Europeans and Amerindians are reconsidered not as part of US

“domestic” development, but as part of early American “foreign” or “imperialist” policy (Citino, 2004: 202–203). The manner by which racialized American identity was constructed through (violent) encounters with native Others is brought into relief in this alternative narrative.

## **The New World versus the Old World: The revolutionary state against the European international system**

### *The European heritage I: Republicanism and the American Revolution*

A group of republican historians, including Bernard Bailyn (1992) and J.G.A. Pocock (1975), unearthed the existence of a unique ideology in colonial society and altered the conventional liberal perception of the origins of the American Revolution. The republican idea that originated in classical Greek and Roman political thought was innovated by Niccolò Machiavelli and later matured into a fully anti-modern problematic through the works of James Harrington. In this ideological framework, the establishment and maintenance of the republic to secure the liberty of *homo politicus* was the pivotal question, and republican theorists reinterpreted human history in accordance with this imagined scheme. Human history was a cyclical place where the liberty and virtue of a republic had always been threatened by and eventually succumbed to power and corruption. World history was described as an unstable equilibrium between the power that threatens the liberty of the people through constant conspiracies and the struggle of citizens to confront this challenge (Bailyn, 1992: ch. 3).

From the viewpoint of republicans, the British constitution after the Glorious Revolution was the only base of liberty in the world. They believed that liberty in Britain was preserved by the most significant outcome of the revolution in 1688 — a “mixed government” that was admired as the best polity since Aristotle (Bailyn, 1992: 70–74). The problem was that liberty in Britain was encroached upon by pervasive power after Walpole led the state. The “Neo-Harringtonians” provided the radical opposition with republican intellectual tools to interpret the modernization of Britain as engineered by Walpole’s cabinet. Their central concern was the anticipated catastrophic consequences of the extinction of liberty and the rise of tyranny that would be generated by modern developments (Bailyn, 1992: 34–42).

In the same vein, the colonial American intellectuals in the latter part of the 18th century thought that the corrupted British Empire was transplanting modernity to threaten the virtue of the uncontaminated colonies. A series of policies designed to consolidate colonial governance after the Seven Years’ War was perceived as a formidable conspiracy by Americans, who already doubted modernization in Britain through the republican lens. This perception made Americans accept the dissident ideology and the critique of British society as proposed by Neo-Harringtonians more ardently than the metropole elites did (Pocock, 1975: 509). Eventually, the power that destroyed the liberty of the Empire seemed to begin exerting its evil influence on the North American colony (Bailyn, 1992: 141–143).

In particular, the historical analogy between Rome and Great Britain was crucial in “othering” the metropole from the eyes of the colonial American literati (Bailyn, 1992:

131–137). In analyzing the Roman republic, which was an ideal historical Other in republican ideology, the tradition focused on what Deudney (2007: 110–112) called “the second iron law of polis republicanism,” which attributes the fall of the Roman republic to its geographical expansion. The imperial overreach of Rome “had the effect of altering the interior balance of power toward the few at the expense of the many” (Deudney, 2007: 110). From this historical perspective, the rise of a “fiscal-military state” (Brewer, 1988) in Britain seemed to follow the negative example of the fallen Roman republic through indiscreet expansion and constitutional deformation. As Britain had won the hegemonic rivalry with France and aggrandized over the globe, its invaluable liberty and mixed regime had been destroyed by a series of developments predicted in “the second iron law,” such as intensified socio-economic polarization and the establishment of a massive standing army. As a consequence, a resolute rupture, or a revolution, was needed for Americans to confront the formidable conspiracy to contaminate the pure colonies at a time when Britain, which was the only land of liberty in the world and the ideal Other, had degenerated into a corrupt empire similar to Rome.

The American Revolution was the culmination of such an anti-British, or, more broadly, an anti-European, US ego embedded in a variety of historical analogies from the classical age. Americans opposed a British Other (a modern avatar of Rome), which was the global “standard of civilization” in the 18th century. Moreover, the US aimed to flee from the “Old” European alterity and secure or construct its own republican identity, that is, the “New” World. The eloquent speech delivered by Richard Henry Lee (1776), a Virginian delegate, after the famous “Lee’s resolution” in the Second Continental Congress that led to the Declaration of Independence can be read as a summation of such politics of identity/difference situated in the early American social imaginary. In Lee’s argument for the Revolution, both “polluted” Europe and recently “withered” England are contrasted with the American republic, which would provide an “asylum” for “all the unfortunate of the human race.”

### *Federalist innovation: Inventing the Philadelphian system*

Americans converged to reflect on the politics among 13 states within the framework of international war and peace through the momentum created by the American Revolution. The central point of reflection was how to constitute a new interstate system to avoid the two extremes of “anarchy” and “empire.” The crisis of the Articles of Confederation in the 1780s urged a new institutional solution. It seemed that the Confederation had limited ability to settle the conflict among states in North America (Hendrickson, 2003: 195–196). Of course, the process of making a new constitution or a new “Peace Pact” (Hendrickson, 2003) was not automatic. When the representatives from each state gathered at Philadelphia in 1787, they stood atop a ridge, on either side of which lay a dangerous abyss. On one side was “empire-consolidation-despotism-centralization,” with “anarchy-dissolution-chaos-disintegration” on the other (Hendrickson, 2003: 33–35). The debate between the Federalists and anti-Federalists was essentially related to the politics of identity/difference, that is, defining the major negative Other or danger to avoid.

To those who were against the ratification of the Federal Constitution, the principal Other was still the danger of an “empire,” which was historically exemplified in the



collapse of the Roman republic and contemporarily represented in the degeneration of the British Empire. In line with the justification for the American Revolution, anti-Federalists insisted that establishing a strong federal government would pose a danger to the republican mixed regime, as the British Empire had been to the colonial society, for such a government would found the basis of an aristocracy and a monarchy and reduce the liberty of common people (Hendrickson, 2003: 252; Lind, 2006: 48).

In contrast, Federalists, on the one hand, criticized their opponents for brooding on “groundless fears” (Bailyn, 1992: 352) and proposed a Madisonian “extended republic” solution (Scigliano, 2001 (henceforth: *Federalist*), No. 10) to the pessimistic “second iron law” in traditional republicanism in order to allay anti-Federalist fears of the Federal Union. In this new theoretical breakthrough in republican security theory, the more factions/sections that exist, the less the danger of tyranny of the majority power would be. Thus, the continental expansion of the US would be beneficial to the preservation of the republic (Deudney, 2007: 166–167; Pagden, 1995: 114–115). On the other hand, Publius privileged another dangerous extreme, that is, “anarchy,” by researching several historical Others that were doomed to collapse.<sup>1</sup> They aimed to invent a new world order that would produce security and peace on the continent through a case study of ancient Greece and the early-modern confederations of Germany, Holland, and Italy. The emerging balance-of-power system in contemporary Europe was also examined as another negative Other to avoid.

The ancient Greek example represented the anarchic situation after the disintegration of a confederation, which results in internal civil wars and the intervention of foreign powers (*Federalist*, No. 18). Similarly, modern Germany, Holland, and Italy were usually cited to show how loose confederations were beset with domestic and international troubles because of structural weakness (*Federalist*, Nos. 19–20). The Federalists were especially concerned about the fact that the Italian experience resembled their own situation from 1786 to 1787. The disunion of the confederation made Italy the center of the European-wide balance-of-power system that led to the militarization of each state and the spread of despotism (Hendrickson, 2003: 36–54).

The negative appreciation of the balance-of-power system that had recently emerged in modern Europe was a decisive factor that made Americans examine an anti-European remedy for interstate order in America. No. 41 of *Federalist* indicates that Publius perceived modern European international relations in the same manner that structural realists do today. According to the international narrative, each modern state pursues individual security against the expansion of a hegemonic state that desires the establishment of a unified European empire, which consequently results in a security dilemma and balance of power.<sup>2</sup> The pivotal issue was the dreadful prediction that a European-style international order must be transplanted if the Confederation of American states collapsed. Such failure would lead to the debacle of a republican government because of the arrival of a military state characterized by a large standing army and heavy taxation, as Europeans, negative Others, had already degenerated into.<sup>3</sup> The total collapse of the Confederation system in the 1780s made a gloomy impression on Federalists, who feared that the 13 states would be split into two or three confederacies and fall into a state of war.<sup>4</sup> As a result, Federalists had to create an interstate order distinct from the European modern international system in order to preserve their nascent republican identity.

The Federal Constitution was proposed to address this historical predicament, which was America's "new political science" that deviated from European modern political science (Hendrickson, 2003: 28–29). The creation of the United States of America, "the Philadelphian system," was "an alternative to the European Westphalian system as a 'negarchic' interstate political order" (Deudney, 2007: 161). The US constitution not only presented a new peace project among nations by pooling and binding sovereigns beyond the balance-of-power system, but also marked the start of the authentic post-European identity of America.

### *Hamilton versus Jefferson: A normal state or a revolutionary state?*

Modern international society placed structural pressure upon the Revolution and continued to domesticate America's post-Westphalian line of flight. From the beginning, the US was forced to either transform or be transformed by the Westphalian system. The fierce dispute between the two Founding Fathers clearly exemplified the ordeal of the early American exceptional identity. We can reconfigure the policy debate between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson in the context of the French Revolution as a political struggle over the (re)construction of American national identity and strategic interest. The question of how to evaluate and identify two European Others — status quo Britain and revolutionary France — shaped the contestations between Federalists and Republicans over American exceptionalism. In other words, as Jefferson and Hamilton pursued different American self-images against different alterities, they, in turn, enacted contrasting foreign policies (Armstrong, 1993: 54; Nau, 2002: 67).

Hamilton recognized external pressure as a given global standard and professed himself as a staunch European modernist. Regarding contemporary European standards as the goal of American statecraft, he wanted to abandon the American exceptional approach toward the world. Indeed, Hamilton declared that the American Revolution had ended and that the US should reconcile itself to the balance-of-power system as a "normal" member that observes the rules of modern international society.<sup>5</sup> Thus, Hamilton suggested that America should be a strong and centralized nation-state that must occupy a higher position in the international order. While abandoning the revolutionary agenda of transforming the modern international order, he adopted a more practical position that aimed to assimilate America into the Westphalian paradigm. To be specific, Hamilton claimed that strengthening the US naval force could make America function as a balancer in the Atlantic world. He also envisioned the US as a future world hegemon. By adopting several measures to enrich his nation based on the English "fiscal-military model," Hamilton hoped that America would overtake the then-hegemonic state of Britain and the rest of Europe (*Federalist*, No. 11).

In contrast, Jefferson wanted to prevent the contemporary American exceptional identity from being assimilated into the modern real-state standard. He believed that this could only be achieved by protecting the US as the "revolutionary" state that could transform the Old World by presenting an alternative "standard of civilization." The central question posed by Jefferson on world politics embodied the American exceptionalist approach toward foreign affairs (Armstrong, 1993: 62–66). Jefferson argued that America was at the apex of human progress and that all of humanity should follow its example.<sup>6</sup>



In the same vein, Jefferson believed that the entire world would evolve into a federation of sister republics, an extended version of the US; that is, he envisioned the proliferation of the “Philadelphian system” worldwide. Indeed, Jefferson thought that the French Revolution of 1789 was evidence that such a hope would become a reality. By identifying the French Revolution with the American Revolution, contemporary republicans believed that what occurred in France would lead to a series of democratic revolutions throughout Europe (Jefferson, 1984: 965–966). Jefferson viewed the causes of the French Revolution from the most radical perspective, and emphasized the importance of the French Revolution in holding that the fate of the international revolution in the Atlantic world would be determined by the success or failure of the revolution.<sup>7</sup>

In sum, Hamilton identified the US with Britain, which was the “normal” state model in European international society. In terms of contemporary IR theory, his approach to foreign affairs thus represented a hallmark “realist” vision that aimed to subsume and assimilate the American Revolution into the modern European standard of civilization. Hamiltonian foreign policy is a historical foundation that has checked and domesticated the 200-year-long American revolutionary project to change the world. In contrast, Jefferson possessed a strong American “revolutionary” state identity in opposition to the old European Others. The Jeffersonian attitude toward foreign affairs formed an initial vision of “liberal internationalism,” which pursued the transformation of the Westphalian system into the US image. As these distinctive traditions have been pitted against each other to gain hegemony over American identity, a series of big swings that oscillated between the two extremes of realism and liberalism defined the recurrent cycles of American foreign policy toward (especially) Europe.

## **Civilization versus barbarism: The civilizing state against the non-white savages<sup>8</sup>**

### *European heritage II: Medieval Christianity and the Enlightenment*

White Americans brought a variety of preconceptions that originated from European experiences and thoughts on internal/external Others to their contacts with the aboriginal peoples in the New World. This “metaphysics of White Indian-understanding” was usually based on a dichotomy between “us” and “them” (Berkhofer, 1979: xv, 4). According to Siba Grovogui (1996: 8), European theology in the medieval ages constituted a particular form of discourse that “established hierarchical and exploitative relations between its Christian subjects and the other.” Since the conquest of America, the ecclesiastical logic established “the philosophical foundation for the totalizing cultural, political, economic, and legal systems of knowledge” (Grovogui, 1996: 8) that justified European hegemony over the “Rest.” Such logic assumed that Christians should bring salvation to infidels on American continents “through conversion and subsequent incorporation into the Christian order” (Grovogui, 1996: 21).

The rise of Protestantism did not change the reigning binary attitude toward heathens in North America. Rather, English Protestant settlers were more obsessed with the medieval crusading tradition and its significantly negative attitude toward pagans (Williams, 2012: 189–190). From the early stage, the possibility of reciprocal “dialogues” between

different but equal participants was blocked by the Christian “monologue.” Early modernity was the “narcissistic moment” when the Christian theology “posited the European ego as the sole locus of intercommunal relations” and posed “the erasure of the other as requisite of self-interest” (Grovogui, 1996: 24).

Even the new post-medieval philosophy movement — the Enlightenment — could not change the Eurocentric, racist discursive formation of the 18th century. While the main Christian binary structure was sustained, the secular turn in European political thought merely “caused a transmutation of the original ecclesiastical dichotomy of savior/fallen into one of civilized/noncivilized” (Grovogui, 1996: 41). The so-called “state of nature” theory was important in this development. The discourse was based on the limited (and distorted) ethnography on Native Americans written by European adventurers or settlers, and the life of natives was exploited as “a living model of human development in its more savage, less civilized stages” (Williams, 2012: 202) that lacked the European “civilized” institutions, such as private property, civil society, and government. In other words, the space of America and its inhabitants were invented as inferior Others who were antithetical to the advanced European Self. Therefore, Europe was now regarded as the leading progressive force in human history, and the domination of the “Rest” was justified as the European “civilizing mission.” Colonialism was viewed as a secular blessing for incapable natives (Grovogui, 1996: 26–27). Combined with the Lockean social efficiency/utility argument and the idea of *terra nullius* (Hobson, 2013: 42–44), the European representational framework that was grounded in the dichotomy between civilized Europe and savage natives simultaneously delegitimized Amerindian sovereignty and legitimized European imperialism over the continent (Keal, 2003: 6; Strang, 1996: 25).

The secularist turn in the Eurocentric worldview culminated in the four-stage theory of the Scottish Enlightenment. Adam Smith’s theory was especially influential among the Founding Fathers. In this linear progressive schema of world history, the simple Amerindian society on the lowest hunter-gatherer stage without private property, law, and government would be doomed to be dominated by a superior form of civilization (i.e. Euro-American agricultural/commercial society) (Williams, 2012: 206–210). In this context, the Scottish philosophy of history became the basis of the East-Coast elite discourse on “benevolent” assimilation (Sheehan, 1973: 7–8).

As a result, the European way of binary thinking that was derived from medieval theology invented “the bipolar or schizophrenic image” of the world as divided by the sphere of civilization and the sphere of barbarism (Hobson, 2013: 40). The “standard of civilization” that demarcated these two areas and justified European colonial practices emerged at this historical juncture, and underlay “the genesis of the modern international society” (Gong, 1984: 4).

### *The North American borderlands diplomatic regime: The “Middle Ground” and the “Covenant Chain”*

After the initial bloody encounters, however, relative peace between the two ethnic communities arose in the Great Lake areas and the Ohio Valley from the late 17th century to

the mid-18th century. Although the Euro-American dichotomized way of thinking did not disappear, and deadly inter-communal combats remained prevalent, “two great systems of colonial-tribal alliance,” namely, the New France composed of the French Empire and Huron/Algonquin nations versus the New England, including the British Colonies and the Iroquois League, emerged by the latter part of the 17th century (Jennings, 1985: 38). As imperial competition between Britain and France intensified in North America, the agency or autonomy of native nations also increased because European empires needed Amerindian alliances to win the hegemonic war and indigenous peoples played imperial rivals off against one another. More equal and hybrid relations within both military and economic spheres came to be established, which were cemented by “intermarriages and gift exchanges” across the ethnic lines (Adelman and Aron, 1999: 838).

Based on material infrastructures such as the balance of power and economic interdependence (mainly fur trade) within and between the French “Middle Ground” (White, 2010) and the British “Covenant Chain” (Crawford, 1994), there emerged a new borderlands diplomatic regime (Sadosky, 2009: 7) in which a series of multicultural norms and tributary practices created an alternative “Lockean” anarchy. Although the story is usually simplified by describing that the lack of mutual sovereignty recognition led to the European genocide against Native Americans (Wendt, 1992: 415), in reality, there was a transition from the initial “Hobbesian” situation, in which only power matters, to the “Lockean” world of mutually recognized sovereignty (i.e. the North American frontiers security regime). Thus, instead of continuous mutual fear and wars, we can observe partial cooperation and coexistence in this particular historical setting.

### *The British imperial frontier: The Royal Proclamation and the “Paxton Boys”*

With the onset of “King George’s War” (1744–1748), the hegemonic rivalry between France and Britain spread to worldwide conflicts, and the relative stability enjoyed by both Euro-Americans and Native Americans broke down (Jennings, 1985: 47). The end of the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), however, heralded not the return of peace, but another grave threat to Eastern Amerindians, because the British Empire that had expelled the French presence on the continent tried to build a hierarchical relationship of colonialism between the two ethnic groups. Therefore, Amerindians revolted against the British imperial plan (i.e. Pontiac’s War) to secure the borderlands regime, and the Empire had to recoil from its new strategy of unilateral domination. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the result of this compromise between Britain and Native American nations, and the Lockean world of the borderlands was restored (Adelman and Aron, 1999: 821–822). The Proclamation, which inherited the legacy of the “Middle Ground,” recognized the partial sovereignty of the aboriginal peoples along with land-ownership and tried to establish a positive law-based treaty relationship by granting *de jure* nationhood to Amerindian nations (Pagden, 1995: 83–85).

Nevertheless, another crucial legacy was produced around the mid-18th century that would ultimately demolish the Lockean world; that is, the color divide in the North

American social imaginary was consolidated. Even though the imperial authority was willing to dispel the discontent of aboriginal allies through the Proclamation, it failed to pacify the new wave of violence in the frontier areas. In fact, the “Spirit of killing all Indians, Friends and Foes, [has] spread amazingly thro’ the whole Country,” as Benjamin Franklin observed in 1764 (cited in Vaughan, 1982: 937).<sup>9</sup> According to Peter Silver’s (2008: 303–305) statistical calculations, after the Seven Years’ War, the racist discourse on the “white us” surprisingly increased among the colonial frontier mass, who were seized with fear of “red savages.” A contagious fear spread among the white frontiersmen, and some politicians and publicists started to exploit this terror to form political coalitions for land expansion. The long war with Amerindians brought a new style to popular “common sense” filled with “rhetoric of victimization” or “the anti-Indian sublime.” In short, a new political discourse “that was genuinely worth calling racist” emerged in the middle of violent conflicts between the two ethnic communities (Bender, 2006: 90; Silver, 2008: xix–xxi).

The series of indiscriminate massacres committed by the “Paxton Boys” — most of whom were newly arrived Scots-Irish frontiersmen who had previous colonial experiences back in Ireland — and their conflicts with the pacifist Quakers of Pennsylvania in the mid-1760s reflected this rising interracial tension in the West (Kenny, 2009). The increase of inter-communal conflicts along with the growth of illegal squatters in the “Middle Ground” constituted a racist discursive formation and established exclusive dichotomized group identities based on skin color as a social construction, which, in turn, incited another round of violence (Shoemaker, 2004: 125–140).<sup>10</sup>

Therefore, we can argue that two separate kinds of anarchy were created in the post-Seven Years’ War America. One was the restored *Lockean* anarchy of mutual sovereignty recognition between the colonial authority and the native alliances. The legacy of the “Middle Ground” and the “Covenant Chain” was respected by both the British Empire and the Iroquois League, and the norms and regime of the borderlands survived to some degree. The other was a reappeared *Hobbesian* anarchy of mutual fear and violence between the Western frontiersmen and the aboriginal inhabitants. The Euro-American settlers did not obey the central controls decreed in the Royal Proclamation and pursued their own “populist imperialism” against Amerindian resistance. The fundamental gap between the national effort to contain the flow of illegal occupancy and the unilateral expansion of the frontier mass would continue even after Independence (Hendrickson, 2009: 148–49). From these chaotic borders, the Jacksonian tradition of militaristic adventurism was developed.

### *The post-Revolution “Indian” policy: Knox, Jefferson, and Jackson*

The American Revolution was not only a republican departure from the Old World that was initiated by the intellectual East-Coast elites, but also a bottom-up revolution of frontiersmen who were immersed in the mentality of “Indian-hating.” The famous sentence in the Declaration of Independence that accused George III of bringing “on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, & conditions of existence” reflected this hostile politics of identity prevalent among white settlers and anticipated what would

happen in the post-Revolutionary West (Hendrickson, 2009: 148; Vaughan, 1982: 942; Williams, 2012: 211). As the “American Leviathan” emerged from the Hobbesian anarchy in the frontier area, the borderlands diplomatic regime was replaced by the nation-state’s pacification, and the sovereignty/autonomy of Amerindians was radically reduced (Griffin, 2007: 14–16). It was a “decisive moment in the shift from borderlands to bordered lands” (Adelman and Aron, 1999: 822), that is, from international relations between different semi-sovereign polities to hierarchical colonial relations. Although England and France could only gain a limited hold on the continent until the 18th century because of the vast distance from their metropole, the American Revolution overcame these material constraints and “established a dynamic national empire in the Ohio Valley” (Hinderaker, 1997: xiii). Thereafter, the borderlands diplomatic regime characterized by hybridity and pluralism was excluded from the grand narrative of modern state-building and the racist classification of peoples in the US.

However, we should be careful not to regard all Indian policies of each US administration as having the same orientation. Actually, there were meaningful contestations among the Knoxian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian paradigms in their basic assumptions and practices. To begin, the Federalists, led by Henry Knox, the Secretary of War in the Washington administration, tried to preserve “the diplomatic norms of the borderlands in conducting Indian diplomacy” (Sadosky, 2009: 151). Knox recognized the autonomy of Amerindian nations by stating: “The independent nations and tribes of Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations not as the subjects of any particular state” (cited in Sadosky, 2009: 158). Also, he attempted to prevent “the individual states and their enterprising republican citizens” from intruding into Native American territory and violating existing inter-communal treaties (Sadosky, 2009: 158).

Second, Jeffersonians perceived Amerindians through the intellectual grid of assimilationism based on the four-stage theory of the Scottish Enlightenment. Although Jeffersonians romanticized the Native Americans as the “noble savages” (Sheehan, 1973: 89–116), Amerindians were doomed to perish because of their backward way of life and hunter-gatherer mode of production, according to the Scottish theory of progressive history. Therefore, Jefferson declared the US as a civilizing state with a special duty to enlighten and assimilate native barbarians.<sup>11</sup> However, the apparently benevolent assimilationism had an inherent anxiety or a compulsion to Others. In a fundamental sense, Jeffersonian philanthropy did not recognize the value of Indian Others as they were. Rather, its tenet was another form of deep narcissism of the Euro-American Self that did not acknowledge the idea of a multicultural world. Consequently, an irony embedded in the Jeffersonian Indian policy is that its genuine goodwill to support the well-being of the Native Americans by transforming them into yeomen farmers included “the seeds of extinction” with its kindness, which ultimately destroyed the aboriginal world (Sheehan, 1973: 11–12).

Third, the growing hegemony of the Jacksonian paradigm was related to an ongoing unstable position of the US in North American geopolitics. The specter of European interference in American frontiers in the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys and the possibility of a European alliance with the Amerindian nations in the same area did not disappear even until the Madison administration started. The vast area of the West acquired by the Louisiana Purchase (1803) was still a “contested ground” (Sadosky, 2009: 194–195).

Thus, the American “War Hawks” had a vital interest in initiating the War of 1812, namely, that conquering Canada and Florida would destroy the encirclement by Britain and its Native American allies of the US. In particular, Western folks, who constructed their own hostile image of the “Indian” Others, were ardent supporters of the war against the British–Indian collaboration. Then-representative Felix Grundy’s pro-war slogan represented the common warlike mentality among the frontier mass: “We shall drive the British from our Continent — they will no longer have an opportunity of intriguing with our Indian neighbors” (cited in Lind, 2006: 60–61). Andrew Jackson, the hero of frontiersmen, used the War of 1812 to lay out his uncompromising Indian policy doctrine, which sought to “undermine the sovereignty of the Indian nations and render them dependent” (Sadosky, 2009: 200), as opposed to the “benevolent” Jeffersonian assimilationism.

On the contrary, the growing anger and unity among the new generation of Amerindians, as mobilized by a group of nativist prophets who professed a pan-Indian vision, conflicted with traditional chiefs, who held an accommodationist position with the US. While the latter (“the Red Gentlemen”), based on an ancient form of localized tribal authority, were willing to compromise with the Federalist US government to restore the borderlands regime of peace and order, the former had gained their power from the increasing invasion by white frontiersmen (“the White Savages”) and attempted to build a new trans-tribal identity to resist white populist imperialism (Dowd, 1992; Nichols, 2008). After all, the unification movement culminated in Tecumseh’s War<sup>12</sup> in the North, along with the insurgency of “Red Sticks” in the South, which sought to found sovereign states autonomous from the US (Gould, 2012: 201).

The emergence of the hostile mirror-image politics of identity between the “Jackson Doctrine” and pan-Indian nativism induced the collapse of the cooperative effort to maintain a Lockean order in post-revolutionary America by the traditional woodland Indian leaders and the Federalist administration (Nichols, 2008: 9–10). The co-constituting processes of antithetical identity formation between white frontiersmen and red prophets reduced the possibility of accommodation in the “Middle Ground,” and only sheer power came to decide the course of history, as usually happens in the Hobbesian state of war. As material conditions had radically shifted from a rough balance of power to a hierarchy with the British retreat to Canada, no barrier was left to the rise of the Jacksonian removalism that rested upon an exclusive dichotomy between civilization and barbarism. Thereafter, Euro-Americans ignored the old norms of the Lockean world and asserted that only the US was the sole sovereign polity on the continent.

### *The Jacksonian democracy: Removal and the “Trail of Tears”*

The victory of the Jacksonian doctrine in post-War of 1812 America meant that the 60-year-long struggle of the Euro-American people from the 1750s to the 1810s to control the Trans-Appalachian West and to construct the *white* American Self ended and the age of populist imperialism began. A series of events — such as Jackson’s invasion of Florida (1818), which eradicated the remnants of the Spanish Empire in the region; the inauguration of President Jackson (1829), supported by frontiersmen; Chief Justice John Marshall’s doctrine in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831), decreeing that “an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state,” but a “domestic dependent



nation”; and, finally, the notorious “Trail of Tears” (1831) following the Indian Removal Act of 1830 — all marked “the sundering of the final vestige of the eighteenth-century borderlands diplomatic regime” (Sadosky, 2009: 215).

A new set of colonialist norms imposed by Jacksonian America replaced the older “Middle Ground” norms of accommodation. One paradox in this shift is that the democratization of American politics initiated in the Jacksonian age promoted westward imperial expansion. As more of the white mass in the frontier participated in election politics and voted for the Jacksonian agrarians, who promised to secure more free land, the old philanthropist Jeffersonians lost their voices (Adelman and Aron, 1999: 828). The previous hegemonic ideas of progress and assimilation that stemmed from the Enlightenment and were held by the East-Coast intellectual ruling group were then “reshaped by the resistance and pressure of the frontier states and their inhabitants” (Horsman, 1981: 114).

## **The two contending traditions and the three-tier model in US diplomacy**

The US has developed two contrasting traditions of foreign policy tailored for each distinct space. American identity has been (re)produced and sustained by its original encounters with peoples of color and by its interactions with Europeans, thereby generating an opposition between Jeffersonian liberal internationalism and Jacksonian populist imperialism that structured the contending doctrines of US diplomacy. Although these two extremes, founded upon distinct social forces, are distinguished from each other in terms of their respective understandings of American identity, strategic interests, and proper diplomatic policies, they share the same American exceptionalism that favors the superior American Self to the inferior Others (both Europeans and non-Europeans) and tries to transform the world in its own new American “standard of civilization.”<sup>13</sup>

### ***The Madisonian/Jeffersonian tradition: The origin of liberal internationalism***

The ambition to escape from interaction with the European balance-of-power system animated a great part of the early “Unionist paradigm” (Hendrickson, 2003: 14–23) in terms of foreign affairs. The East-Coast intellectual elites that followed the Enlightenment/republican line of the Founding Fathers defined the ultimate national interest so as to transform the norms of the Westphalian international system into ones that were more compatible with the internal principles of the “Philadelphian system” (Deudney, 2007: 185–189). In other words, the distinctive revolutionary American Self was instituted in the form of the Federal Union, and this experience formed the origin of American-style liberal internationalism. After the First World War and the debacle of the European balance-of-power system, US liberal internationalists came to realize that the “Madisonian Moment” recurred all over again on a global scale (Hendrickson, 2009: 304). In this context, the US Constitution and its federal model “formed a template of the problems of world order” for Woodrow Wilson and his internationalist comrades (Hendrickson, 2009: 11). Both the League of Nations and, later on, the United Nations were institutionalized

solutions “to make the world safe for democracy,” or to transform the globe in America’s own image (Hendrickson, 2009: 330).

Hence, so-called Wilsonianism was not invented *ex nihilo* and neither was American internationalism a product of the 20th century, as conventional American narratives often explain. Rather, key elements of liberal internationalism were “drawn word for word from the script of federalism” (Hendrickson, 2009: 256). Almost all crucial principles of 20th-century liberal internationalism were already expressed in the Unionist paradigm of the early US. Whereas the US could exert substantial power to reshape international relations in its image only after the Second World War, “the *idea* of the order American internationalists wished to build was, in critical respects, previously formed” (Hendrickson, 2009: 8 [emphasis in original]) through the experience of the politics of identity/difference that had separated a revolutionary American Self from reactionary European Others.

### *The Jacksonian tradition: The origin of popular imperialism/unilateral militarism*

At the outset, the US was a “facing west” (Drinnon, 1997) empire, and its continental expansion, which was glorified as “Manifest Destiny,” shaped a part of the authentic American worldview. Cumings (2009: 39) argues that the dominance of “Atlanticism” or a liberal internationalist consensus among the Eastern foreign policy elites after 1941 made us forget the expansionist characteristics of American “continentalism” in the 19th century and consciously mischaracterized it as “isolationism” in a pejorative sense. Instead, such characteristics are actually a “form of exclusive continentalism” that shaped the imperialist tendency of America until Atlanticism emerged as a mainstream ideology of foreign policy. Before the Second World War, Atlanticism in New England was merely a “regional and a minority phenomenon” in the US (Cumings, 2009: 38–40).<sup>14</sup>

Put differently, there exists a genealogy of a racist/orientalist dichotomy between barbarianism and civilization vis-a-vis non-Western peoples in some parts of American foreign policy (Hunt, 1987: ch. 3). This genealogy originated from a “mixture of a Scots Irish Calvinism and the Frontier experience” (Lieven, 2004: 99) and was crystallized in the Jackson Doctrine against the East-Coast intellectual elites. The Jacksonian tradition imagines the American Self “as a folk community bound together by deep cultural and ethnic ties” (Mead, 2001: 226), and “a strong sense of White identity and violent hostility to other races, was long at its core” (Lieven, 2004: 96). Self-imposed overseas missions of the US have been justified following the Jacksonian logic of a civilizing mission that was once mobilized to rationalize the removal of Native Americans in the 19th century. Although the US encountered a variety of Others all over the world, “the figurations with which they were inscribed were drawn from the well-established narratives of Otherness in American experience” (Campbell, 1998: 135).

Even today, the Jacksonian tradition, a maverick school from other American liberal creeds, is alive in the embittered “White South” or “the Bible Belt,” in which “the socio-economic anxieties of the White middle classes and rural populations often have fused with ethnic and racial fears” (Lieven, 2004: 93) and the exclusivist vision of Christian fundamentalism has recently surged. In particular, “the ‘southernization’ of the Republican

Party” after the late 1970s has provided the Jacksonian tradition with a new importance in American domestic politics and, consequently, in US foreign policy in our time (Lieven, 2004: 105).

### *A tripartite hierarchy of the “standard of civilization”*

In Eurocentric thinking on modern international society, a dualistic nature of world order was assumed. While the European interstate order or the sphere of civilization was founded upon the principles of sovereignty, equality, and toleration of differences, the extra-European order or the sphere of the savages was designated as the place of backward, barbaric peoples, where European international norms could not be applied and natives should be enlightened by European civilizing forces through colonization. Thus, there existed multiple “regimes of sovereignty” (Grovogui, 2002) that prescribed different standards of behavior for each region, the West and the “Rest,” in the hegemonic imaginary of modern international society (Keene, 2002: 5–11).

As a member of the Western powers, the US also possessed an imperial identity and classified different foreign areas and peoples in a hierarchical manner. What is noteworthy here is that the US has tried to distinguish itself even from Europe, or the “Old” World, as demonstrated in the Madisonian/Jeffersonian tradition. Thus, the American classification of the world assumed three distinct spheres in terms of “the standard of civilization” (Gong, 1984): American civilization at the top; Western Europe in the middle; and the “Rest,” including the western/southern frontier of America and Asian peoples across the Pacific, at the bottom.

The construction of the US federal interstate order provided confidence to Americans that their political achievement is “the model, the vanguard, and at times vital facilitator, of a universally appealing and universally realizable way of life” (Deudney and Meiser, 2008: 25). That is, the US has a “vision of an eventual liberal republican end of history” (Deudney and Meiser, 2008: 25) at its kernel. In this context, the republican worldview that was prevalent in the colonial and the founding eras depicted the Old World as “morally inferior and even decadent compared to America” (Campbell, 1998: 123). Western Europe, which was also included in the American list of Others, has played an important role in constructing an American revolutionary identity. Europe itself should be negotiated with the American Creed, or reformed by a series of revolutions following the model of US civilization in the future. Therefore, liberal internationalism has been applied to Europe to transform the Westphalian system after the First World War.

However, the US and other European states have also met “each other as equals, as part of the same cultural realm” (Cumings, 2009: 5). This situation was true when Americans and Europeans were jointly juxtaposed to peoples of color, who were identified as “barbarians.” In this context, “white Christians” were “reconfigured in a relation of similarity.” In other words, a “Western bond” was created, which not only erased differences between European countries and the US, but also strengthened the inequality between the West and the “Rest” (Doty, 1996: 33).<sup>15</sup> These historical practices, in turn, resulted in the construction of opposite international representations and identities between the North and the South, which are still influential even after the end of the official imperialism era.

## Conclusion

### *Revisiting the intersection of IR theory and American foreign policy*

**Constructivism.** This study is a response to Alexander Wendt's (1992: 404) suggestion that a "systemic empirical study of first contacts would be interesting" to understand "how self-regarding ideas about security might develop" in world history. In his own account, the "First Encounter" between Europeans and Native Americans was unique in the sense that "their interaction was highly structured by their beliefs about each other, beliefs that were rooted in pre-Encounter experiences and thus not shared" (Wendt, 1999: 158).

Likewise, I also place an emphasis on the importance of preconceptions of alterity as a main factor that structures the Self–Other relationship. I argue that the European intellectual heritage, such as republicanism, Christianity, and the Enlightenment, and the European binary attitude to various Others had a grave impact on the formation of Euro-American identity and interest in early-modern North America. As a result, this article opens a historical inquiry into the way in which the Hobbesian culture was constituted through early-modern inter-civilizational encounters, and how an imperial "hierarchy" rather than an international "anarchy" was established between Europe and the extra-European world.

**The English School.** This article engages with the English School in two main ways. First, I seek to provide a new understanding of the relationship between the US and modern international society. The English School conventionally assumes that a "common dilemma" exists for revolutionary states; that is, "the belief system on which its revolution was founded and which legitimized the assumption of state power by the revolutionary elite is certain to run counter to the prevailing political doctrines of most other states" (Armstrong, 1993: 1) in the history of modern international society. Revolutionary states have usually responded to such a reactionary external environment by rejecting the reigning rule of the established powers, that is, by seeking to "avoid contamination by the outside world" in a negative manner or "by attempting to restructure it in its own image" in a positive manner (Armstrong, 1993: 1). The problem is that as soon as "a revolution assumes the form of statehood," it is challenged by intensive pressures to observe the dominant norms of the existing international society and becomes "socialized" (Armstrong, 1993: 1). Although the US also possessed some features of a "revolutionary" state, this theoretical schema maintains that America had to be assimilated to international norms through the process of "socialization" in order to deal with the dominant European states and to acquire international recognition (Armstrong, 1993: 77). Furthermore, even after gaining its hegemonic status, the US "has been unable to achieve more than the most marginal changes in the fabric of international society" (Armstrong, 1993: 78).

In contrast, the present study emphasizes the original formation of the American "revolutionary" identity and examines how its "Philadelphian system" (Deudney, 2007) or "Unionist paradigm" (Hendrickson, 2003, 2009) was constructed through its contentious politics of identity/difference. Considering the extent to which our international system has been reconstructed through the American postwar program of a liberal international

order (Ikenberry, 2011), we need to distinguish the US case from other failures of the French and Russian Revolutions in terms of their transformative effects on international arrangements (Deudney and Meiser, 2008: 25).

Second, my study resonates with those revisionists who criticize the Eurocentrism that is inherent in the English School. Keal (2003), Keene (2002), and Seth (2013) all share the notion that the English School's problematic of the "expansion of international society" inadequately presupposes the priority (and superiority) of the European interstate order and ignores the existence of a pre-modern inter-civilizational relationship between Europe and Asia. In particular, the story of expansion is "incomplete" in describing the entirety of modern world politics because "the dispossession and destruction of indigenous societies" or "the dark side of the story of expansion" is invisible in the Eurocentric narrative of world history (Keal, 2003: 2).

Thus, it should be noted that two very different logics/spheres of international relations were established: the "European order of toleration" predicated on the principles of sovereignty; and the "extra-European order" of inequality based on the "hierarchical institutions through which colonial and imperial powers transmitted the supposed benefits of their civilization to the rest of the world" (Keene, 2002: xi). The new idea of "the standard of civilization" was the measure to divide these two spheres — the West and the "Rest" — and defined the historical role of Europe or "the civilizing mission" in modern times. Along these lines, this article situates US history in the modern colonial division of the world and traces the formation of an imperial/civilizing identity in the American Self through its own colonial project in the western frontier.

### *Reflecting on contemporary practice*

A normative goal of the present article is to call for a reflection on the exclusivist, monologic form of the American exceptionalist identity and foreign policy that, lacking the proper understanding of differences, is obsessed with the representation of "inferior" Others and the necessity to change them in the American image. Certain critics of American exceptionalism already addressed this problem during the Cold War period. Louis Hartz (1991: 12), for example, examines the relationship between the origin of the Red Scare/McCarthyism and "the violent moods of its mass Lockianism." Hartz (1991: 285) then explains how the latter "hampers creative action abroad by identifying the alien with the unintelligible, and ... inspires hysteria at home by generating the anxiety that unintelligible things produce." Robert A. Packenham (1973) also stressed how exceptionalism produced the distorted view and development policy debacles of America on the Third World.

In the same vein, Tony Smith (2012: ch. 12) analyzed the manner by which 9/11 was captured by the neoconservatives as an opportunity to materialize "America's Mission." The so-called Bush Doctrine was "a doctrine of progressive imperialism" (Smith, 2012: 358) and a unique mixture of liberal internationalism and Jacksonian unilateralism. Neoconservatives tried to seize 9/11 as a chance to "take decisive steps to change the character of international relations," and regarded the US as an agent of world-historical progress toward permanent peace (Smith, 2012: 361–362). However, the victory of the US-led "world revolution" did not last long. After all, the imperial overconfidence of

America in democratic peace and free capitalism was set back by the global financial meltdown of 2008 (Smith, 2012: 387). The “one-legged Wilsonianism” (Deudney, 2007: 186) not only destroyed both the soft and hard power of the US, but also triggered an age of extreme violence and chaos all over the world.

So, what is to be done then? The US is required to thoroughly rethink the history of its relationship to Others so as not to reiterate the failure of the exceptionalist crusade by the neoconservatives that weakened its global leadership. In principle, America should “learn to step beyond the limits of contemporary forms of self–other relations” (Inayatullah and Blaney, 1997: 78) to realize relatively peaceful inter-civilizational dialogues. Indeed, we need to create an alternative global ethics that recognizes “*equality* without its compelling us to accept identity; but also *difference* without its degenerating into superiority/inferiority” (Todorov, 1984: 249, emphasis in original) in order to construct a worldwide base of “deep pluralism” (Connolly, 1995), or “deep multilateralism.”

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### Notes

1. Publius is a pseudonym used by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in writing *Federalist*.
2. “If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch” (*Federalist*, 258).
3. “The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous.... The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States or Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the *Old World*.... The face of America will be but a *copy of that of the continent Europe*. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes” (*Federalist*, 259, emphasis added).
4. “But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the *continental powers of Europe* — our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other” (*Federalist*, 46, emphasis added).



5. "[W]e are not now in the midst of a revolution but have happily brought it to a successful issue ... that we have taken our station among nations have claimed the benefit of the laws which regulate them, and must in our turn be bound by the same laws" (Hamilton, 1784).
6. His letter to Joseph Priestly (dated 19 June 1802) demonstrated this missionary belief: "[W]e feel that we are acting under obligations not confined to the limits of our own society. It is impossible not to be sensible that we are acting for all mankind; that circumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which a society may venture to leave its individual members" (quoted in Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990: 11).
7. "I look with great anxiety for the firm establishment of the new government in France, being perfectly convinced that if it takes place there, it will spread sooner or later all over Europe. On the contrary a check there would retard the revival of liberty in other countries. I consider the establishment and success of their government as necessary to stay up our own, and to prevent it from falling back to that kind of Half-way house, the English constitution" (Jefferson, 1984: 971–972).
8. African-Americans, who have also been significant Others in the American social imaginary, are set aside in this article. Unlike the European empires that encountered Africans as "external" Others or the object of the civilizing mission, the US treated African-Americans as "internal" Others (i.e. slaves in the sphere of the domestic political economy) from the beginning. While Native Americans were addressed in terms of foreign policy and war, African-American slaves were located in the area of police in early America. In short, black people were not included in the American "security" imaginary I discuss here. Of course, the situation became complicated after the Haitian Revolution. The profound interconnectedness between the problem of slavery in the South and the diplomatic policy toward the first black republic deepened the partisan/sectional divisions within the white US ruling group (Bender, 2006: 108–109).
9. In 1766, British Superintendent of Indian Affairs Sir William Johnson reported to the London government that the white settlers in the frontier area "murder, Robb and otherwise grossly misuse all Indians they could find ... and [are] treating the Indians with contempt, much greater than they had ever before experienced" (cited in Vaughan, 1982: 937).
10. Again, Franklin's critique made in 1764 deplored that the pervasive massacre committed by Euro-Americans was caused by unjustifiable racist discourse: "The only Crime of these poor Wretches seems to have been, that they had a reddish brown Skin, and black Hair; and some People of that Sort, it seems, had murdered some of our Relations. If it be right to kill Men for such a Reason, then, should any Man, with a freckled Face and red Hair, kill a Wife or Child of mine, it would be right for me to revenge it, by killing all the freckled red-haired Men, Women and Children, I could afterwards any where meet with" (cited in Shoemaker, 2004: 126).
11. In a letter to Alexander von Humboldt in 1813, Jefferson (1984: 1312) wrote: "You know ... the benevolent plan we were pursuing here for the happiness of the aboriginal inhabitants in our vicinities.... To teach them agriculture and the rudiments of the most necessary arts, and to encourage industry by establishing among them separate property. In this way they would have been enabled to subsist and multiply on a moderate scale of landed possession. They would have mixed their blood with ours, and been amalgamated and identified with us within no distant period of time."
12. The war speech delivered by Tecumseh to the Creek in 1811 shows the racialized and dichotomized logic of his pan-Indian campaign: "Let *the white race* perish. They seize your land; they corrupt your women; they trample on the ashes of your dead! Back, whence they came, upon a trail of blood, they must be driven. Back! back, ay, into the great water whose accursed

- waves brought them to our shores! Burn their dwellings! Destroy their stock! Slay their wives and children! *The Red Man* owns the country, and *the Pale-faces* must never enjoy it. War now! War forever!” (cited in Bunn and Williams, 2008: 163, emphasis added).
13. On the contrary, the realist tradition exemplified by Hamilton does not share American exceptionalism because it is a continental European import not based on the autogenous identity and experiences of America (Mead, 2001: 34–39).
  14. In this sense, the conventional opposition between isolationism and internationalism represents a Eurocentric reading of American diplomatic policy. From the perspective of Native Americans or Mexicans, the US was never isolationist even during the 19th century. Rather, America’s global intervention after the Second World War can be reread as a continuation of its ever-expanding foreign policy.
  15. As a subset of such a genealogy of a “Western bond,” Srdjan Vucetic (2011: 3–4) demonstrates how “the origins of Anglosphere are racial.” That is, it is shown how “cooperation among select English-speaking states became possible through a variety of racialized processes.”

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