

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

امکان سنجی میزان لغو تحریم‌ها از سوی دولت آمریکا
پس از رسیدن به توافق جامع هسته‌ای

دکتر فؤاد ایزدی
دانشکده مطالعات جهان دانشگاه تهران

همایش دیپلماسی هسته‌ای
۱۱ آذر ۱۳۹۳

• آیا رئیس جمهور آمریکا امکان لغو تحریم‌های اصلی بانکی و نفتی را پس از رسیدن به توافق جامع هسته ای دارد؟

• خیر

*Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution**

The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:

- Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.
- Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.
- Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.
- Involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical-needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.
- Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.
- Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).
- Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

* With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" applies.

2. U.S. Executive Orders

U.S. Executive Orders	Year	Trigger				Targets								Status	Economic Impact	Ease of Repealing	Ease of Suspending
		Nonproliferation	Terrorism	Human Rights	Other	Arms	Nuclear/ Missile	Financial	Energy	Travel bans	Asset Freeze	Trade ban*	Other				
EO 12170	1979				X						X			Modified	L	1	1
EO 12205	1980				X			X				X		Revoked	N/A	N/A	N/A
EO 12211	1980				X			X		X		X		Revoked	N/A	N/A	N/A
EO 12613	1987		X		X				X			X		Revoked	N/A	N/A	N/A
EO 12957	1995				X				X					Codified	H	4	4
EO 12959	1995				X							X		Codified	H	4	4
EO 13059	1997				X							X		Codified	H	4	4
EO 13224	2001		X					X				X			L	1	1
EO 13382	2005	X						X	X			X			L	1	1
EO 13553	2010			X						X		X			L	1	1
EO 13572	2011			X								X			L	1	1
EO 13574	2011				X			X				X			H	4	4
EO 13590	2011	X						X	X			X		Codified	H	4	4
EO13599	2012				X			X				X			H	1	1
EO 13606	2012			X						X		X		Codified	L	4	4
EO 13608	2012				X			X		X		X			L	1	1
EO 13622	2012				X			X	X			X			H	1	1
EO 13628	2012	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			H	4	4

* Trade ban applies to both partial and total bans.

3. U.S. Acts of Congress

U.S. Congressional Legislation	Year	Trigger				Targets								Status	Economic Impact	Ease of Repealing	Ease of Suspending	
		Nonproliferation	Terrorism	Human Rights	Other	Arms	Nuclear/ Missile	Financial	Energy	Travel bans	Asset Freeze	Trade ban*	Other					
National Defense Authorization Act of 1993	1992	X				X	X									L	4	2
Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)	1996	X	X						X					Amended	H	4	2	
Iran Nonproliferation Act	2000	X				X	X					X		Renamed INKSNA	L	4	4	
Iran Freedom Support Act (IFSA)	2006	X	X	X		X	X	X	X					Replaced	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)	2010	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		Amended	H	4	2	
Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA)	2011	X				X	X					X			L	4	4	
Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act	2011	X	X		X			X							H	4	1	
National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, Sec 1245	2011	X	X		X			X	X			X		Amended	H	4	2	
Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA OT TRA)	2012	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X		H	4	2		
National Defense Authorization Act of 2013, Subtitle D	2012	X	X	X				X	X			X	X	H	4	2		

* Trade ban applies to both partial and total bans.

2 of 2 DOCUMENTS

Federal News Service

October 3, 2013 Thursday

Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subject: "Reversing Iran's Nuclear Program" Chaired by: Senator Robert Menendez (R-NJ) Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; James Jeffrey, Visiting Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security; Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Location: 419 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:03 a.m. EDT Date: Thursday, October 3, 2013

SECTION: PRESS CONFERENCE OR SPEECH

LENGTH: 26004 words

Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subject: "Reversing Iran's Nuclear Program" Chaired by: Senator Robert Menendez (R-NJ) Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; James Jeffrey, Visiting Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security; Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Location: 419 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:03 a.m. EDT Date: Thursday, October 3, 2013

SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ (D-NJ): (Sounds gavel.) Good morning. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

We're here today under unusual circumstances but nevertheless ready to fulfill our constitutional duty to oversee national security policy, foreign policy, international economic policy as it relates to safeguarding America's interests abroad. That is our fundamental duty. And we have convened today to ensure that the world understands that a shutdown of government in the United States is not a shutdown of American interests and obligations abroad.

Having said that, we're pleased to have with us a familiar face to the committee, undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman. She is here to help shed light on U.S. policy towards Iran given the change in leadership and recent statements of President Rouhani and to provide her perspective in behalf of the department on the way ahead on the nuclear issue.

On our second panel today we have three distinguished experts from the private sector: Dr. David Albright, a physicist who is the founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security and who has written extensively on secret nuclear weapons programs around the world; Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, distinguished visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, where he is focused on Iran's efforts to expand its influence in the region; and Dr. Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former senior adviser on Iran at the State Department. We look forward to all of your testimony and thoughts on the status and the future of U.S.-Iran policy.

Before we hear our panelists, let me restate concerns that I have expressed publicly and will express again for the record.

In my view, the sanctions have worked to bring us to this pivotal point, and the fundamental question is now whether the Iranians are ready to actually conclude an agreement with the international community, whether they are prepared to turn rhetoric into action.

Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subject: "Reversing Iran's Nuclear Program" Chaired by: Senator Robert Menendez (R-NJ) Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; James Jeffrey, Visiting Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security; Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Location: 419 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:03 a.m. EDT Date: Thursday, October 3, 2013 Federal News Service October 3, 2013 Thursday

MS. SHERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of points, if I may. On Pakistan, we have had those discussions and will continue with the Pakistani government. My own assessment is it's not going anywhere anytime soon.

But they certainly understand what -- where we are and what our sanctions require should it proceed. So we will keep vigilant about not only what Pakistan may do, but any country that is going to have to confront the sanctions that the United States and the international community has at its disposal.

If I may, Senator, I'd also like to take the opportunity to comment on what you said about Iraq. And we quite agree -- and what Senator McCain said -- we quite agree that we need to do everything we can to resettle people, to get them out of harm's way, to make good on the word that we gave to the MEK.

I know that there are strong feelings up here, and I understand why, about arm sales to Iraq, but I do want to put on the record that U.S. security assistance and foreign military sales in particular are tools that we use for building and shaping Iraq's defense capabilities and integrating Iraqi security forces with our security forces and regional partners.

And I just want to caution that withholding security assistance may well serve to decrease our influence in Baghdad, seed relationships and leverage to strategic competitors who will fill the vacuum and could conceivably damage our long-term interests. So I just ask that we talk very carefully as we go forward.

SEN. MENENDEZ: Well, let me -- let me -- let me caution -- let me caution you about the overflights that Iraq has permitted from Iran into Syria with -- largely with impunity. And let me also caution that the seven hostages, which we believe the Iraqi government knows where they are, should they die would be complicating matters for all of that.

MS. SHERMAN: Quite agree. Quite agree.

SEN. MENENDEZ: So I hope that we've both cautioned each other.

MS. SHERMAN: I quite agree with you on both issues.

SEN. MENENDEZ: Let me close by asking you one final question. What is it that we will accept less than what the world has said is necessary through the Security Council resolutions?

MS. SHERMAN: I'm sorry, say --

SEN. MENENDEZ: What is it that we would accept in these negotiations with Iran less than what has been established under the Security Council resolutions?

MS. SHERMAN: We have continued to say to Iran that we expect them to fulfill all their obligations under the NPT and the Security Council resolutions.

SEN. MENENDEZ: All right. Well, thank you for your testimony. I look forward to what the department and the State Department's going to be able to do with Iran as you test their intentions. I intend to keep the department's feet to the fire on our issue of sanctions as we move forward.

And Senator Corker.

SEN. CORKER: Mr. Chairman, I'll be very brief. I know we have another panel coming. But I would like to ask the secretary, you know, we've talked a lot today about the nuclear issue and other important issues here today. But if we negotiate and end to their nuclear program or a significant rollback, we still have a country that is hostile. They are a state-sponsor of terror. They have a terrible human rights record.

So you know, I know that you all are looking at trying to negotiate some relief, if you will, relative to the sanctions. But the fact is that the way the sanctions law reads, they've got to not only dismantle their nuclear program, but they also have to renounce terrorism. And I just wonder how those negotiations are going simultaneously to these others and what you're doing to ensure -- because, again, the way the law reads, these sanctions cannot be undone unless all of that occurs. And it seems to me we're only moving on one track, a very good one track, but I'm just wondering how you might be addressing the other.

MS. SHERMAN: We have been clear with the Iranians that we are talking here about their nuclear program and the sanctions that relate to their nuclear program, and that the sanctions that exist are regarding human rights actions -- their terrorist actions are still on the table because of exactly what you say, which is that they need to make progress, consid-

Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subject: "Reversing Iran's Nuclear Program" Chaired by: Senator Robert Menendez (R-NJ) Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; James Jeffrey, Visiting Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security; Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Location: 419 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:03 a.m. EDT Date: Thursday, October 3, 2013 Federal News Service October 3, 2013 Thursday

erable progress, around human rights; they have to stop their sponsorship of terrorism; they have to stop regionally destabilizing that part of the world and many other parts of the world, quite frankly.

So those are other discussions that we have with Iran, as is the subject of this today and as the subject of the 15th and 16th will be on their nuclear program.

SEN. CORKER: Thank you.

SEN. MENENDEZ: Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your testimony. We always appreciate your service.

MS. SHERMAN: Thank you for the opportunity.

SEN. MENENDEZ: Let me call up our next panel. I've introduced them already, but David Albright, found and president of Institute for Science and International Security; the Honorable James F. Jeffrey, distinguished visiting fellow of Washington Institute for Near East Peace (sic; Policy); and Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for the Middle East studies on the Council on Foreign Relations. (Pause for seating the second panel.)

(Sounds gavel.) And let me apologize to Mr. Takeyh for my mispronunciation of his name.

We welcome you. We'll -- your full testimony will be included in the record, without objection. We ask you to summarize it in about five minutes or so.

And we'll start with Mr. Albright.

DAVID ALBRIGHT: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and ranking member Senator Corker and other members of the committee for the opportunity to testify today.

I think it's been made clear that there is certainly hope that an agreement with Iran can be achieved over its nuclear program, and I think I certainly share many of the views here that it -- one should be skeptical and move very quickly to test whether the Iranians have really changed.

And I think we also have to keep in mind that the goal isn't necessarily specific limitations on their nuclear program but it's to provide an agreement that ensures that they will not seek nuclear weapons. And I think that is a very difficult thing to do, and what I'd like to do is talk through some of the issues on the nuclear program and then some of the implications of that kind of objective on what you'd like to see in agreement.

And I think it's clear to everybody -- and some have made this point today -- that Iran's nuclear program is large and growing. And it's also true that there's been no signs of the reduction in that program since President Rouhani took office. In fact, some of his comments in New York clearly implied that he envisions a growing nuclear program.

And as you know, there's two main gas centrifuge sites at Natanz and Fordo. There's also growing suspicion that they may be building a new one, and President Rouhani has not provided answers to that question.

It's -- also Iran has produced very large stock of enriched uranium, significant stock that's near 20 percent enriched and then a very large stock of 3 1/2 percent enriched uranium. And then during the last two years Iran has essentially doubled the number of its centrifuges at Natanz and Fordo, and it now has over 19,000 centrifuges installed at these facilities, and 1,000 of them are these advanced centrifuges that we've worried about for years. And so Iran is putting together a considerable nuclear weapons production capability, if it chose to go that route.

And I think in -- as I mentioned, in developing a negotiating position, we have to look at how to constrain that program and provide the kind of assurance we need that it wouldn't build nuclear weapons.

And in that, we have to consider how long it would take Iran to make weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon. And I think the chairman has mentioned some of the estimates, and we have done some looking at today and how much they could do.

And essentially, if Iran made a decision today to produce weapon-grade uranium, which is to us the long pole in the tent for making a nuclear weapon, it could make enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb in about one to one-and-a-half months. Now, there's many things that could happen that would lengthen that time, but that to us is a -- is a credible minimal time for Iran to break out.



17:14 - 92/09/03

شماره: 13920903001384



وزارت خارجه ایران منتشر کرد

ترجمه رسمی متن کامل توافقنامه هسته‌ای ایران و ۱+۵

وزارت امور خارجه جمهوری اسلامی ایران متن کامل توافقنامه هسته‌ای ایران و ۱+۵ که در پایان مذاکرات ژنو محقق شد، منتشر کرد.



به گزارش **خبرگزاری فارس**، وزارت خارجه جمهوری اسلامی ایران متن توافقنامه ایران و 5+1 را منتشر کرد که به این شرح می‌باشد. همچنین متن این توافقنامه به زبان انگلیسی منتشر شده است که می‌توانید در **اینجا** ملاحظه فرمایید.

برنامه اقدام مشترک

مقدمه:

- بیانگر حقوق و تعهدات اعضا معاهده عدم گسترش سلاح‌های هسته‌ای و موافقتنامه‌های پادمان آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی باشد.

- بطور همه جانبه تحریم‌های هسته‌ای شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد و تحریم‌های چندجانبه و تحریم‌های ملی را برداشته و از جمله گام‌هایی برای دسترسی به حوزه‌های تجاری، فن‌آوری، مالی و انرژی را بر مبنای یک برنامه تنظیمی که در خصوص آن توافق به عمل خواهد آمد را اتخاذ نماید.

- متضمن یک برنامه غنی سازی باشد که توسط طرفین تعریف می‌گردد، برنامه‌ای که شاخصه‌های آن با موافقت طرفین و منطبق با نیازهای عملی، با محدودیت‌های مورد توافق در خصوص دامنه و سطح فعالیت‌های غنی سازی، ظرفیت غنی سازی، محل‌هایی که در آن غنی سازی انجام می‌شود و ذخایر اورانیوم غنی شده برای دوره زمانی که مورد توافق قرار می‌گیرد، تعیین می‌گردد.

- نگرانی‌های مرتبط با رآکتور اراک که توسط آژانس با نام IR-40 شناخته می‌شود، را کاملاً برطرف نماید. بازفرآوری و یا احداث تاسیساتی که قادر به بازفرآوری باشد، ایجاد نخواهد شد.

- اقدامات شفاف ساز و با نظارت بیشترمورد توافق را به طور کامل به اجراء درآورد. پروتکل الحاقی در چارچوب اختیارات رئیس جمهور و مجلس شورای اسلامی تصویب و به اجراء درآید.

- شامل همکاری بین‌المللی هسته‌ای غیر نظامی باشد، که این همکاری‌ها از جمله در خصوص دستیابی به راکتورهای مدرن آب سبک قدرت و تحقیقاتی و تجهیزات مرتبط و نیز عرضه سوخت هسته‌ای مدرن و برنامه های تحقیق و توسعه (D&R) مورد توافق می‌باشد.

به دنبال اجرای موفق گام نهایی راه حل جامع و با سپری شدن کامل دوره زمانی گام نهایی، با برنامه هسته‌ای ایران مانند برنامه هر کشور غیرهسته‌ای دیگر عضو NPT رفتار خواهد شد.

* در خصوص گام نهایی و هر یک از گام‌های میانی، این اصل اساسی که «تا در مورد همه چیز توافق نشود، در خصوص هیچ چیزی توافق حاصل نشده است» اعمال می‌شود.

113TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 2650

To provide for congressional review of agreements relating to Iran’s nuclear program, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 23, 2014

Mr. CORKER (for himself, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. RISCH, and Mr. JOHNSON of Wisconsin) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To provide for congressional review of agreements relating to Iran’s nuclear program, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Iran Nuclear Negotia-
5 tions Act of 2014”.

6 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

7 In this Act:

8 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**
9 **TEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional com-
10 mittees” has the meaning given that term in section

1 tives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part
 2 of the rules of each House, respectively, but ap-
 3 plicable only with respect to the procedure to be
 4 followed in that House in the case of a joint
 5 resolution, and it supersedes other rules only to
 6 the extent that it is inconsistent with such
 7 rules; and

8 (B) with full recognition of the constitu-
 9 tional right of either House to change the rules
 10 (so far as relating to the procedure of that
 11 House) at any time, in the same manner, and
 12 to the same extent as in the case of any other
 13 rule of that House.

14 (d) **LIMITATION ON FUNDING FOR IMPLEMENTATION**
 15 **OF AGREEMENT.**—No funds authorized to be appropriated
 16 for the Department of State that remain available for obli-
 17 gation as of the date of the enactment of this Act may
 18 be obligated or expended to implement an agreement de-
 19 scribed in subsection (a)(2), including for the waiver, sus-
 20 pension, or other reduction of any sanctions with respect
 21 to Iran pursuant to such an agreement, if—

22 (1) the President fails to submit the agreement
 23 to Congress as required by subsection (a); or

24 (2) a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted
 25 into law pursuant to subsection (b).

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 18, 2014

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We all hope that nuclear negotiations succeed in preventing Iran from ever developing a nuclear weapons capability. For diplomacy to succeed, however, we must couple our willingness to negotiate with a united and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime.

We believe, as you do, that the pressure from economic sanctions brought Iran to the table, and that it must continue until Iran abandons its efforts to build a nuclear weapon. We also agree pressure will intensify if Iran violates the interim agreement, uses the talks simply as a delaying tactic, or walks away from the table.

For twenty years, Congress has consistently focused attention on the threat of the Iranian program and taken the lead in initiating sanctions. Congress has repeatedly stated that preventing an Iranian nuclear capability is a key goal of U.S. foreign policy. Nine separate pieces of sanctions legislation have passed Congress since 1996. We appreciate your continued commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and your efforts to implement the sanctions, which isolated and pressured the regime into negotiations.

We believe that Congress has a continuing role to play to improve the prospects for success in the talks with Iran. As these negotiations proceed, we will outline our views about the essential goals of a final agreement with Iran, continue oversight of the interim agreement and the existing sanctions regime, and signal the consequences that will follow if Iran rejects an agreement that brings to an end its nuclear weapons ambitions.

We write now to express our support for the following core principles we believe are consistent with your administration's positions, and urge you to insist on their realization in a final agreement with Iran:

- We believe that Iran has no inherent right to enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- We believe any agreement must dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons program and prevent it from ever having a uranium or plutonium path to a nuclear bomb.
- We believe Iran has no reason to have an enrichment facility like Fordow, that the regime must give up its heavy water reactor at Arak, and that it must fully explain the questionable activities in which it engaged at Parchin and other facilities.

• چرا آمریکا پای میز مذاکرت هسته ای آمد؟

۱- تحریم‌ها علیه ایران در حال سست شدن بود.

[Home](#) • [Briefing Room](#) • [Statements & Releases](#)

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary



For Immediate Release

November 23, 2013

Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

The P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, facilitated by the European Union) has been engaged in serious and substantive negotiations with Iran with the goal of reaching a verifiable diplomatic resolution that would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

President Obama has been clear that achieving a peaceful resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is in America's national security interest. Today, the P5+1 and Iran reached a set of initial understandings that halts the progress of Iran's nuclear program and rolls it back in key respects. These are the first meaningful limits that Iran has accepted on its nuclear program in close to a decade. The initial, six month step includes significant limits on Iran's nuclear program and begins to address our most urgent concerns including Iran's enrichment capabilities; its existing stockpiles of enriched uranium; the number and capabilities of its centrifuges; and its ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium using the Arak reactor. The concessions Iran has committed to make as part of this first step will also provide us with increased transparency and intrusive monitoring of its nuclear program. In the past, the concern has been expressed that Iran will use negotiations to buy time to advance their program. Taken together, these first step measures will help prevent Iran from using the cover of negotiations to continue advancing its nuclear program as we seek to negotiate a long-term, comprehensive solution that addresses all of the international community's concerns.

In return, as part of this initial step, the P5+1 will provide limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief to Iran. This relief is structured so that the overwhelming majority of the sanctions regime, including the key oil, banking, and financial sanctions architecture, remains in place. The P5+1 will continue to enforce these sanctions vigorously. If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the limited relief and impose additional sanctions on Iran.

The P5+1 and Iran also discussed the general parameters of a comprehensive solution that would constrain Iran's nuclear program over the long term, provide verifiable assurances to the international community that Iran's nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful, and ensure that any attempt by Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon would be promptly detected. The set of understandings also includes an acknowledgment by Iran that it must address all United Nations Security Council resolutions – which Iran has long claimed are illegal – as well as past and present issues with Iran's nuclear program that have been identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would include resolution of questions concerning the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program, including Iran's activities at Parchin. As part of a comprehensive solution, Iran must also come into full compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its obligations to the IAEA. With respect to the comprehensive solution, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Put simply, this first step expires in six months, and does not represent an acceptable end state to the United States or our P5+1 partners.

Halting the Progress of Iran's Program and Rolling Back Key Elements

Iran has committed to halt enrichment above 5%:

- Halt all enrichment above 5% and dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5%.

Iran has committed to neutralize its stockpile of near-20% uranium:

- Dilute below 5% or convert to a form not suitable for further enrichment its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium before the end of the initial phase.

Iran has committed to halt progress on its enrichment capacity:

LATEST BLOG POSTS

December 01, 2014 6:00 AM EST

[Three Steps to Help Protect Your Personal Information on Cyber Monday](#)

Cyber Monday is far and away the busiest online shopping day of the year -- here's what you need to know about shopping securely today.

November 28, 2014 3:00 PM EST

[More than 4.12 Million Records Released](#)

Today's record release brings the total number of records made public by this White House to more than 3.96 million.


November 28, 2014 11:47 AM EST

[The 2014 Christmas Tree Arrives at the White House](#)

First Lady Michelle Obama, Sasha, and Malia greeted this year's official Christmas tree and the Botek family who grew the tree on the Crystal Spring Tree Farm in Leighton, PA.

[VIEW ALL RELATED BLOG POSTS](#) ▸

STAY CONNECTED



- o Sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran and approximately two dozen other major Iranian banks and financial actors;
 - o Secondary sanctions, pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) as amended and other laws, on banks that do business with U.S.-designated individuals and entities;
 - o Sanctions on those who provide a broad range of other financial services to Iran, such as many types of insurance; and,
 - o Restricted access to the U.S. financial system.
- All sanctions on over 600 individuals and entities targeted for supporting Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile program remain in effect.
 - Sanctions on several sectors of Iran's economy, including shipping and shipbuilding, remain in effect.
 - Sanctions on long-term investment in and provision of technical services to Iran's energy sector remain in effect.
 - Sanctions on Iran's military program remain in effect.
 - Broad U.S. restrictions on trade with Iran remain in effect, depriving Iran of access to virtually all dealings with the world's biggest economy
 - All UN Security Council sanctions remain in effect.
 - All of our targeted sanctions related to Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism, its destabilizing role in the Syrian conflict, and its abysmal human rights record, among other concerns, remain in effect.

A Comprehensive Solution

During the six-month initial phase, the P5+1 will negotiate the contours of a comprehensive solution. Thus far, the outline of the general parameters of the comprehensive solution envisions concrete steps to give the international community confidence that Iran's nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful. With respect to this comprehensive resolution: nothing is agreed to with respect to a comprehensive solution until everything is agreed to. Over the next six months, we will determine whether there is a solution that gives us sufficient confidence that the Iranian program is peaceful. If Iran cannot address our concerns, we are prepared to increase sanctions and pressure.

Conclusion

In sum, this first step achieves a great deal in its own right. Without this phased agreement, Iran could start spinning thousands of additional centrifuges. It could install and spin next-generation centrifuges that will reduce its breakout times. It could fuel and commission the Arak heavy water reactor. It could grow its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to beyond the threshold for a bomb's worth of uranium. Iran can do none of these things under the conditions of the first step understanding.

Furthermore, without this phased approach, the international sanctions coalition would begin to **fray** because Iran would make the case to the world that it was serious about a diplomatic solution and we were not. We would be unable to bring partners along to do the crucial work of enforcing our sanctions. With this first step, we stop and begin to roll back Iran's program and give Iran a sharp choice: fulfill its commitments and negotiate in good faith to a final deal, or the entire international community will respond with even more isolation and pressure.

The American people prefer a peaceful and enduring resolution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and strengthens the global non-proliferation regime. This solution has the potential to achieve that. Through strong and principled diplomacy, the United States of America will do its part for greater peace, security, and cooperation among nations.



BRIEFING ROOM

ISSUES

THE ADMINISTRATION

PARTICIPATE

1600 PENN

[Home](#) • [Briefing Room](#) • [Speeches & Remarks](#)

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary



For Immediate Release

December 07, 2013

Remarks by the President in a Conversation with the Saban Forum

Willard Hotel
Washington, D.C.

1:13 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Hello! (Applause.)

MR. SABAN: How are you doing?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm good. Hello, everybody.

MR. SABAN: One of your staffers said you are in a great mood this afternoon, so --

THE PRESIDENT: I am.

MR. SABAN: -- we're doubly blessed here. So that's terrific.

I'd like to thank you very much for being here today, Mr. President. The Forum, and I personally, are honored to have you join us in this conversation. And I am personally honored that you insisted that I have this conversation with you, even though I never set foot for any conversation for 10 years. (Laughter.) So thank you. I'm very honored.

Shall we start with Iran?

THE PRESIDENT: We should.

MR. SABAN: Okay, good. (Laughter.) Mr. President, polls indicate that 77 percent of Israelis don't believe this first nuclear deal will preclude Iran from having nuclear weapons, and they perceive this fact as an existential matter for them. What can you say to the Israeli people to address their concern?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first, before I answer the question, let me say to you, Haim, thank you so much for the great work that you've done. I think the Saban Forum and the Saban Center has done outstanding work, and it provides us a mechanism where we don't just scratch the surface of these issues. Obviously the challenges in the Middle East are enormous, and the work that's being done here is terrific.

So I want to also thank Strobe for hosting us here today, and all of you who are here, including some outstanding members of the Israeli government and some friends that I haven't seen in a while. So thanks for having me.

Let me start with the basic premise that I've said repeatedly. It is in America's national security interests, not just Israel's national interests or the region's national security interests, to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.

And let's remember where we were when I first came into office. Iran had gone from having less than 200 centrifuges to having thousands of centrifuges, in some cases more advanced centrifuges. There was a program that had advanced to the point where their breakout capacity had accelerated in ways that we had been concerned about for quite some time and, as a consequence, what I said to my team and what I said to our international partners was that we are going to have to be much more serious about how we change the cost-benefit analysis for Iran.



LATEST BLOG POSTS

December 01, 2014 6:00 AM EST

[Three Steps to Help Protect Your Personal Information on Cyber Monday](#)

Cyber Monday is far and away the busiest online shopping day of the year -- here's what you need to know about shopping securely today.

November 28, 2014 3:00 PM EST

[More than 4.12 Million Records Released](#)

Today's record release brings the total number of records made public by this White House to more than 3.96 million.


November 28, 2014 11:47 AM EST

[The 2014 Christmas Tree Arrives at the White House](#)

First Lady Michelle Obama, Sasha, and Malia greeted this year's official Christmas tree and the Botek family who grew the tree on the Crystal Spring Tree Farm in Leighton, PA.

[VIEW ALL RELATED BLOG POSTS](#) ▶

STAY CONNECTED



We put in place an unprecedented regime of sanctions that has crippled Iran's economy, cut their oil revenues by more than half, have put enormous pressure on their currency -- their economy contracted by more than 5 percent last year. And it is precisely because of the international sanctions and the coalition that we were able to build internationally that the Iranian people responded by saying, we need a new direction in how we interact with the international community and how we deal with this sanctions regime. And that's what brought President Rouhani to power. He was not necessarily the first choice of the hardliners inside of Iran.

Now, that doesn't mean that we should trust him or anybody else inside of Iran. This is a regime that came to power swearing opposition to the United States, to Israel, and to many of the values that we hold dear. But what I've consistently said is even as I don't take any options off the table, what we do have to test is the possibility that we can resolve this issue diplomatically. And that is the deal that, at the first stages, we have been able to get done in Geneva, thanks to some extraordinary work by John Kerry and his counterparts in the P5-plus-1.

So let's look at exactly what we've done. For the first time in over a decade, we have halted advances in the Iranian nuclear program. We have not only made sure that in Fordor and Natanz that they have to stop adding additional centrifuges, we've also said that they've got to roll back their 20 percent advanced enrichment. So we're --

MR. SABAN: To how much?

THE PRESIDENT: Down to zero. So you remember when Prime Minister Netanyahu made his presentation before the United Nations last year --

MR. SABAN: The cartoon with the red line?

THE PRESIDENT: The picture of a bomb -- he was referring to 20 percent enrichment, which the concern was if you get too much of that, you now have sufficient capacity to go ahead and create a nuclear weapon. We're taking that down to zero. We are stopping the advancement of the Arak facility, which would provide an additional pathway, a plutonium pathway for the development of nuclear weapons.

We are going to have daily inspectors in Fordor and Natanz. We're going to have additional inspections in Arak. And as a consequence, during this six-month period, Iran cannot and will not advance its program or add additional stockpiles of advanced uranium -- enriched uranium.

Now, what we've done in exchange is kept all these sanctions in place -- the architecture remains with respect to oil, with respect to finance, with respect to banking. What we've done is we've turned the spigot slightly and we've said, here's maximum \$7 billion out of the over \$100 billion of revenue of theirs that is frozen as a consequence of our sanctions, to give us the time and the space to test whether they can move in a direction, a comprehensive, permanent agreement that would give us all assurances that they're not producing nuclear weapons.

MR. SABAN: I understand. A quick question as it relates to the \$7 billion, if I may.

THE PRESIDENT: Please.

MR. SABAN: How do we prevent those who work with us in Geneva, who have already descended on Tehran looking for deals, to cause the seven to become 70? Because we can control what we do, but what is the extent that we can control the others?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Haim, this is precisely why the timing of this was right. One of the things we were always concerned about was that if we did not show good faith in trying to resolve this issue diplomatically, then the sanctions regime would begin to **fray**.

Keep in mind that this was two years of extraordinary diplomatic work on behalf of our team to actually get the sanctions in place. They're not just the unilateral sanctions that are created by the United States. These are sanctions that are also participated in by Russia, by China, and some allies of ours like South Korea and Japan that find these sanctions very costly. But that's precisely why they've become so effective.

And so what we've said is that we do not loosen any of the core sanctions; we provide a small window through which they can access some revenue, but we can control it and it is reversible. And during the course of these six months, if and when Iran shows itself not to be abiding by this agreement, not to be negotiating in good faith, we can reverse them and tighten them even further.

But here is the bottom line. Ultimately, my goal as President of the United States -- something that I've said publicly and privately and shared everywhere I've gone -- is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. But what I've also said is the best way for us to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapons is for a comprehensive, verifiable, diplomatic resolution, without taking any other options off the table if we fail to achieve that.

• چرا آمریکا پای میز مذاکرت هسته‌ای آمد؟

۲- مذاکرات باعث کاهش سرعت برنامه هسته‌ای ایران می شد.

۳- مذاکرات باعث به عقب برگرداندن برنامه هسته‌ای ایران می شد.



Home » Secretary of State John Kerry » Secretary Kerry's Remarks » 2014 Secretary Kerry's Remarks » Remarks by Secretary Kerry: November 2014 » Solo Press Availability in Vienna, Austria

Solo Press Availability in Vienna, Austria

[Press Availability](#)

[John Kerry](#)

[Secretary of State](#)

[Vienna, Austria](#)

[November 24, 2014](#)



Share

SECRETARY KERRY: Good afternoon, everybody, and thank you so much for your patience. We appreciate it very much. We know that this is a long process and there's a great deal of waiting, and you have waited with great patience.

I want to begin by thanking the Austrian Government, particularly, who have hosted us here in Vienna for these negotiations. We've had many visits now and they have been equally gracious in every single one of them and enormously helpful. And we thank all the people of Austria for their very generous embrace and welcome.

I want to thank the United Nations and my colleagues from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, China, and the EU, and especially my good friend Baroness Cathy Ashton, whose partnership has been absolutely invaluable throughout this process and who has done a terrific job of helping to bring people together and define the process.

Let me also take a moment to thank the team of people that you don't see right now, but they're closeted up in a suite in the hotel – a strong, large group of people who spend unbelievable amounts of hours working hard. And if Foreign Minister Zarif and I and Baroness Ashton or some combination of foreign ministers come up with an idea, we take the idea to them and then they work literally through the night into the morning to put it to the test and see if it can be viable. And I want to thank them for their incredible amount of hard work and their commitment; the expertise, the diligence, the hard work they've put in to try to make sure we get this right.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. The Iranian foreign minister has worked hard and he has worked diligently. He has approached to these negotiations in good faith and with seriousness of purpose, and that's what it takes to try to resolve the kind of difficult issues here.

And finally, I want to thank all of you for being patient throughout the process and bearing with our need, the imperative, to keep what is discussed in these negotiations exclusively among the negotiators to the greatest degree that we can. I know you understand and I can tell you through my years in public life of negotiating, that if facts are out there being bandied back and forth in the public domain with specificity, they often can wind up defeating good ideas before they get off the ground. So we need to continue to work the way we have been exclusively among the negotiators with respect to the details.

Now we have worked long and hard not just over these past days but for months in order to achieve a comprehensive agreement that addresses international concerns about Iran's nuclear program. This takes time. The stakes are high and the issues are complicated and technical, and each decision affects other decisions. There's always an interrelationship,

Your System Status

WE'RE SORRY!

You need to update your Flash Player.



IMPORTANT: After installing the required upgrade please reload this browser window to view the video player.

Stay Connected with State.gov



Short URL:
<http://go.usa.gov/HDCy>

Learn More

[Secretary's Travel](#)



Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to London, Paris and Vienna, November 17-24.

[Trip Page»](#)

Country Profiles

Select a Country or Other Area



and each decision also deeply affects international security and national interests.

It also takes time to do this because we don't want just any agreement. We want the right agreement. Time and again, from the day that he took office, President Obama has been crystal clear that we must ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon, period. And this is not specific to one country; it's the policy of many countries in the world to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons that exist today and not to allow new ones. And we are engaged in that struggle in many places. And the fact is that even Russia and the United States, who have the largest number, are working hard to reduce that number and to reduce the potential of fissionable nuclear material being available to any additional entity in the world.

President Obama has been just as clear that the best way to do this is through diplomacy, through a comprehensive and durable agreement that all parties can agree to, that all parties are committed to upholding, and whose implementation is not based on trust but on intensive verification. And that is not just because diplomacy is the preferred course; it is also the most effective course.

Diplomacy is also difficult. These talks aren't going to suddenly get easier just because we extend them. They're tough and they've been tough and they're going to stay tough. If it were easier, if views on both sides weren't as deeply held as they are, then we'd have reached a final agreement months or even years ago. But in these last days in Vienna, we have made real and substantial progress, and we have seen new ideas surface. And that is why we are jointly – the P5+1, six nations and Iran – extending these talks for seven months with the very specific goal of finishing the political agreement within four months and with the understanding that we will go to work immediately, meet again very shortly. And if we can do it sooner, we want to do it sooner.

At the end of four months, we have not agreed on the major – if we have not agreed on the major elements by that point in time and there is no clear path, we can revisit how we then want to choose to proceed.

Now we believe a comprehensive deal that addresses the world's concerns is possible. It is desirable. And at this point, we have developed a clearer understanding of what that kind of deal could look like, but there are still some significant points of disagreement, and they have to be worked through.

Now I want to underscore that even as the negotiations continue towards a comprehensive deal, the world is safer than it was just one year ago. It is safer than we were before we agreed on the Joint Plan of Action, which was the interim agreement.

One year ago, Iran's nuclear program was rushing full speed toward larger stockpiles, greater uranium enrichment capacity, the production of weapons-grade plutonium, and ever shorter breakout time. Today, Iran has halted progress on its nuclear program and it has rolled it back for the first time in a decade.

A year ago, Iran had about 200 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium in a form that could be quickly enriched into a weapons-grade level. Today, Iran has no such 20 percent enriched uranium – zero, none – and they have diluted or converted every ounce that they had and suspended all uranium enrichment above 5 percent.

A year ago, Iran was making steady progress on the Arak reactor, which, if it had become operational, would have provided Iran with a plutonium path to a nuclear weapon. Today, progress on Arak, as it is known, is frozen in place.

A year ago, inspectors had limited access to Iran's nuclear program. Today, IAEA inspectors have daily access to Iran's enrichment facilities and a far deeper understanding of Iran's program. They have been able to learn things about Iran's centrifuge production, uranium mines, and other facilities that are important to building trust. That's how you build trust, and that's why Iran made the decision to do it. And they've been able to verify that Iran is indeed living up to its JPOA commitments.

All of these steps by Iran and the limited sanctions relief that the international community provided in return are important building blocks to lay the foundation for a comprehensive agreement and they begin to build confidence among nations.

A year ago, we had no idea whether or not real progress could be made through these talks. We only knew that we had a responsibility to try. Today, we are closer to a deal that would make the entire world, especially our allies and partners in Israel and in the Gulf, safer and more secure.

Is it possible that in the end we just won't arrive at a workable agreement? Absolutely. We are certainly not going to sit at the negotiating table forever, absent measurable progress. But given how far we have come over the past year and particularly in the last few days, this is not certainly the time to get up and walk away. These issues are enormously complex. They require a lot of tough political decisions and they require very rigorous technical analysis of concepts. It takes time to work through the possible solutions that can effectively accomplish our goals and that give the leaders of all countries confidence in the decisions that they are being asked to make.

• چرا آمریکا پای میز مذاکرت هسته‌ای آمد؟

۴- مذاکرات "فشار داخلی" بر دولت ایران را افزایش خواهد داد.

1 of 3 DOCUMENTS

Federal News Service

December 12, 2013 Thursday

Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Subject: "Assessing the P-5 Plus One Interim Nuclear Agreement with Iran: Administration Perspectives" Chaired by: Senator Timothy Johnson (D-SD) Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; David Cohen, Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Location: 538 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:00 a.m. EST Date: Thursday, December 12, 2013

LENGTH: 13639 words

Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Subject: "Assessing the P-5 Plus One Interim Nuclear Agreement with Iran: Administration Perspectives" Chaired by: Senator Timothy Johnson (D-SD) Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; David Cohen, Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Location: 538 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:00 a.m. EST Date: Thursday, December 12, 2013

SENATOR TIMOTHY JOHNSON (D-SD): I call this hearing to order. Yesterday all senators had a chance to hear directly from Secretaries Lew and Kerry and senior intelligence officials on the **first-step** nuclear agreement reached in Geneva between the P-5 plus one and **Iran**.

Today we **will** delve into the agreement in gritty detail, assess prospects for a final agreement and explore the likely effects of congressional action on new sanctions legislation at this time to which the president and his secretary of state strongly object.

I've talked with various members of the committee about (those ?) issues and ensured that all members have had the opportunities to be briefed repeatedly by Secretaries Kerry and Lew and the intelligence committee -- community on the ongoing Geneva negotiations.

Let me be clear. I support strong sanctions and authored many of the U.S. sanctions currently in place. I've negotiated a new bipartisan sanctions bill with my ranking member that could be finalized and move quickly if **Iran** fails to comply with the terms of the **first-step** agreement in Geneva or if negotiations collapse.

Sanctions have been an effective tool of coercive diplomacy, crippling **Iran's** economy, sharply curtailing its oil revenues and helping to persuade the Iranian people to vote for new leadership. It now appears that some of **Iran's** leaders have recognized that the only way to relieve the economic pressure and lesson **Iran's** international isolation is to reach agreement with the West to halt its illicit nuclear activities. Time **will** tell if that's true but only if Congress is willing to provide some time.

Some have argued that acting on a bill now, as long as it does not become effective in six months, gives the administration additional leverage in negotiations. The president disagrees, arguing that congressional action on new sanctions would be taken as a sign of bad faith by our P-5 plus one partners and by -- and by **Iran** and could erode or even unravel the sanctions regime.

The history of our of relationship with **Iran** is littered with missed opportunities on both sides.

I want to assess the formal analysis the committee is to receive today from the director of National Intelligence, and the effects of negotiations on our P-5 plus one partners of congressional action on new sanctions.

Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee Subject: "Assessing the P-5 Plus One Interim Nuclear Agreement with Iran: Administration Perspectives" Chaired by: Senator Timothy Johnson (D-SD) Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; David Cohen, Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Location: 538 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:00 a.m. EST Date: Thursday, December 12, 2013 Federal News Service December 12, 2013 Thursday

there's a lot of discussion about the internal politics of **Iran**. And the -- whether in fact there is a mature enough diplomatic situation in **Iran** to actually deliver anything that we might hope for as we pursue peace in the region.

And so I'd like comments from both you about how you see the internal politics and how you see this -- how fragile is this agreement in **Iran**.

MS. SHERMAN: Well, thank you very much, Senator. First of all, I take to heart your imprimatur to us to listen better and to understand the concerns here of the United States Senate, and we **will** work and endeavor to do so.

Secondly, as regards the internal politics, I would urge you, if you haven't had a classified briefing with our national intelligence manager for **Iran**, to avail yourself of that -- I think you have heard some of it -- because you'll get some insights into what's going on. But in this unclassified setting, let me say my own understanding --

SEN. HEITKAMP: Yeah, and I think I have a pretty good idea. But I also think it's really important for the American public to understand at least some characteristics of who we're negotiating with.

MS. SHERMAN: Thank you. The supreme leader is the only one who really holds the nuclear file, makes the final decisions about whether **Iran will** reach a comprehensive agreement to forego much of what it has created in return for the economic relief it seeks.

The supreme leader has, however, given to President Rouhani, who was elected to get that economic relief and was quite clearly not the supreme leader's first choice to be president of **Iran**, but was acceptable and is himself a conservative cleric. No one should misunderstand or believe that President Rouhani is not anything but a very conservative cleric. He is about preserving the regime, not changing it, not changing the supreme leader. So none of this is about regime change for him, nor is U.S. policy headed and about regime change. It is about addressing the concerns about **Iran's** nuclear program.

So Rouhani was given a license by the supreme leader to go and try and see what he could do to get economic relief with some red lines in place, including making sure that **Iran** could keep some of its capability. Indeed then Rouhani passed off to Foreign Minister Zarif -- who knows the United States very well, having lived here and studied here and worked for **Iran** here for nearly 30 years -- to see whether in fact he could move the negotiation forward. So it is in that setting that we have begun to really make some progress because they want this economic relief.

Additionally, I have to add that they do have differences among their country. There are hardliners who are much more conservative than the conservative cleric president of **Iran**, President Rouhani, who do not think that they should be talking with the United States or anyone else, for that matter, about their nuclear program. There are some people who are more reform-minded, but there is a general belief among the Iranian people that they have a right to enrich. The United States does not believe any country has a right to enrich, but the Iranian people do, and they have a great deal of pride and a culture of resistance to change and don't particularly want to adopt all that the United States stands for, so they very much hold onto their own tenets.

Undersecretary Cohen may want to add something from an economic point of view.

MR. COHEN: If I could just very briefly, Mr. Chairman, Sen. Heitkamp, just picking up on what Undersecretary Sherman said about the election of Rouhani, it was, I think, generally understood as an expression by the Iranian people of a desire for relief from the **economic conditions** that they're currently facing. Among the skewed list of candidates, he was the one who was sort of most likely to try to bring about improved **economic conditions** through engagement with the West, understanding full well that the only way that he can get improved **economic conditions** in **Iran** is to get the sanctions lifted. And the only way to get the sanctions lifted is to address concerns with their nuclear program.

This **initial first step, joint plan of action, will not improve the economic conditions in Iran**, but it was greeted with excitement among the people of **Iran**, because I think they saw this as showing the potential, the prospect for economic improvement down the road. Frankly, I think the -- this next six months, as the Iranian people see through this **joint plan of action**, that there is the potential if the -- if their government negotiates, you know, in a serious fashion about the nuclear program to get real sanctions relief, can create (sort of ?) **additional internal pressure** the -- of the kind that we saw that led to the election of Rouhani, **additional pressure to push their government to do what's necessary to address the concerns**.

SEN. JOHNSON: Senator Warren.

Statement for the Record

**Worldwide Threat Assessment
of the
US Intelligence Community**

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence



James R. Clapper

Director of National Intelligence

January 29, 2014

a key partner in the “axis of resistance” against Israel and are prepared to take major risks to preserve the regime as well as their critical transshipment routes.

Iran and Hizballah

Outside of the Syrian theater, Iran and Lebanese Hizballah continue to directly threaten the interests of US allies. Hizballah has increased its global terrorist activity in recent years to a level that we have not seen since the 1990s.

Counterterrorism Cooperation

As the terrorist threat is becoming more diffuse and harder to detect, cooperation with CT partners will take on even greater importance. The fluid environment in the Middle East and North Africa will likely further complicate already challenging circumstances as we partner with governments to stem the spread of terrorism.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION

Nation-state efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems constitute a major threat to the security of the United States, deployed troops, and allies. We are focused on the threat and destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation, proliferation of chemical and biological warfare (CBW)-related materials, and development of WMD delivery systems. The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is past. Biological and chemical materials and technologies, almost always dual use, move easily in the globalized economy, as do personnel with scientific expertise to design and use them. The latest discoveries in the life sciences also diffuse globally and rapidly.

Iran and North Korea Developing WMD-Applicable Capabilities

We continue to assess that **Iran’s** overarching strategic goals of enhancing its security, prestige, and regional influence have led it to pursue capabilities to meet its civilian goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so. At the same time, Iran’s perceived need for economic relief has led it to make concessions on its nuclear program through the 24 November 2013 Joint Plan of Action with the P5+1 countries and the European Union (EU). In this context, we judge that Iran is trying to balance conflicting objectives. It wants to improve its nuclear and missile capabilities while avoiding severe repercussions—such as a military strike or regime-threatening sanctions. **We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.**

Tehran has made technical progress in a number of areas—including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles—from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.

Of particular note, Iran has made progress during the past year by installing additional centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant, developing advanced centrifuge designs, and stockpiling more low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF₆). These improvements have better positioned Iran to produce weapons-grade uranium (WGU) using its declared facilities and uranium stockpiles, if it chooses to do so. Despite this progress, we assess that Iran would not be able to divert safeguarded material and produce enough WGU for a weapon before such activity would be discovered. Iran has also continued to work toward starting up the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor near Arak.

We judge that Iran would choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if Iran ever builds these weapons. Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran's progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

We assess that if Iran fully implements the Joint Plan, it will temporarily halt the expansion of its enrichment program, eliminate its production and stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium in a form suitable for further enrichment, and provide additional transparency into its existing and planned nuclear facilities. This transparency would provide earlier warning of a breakout using these facilities.

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to the security environment in East Asia, a region with some of the world's largest populations, militaries, and economies. North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities. Despite the reaffirmation of its commitment in the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, North Korea might again export nuclear technology.

In addition to conducting its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013, North Korea announced its intention to "adjust and alter" the uses of existing nuclear facilities, to include the uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, and restart its graphite moderated reactor that was shut down in 2007. We assess that North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production. North Korea has publicly displayed its KN08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although it remains untested. North Korea is committed to developing long-range missile technology that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States. Its efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns.

Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders are focused on deterrence and defense. We have long assessed that, in Pyongyang's view, its nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We do not know Pyongyang's nuclear doctrine or employment concepts.