



# Decidability

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# What we are going to discuss?

- Decidable problems concerning
  - Regular languages
  - Context-free languages
- Undecidability
  - Diagonalization method
  - An unrecognizable language

# “exploring the limits of algorithmic solvability”

Why?

knowing that a problem is algorithmically unsolvable



to solve, we need to simplify it

$$A_{DFA} = \{\langle B, w \rangle \mid B \text{ is a DFA that accepts } w\}$$



Theorem 4.1

$M =$  “On input  $\langle B, w \rangle$ , where  $B$  is a DFA and  $w$  is a string:

1. Simulate  $B$  on input  $w$ .
2. If the simulation ends in an accept state, *accept*. If it ends in a nonaccepting state, *reject*.”

$$A_{NFA} = \{\langle B, w \rangle \mid B \text{ is an NFA that accepts } w\}$$



**Decidable**

**Theorem 4.2**

$N =$  “On input  $\langle B, w \rangle$ , where  $B$  is an NFA and  $w$  is a string:

1. Convert NFA  $B$  to an equivalent DFA  $C$ , using the procedure for this conversion given in Theorem 1.39.
2. Run TM  $M$  from Theorem 4.1 on input  $\langle C, w \rangle$ .
3. If  $M$  accepts, *accept*; otherwise, *reject*.”

$$A_{REX} = \{\langle R, w \rangle \mid R \text{ is a regular expression that generates } w\}$$



Theorem 4.3

$P =$  “On input  $\langle R, w \rangle$ , where  $R$  is a regular expression and  $w$  is a string:

1. Convert regular expression  $R$  to an equivalent NFA  $A$  by using the procedure for this conversion given in Theorem 1.54.
2. Run TM  $N$  on input  $\langle A, w \rangle$ .
3. If  $N$  accepts, *accept*; if  $N$  rejects, *reject*.”

$$E_{DFA} = \{\langle B, w \rangle \mid B \text{ is a DFA and } L(B) = \emptyset\}$$



Theorem 4.4

$T =$  “On input  $\langle A \rangle$ , where  $A$  is a DFA:

1. Mark the start state of  $A$ .
2. Repeat until no new states get marked:
3.     Mark any state that has a transition coming into it from any state that is already marked.
4. If no accept state is marked, *accept*; otherwise, *reject*.”



$$EQ_{DFA} = \{\langle A, B \rangle \mid A \text{ and } B \text{ are DFAs and } L(A) = L(B)\}$$



Theorem 4.5

$$L(C) = (L(A) \cap \overline{L(B)}) \cup (\overline{L(A)} \cap L(B))$$

$F$  = “On input  $\langle A, B \rangle$ , where  $A$  and  $B$  are DFAs:

1. Construct DFA  $C$  as described.
2. Run TM  $T$  from Theorem 4.4 on input  $\langle C \rangle$ .
3. If  $T$  accepts, *accept*. If  $T$  rejects, *reject*.”

$$A_{CFG} = \{\langle G, w \rangle \mid G \text{ is a CFG that generates string } w\}$$



Theorem 4.7

$S =$  “On input  $\langle G, w \rangle$ , where  $G$  is a CFG and  $w$  is a string:

1. Convert  $G$  to an equivalent grammar in Chomsky normal form.
2. List all derivations with  $2n - 1$  steps, where  $n$  is the length of  $w$ ; except if  $n = 0$ , then instead list all derivations with one step.
3. If any of these derivations generate  $w$ , *accept*; if not, *reject*.”

$$E_{CFG} = \{\langle G \rangle \mid G \text{ is a CFG and } L(G) = \emptyset\}$$



Theorem 4.8

$R =$  “On input  $\langle G \rangle$ , where  $G$  is a CFG:

1. Mark all terminal symbols in  $G$ .
2. Repeat until no new variables get marked:
3. Mark any variable  $A$  where  $G$  has a rule  $A \rightarrow U_1 U_2 \cdots U_k$  and each symbol  $U_1, \dots, U_k$  has already been marked.
4. If the start variable is not marked, *accept*; otherwise, *reject*.”

$A = L(G)$  for some CFG  $G$



Theorem 4.9

$M_G =$  “On input  $w$ :

1. Run TM  $S$  on input  $\langle G, w \rangle$ .
2. If this machine accepts, *accept*; if it rejects, *reject*.”

$$EQ_{CFG} = \{\langle G, H \rangle \mid G \text{ and } H \text{ are CFGs and } L(G) = L(H)\}$$

 Undecidable

We'll do it later in Chapter 5, by reducing it to HALT!

I'll promise ...

# An Undecidable Problem

The general problem of software verification **is not solvable** by computers.

# Researchers show off remote attack against Tesla Model S

The researchers were able to remotely control the braking system, sunroof, door locks, trunk, side-view mirrors and more.



<http://www.computerworld.com/article/3121908/security/researchers-show-off-remote-attack-against-tesla-model-s.html>