# Usable Authentication & Passwords

### Top 10 Common Chosen Passwords

- 1. password
- 2. 12345
- 3. 12345678
- 4. abc123
- 5. qwerty
- 6. monkey
- 7. letmein
- 8. dragon
- 9. 111111
- 10. baseball

#### **Password Guidelines**

In order to protect your security, Intel has certain rules for choosing passwords. Please read the following rules so that you will know how to choose a good password:

The following rules apply to all passwords:

- The password must be at least eight characters long, and can contain letters, numerals, and punctuation.
- · It cannot contain spaces.
- It must contain at least one alpha character [a-z; A-Z].
- It cannot contain your login ID.
- The first eight characters cannot be the same as your previous password.
- · Passwords are treated as case sensitive.

Examples of strong passwords:

(The following is for example purposes only. Do not use any of these examples as your actual password.)

- Use a name, modified slightly, like "Bob\*1Smith" or "Bobby\$123"
- Use a phrase you can remember, like "hello world" modified to "hello1@World2"
- "ttL\*hi?wur5" (contains lower case letters, capital case letters, special characters, and numbers)

Thank you for supporting your security by following these password guidelines. If you have any questions about these password guidelines, please contact <u>Technical Support</u>.

By submitting a support request you may be contacted by Intel or an Intel authorized reseller.

- Internet Explorer - سیستم جامع دانشگاهی گلستان - دانشگاه یزد - ورود به سیستم 🎯			
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		• 12	2 <b>5% 🔻</b> 1

#### Since the expansion of the Internet and increased online activities, users have been challenged by both the explosion of numbers of passwords and the length requirement of passwords. A recent study by Microsoft Research (Florencio and Herley, 2007) shows that the average Web user has about 25 accounts that require passwords and has 6.5 passwords, each of which contains mostly lower case letters with an average bitstrength of 40.54 bits. In addition, passwords are re-used and forgotten very often, confirming the convention wisdom. An online experiment conducted by Carnegie Mellon University (Shay *et al.*, 2014) evaluates the password policy for a security/usability tradeoff. The study reveals that adding require guessed passwords, and that certain combin traditional complex policy.

Section: Choose

2015-0026

Traditionally, metrics such as Shannon entropy and guessing entropy have been used to analyze the security of

passwords. For example various password creat cracking over a real-wc a secure system, adapti

2. Related work

Through analyzing 70 r guessing difficulty of sk (Dell'Amico *et al.*, 2010)



#### Information and Computer Security

ISSN: 2056-4961 Previously published as: Information Management & Computer Security Online from: 2015 Subject Area: Information & Knowledge Management

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dictionary attacks, dictionary mangling and Markov chain techniques. All attack techniques are affected by

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### Password Attacks

- Human
- Brute force
- Common word
- Dictionary words

Туре	Password	Method	Time	Security level
6 random characters	jskerv	Brute-force	1 month	risky
6 random characters with numbers	ergs43	Brute-force	8 months	Low risk
6 random characters with mixed case, symbols and numbers	J4fS<2	Brute-force	219 years	Secure for life
6 character common word	orange	Common words	3 minutes	useless
6 character uncommon word	woosaa	dictionary	1 hour 22 minutes	useless

Туре	Password	Method	Time	Security level
2 common word password	alpine fun	Common word	2 months	Low risk
3 common word password	this is fun	Common word	2,537 years	Secure forever

Туре	Password	Method	Time	Security level
3 uncommon word password	fluffy is	Dictionary	39,637,200 years	Secure
	puffy			forever
5 uncommon word password	du-bi-du-	Brute-force	531,855,448,467	Secure
	bi-dub		years	Torever

No of attacks	Password	Time	Security level
100 times per sec	alpine fun	2 months	Low risk
1 time every 5 sec	alpine fun	63 years	Secure
1 time every 5 sec with a 1 hour penalty period after 10 attempts	alpine fun	1,889 years	Secure forever



TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

### Conclusions

- Password systems would be more secure if passwords were more usable
  - Human reasons
  - Computational reasons
- Why haven't we fixed this?

### **Two-Factor Authentication**

### Two-Factor Authentication (TFA)

- Password + one time unique code
- Generated by
  - Device
  - Email
  - Text
  - App

### Security of TFA?

- More secure
- Stops most hacking attacks
- Users perceive it as more secure

### Usability of TFA

- Research says:
  - Speed: slower
  - User preference:
    - Felt less usable
    - Less convenient
    - Harder to use

#### Conclusions

• More secure, less usable

# Biometrics









# Without Biometrics

# Fingerprint Recognition

# Face Recognition

# Voice Recognition

# Analyzing Usability

### Voice Recognition

- Speed
  - Medium
- Efficiency
  - Medium
- Learnability
  - Easy
- Memorability
  - Easy

### Facial Recognition

- Speed
  - Medium
- Efficiency
  - Medium
- Learnability
  - Easy
- Memorability
  - Easy

### Fingerprint Recognition

- Speed
  - Fast
- Efficiency
  - Good
- Learnability
  - Easy
- Memorability
  - Easy

### Analyzing Security

- Who can access the device?
- How easily can they replicate the biometric input?

### Conclusions

- Biometrics are easy & relatively secure
- Common on mobile devices but work anywhere
- Compare usability

### Gesture-based Authentication

### Keypad Gestures



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#### Free Gestures

Napa Sae-Bae, Kowsar Ahmed, Katherine Isbister, and Nasir Memon. 2012. Biometric-rich gestures: a novel approach to authentication on multi-touch devices. In *Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems* (CHI '12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 977-986. DOI: <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2207676.2208543</u>

### Benefits

- Gestures
  - users enjoy (easy, fun, etc.)
  - tend to be more secure
- Users prefer gestures to passwords
- Gestures are faster than passwords & are less error prone

### Case Study: Smudge Attacks



#### **Experiment 1: Ideal Collection**



Figure 5: Phone A, from Experiment 1, where the pattern is entered with normal touches. Notice that the directionality of the pattern can be determined at ever direction change.

Aviv, Adam J., et al. "Smudge Attacks on Smartphone Touch Screens." WOOT 10 (2010): 1-7. <u>https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot10/tech/full\_papers/Aviv.pdf</u>

### Case Study: Smudge Attacks



#### **Experiment 1: Ideal Collection**



Figure 7: Phone from Experiment 1: One stroke of the pattern, |84|, is lost due to the camera or lighting angle. The contrast has been adjusted.

Aviv, Adam J., et al. "Smudge Attacks on Smartphone Touch Screens." WOOT 10 (2010): 1-7. <u>https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot10/tech/full\_papers/Aviv.pdf</u>

### Case Study: Smudge Attacks





#### **Experiment 2: Simulated Usage**

Figure 8: Phone from Experiment 2: With this usage condition (dot and streaks, under), the pattern is nearly all lost. The contrast has been adjusted.

Aviv, Adam J., et al. "Smudge Attacks on Smartphone Touch Screens." WOOT 10 (2010): 1-7. <u>https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot10/tech/full\_papers/Aviv.pdf</u>
#### Case Study: Smudge Attacks





Figure 6: Phone from Experiment 3, where the phone was wiped, placed (and replaced) in a pocket. Unlike Phone A from Fig. 5, some directionality is lost in the upper left portion of the pattern.

#### **Experiment 3: Removing Smudges**

Aviv, Adam J., et al. "Smudge Attacks on Smartphone Touch Screens." WOOT 10 (2010): 1-7. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot10/tech/full\_papers/Aviv.pdf

## Multiple Phones

- Clean, normal password
- Clean, light password
- Dirty

#### Results

- Easy to retrieve at least some information about password from smudges
- Clean screens are easier to work with, but even on dirty screens, a lot of password info can be found

#### Conclusions

- Interesting attack on non-traditional authentication
- Human-based with a twist

## Usable Privacy Basics

#### Privacy is a kind of security.

- Users want to protect their information.
- Users should have the right to understand what happens with their data.
- Users should have as much control as possible over how it is used.

#### **Privacy Policies**

- Tell a user everything they need to know about how their data is collected, used & shared.
- Can be analyzed for usability.

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Google Privacy & Terms	-

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Overview Privacy Policy Terms of Service Technologies and Principles FAQ

#### **Privacy Policy**

- Information we collect How we use information we collect
- Transparency and choice
- Information you share
- Accessing and updating your personal information
- Information we share
- Information security
- When this Privacy Policy applies
- Compliance and cooperation with regulatory authorities
- Changes

Specific product practices

Other useful privacy and security related materials

Self Regulatory Frameworks

Key terms

#### Welcome to the Google Privacy Policy

When you use Google services, you trust us with your information. This Privacy Policy is meant to help you understand what data we collect, why we collect it, and what we do with it. This is important; we hope you will take time to read it carefully. And remember, you can find controls to manage your information and protect your privacy and security at My Account.

#### **Privacy Policy**

Last modified: October 2, 2017 (view archived versions)

#### Hide examples

My Account

Download PDF version

There are many different ways you can use our services - to search for and share information, to communicate with other people or to create new content. When you share information with us, for example by creating a Google Account, we can make those services even better - to show you more relevant search results and ads, to help you connect with people or to make sharing with others quicker and easier. As you use our services, we want you to be clear how we're using information and the ways in which you can protect your privacy.

Our Privacy Policy explains:

- What information we collect and why we collect it.
- How we use that information.
- The choices we offer, including how to access and update information.

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#### حريم خصوصى

دیجیکالا ضمن احترامی که برای حریم شخصی کاربران قائل است، برای خرید، ثبت نظر یا استفاده از برخی امکانات وب سایت اطلاعاتی را از کاربران درخواست میکند تا بتواند خدماتی امن و مطمئن را به کاربران ارائه دهد. برای پردازش و ارسال سفارش، اطلاعاتی مانند آدرس، شماره تلفن و ایمیل مورد نیاز است و از آنجا که کلیه فعالیتهای دیجیکالا قانونی و مبتنی بر قوانین تجارت الکترونیک صورت میگیرد و طی فرایند خرید، فاکتور رسمی و بنا به درخواست مشتریان حقوقی گواهی ارزش افزوده مادر میشود، از این رو وارد کردن اطلاعاتی مانند نام و کد ملی برای اشخاص حقیقی یا کد اقتصادی و شناسه ملی برای خریدهای سازمانی لازم است. همچنین آدرس ایمیل و تلفنهایی که مشتری در پروفایل خود ثبت میکند، افزوده مادر میشود، از این رو وارد کردن اطلاعاتی مانند نام و کد ملی برای اشخاص حقیقی یا کد اقتصادی و شناسه ملی برای خریدهای سازمانی لازم است. همچنین آدرس ایمیل و تلفنهایی که مشتری در پروفایل خود ثبت میکند، ا تنها آدرس ایمیل و تلفنهای رسمی و مورد تاید مشتری است و تام مکاتبات و پاسخهای شرکت از طریق آنها صرت میگیرد.

بنابراین درج آدرس، ایمیل و شماره تماسهای همراه و ثابت توسط مشتری، به منزله مورد تایید بودن صحت آنها است و در صورتی که این موارد به صورت صحیح یا کامل درج نشده باشد، دیچیکالا جهت اطمینان از

صحت و قطعیت ثبت سفارش میتواند از مشتری، اطلاعات تکمیلی و بیشتری درخواست کند.

مشتریان میتوانند نام، آدرس و تلفن شخص دیگری را برای تحویل گرفتن سفارش وارد کنند و دیجیکالا تنها برای ارسال همان سفارش، از این اطلاعات استفاده خواهد کرد.

همچنین دیجی US ممکن است برای ارتباط با مشتریان، بهینه سازی محتوای وب سایت و تحقیقات بازاریابی از برخی اطلاعات استفاده کند و برای اطلاع رسانی رویدادها و اخبار، خدمات و سرویسهای ویژه یا پروموشنها، برای اعضای وب سایت ایمیل یا پیامک ارسال نماید. در صورتی که کاربران تمایل به دریافت اینگونه ایمیل و پیامکها نداشته باشند، میتوانند عضویت دریافت خبرنامه دیجیکالا را در پروفایل خود لغو کنند.

توجه داشته باشید که 300061930000 و 10006193000 شمارههایی است که دیجیکالا از طریق آن برای کاربران و مشتریان خود پیامک (اس ام اس) ارسال میکند. همچنین این شمارهها، سامانه ارسال پیامک است که وضعیت پردازش سفارش یا رویدادها، خدمات و سرویسهای ویژه دیجیکالا را به اطلاع کاربران میرساند و روشن است که امکان دریافت پیامهای شما از طریق آن وجود ندارد.

همچنین ممکن است دیجی کالا از طریق شماره **300061930002** برای برخی کاربران یا مشتریان خود، سوال نظرسنجی ارسال کند.

بنابراین ارسال هرگونه پیامک تحت عنوان دیجیکالا، با هر شماره دیگری تخلف و سوء استفاده از نام دیجیکالا است و در صورت دریافت چنین پیامکی، لطفاً جهت پیگیری قانونی آن را به Info@digikala.com بنابراین ارسال هرگونه پیامک تحت عنوان دیجیکالا، با هر شماره دیگری

دیجیکالا ممکن است نقد و نظرهای ارسالی کاربران را در راستای رعایت قوانین وب سایت ویرایش کند. همچنین اگر نظر یا پیام ارسال شده توسط کاربر، مشمول مصادیق محتوای مجرمانه باشد، دیجیکالا میتواند از اطلاعات ثبت شده برای پیگیری قانونی استفاده کند.

حفظ و نگهداری رمز عبور بر عهده کاربران است و برای جلوگیری از هرگونه سوء استفاده احتمالی، کاربران نباید آن را برای شخص دیگری فاش کنند. دیجیکالا هویت شخصی کاربران را محرمانه میداند و اطلاعات شخصی آنان را به هیچ شخص یا سازمان دیگری منتقل نمیکند، مگر اینکه با حکم قانونی مجبور باشد در اختیار مراجع ذی صلاح قرار دهد.

دیجیکالا همانند سایروب سایت ها از جمع آوری IP و کوکیها استفاده میکند، اما پروتکل، سرور و لایههای امنیتی دیجیکالا و روشهای مناسب مدیریت دادهها اطلاعات کاربران را محافظت و از دسترسیهای غیر قانونی جلوگیری میکند.

در صورتی که تمایلی به دریافت ایمیلها و خبرنامه های دیجی کالا ندارید، می توانید بر روی کلمه لغو عضویت در انتهای صفحه ایمیل کلیک کنید.

#### Privacy Controls

- Should data be collected or not?
- Who has permission to see it?

### Going Forward

- Privacy & security are part of the same issue
- Analyzing usability is done the same way with privacy
- Keep the user in mind first

## Privacy Policies & User Understanding

For users to control their privacy, they must understand privacy policies. Do they?

#### What We Know

- Most people do not read privacy policy.
  - about 16% said that they read them all the time.
- However, when people do read them, they do not necessarily understand them.
  - about half of the people who said they read them, said that they do not understand them.

#### How to Learn?

- Read privacy policies
- Discover through other sources

## A quick experiment: Facebook apps

- Ask people what data they think apps can access
- Have them read privacy policy or watch a video
- Ask again

J. Golbeck, M.L. Mauriello. "User Perception of Facebook App Data Access: A Comparison of Methods and Privacy Concerns" Future Internet 2016, 8(2), 9; doi:<u>10.3390/fi8020009</u>

#### Results

- Every user underestimated what data could be accessed when they were first asked
- Every user improved after reading the privacy policy or watching the video
- The video led to greater improvements in user understanding

## Implications

- Privacy policies are boring & hard to read
  - Poor usability
- They are also really important
- Are there more usable ways to convey the information in a privacy policy?

## Informed Consent by Design

Friedman, Batya, Peyina Lin, and Jessica K. Miller. "Informed consent by design." Security and Usability (2005): 495-521

#### What is Informed Consent?

- Users understand what data is being collected & shared and they consent to how it is used.
- Six components
  - Disclosure
    - who, what, where, when, how
  - Comprehension
  - Voluntariness
  - Competence
  - Agreement
  - Minimal Distraction

### Some Examples

- Google.com Privacy Policy
- Facebook Privacy Policy



Oh dear, Facebook. This weekend it emerged that the world's largest social network had conducted a study in which the company attempted to manipulate the emotional reaction of users by controlling the content that appeared in their News Feeds.

#### Conclusion

- Usable privacy requires informed consent from users
- They must understand how their data is used & agree to it being used that way
- These six components can help you analyze a system for informed consent

## Five Pitfalls of Privacy

Lederer, Scott, et al. "Personal privacy through understanding and action: five pitfalls for designers." Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 8.6 (2004): 440-454.

### Understanding

- 1. Obscuring potential information flow
- 2. Obscuring actual information flow

#### Action

- 3. Emphasizing configuration over action
- 4. Lacking coarse-grained control
- 5. Inhibiting established practice

# Obscuring potential information flow Obscuring actual information flow

### Information Flow

- Types of information
- Kinds of observers
- Media through which info is conveyed
- Length of retention
- Potential for unintended disclosure
- Collection of metadata

# Obscuring potential information flow Obscuring actual information flow

### Emphasizing configuration over action

- Privacy management should be part of natural workflow
  - Recall this same guideline about security

#### Lacking coarse-grained control

• Have an obvious, top-level control to turn sharing on and off

### Inhibiting established practice

- What do users expect from other experiences?
  - Let them expect that here, too.
- Mental models, conventions

#### Conclusion

- Make it clear how information is being shared
- Make it easy & natural for users to control privacy
- Make the default practice match users' expectations

## Inferring Personal Data

#### Assignment

• Do the same for two Privacy Policies in Farsi
## That's all on the privacy.