by Alexander Alekhine

Foreword by Andy Soltis

21st Century Edition!



Alekhine's Controversial Masterpiece Finally in English!

For decades, Alexander Alekhine's account of New York 1927 was at the top of the list of works that should have been rendered into English but unaccountably were not.

This is unlike any other tournament book ever written. Not only do you have one of the greatest annotators of all time rendering some brilliant analysis, but he melds it with an exceptional agenda, an anti-Capablanca agenda. And since he wrote it after defeating Capablanca in their marathon match, he sounds like a sore loser who became a sore winner.

So, this is just a mean-spirited book, right? Nothing of the sort. Alekhine goes beyond elaborate move analysis and offers deep positional insights and psychological observations. Nikolai Grigoriev, in his foreword to the 1930 Russian edition of this book, pointed out how Alekhine broke new ground by underlining the critical moments of each game.

Why Alekhine's work was published in German, in Berlin in 1928, and not in English, is unclear. But now, after more than 80 years, it's finally available to the largest audience of chessplayers. It's about time.



Alexander Alekhine

Foreword by Andy Soltis



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by Alexander Alekhine

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> Russell Enterprises, Inc. PO Box 3131 Milford, CT 06460 USA

info@russell-enterprises.com http://www.russell-enterprises.com



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Foreword

It's about time this book was published. For decades, Alexander Alekhine's account of New York 1927 was at the top of the list of works that should have been rendered into English but unaccountably were not.

There is no shortage of reasons for why this book was recognized as a classic when it first appeared. First, the tournament was one of the strongest ever held. The only previous events that came close to it in average strength were St. Petersburg 1895-96 and the finals of St. Petersburg 1914. The New York organizers further ensured their place in history by luring José Capablanca back into action. He had appeared in only four tournaments since becoming world champion in 1921.

The tournament also captured a pivotal moment in the evolution of chess thinking. New ideas normally gain acceptance slowly, almost glacially. But the games played at the Manhattan Square Hotel in the final days of the winter of 1927 showed how chess thinking had been transformed by the Hypermodern revolution. Even lapsed gambiteers like Frank Marshall and Rudolf Spielmann were experimenting with Indian openings at New York 1927. New theory was being written as early as games 1 and 2, which gave us the "Manhattan Variation" of the Queen's Gambit Declined. Put that into perspective: Can you recall a modern tournament that provided the name for an opening?

And yet... And yet the 1927 tournament and its magnificent book have garnered only a fraction of the attention that New York 1924 achieved. Why?

There are several explanations and none tells the whole story. One version is that the 1927 tournament never became what the contemporary fans hoped it would be: It was not a candidates tournament. It was not a battle royale among all the potential challengers to determine who would be Capablanca's next match opponent. There was no need for such an event because Capa's five-year-old "London Rules" had stipulated how challengers should be chosen, and it wasn't by a tournament. Alekhine had already challenged Capablanca according to those rules and he threatened to boycott the tournament if it would deprive him of his place at the head of the line of challengers.

Another explanation for why New York 1927 never reached the iconic status of 1924 is that there seemed to be something missing in the scoretable. Or rather, someone. It's always hard to identify the precise international pecking order of bygone, pre-Elo days in this case, the days of February 19-March 25, 1927. However, it's safe to say that several world-class players were absent, beginning with Akiba Rubinstein, Yefim Bogoljubow and Emanuel Lasker.

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Bogo and Lasker were invited but failed to accept. Why that happened is significant because according to an alternative ratings universe, Chessmetrics, they and not Capa or Alekhine were the two strongest players in the world at the time. Bogoljubow had an amazing year in 1925, capped off by his stunning victory at the first international tournament of the Soviet Union, at Moscow. But success had clearly gone to his head by 1927. Bogoljubow replied to his invitation by asking for an enormous appearance fee of \$1,500, which is well over \$20,000 in today's dollars. If his attitude wasn't clear enough, he added that instead of this "mediocre" tournament – his word – the New Yorkers should spend their time, money and energy on a Bogoljubow-Capablanca world championship match.

Lasker, who was used to making his own huge fee demands, had a different reason for saying "Nein" to New York. He was still angry at Norbert Lederer, the organizer of both New York tournaments, because of an incident during his game with Capablanca in 1924. Lasker blamed his loss on a faulty clock and was upset that his protest wasn't treated properly. The former world champion did not reply to his invitation to New York 1927 and his place was taken by Spielmann.

In addition to the missing-in-action masters and the lack of "candidate" tournament status, there are other explanations of why New York 1927 doesn't match the caché of the 1924 tournament. One is the matter of age. The 1920s seemed to cherish everything that was new and young, at the expense of anything that predated the Great War that everyone wanted to forget.

New York 1924 may not have been a tournament filled with Magnus Carlsen-like kids but at least it had Richard Réti and his 1.©163 idea. That was fresh enough. In contrast, the 1927 invitees seemed old. All of them had won their spurs at least a dozen years before. The youngest, Alekhine, was 34. The players' average was just under 41 years. By comparison, Garry Kasparov was an ex-champion at 37 and retired at 41. It's easy, therefore, to write off this off as a tournament of hasbeens.

But that would be quite wrong. Capablanca was never stronger than he was at New York. Alekhine reached his peak three years later. Aron Nimzovich and Spielmann would have their best-ever results when they finished 1st-2nd at Carlsbad 1929. Even Marshall seemed to be getting stronger in the years before 1927. His historical rating was on the rise since his poor showing in the U.S. Championship match of 1923 against Edward Lasker. Yes, the New York invitees were ancient by today's standard. But in those days, super-GMs hit their apex later in life then than they do now.

Another stab at explaining why New York 1927 has been dimly remembered is the games. Alekhine included only two of the 20 he played (games 32 and 53) in his second best-games collection. This was significant because in those pre-Informant days, it was the GMs who established priorities and told the fans which

games were important. In contrast, Alekhine put five of his 20 games from Baden-Baden 1925 and three of his 16 games from Kecskemet 1927 in that book. Marshall could only include one of his 27 games in *My 50 Years of Chess* because he only won one

But this explanation, too, has flaws. Great chess was played in New York, a lot of it. Milan Vidmar's wonderful win over Nimzovich (game 29) and Nimzo's crush of Vidmar (game 14) and of Marshall (game 51) are among the finest games they ever played. Nimzovich felt that nine of his New York games deserved to be included with 100 others in his brilliant *The Praxis of My System*. And, of course, there were the games of the tournament winner. Capablanca never compiled his best games. But in the Harry Golombek's book of Capa's 100 best, you'll find wins over Nimzovich (games 4 and 43), Alekhine (game 13), Vidmar (game 34) and Spielmann (game 37). All of these games deserve the ovations they received at the time.

Perhaps the most compelling reason for why New York 27 is largely forgotten is its lack of drama: The heavy favorite won easily. Only one of the invitees, the hapless Marshall, had ever beaten Capablanca before, and Capa was in no danger of losing to his old rival this time. In fact, the world champion wasn't in real jeopardy in any of his 20 games. The densely annotated collection of Capablanca games by Alexander Khalifman and Leonid Yudasin indicates he had inferior positions only three times in the tournament. Although Alekhine claims he could have put Capa in a "difficult position" in game 13, Khalifman/Yudasin deny that. They say Capa was at risk only in game 40. He held the sole lead after three rounds and never looked back. He was so far ahead in the final rounds that he telegraphed his intentions to the other players that he wouldn't try to beat them.

So, the tournament script may fail to stir a modern reader. But Alekhine's words should. This is unlike any other tournament book ever written.


Not only do you have one of the greatest annotators of all time rendering some brilliant analysis, but he melds it with an exceptional agenda, an anti-Capablanca agenda. The extraordinary bias is a rarity for tournament books, which were often written in cool, dispassionate and boring prose. One of the few exceptions was the book of Nuremberg 1896, in which Siegbert Tarrasch ridiculed the victory of his rival, world champion Emanuel Lasker. At the end of that book, Tarrasch compiled a "luck scoretable," that claimed that Lasker scored five "luck acquired points" from bad positions, and this was more than enough to turn what should have been a poor performance into an outstanding result.

Tarrasch was being a sore loser in that appendix. But Alekhine's bitterness runs throughout the 1927 book. And since he wrote it after defeating Capablanca in their marathon match, he sounds like a sore loser who became a sore winner.

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Alekhine's theme is evident in the introduction where he derides Capa's third place at Moscow ("the biggest disappointment he had experienced up until then in his international career"). Moscow helped reveal the truth about "the half-mythic Capablanca *Uberspieler*." New York revealed more of Capablanca's weaknesses, Alekhine adds, and that showed him how to beat the world champion in the match in Buenos Aires six months later.

Alekhine's hostility is still raging near the very end of the book when this position arises.



Capablanca-Nimzovich White to play

He criticizes Capa's choice of 21.\$\frac{1}{2}f2?\$, "instead of the obvious 21.\$\bar{2}d6!." Like Bobby Fischer, Alekhine didn't think much of what was considered Capablanca's strong suit. "In the endgame," he sniffs, "he is not to be feared by a first-class master."

But Alekhine must have known that 21. \$\frac{1}{3}\$ f2 was not just weak but deliberately weak. Capablanca felt that if he had won this game or added other victory-lap points, it would have unfairly altered the race for second place. According to Hans Kmoch, in a 1962 Chess Review article, Capa even wrote a note that read "Please make better moves. I don't know how to avoid a win" and passed it, through a tournament official, to Nimzovich, during the endgame.

Alekhine also took aim at Nimzovich, who, after Alekhine had won the world championship, seemed like the most likely challenger for his new title. It's worth noting that a 1932 poll of readers of *Wiener Schachzeitung* found that they considered the world's best players were Alekhine, Capablanca, and Nimozvich, followed by Bogoljubow and Spielmann, in that order.

Alekhine repeatedly trashed his rivals' play in the New York tournament book. Nimzovich's choice of 16.g4?? in game 43 "is unworthy of even a mediocre amateur," he writes. "The fact is that Nimzovich, in a contest with an equal opponent

is probably always doomed to fall from the highest level into the abyss, and then work his way back upward," he says.

It becomes clear later in the introduction that Alekhine felt that the tournament should have been a two-man race between him and Capablanca because there was no one else worthy to compete. Once Alekhine lost his first game with the champion, he sought a draw in their subsequent games, he said, and the tournament drama disappeared.

Nevertheless Alekhine castigates his colleagues, over and over, for their pitiful play against Capablanca. "It's really unbelievable how self-consciously and weakly Marshall always plays against Capablanca!" he writes in transparent frustration. Vidmar "played somewhat under his usual league" against the champion, and Spielmann was cowed by Capa's reputation, he said.

So, this is just a mean-spirited book, right? Nothing of the sort.

In contrast with his New York 1924 book, here Alekhine goes beyond elaborate move analysis and offers deep positional insights and psychological observations. Nikolai Grigoriev, in his foreword to the 1930 Russian edition of this book, pointed out how Alekhine broke new ground by underlining the critical moments of each game. We see this in Alekhine's comments to 56. Ee4 in game 11, to 14... ed4 in game 15, to 24... c3 in game 17, to 32... d4 in game 24, to 19. f7 in game 27, to 22.c4 in game 39, for just a few examples.

Alekhine also offers some valuable positional pointers. For instance, he shows the virtues of not contesting control of an open file in game 14 and the bank-ruptcy of an outpost-centric strategy in game 27. After Nimzovich castles in game 3, with few of his pieces in the vicinity, Alekhine writes that a king's capacity for self-defense "has been strongly underestimated for a considerable time (after the desperate attempt by the aging Steinitz to use this piece to attack on a full board was a miserable fiasco)." His explanation of how to win the \$\mathbb{C} + \mathbb{C} vs. \$\mathbb{C} + \mathbb{E} + \mathbb{C} vs. \$\mathbb{C} + \mathbb{C} vs. \$\mathbb{C} + \mathbb{C} vs. \$\mathbb{C} vs. \$\mathbb{C}

Alekhine also tosses out some remarkable and original opening ideas. For example, after 1.d4 \(\text{1.6} \) 6 2.\(\text{1.6} \) 3 e6 3.g3 in game 41, he suggests 3...b5! more than 40 years before the world appreciated its strength. He also suggests 6.\(\text{\

Alekhine also entertains us with his use of language. Or rather languages. He was a polyglot who, at a later tournament, Kemeri 1937, could speak English with

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Reuben Fine, German with Kmoch, and French with everyone at the opening ceremony. In this book you'll find him coining terms such as "angst-moves" and "positional hari-kiri." In game 24 he pokes fun at Marshall's mishandling of the pawn structure by adding that he couldn't bring himself to try to correct it with a "pater peccavi-move." He suggests there was "a mot d'ordre to play only second- or third-best moves against" Capablanca.

Ironically, it was Capablanca who was supposed to write this book. He reached an agreement to edit it before play began. But on the eve of the Buenos Aires match, the *American Chess Bulletin* said that he was unable to write the notes and therefore the tournament committee had "ceded the rights for the English edition to Dr. Alekhine." Alekhine's notes to his own games were turning up in leading journals in Germany, Russia, Austria and Switzerland, among others, and a Russian tournament book, by Savielly Tartakower, soon appeared. Why Alekhine's work was published in German, in Berlin in 1928, and not in English, is unclear. But now, after more than 80 years, it's finally available to the largest audience of chessplayers. As I said, it's about time.

Andy Soltis New York City December 2010

Editor's Note

When the publisher came to us with the tournament book of New York 1927, published in German, we saw a chance to correct a historical injustice. It just could not stand that the book of one of the most important chess events ever held in the U.S., written by the fourth world champion, Alexander Alekhine, was not available in English. (A 78-page pamphlet by Chess Digest [Alekhine, Alexander: International Chess Tournament New York 1927, Dallas, Chess Digest 1972] made no attempt at an extensive translation.)

The project seemed ideal for our husband-and-wife team. Mary, a former German teacher and Fulbright scholar at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, worked on the translation of the text, while Al, a chess editor and writer, helped sort out the colorful and intricate chess annotations Dr. Alekhine is famous for. We worked hard to maintain faithfully Alekhine's original thoughts, as well as his presentation of material. Along the way, we discovered the inevitable mistakes in the commonly used databases of these games, as well as challenging typos in the German source itself.

But more than anything, we found Alekhine's brilliance, humor, and deep insight. We hope you agree that the outcome is both an important piece of history and a series of chess lessons on the highest level.

In 1927 Alekhine obviously lacked the benefit of computers. And although Al ran "Deep Rybka 4" as he played through the games and variations, we made no changes to Alekhine's annotations and inserted no notes. What readers get is what Alekhine wrote. Many readers will, however, enjoy running such an engine and will find a few bloopers. But they will much more often find impressive instances in which Alekhine sees his way through to the truth of a confusing position. And greatly to the benefit of the serious student, Alekhine is able to explain the reasoning that leads him to that truth.

We found Alekhine's thoughts on his great rival, world champion José Raúl Capablanca, particularly interesting, revealing as much about Alekhine himself as the great Cuban. In this regard, we should understand the author's perspective. To maintain his undisputed position as challenger, Alekhine had to come from behind during the last stages of the 60-game tournament, which ended in late March, to secure second place behind Capablanca, who had cruised through the 60 games of the marathon without a loss, racking up a plus score against every one of his opponents. But it's important to know that the tournament book was written only after Alekhine's subsequent victory over Capa in the Buenos Aires match for the world title, which took place from mid-September to the end of November of the same year. The result was a surprise to the general public, if not

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to Alekhine, who analyzed the games of New York 1927 to prepare for Buenos Aires while sailing there on the steamer *Massilia*. He writes that "Only then did it finally become clear to me how exaggerated were the general shouts of praise with which the quality of his (Capablanca's) performance in New York was greeted."

Indeed, Alekhine repeatedly makes the point, beginning immediately with his preface, "The New York Tournament 1927 as Prologue to the World Championship in Buenos Aires." that the quality of Capablanca's play in New York, despite results, was hardly worthy of the widespread public opinion that Capa was an *Überspieler*, or "super player." Alekhine concedes Capa's wonderful instincts in the middlegame, but undercuts the tribute by saying that his "ability lies much more in intuition than in critical thinking."

On the negative side, Alekhine goes so far as to say, counter to both contemporary and modern assessments, that Capablanca was "definitely no remarkable endgame artist"! Then how did Alekhine explain Capa's fine result? Nearly everyone was cowed by his reputation, playing below his true strength when facing the Cuban legend.

Of course, there is undoubtedly a grain of truth to this last assertion – great champions sometimes benefit from their reputations. At any rate, Alekhine's premise affords him an ongoing context to work particularly hard throughout his book to find improvements in both Capablanca's play and that of Capa's opponents. Those readers who kibitz the games with an engine may, however, notice, as Al did, that the computer evaluations often agree with Capablanca's choices. Ironically, and whatever the ultimate value of the moves themselves, Alekhine's challenging suggestions, when brought forward to the era of chess-playing programs, may actually bolster the popular claim that Capa was the closest a human could come to being a "chess machine"!

The tournament book of New York 1927 is fascinating on many levels – as the history of one of the great chess tournaments, as a testament to the fourth world champion's analytical skills, as a personal history of Alekhine's preparation for his famous championship victory – and as a continuation of the great rivalry of the 1920s.

Al Lawrence Wallkill, New York December 2010

New York 1927

February 19 - March 22, 1927

		1	2	8	4	9	9	Total
	l Capablanca	X	1 1/2 1/2 1/2	1 1/1 1/2	1 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1 1/2 1/2	1/1 1/1 1/1	11111	141/2
	2 Alekhine	7, 7, 7, 0	X	1/2 0 1 1/2	1,011,11,11,11,11	1 1/2 1/2 1	1,11,11	111%
~	Nimzowitsch 0 1/2 0 1/2	0 1/2 0 1/2	1/2 1 0 1/2	X	1001/2	111/2 1/2	1 1/2 1/2 1	$10^{1/2}$
_	4 Vidmar	1/2 1/2 0 1/2	1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2	01111/2	X	1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1	1,011,7	10
10	5 Spielmann	1/2 1/2 1/2	1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2	7/1 7/1 0 0	1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2	X	1,111,4	∞
	6 Marshall	0 0 1/2 0	1/2 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1 0 1/2	0 1/2 1/2 0	1/2 1 0 1/2	7/1 0 7/1 7/1	X	9

The 1927 New York Tournament as Prologue to the World Championship in Buenos Aires

I. We know that the year 1925 brought Capablanca the biggest disappointment he had experienced up until then in his international tournament career: in the Moscow tournament, he took third only with great effort, lost two games to players of a relatively lesser class, and escaped defeat in some other games (as against Réti or Loewenfisch, for example), mainly thanks to the kindness or carelessness of the opponents. Already at this point, one could hear the voices of, in part, the specialty press, pointing out a number of not completely credible symptoms that characterized the achievements of the Cuban grandmaster in that tournament. These symptoms gave cause to not unwarranted assumptions along the lines that Capablanca's art was not nearly what it had promised to be during his activity in the period before the war. The blame lies in his tendency, manifest more and more over the years, toward the simpler – toward, whenever possible, the pure, technical forms of battle. This predilection gradually killed his "lively spirit," with which his performances in San Sebastian 1911 and St. Petersburg 1914, for example, were impressively imbued. And finally, that even his attempts to rouse his former self (caused by his realization that pure technique against modern competition wasn't enough anymore) were his undoing in the aforementioned losses (the unusually complicated – for him – game, with attacks on both wings, against Ilyin-Zhenevsky, the unprepared artifice in the opening against Verlinsky).

We may say without exaggeration that for Capablanca, the somewhat negative impression of his *qualitative* results during his Moscow performance cast a much more perceptible shadow over his reputation than his lost games – because even Lasker, the unsurpassed tournament fighter, was third in Hastings 1895 and shared second and third place with Janowski in Cambridge-Springs 1904, two clear places behind the victor Marshall! But during the entire, very long period of his world championship, Lasker was never so defeated as Capablanca was by Verlinsky. It was especially this impression on the part of the general public – that he, although extremely rarely, could play absolutely weakly – that Capablanca had to try to obliterate sometime soon.

And it must be admitted that this problem – the preparation and organization of a larger tournament in the interest of the complete rehabilitation of the current world champion – was solved in the most brilliant way. By whom – by people or ... fate, with Capablanca's help or without – is in my opinion irrelevant. So I will now draw upon facts, with the conviction that they speak clearly enough for themselves.

In the autumn of 1926, the then-champion received two challenges to a competition for the championship – one came from Aron Nimzovich, the other from me. It soon became apparent, however, that Nimzovich's attempt was of a "platonic" nature, since he lacked a small thing, namely the financial support to fulfill the

conditions coming out of London. Therefore his challenge probably had much more the purpose of informing the chess world unequivocally that he, grandmaster Nimzovich, wished this contest and consequently considered himself a world championship candidate. That he was entitled to have such a position owing to the rising curve of his tournament successes in recent years is beyond doubt; but its immediate practical value, the challenge, as I said, was nil.

The case was different with the telegram I sent Capablanca in September from Buenos Aires: Sufficiently instructed by the experience of my fruitless attempts of 1921 and 1923, I was determined to send a challenge only if I would have an absolute guarantee on the part of the interested organizations that, financially, nothing would stand in the way of the realization of the match. Therefore I imagined that it would hardly be possible for the world champion – after assurances were given him that his material conditions were wholeheartedly accepted - to drag out the acceptance of the challenge; by the way, the chess world appeared to believe that as well. But it in fact turned out differently: while the challenge was not rejected, it was also not accepted. And instead of a direct answer, I got (aside from a private letter from Capablanca, the exact meaning of which got lost in generalities, but still contained a clear idea - that I should come to New York) the official program of the New York "Six Master's Tournament." The conditions for the event appeared immediately to take many in the chess community aback. As Capablanca had demanded for future world championships, Dr. Lasker was not invited, and the number of hours of play and also the time controls were unusual. Finally, the point, the winner of this tournament (or the runner-up, if Capablanca was first) would be declared the official world championship candidate.

The reckoning of fate, which in everything concerning the tournament in 1927 so supported the world champion, was incontestable – although it was clear that the introduction of this last point would have, as a consequence, justifiable protests from the interested masters, especially from the present writer. But what might emerge from such a protest, what came out of that really? The committee gave in formally – but meanwhile, thanks to the corresponding handling of the entire press, the whole psychological atmosphere was irrevocably created: the tournament was viewed by "public opinion" as a test for the world championship candidate, from which he had to emerge at least in second place. As a result, from a sporting point of view, in this tournament it came to a rather paradoxical situation in which the only one who risked nothing was the titleholder; because for him, in case of relative failure, a competition with the fortunate rival was as good as certain. On the other hand, both for Nimzovich as well as for me, not achieving one of the first two places was virtually synonymous with abandonment of a match with Capablanca – if not forever, then at least for a very long time.

Precisely because of this psychological handicap, I had very serious concerns before I accepted the invitation of the committee. Finally I decided – mainly for the two following reasons: (1) Despite repeated requests, both on my part and on

New York 1927 as Prologue to the World Championship

the part of the Argentine Chess Club, Capablanca refused to give a clear and definitive answer to my challenge and, in his letters and telegrams, gave me to understand unequivocally that it was necessary for me to come to New York if I wanted to reach an understanding with him; (2) My refusal could have been interpreted incorrectly by the chess world – that is, as a testimony of "fear" of Capablanca, which ultimately would have made it easy for him (if desirable) to replace me with the first- or second-place finisher, and then let the whole project proposed from Buenos Aires drop into the water.

And so I decided out of necessity to put at stake my perhaps unrepeatable opportunity in New York for the fight for the world title – and this, even though I could have no illusions about my form at the moment. Actually, the ten practice games that I had played about six weeks previously with Dr. Euwe in Holland had clearly convinced me that, due to a number of circumstances, among which the physical excessive fatigue following the strenuous tour in South America didn't play the least role, I found myself in one of my periods – fortunately not occurring frequently, and not lasting long – in which my thinking about chess requires a dual strain on the nerves and incomparably more time than otherwise demanded. As a result, I became much more quickly exhausted, and only in the rarest cases able to produce consistently good play. Under those circumstances, achieving second place in New York required a very special unfolding of the forces of will – far greater than at the later match in Buenos Aires – that in general went quite as planned, according to my requirements.

In qualitative terms, my achievements in New York would have meant for me a clear step backward – especially compared with the year 1925 (Paris, Baden-Baden) – if I'd known less precisely the reasons for this internal failure. It was significant to me, among other things, that I played particularly inaccurately, and sometimes downright poorly, only up to the moment (Cycle VI, in the game with Nimzovich), when I was still able to hope for the first prize. On the other hand, when I started playing, from the seventh round on, only for the second prize, I managed to get, despite the apparently inferior state, exactly the same score as Capablanca (9 out of 14). The reasons for my failure lay, as I said, mainly in the condition of my nerves at that time. And since I knew exactly how I could improve, I was quite calm with respect to the fight – it had to be a struggle from which I, if not necessarily winning, at least should emerge with honor.

The lineup of the tournament and its technical results can be seen from the adjacent tables and annotated games. But these tables don't speak of those who were missing. Therefore it's not superfluous to recall those names to the readers: they were (1) Dr. Lasker, who surpassed Capablanca in all the tournaments where he met him, and took away from him an historic match-up in St. Petersburg, 1914; (2) Bogoljubow, who, ahead of Capablanca (and by how much!), emerged as first in Moscow, 1925; (3) Rubinstein, who prior to Buenos Aires, was the only master who had a better result against Capablanca (+1, = 2); (4) Réti, who in New York

1924 won the only game against Capablanca that the world champion lost, and also put up bitter resistance at other encounters (for example, see the Moscow game); and (5) Dr. Tarrasch, who has an equal result against Capablanca (+1, -1; = 2).

When you put together the successes of those absent with the fact that up until then, none of Capablanca's invited European competitors in New York had won even one game against him – you have to admit that "the fate" of the world champion at the time was especially favorable, in that it assured him of maximum psychological preconditions for final success.

As far as the organization and management of the tournament itself is concerned, it is a pleasant duty for me to acknowledge that those were in fact quite irreproachable. In my long tournament practice, I have very few cases in memory where the contests were taking place so harmoniously and in such a pleasant, quiet atmosphere. The principal credit for this goes without doubt to the tireless secretary of the tournament competition, Dr. Norbert Lederer, who must be referred to as the soul of the whole event, and without whose cooperation the foreign masters hardly can imagine a tournament in the United States. But also grandmaster Geza Maróczy, as tournament director, and the press department director Hermann Helms, contributed in no small measure to the full outward success of the tournament. I believe myself to be pronouncing the opinion of all my European colleagues who participated in the tournament when I express the hope that all future tournaments, in technical and social respects, be organized just as perfectly as the one just discussed.

It is hardly possible to speak of the New York tournament without mentioning – at least in a sporting relationship – the sweeping role that Nimzovich was destined to play in the first half of the tournament. It's especially to be noted that his success in this period of the competition was very well deserved – just as deserved as his failure in the second half. The fact is that Nimzovich, in a contest with an equal opponent, is probably always doomed to fall from the highest level into the abyss, and then work his way back upward. For it is truly difficult to imagine that he should succeed suddenly, after a 25-year chess career, in changing his temperament entirely – this temperament, which until now helped him at times to get very special results, both of a combinational as well as purely positional nature, but sometimes threw him into the abyss.

I see the main fault in Nimzovich's creativity in some uncertainty in the treatment of opening positions that are unknown to him. Perhaps this uncertainty comes from his placing, in my opinion, exaggerated value on the preparation of an "opening repertoire," and consequently he does not feel at home every time he is placed in front of a new strategic opening problem — not in terms of variations, for he possesses more than enough technique to solve such a problem. Anyway, the fact is — although we can find roughly no case where Capablanca lost as a direct result

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of the opening (the game with Verlinsky forms the only exception, which confirms the rule) – that with Nimzowich, such cases happen fairly often (compare, for example, his third game with Vidmar from this tournament, the games with Lajos Steiner from Kecskemet and Berlin in 1928, some games from Baden-Baden, 1925). Instead, he showed in New York as well the valuable work he can produce after a fortunately survived opening (see his games with Vidmar and Spielmann from the Cycle I, and with the author in Cycle II). As I said, I'm of the opinion that in New York he filled just the spot corresponding to his current strength. But it will not surprise me at all if, in the future, he does something greater, because his path seems to lead upward.

The play of the other three participants generally made a very lame impression: Dr. Vidmar played less enterprisingly than usual, Spielmann gave up most of the games as draws far too early and had some bad luck besides (in the games with Nimzovich in the Cycle II, and with the author in Cycles I and IV). Finally, Marshall lost courage after an unfortunate start and played the end of the tournament in a class lower than his real strength.

Despite the aforementioned shortcomings in the performance of individual participants, I'm of the opinion that this tournament produced a number of valuable games, most of which either were not yet published, or were accompanied by quite superficial comments. So I hope the following work of annotation, in which it seemed to me to be particularly valuable to emphasize the scientific aspects of interesting openings, will be of use to the chess community. In my view, some lines of the Queen's Indian, the Caro-Kann, and the Dutch systems deserve special attention for opening theoreticians.

- II. It's well known that Capablanca's sporting success in New York was brilliant. But to what extent did the internal performance, the qualitative value of the games delivered, suit him? In order to come to an unbiased judgment about that, it's relevant to check his games against each individual opponent from an artistic point of view. Then one probably will have to come to the following conclusions.
- (A) With me, really just one game was played, the first one, for in the others I played for a draw as a result of my vulnerable tournament standing and bad shape. And since such a result was quite welcome for Capablanca as a consequence of the absence of otherwise serious competition these games actually never came to a struggle at all. So what can one say of the first game? First, the second player (Capablanca) chose a risky playing style, which with correct counter-play, as later analysis showed, would have put him in a difficult situation. But it turned out differently, because in contrast to my usual style (since at other times I play imprecisely now and then in worse opening positions, but almost never in better ones), White (me) played a number of inferior moves one after another, the refutation of which would have been easy even for an average master. Understandably, Capablanca took advantage of the opportunity accordingly and won quickly

and surely. Thanks to my bad play, the chess value of this game was equal to zero, the psychological value, on the other hand, enormous – not for the vanquished, but rather for the vast chess audience.

There was no doubt that right after this game, some 95% of the so-called expert critics endeavored to persuade the entire chess world (and succeeded in part) that in Buenos Aires, there would be no fight at all, but rather a massacre. If these gentlemen had taken the trouble to compare this referred-to game with any number of my average performances from tournaments of the last few years, they would have had to come to a somewhat different opinion. But it was clearly their lot to remain blind up to the end of the competition. Some – *Nomina sunt odiosa* (names are disagreeable) – remain so even now, probably because they don't want to see. On the other hand, you can't fight it, of course.

- **(B)** With Nimzovich, the four games took the following course:
- (1) Nimzovich (White) played the opening very inconsistently and quite weakly; also in the following play, he missed a series of game-saving possibilities. In the first half, Capablanca's play is by no means an example of accuracy. Admittedly the complex endgame was full of possibilities.
- (2) With White, Capablanca dispenses with any kind of initiative and seeks merely continuous exchange although the position certainly doesn't require such a trading. As a result a short, bland draw.
- (3) One of Capablanca's best games in the tournament in so far that in it, he is guilty of no detectable failure. But what a helpless impression Nimzovich's positional play makes! Move 16. g4, for example, is unworthy of even a mediocre amateur. By the way, in this game Capablanca's play is not consistently flawless (22...\2a5[?]), and only the final part is impressive in its logical simplicity.
- (4) A very bad game. Without compelling reason, Nimzovich lets his opponent have the open center file, through which a winning position is effortlessly achieved. But instead of the obvious \(\mathbb{I}\)d6, Capablanca plays 21.\(\mathbb{G}\)f2??, and the game is a draw!
- (C) With Dr. Vidmar, the case was not so simple for the ex-world champion he won only one game but also in this case he had to deal with an opponent who played somewhat under his usual league:
- (1) Through weak use of his middlegame opportunity on the d-file, Capablanca lets the opponent achieve an approximately balanced position, but then sets a positional trap for him (provocation to an only apparently "simplistic," but in fact fatal queen exchange, which could easily have been avoided) and gets a won

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endgame after its success. But then he fails completely and, after adjournment, allows his opponent a straightforward drawing simplification.

- (2) Following fortunate opening play, Capablanca leaves unused a simple possibility to secure a positional advantage, and hurries instead through a series of exchanges to give way to a drawish endgame. In the final position, Vidmar even stands a tad better.
- (3) As a result of the weak move 14...b4?, Capablanca gets positional domination as White. But instead of trying methodically to exploit this, he immediately brings about a simplification, which ensures him of an admittedly comfortable, though not won, endgame. Black loses this endgame as a result of remarkably imprecise play.
- (4) In general, no game, rather deforestation.
- **(D)** Spielmann was actually the only one who didn't play below his strength against Capablanca. His mistakes were generally not chess-related, but rather psychological in nature. That is to say, he couldn't conceive how one can conquer the "unconquerable," even with a better position.
- (1) An unfortunate opening idea of the first player (Capablanca), in conjunction with tactically inferior implementation, whereby, as things developed, the result is a forced pawn sacrifice. Then Capablanca picks himself up and finds redemptive counter-play in a couple of the opponent's inaccuracies.
- (2) A superficial handling of the not easy for Black, anyway 3. ②c3 variation of the Caro-Kann, in which the inclination to clear the board proves to be an insufficient means of equalizing. The game remained without a proper finish, because Spielmann suddenly called it a draw after he had obtained a clear advantage. It's more than doubtful that he would have done this against any other opponent.
- (3) In at-home analysis, Capablanca finds reinforcement for the variation used in Cycle I and, with Spielmann's indifferent countermoves, already obtains a winning position in the opening. The final combination is exactly calculated, but also very simple. The brilliancy game award is probably explained by the fact that Capablanca did indeed execute it so impeccably.
- (4) In general, the same picture as in the second game again the Caro-Kann, again the same tendency towards simplification in no way justified by the position. The difference is only that Spielmann forfeited his chances in an elementary way even before the "drawn ending," and as a result Capablanca probably could have played on for a win. The overall impression of the game is that both were playing without any strong interest.

- (E) With Marshall, Capablanca had as he has so often a very easy match:
- (1) In a Queen's Indian defended weakly by his opponent, Capablanca again overdoes the motif of simplification, and permits Marshall a chance to equalize. After this opportunity goes inexplicably unused (14...b5??), Capablanca plays the conclusion in good style.
- (2) Marshall again plays the opening very badly, and drops a piece on the 12th move. The rest is silence.
- (3) A less than satisfying game. Capablanca uses his opening chances imprecisely (especially the fight for c4 leaves a lot to be desired) and gives his opponent various opportunities to equalize chances. Finally Capablanca wins, thanks to some tactical errors by Black, first a pawn, then a second whereupon one could think that the fight was over. But right afterward, he makes an elementary blunder and, at the sacrifice of one of the extra pawns, allows a drawn endgame with bishops of opposite color.
- (4) The opening phase was handled by Capablanca, as Black, with great sophistication, and gradually he got a crushing positional domination (f5 together with the center file). But then follows a typical "simplification move" (permitting the rook exchange), which grants the possibility of a reprieve for White. Since Marshall blindly passes over this simple opportunity (32.g3), the subsequent endgame takes place as if by itself to win for Capablanca.

This was roughly the impression the Capablanca games in New York made on me as I (for the purpose of "preparation" for the match with him) reviewed them more precisely on the steamer *Massilia*, which brought me to Buenos Aires. Only then did it finally become clear to me how exaggerated were the general shouts of praise with which the quality of his performance in New York was greeted. That's supposed to be a chess machine? A "champion of all times?" What absurd pronouncements with respect to a player, whose overwhelming majority of games, while with no direct mistakes, exhibits about two to three omissions each, which either put the win in question or, countered with a suitable reply, seriously compromise his position.

But I have to state specifically that this "critique of the criticism" is directed solely toward the half-mythic Capablanca Überspieler (superplayer). For when one takes the trouble to rid his thinking of this anesthetizing legend, then one comes, of course, to the belief that Capablanca is entirely a first-class master, whose ability lies much more in intuition than in critical thinking. Before the match, it seemed only appropriate to determine objectively to what extent and in which form this, his primary quality, manifests in individual phases of the struggle. In the process, I came to the following insights, which in the most part were confirmed in Buenos Aires:

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(A) The Opening. As Capablanca himself tells us in one of his books (I think in Chess Fundamentals), in each individual chess battle he participates in, he uses basically only one or two openings or variations of the same opening. So it was in his contests with Marshall (the Spanish, and the ... De4 variation of the Queen's Gambit Declined) and Lasker (again the Spanish, Steinitz Defense, and the orthodox variation of the Queen's Gambit), so it was also — with few exceptions, which only prove the rule — in New York 1927 (the King's Fianchetto against the Queen's Indian as White, and Caro-Kann as Black). This limited repertoire is studied closely and in particular detail.

His opening theory knowledge, if not particularly many-sided – is characterized always with imposing depth and, above all, expediency. This economy of approach to developing an opening repertoire is definitely not to be criticized, by the way. If anything, it is much more suitable in its limited share of opening knowledge, chosen to produce lasting value, than the comprehensive and eclectic, yet unmethodical scrutinizing of the so-called "modern theoreticians." Let's not forget that also Lasker's opening repertoire, for example, was rather limited during his long-lasting brilliancy period – and yet probably no one can accuse him of superficiality or a lack of will to win...

The first seemingly logical conclusion which one can draw from the above observation would be that, in a match with Capablanca, it must be useful and advantageous, where possible, to vary the openings (or its branches), in order to bring him as quickly as possible out of the explored paths. But this observation would be correct only if, especially in the recent years of Capablanca's chess activity, a characteristic hadn't developed beyond all measure and hadn't traversed his entire creative work like a recurring theme. This is the instinct of self preservation to which he sacrificed so many beautiful, enticing trains of thought and placed such a number of rook pairs on the open file for exchange! This instinct, which at this stage his refined intuition serves almost exclusively, makes any attempt to gain the upper hand against Capablanca by a surprise in the opening ripe for failure from the beginning. Actually, no case is known, to me, at any rate, in which Capablanca was stumped by a complicated novelty; if anything, in such circumstances he unveils a maximum presence of mind and hits upon the only right thing (compare his familiar Spanish with Marshall, New York 1918); never has he gotten into a lost position as a result of a combinational surprise in the opening!

This extraordinary certainty in the disposal of any half-way real danger is explained by the fact that, exactly in the positions where such a thing could manifest, it was easiest for Capablanca to lead with his high trump — exactly that, which for so long secured him a predominance with regard to the other masters, even those of first class. It was this, his unmatched defensive technique, sharpened for simplification — a weapon, of which he availed himself with complete virtuosity, but only up to the unhappy moment where he (perhaps subconsciously)

began to regard it as an all-holy method in any random position. This tendency to exaggerate reveals itself in New York, of all places, thanks to which one of the main strengths of his style threatens to transform unequivocally into a serious weakness. Both in positions promising victory (in Cycle III, his game with Vidmar; in Cycle IV, with Marshall – just to name these), and in such positions where a chance to win already was eliminated for him (Cycle II and IV games with Spielmann), his use of the simplifying method was excessive by all means and, with better counter-play, could have had serious consequences. But since it was once again crowned with success, I was well able to assume that Capablanca would continue to use it (and in fact in the exaggerated way just described), particularly in the match – and from this assumption was able to profit in the following two ways:

- (1) With White, to avoid none of the simplified opening problems familiar to him in the assumption, that exactly their apparent simplicity will tempt him to want to solve it through any old system of exchange, a tendency which possibly can compromise his position. For a match, this tactic has the inestimable value that it decreases the possibility of a loss to the extreme (as is generally known, I lost no game as White) and, at the same time, not all too infrequently leads to positions that are not forced wins, but still contain within them the seed of a win. Of course, winning chances of this kind are mostly very difficult to accomplish and therefore, of the four games in which they existed (the 8th, 22nd, 28th, 34th), I succeeded in happily finishing off only the last. But on the other hand, the tactic proved itself brilliant from a psychological point of view, in that it forced my opponent to defend himself arduously for hours in positions where he himself no longer could hope for a win and so posed him thankless, from his point of view, unnecessary and disagreeable problems.
- (2) With Black, I strove in general to use the same method of simplification as Capablanca himself does in the defense, but where possible, only without exaggeration, and always keeping in mind that positions occur only all too frequently in which the weaknesses of the defending party manifest most clearly after simplification. Since this problem was a rather new one for me, I wasn't able, of course, to bank on 100% success. Yet in the middle of the match (games 8-24) where on the one hand I was rid of the indisposition I suffered at the beginning of the competition, but on the other hand had not yet entered the tired period of the final phase I found playing for a draw with Black absolutely no trouble.
- (B) The Middlegame. From the moment of the competition, where detailed knowledge takes a step back from pure art, those characteristics of Capablanca's style, which had helped establish his half-legendary reputation, appeared most clearly; above all, an exceptional swiftness in understanding, then an almost infallible, intuitive view of the positional. Curiously enough, these particular two gifts, which with appropriate application would have brought their possessor perhaps to

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unimagined heights as an artist, in effect led him to an opposite result – namely, to a dead point, to the belief that the art of chess is very near its worn-out end.

How was that able to happen? In order to answer this question correctly, it's necessary to penetrate into the psychological dangers, which the first of the above-named characteristics conceals. Actually, quickness in perception – the possibility of a nearly simultaneous overview of a series of tactical elements, which every complicated position holds within it – besides its obvious advantages (economy of thought and, as a result, self-confidence), contains the following temptation, which is difficult to avoid: all too easily, the player can lapse into the delusion that the good moves, which he sees immediately – or nearly so – by contemplation of the position, are absolutely the best, and as a result of this delusion, his creative work loses in depth what it gained in ease.

This gradual abandonment of seeking the absolute, the contentment with only good moves is unfortunately (for the art itself) characteristic of the current phase of Capablanca's chess career. Only two cases are exceptions for him: (1) In positions where the combinational element dominates in such a way that it literally forces him into exact reasoning (as for example, in the game with Dr. Tartakower, London 1922); (2) If he – mostly as a result of one or several clearly detectable enemy mistakes – has already gained sufficient domination for a win, then suddenly the true artist awakens in him, who finds pleasure in ending the fight in the quickest and thereby most elegant way. The most peculiar thing about it is that this tendency occasionally stands in no relation to the internal aggregate value of the game itself: thus he came to the idea, for example, of a forced queen sacrifice in the second game of the New York tournament with Marshall, after the latter, in a most unaesthetic fashion, already scrapped a whole piece in the opening.

It's clear that such cases of an awakening of the combinational spirit, caused by quite special positions, can be looked at only as exceptional occurrences. In contrast, as a rule one can observe in Capablanca's creative work over the years an ever-decreasing immersion in the details of a position, based on his unflappable (I'm speaking of the years before Buenos Aires) belief in the infallibility of his intuition. The saddest thing indeed was that this system – to work with the "second-best moves" – was enough for him almost without exception because, in the majority of cases, more or less helpless resistance, in a positional sense, opposed him. Through this "impunity" upon execution of the second-best moves he, on the one hand, gradually became weaned from steady concentration during a chess match, which alone can give an absolute guarantee against possible elementary blunders. On the other hand his self-confidence grew in the extreme, indeed turned into self-idolization. (Before the match, for example, he wrote in an Argentine newspaper that to become a world champion ranks among the miracles.)

No wonder that, in addition to mentally flawless strategic thought, his praxis of the last years displayed relatively more and more frequent cases of neglect of

winning, or simply of more favorable tactical opportunities. As examples from recent tournaments, it will probably suffice to allude to his games (as Black) with Yates and Marshall (New York 1924), with Dr. Lasker (Moscow 1925); the third game with Marshall and the fourth with Nimzovich (New York 1927). Also, rather severe blunders occur less rarely than in the beginning of his career; nevertheless, these are not at all always exploited by his opponents (compare the games with Sir Thomas, Hastings 1919; and Morrison, London 1922), but sometimes they lead to a loss (like the loss of the queen against Chajes, New York 1916, or missing the queen check on b2 against Réti in New York 1924).

As I said, such sporadic signs of intellectual weakness can in no way be regarded as rare exceptions – for the total number of tournament games delivered by Capablanca in recent years is very small compared to the quantitative performance of other grandmasters, and proportionately the number of his mistakes is therefore significant. Thanks to these observations, I came to the somewhat seemingly paradoxical conviction that the tactician Capablanca at present stands far behind the strategist; that as a result, it is necessary not to believe him in the middle game, that is, to check each of his tactical thoughts with the utmost meticulousness – for it is by no means impossible that a demonstrable "hole" will be found. This decision, which of course has nothing in common with a potential underestimation of the opponent, helped me in no small measure to make the most of Capablanca's omissions in a whole number of match games (1, 11, 21, 34).

(C). The Endgame. If possible, even larger tall tales were spread about Capablanca's performances in the last, semi-technical part of the game than about his handling of the opening and middlegame. All these exaggerations probably had root in the fact that Capablanca is the victor over Lasker, whose mastery, especially in the endgame – particularly in the complicated, not purely technical ones – over the course of at the very least two decades, stood at an unattainable height. Actually, one of the four decisive games of the Havana match (the 10th) was won by Capablanca in a splendidly implemented endgame. Certainly, one can find in his twenty-year chess career some other good endgame performances (for example, with Nimzovich, Riga 1913; Bogoljubow, London 1922; Réti and Dr. Tartakower, New York 1924). But about which of the present-day grandmasters can one not say the same thing? For that reason, it seems downright amazing the (proportionally) enormous number of endgame opportunities missed by him, which is far greater than the number of his mistakes or omissions in the middlegame.

In order to get a clear overall picture, I expect it's sufficient to review critically his games from (a) San Sebastian with Leonhardt (which he did win, but – as Dr. Tarrasch demonstrated – highly laboriously and thanks to the opponent's help), and Rubinstein (in which he plainly failed to notice the gleaming chance at a draw by means of a rook sacrifice); (b) Havana – with Marshall (in which he lost an endgame, after standing better, if not won, in the beginning); (c) New York

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1924, with the author (this game among others was a turning point in my grasping Capablanca's chess individuality); (d) Moscow 1925 with Torre and Spielmann; and finally, (e) New York 1927, with Vidmar from Cycle I. Then one will have to come to the realization that Capablanca is definitely no remarkable endgame artist, that his proficiency in this phase of the game is decidedly of a more technical nature, and that there are other masters (like Rubinstein, for example, in rook endgames) who in some variations certainly are or were superior to him.

In order to pull the discussion together succinctly, I can formulate my overall impression of Capablanca's method of play before the match: in the opening, he is only great as defender; the middlegame is his strongest suit, in which he now and then reveals also an attacking spirit; in the endgame he is not to be feared by a first-class master, for here he succeeds only in exceptional cases to rise above the mediocre.

As prologue to the world championship match, the New York Tournament had then a double and very real meaning – but one which differed completely from the opinion of the entire chess world concerning this last event: it gave Lady Fortune the opportunity to gift the Cuban hero with an ambiguous smile in which, besides outward encouragement, also a faint warning was imbedded; and it is really not her fault that her darling this time couldn't decipher her smile. Moreover, the tournament allowed his future opponent, immediately before the Armageddon, to verify observations of earlier years by a number of new examples, and so to come to the correct conclusions. May also the years to come bring us the greatest surprises – in any case, in the history of chess, the New York Tournament 1927 will be in the books as the starting point to that spectacle, which finally destroyed for our art the harmful legend of the human chess machine.

Cycle I

Round 1

½ Capablanca – Spielmann ½
 ½ Alekhine – Vidmar ½
 0 Marshall – Nimzovich 1

Standings after Round 1:

Nimzovich 1 Alekhine ½ Capablanca ½ Spielmann ½ Vidmar ½ Marshall 0

(1) Capablanca – Spielmann Queen's Gambit Declined [D38]

1.d4 d5 2.2)f3 e6 3.c4 2)d7

Dr. Lasker's move, the idea of which—as I understand it—consists much less in preparing the bishop sortie to b4 in connection with ...c5, which Spielmann and Dr. Vidmar delighted in using in New York, than in reserving the possibility of the Cambridge Springs Defense for himself, and with that, preventing the opponent from choosing the fashionable line 4.4g5 (after 3...2f6), together possibly with 2b1-d2. With this in mind, I also used the text move in my seventh match game with Capablanca.

4.c×d5 e×d5 5. ᡚc3 ᡚgf6

If White wanted to force this position, then he should have played first of all 4.2c3 and only upon 4...2g8-f6, 5.4g5 (as in the following game Alekhine-Vidmar); because in the text position, Black could avoid the following pin

with 5...c6, completely without harm. Such small inaccuracies in handling the opening aren't rare with Capablanca.

6.Ag5 Ab4(?)

Spielmann wants to force the counterpin variation at all costs, questionable in any case, which he - according to his own report - had analyzed carefully with Dr. Vidmar on the way to New York. But in the available position, the idea appears illogical; indeed, usually one makes the bishop move with the intention of forcing a clarification in the center (c×d5, ...e×d5) by means of tactical threats. If, however, the opponent already decided voluntarily on this clarification beforehand, then Black can bring about long-known positions, quite harmless to him, through ...c6, together with ... \$\\ e7, ... 0-0, ... \(\) e8 and ... \(\) f8, etc.

7.骨b3

Not a very happy thought – although, of course, White didn't need to get an disadvantage because of this move alone. If he absolutely wanted to move the queen, then more appropriate was 7. \$\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}}}} a4 - \text{which happened between the same players in Cycle III. I still believe that White doesn't need to get involved here with artifice, and can fortify his opening advantage rather through simple further development (e3, \$\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\text{\$\$\text{\$\t

7...c5!

Here completely correct, since it threatens the immediate counterattack \(\mathbb{G} \) a5, etc., and in the process, White lacks time to bring the king into safety by castling short.

8.a3 &xc3+

To 8... a5, 9. 2d2! would be a sufficient reply.

9.骨×c3

More in accord with the position was 9.b×c3, since against this formation, Black's queenside pawn supremacy would be much more difficult to mobilize than in the actual game.


9...c4!

The point of this good move is that now White can't play 10.e4, because of 10... ♠xe4, etc.

10.龄e3+

Still relatively the best move.

10...皆e7 11.皆×e7+ 當×e7



12.43d2?

Only after these angst-moves does White find himself at a direct disadvantage, which could be avoided with the natural 12.e4 – for example, with 12...d×e4 13.£e5! h6 (13...b5 14.a4) 14.£×f6+ £×f6 15.£×c4, etc., whereby chances and counter-chances would balance out.


12...h6 13. Ah4

In case of 13. \(\mathref{L}\) xf6 + \(\infty\) xf6 14.e4, Black would, following 14...\(\infty\) xe4 15.\(\infty\) xe4 dxe4 16.\(\mathref{L}\) xc4 \(\mathref{E}\) d8 17.d5 (or 17.\(\mathref{E}\) d1 \(\mathref{L}\) g4), block the passed pawn with 17...\(\mathref{E}\) d6, and later show his pawn supremacy to advantage on the kingside.

13...b5 14.e4

Bitter necessity; otherwise the queenside pawn advance would win rather easily as a matter of technique.

14...g5 15.Ձg3 ᡚ×e4 16.ᡚ×e4 d×e4 17.a4



The only possibility, of course, of avoiding the consolidation of the enemy pawn chain (with ...a6).

17... **Qa6**?

Until this moment, Spielmann had played the game perfectly and was now able, with 17...f5!, to maintain his material advantage in a good position, and retain excellent chances of winning. Capablanca (and also Dr. Tartakower in the Russian tournament book) gives the following variation: 18.2c7 2a6 19.h4 2hc8 20.2a5 g4 21.h5!, with prospects of a draw for White. I believe, however,

that only in absolute necessity would Black have to make the move ...g4, devaluing the pawn-chain, and in the case at hand, no such obligation existed. So instead of this, he should have played 20....2f6! in order to annul – in case of h×g5, ...h×g5 – the effect of the white rook on the h-file with either2f7-g7 or possiblyZh8. After the text moves, White achieves a longed-for draw through the coordination of his pieces, precisely carried out and intensified by a number of tactical threats.

18.a×b5 Q×b5 19.b3! 国hc8

As can be seen, Black has no more time to play ...f5, after his failing on the 17th move.

20.h4 a6

Strangely enough, after 20...g4, White would have had sufficient counter resources at his disposal – for example, 21. Le2 f5 (or h5) 22. Ea5! a6 23.b×c4 L×c4 24. Cd2!.

21.b×c4 Q×c4 22.h×g5 h×g5 23. 日 h6!

With the awful threat 24. Ad6+, etc.

23...5f6

Not 23...f6 because 24.\(\mathbb{L}\) \times c4 \(\mathbb{Z}\) \(\mathbb{Z}\) \times c4 \(\mathbb{Z}\) \times c4 \(\mathbb{Z}\) \(\mathbb{Z}\) \times c4 \(\mathbb{Z}\) \(\mathbb{Z}\) \times c4 \(\

Threatening 25.4×c4, together with Ξ e5+, etc. The rook attacks on both flanks are interesting.

24...**Д**b5

Evidence that he's already happy with a draw. Actually, there was nothing more here to get out of this position. If, for example, 24...包g4, then 25. 量b6 Q×f1 26. 国b7+ \$e8 27. \$vf1 国c1+ 28. \$e2 国a8-c8 29. 国b2, and White would have had nothing more to fear, considering the many enemy weaknesses.

25. **Q**×b5 a×b5 26. **E**×b5 **E**a1+27. **B**d2 **E**a2+

Insufficient is 27...e3+ after 28.f×e3! 2e4+ (or 28...\(\beta a 2 + 29.\(\beta d 3 \)) 29.\(\beta d 3 \)
 \(\subseteq x \) 30.\(\beta b 7 + \), together with \(\beta h 6 - h 8 + \)
 and \(\beta \times c 8 \). Capablanca proved himself once again to be a splendid tactician and cleverly saved a game, which strategically was inadequately conceived.

28.曾d1 囯a1+ ½-½

(2) Alekhine – Vidmar Queen's Gambit Declined [D38]

1.d4d5 2.c4 e6 3.\(\text{9}\)f3 \(\text{0}\)d7 4.\(\text{0}\)c3 \(\text{Qgf6}\) 5.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qb4}\) 6.c×d5 e×d5 7.e3 0-0

Lately this variation has been played occasionally up to this move, especially by Spielmann. Here, however, only 7...c5 seems to be in harmony with the sharp-edged bishop sortie of the previous move, whereupon the first player would then be forced to play a proper gambit with all its advantages and downsides - in fact, 8, 2d3 c4 9, 2c2 쌀a5 10.0-0요×c3 11.b×c3 쌀×c3, and now either 12. 當b1 or 12. 罩b1, both of which make Black's castling questionable. For example, 12.\bar{\text{\text{b}}}\text{1} 0-013.e4! d×e4 14. ad2 a3 15. ab4 a6 16. \(\text{\pm}\) xf8 exf3, and now – not as in the club tournament game MaróczyTenner, New York 1926, 17. 是e7? 營e6—but, of course, rather 17. 是b4 f×g2 18. 星e1, with the threat & h7+!, and White must win. After the imprecise text move, White in any case gets a good attack, without needing to sacrifice anything for it.

8.Qd3 c5 9.0-0Q×c3 10.b×c3 c4 11.Qc2 對a5

After this, White could try with 12. \$\beta\$ to bring about variations similar to those mentioned in the previous note. But his next move is even more effective.

12.4 e5!

The exchange of the c3-pawn for the h7-pawn, which this move intends, damages the position of the black king much more than is noticeable at first sight; therefore, it probably would have been more advisable for Black to beware "Greeks bearing gifts" by rejecting c3 and play 12...\(\mathbb{Z}\)e8 - for example, with a sequence similar to 13.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×d7 \(\mathbb{A}\)×d7 14.\(\mathbb{G}\)d2 b5 15.a4, when White would still have kept the better prospects.

12...骨×c3 13.分×d7! 分×d7

Quite bad, of course, would be 13...2xd7 14.2xf6, together with \(\mathbb{E}\)c1, etc.

14.骨b1!

The point of the 12th move: because of the strong threat of 15. 2e7, Ee8 16. 2b4, Black has no time to save his h-pawn.

14... **営e8 15. Q×h7+ 含h8 16. Qc2**

In spite of opposing superior strength on the queenside, White's advantage is entirely clear, and in spite of his proven resourcefulness, Dr. Vidmar cannot devise a sufficient parry against the many-sided threats (i.e., 17.e4, 17.\(\mathbb{d}\)d1, 17.\(\mathbb{d}\)a4).

16...分f8

If 16... \(\Delta \) b6, then simply 17.a4, etc.

17. Aa4!

Leads to the win of a pawn plus a more powerful position. The remainder should have been simply a matter of technique.

17...買e6

Forced.

18.龄b5

This, and not 18. \text{\textit{\textit{B}}f5} f6!, is correct.

18... **罩g6 19. 對×d5**

Should amply suffice, it's true. More economical first, however, was 19. 2 f 4!, when it would have been quite difficult for Black to invent anything else at all.

19...骨b4!

Quite shrewd subterfuge: Black defends squares b7 and f8, attacks a4 and apparently threatens the other bishop with 20... 2e6, etc. And still White has an easy save.

20.Qc2 Qe6 21.營e4

Of course not 21. \delta e5, f6, etc. But now the bishop is covered by the possible

queen check on h4, and in the following, White will have all to great a choice of various winning continuations.

21...f5 22.骨f4

Or 22. \$\delta h4+ \$\delta h7 23. \$\overline{\textit{L}}\$f4, etc.

22... ②h7 23.h4

This defense was planned with the previous move. But rather good also was 23. ♣h4 \(\begin{align*} \lambda 24. \\ \delta \end{align*} etc. \end{align*}

23...公×g5 24.h×g5 營e7 25.營h4+

White wants to lead the rook still further astray, and so allows his opponent some further swindles (see the remark to move 30). Incomparably simpler, in any case, was: 25. ₩h2+ ₺g8 26.f4, threatening e4, etc.

25...宣h6 26.曾g3 宣h5 27.f4

Hardly stronger was 27. \delta e5 \delta d8!, etc.

27...曾a3

With that he still provides the opponent with the most practical difficulties.

28.皆f3 g6 29.e4!


The simplest, because it forces a won endgame. Less clear by far would be 29.\mathbb{\mathbb{E}}\text{ab1} \mathbb{\mathbb{E}}\text{d8!}, etc.

29...曾b2 30.e×f5

Absolutely not a mistake – as some critics believed – but rather the intended consequence of the maneuver introduced by the previous move. Simpler, though, was 30. ⊌f2, and after 30... ₽g7

(intending ... \(\mathbb{H}\)ah8), 31. \(\mathbb{L}\)d1!, with an easy win.

30...曾×d4+31.曾f2



With this move, the position is finally clarified. Black is forced into a queen exchange and very soon will have to hand over his two united passed pawns. To White's misfortune, however, with his next move he permits himself to be distracted from the originally calculated winning plan.

31...曾×f2+ 32.曾×f2

With the rather worthless pawn-grabbing intention of this move, White misses the way to his hereto fore well-earned victory. Black gains adequate counter chances in the pure rook ending.

After 32. \(\mathbb{Z}\) xf5 (after 32...gxf5 33. \(\mathbb{Z}\)e1, etc., Black would perish because of his unfortunate bishop position) 33.g4! \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg4 34. \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h3 35. \(\mathbb{Z}\)e4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b8 36.f5, etc., Black would very soon have had to recognize the uselessness of further resistance.

32... Q×f5 33. Q×f5 g×f5 34. 互fd1

Winning a pawn with the threats 35. \(\text{Ed7} \) or 35. \(\text{Ed5/c5} \), which proved

to be insufficient, however, against determined counter-play. Likewise unclear would be 34.g4 f×g4 35.\$\display\$g3, \$\display\$g7!, etc.

34...買h7 35.買d5

On the other hand, at this moment, there was a last winning attempt: 35.g4!, fg4 36.\$\displaystyle{\pi}g3\$, since the opportunity to double rooks on the h-file would no longer be at the opponent's disposal.

35... 宣c8! 36. 宣×f5 宣d7 37. 宣e5 c3 38. 宣c1 c2 39. 宣e2 宣dc7 40. 當f3 b5 41. f5 當g7 42. 宣e6

With that, White expresses his peaceful intentions, since the terrible passed pawn on the seventh rank would thwart any serious attempt to win. For example, if 42.\$\Psi\$f4, then simply 42...\$\Pi\$c4+, and now the rook exchange 43.\$\Pi\$e4, after 43...\$\Pi\$e4+ 44.\$\Pi\$xe4 \$\Pi\$c3!, together with ...\$\Pi\$4, etc., would actually seriously endanger White's game.

42...買d7

He also could have tried 42... 豆c3+, when 43. 豆e3 would be the simplest.

43.\(\mathbb{E}\)e2 \(\mathbb{E}\)dc7 44.\(\mathbb{E}\)e6 \(\mathbb{E}\)d7 45.\(\mathbb{E}\)e2 \(\frac{1}{2}\)-\(\frac{1}{2}\)

(3) Marshall – Nimzovich French Defense [C01]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.ᡚc3 Ձb4 4.e×d5 e×d5 5.ᡚf3

With his last, White foregoes even a shade of an opening advantage – and even more: now Black gets the chance, through a possible exchange on c3, to

brand the resulting doubled pawn as a permanent weakness. More frequently, 5. \(\textit{4d}\)3 occurs immediately.

5... වe7 6. 🖺 d3 ව bc6 7.h3

Upon immediate castling, 7... \(\textit{Q} \)g 4 isn't so pleasant. The difference in the development of the king's knights becomes noticeable, to the disadvantage of White

7...Ae6

Encouraged by the unfortunate opening tactic of the opponent, Nimzovich did without the more obvious exchange maneuver, 7....2f5, in favor of a more complicated, interesting, yet probably not-quite-correct, manner of play.

8.0-0 曾d7 9. Qf4

Simpler was 9.2e2, with roughly the same game. But the text move is also not to be dismissed – and even offers good, practical chances, in that it leads the opponent to a foolhardy experiment.


9...Axc3

In the last few years, the play against pawns in the center, weakened by doubling, became one of Nimzovich's most preferred strategic motifs, and he dealt with such positions – which he knew how to bring about from the most diverse openings – with special virtuosity. Here, however, he was mistaken, because the uncertainty of his king's position should have prevented him, in the following play, from benefiting from the weaknesses. With 9...Qd6, he could, of course, have had a comfortable equality.

10.b×c3 f6

The necessary supplement for the previous move: After the disappearance of the king bishop, the dark squares must be protected with pawns where possible. But now e6 becomes weak.

11. 臣b1 g5 12. Qg3 0-0-0



The king takes on the defense of b7 and c7. The king's role of defense has been strongly underestimated for a considerable time (after the desperate attempt by the aging Steinitz to use this piece to attack on a full board was a miserable fiasco) – and only the years after the war seemed to bring a gradual about-face in this respect. One can examine the games of the Buenos Aires match, for example, where the kings, already in the middle game, were used now and then to defend key squares – that is, functioning as active pieces even before the endgame.

Black's last moves, with their original strategic approach, must make a pleasing impression on anyone who believes in the evolution and depth of chess thought. Therefore it's almost too bad that upon closer examination of this position, it becomes clear that Black's plan was not only not the best, but in-

stead, with correct (and not at all abstruse) counter-play, must bring the second player a completely unenviable situation. So he would have done better to choose instead of 11...g5, the down-to-earth 11...\$\(\delta\)d8, together with ...0-0, etc.

13.皆e2?

The opponent's temerity breaks Marshall's train of thought, and here and in the following play, he makes a couple of errors in precision that are hardly to be made up for. Instead of the queen move, for example, the less stereotyped (since with \$\mathbb{\text{e}}\varepsilon_2\$, White threatens only quite clumsily 14. \$\mathbb{\text{a}}\varepsilon_6\$, which is deflected in the easiest way) attack formation beginning with 13. \$\mathbb{\text{d}}\varepsilon_2! is called for. If after that, for example, 13...\$\mathbb{\text{b}}\varepsilon_6\$, then 14. \$\mathbb{\text{b}}\varepsilon_6\$ bf 15. \$\mathbb{\text{e}}\varepsilon_2\$ - this time with really unpleasant threats.

Therefore, Black could better answer 13. ව්d2 with 13...වa5, with the necessary idea of exchanging the enemy knight on the way to c5. But - apart from the fact that this exchange would put a better face again on the White pawn queenside position, and consequently show the inadequacy of the plan introduced with $9... \triangle \times c3$ – in this case White wouldn't at all have had to play 14. වb3 immediately. Instead of this, 쌀c1 (or possibly 쌀a3) would have been lasting and good - and only then the knight move. As one can easily be convinced, White would have kept a lasting initiative with this method of play. Now he gets into a tight spot bit by bit.

13...買de8!

Defense (making an escape square, d8, for the king) and counterattack at the same time.

14.\fe1

If 14.且a6, then 14...b×a6 15.增×a6+ 含d8 16.且b7 包f5! 17.且×c7 增×c7 18.且×c7+ ⑤×c7, etc., with an easily winning game.

14...**包f5** 15.**总**×f5

After the disappearance of this bishop, the queenside pawn complex becomes quite weak, and the prospects in the endgame become so much the grimmer. In spite of the apparent danger, 15. Ah2 would have offered him more chances.

15... Q×f5 16. 皆b5 勾d8 17. 皆c5?

The decisive mistake, because now the second player can occupy the correct queenside defense formation with gain of tempo. With 17. \$\preceq\$ a5! (17... \$\precep\$ b8 18.c4!, with some chances in the complications), this would have been avoided.

17...b6 18.皆a3 當b7 19.皆b3

Beginning of the tragedy – otherwise c2 was hard to guard.

19...ഉc6 20.ഉd2

What on the 13th move would have meant the beginning of a very promising attack is now merely a shy defensive move against the penetration of the black knight to c4. It gets ever more gloomy.

20...分a5 21.皆b2 莒×e1+ 22.莒×e1 莒e8

Apart from the fact that Black doesn't need these pieces for the exploitation

of his positional advantage, a purely tactical idea also forms the basis of the double-rook exchange. Black gets rid of the threat, floating in the air, of 2b3-c5+ (after 2d2-b3), and with that avoids the otherwise inevitable knight exchange.

What else? With 24. \$\frac{1}{2}\$f1, for example, 24...\$\frac{1}{2}\$a4 would already be very strong.

24...\$c8(?)

Probably time pressure, since otherwise the omission of 24... 쌀e2! – which after 25.쌀c1 puts White at a standstill, and after 25.신b3 신c4 26.신c5+ 쌓c8 27.신d3 신d2!, forces material gain with a continuous attack – is inexplicable.

25. 骨d1 骨e6

Also 26...\\$c6 was strong.

26. 9b3 9c4 27. 9d2 9a3 28. 9f1 9xc2

The loss of this pawn perhaps would have still been bearable for White with the bishops of opposite color, if he wouldn't have to suffer from the remaining – and incurable – weaknesses of his queenside. But as it is, he has only to wait until the opponent gives the *coup de grace*.


After 32. ac1 ac1!, etc., he would gradually suffocate.

Otherwise 35...2b5, together with ...2d3, etc.

35... 4h5 36. 4e5 g4 37. h×g4

Kingside pawn exchanges are beneficial only to Black, who, on the other side, possesses completely sufficient material to win. Therefore, 37.h4 was certainly more advisable from a practical point of view.

37...Q×g4 38.&e3 Qf5 39.Qg7



39...**⊈e**6!

Threatens to win a pawn with 40...\(2\)b5, etc., which at this moment, on account of the response c3-c4, would still be premature. White, apparently under time pressure (the 40th move!) misses the threat, whereupon the endgame causes no more difficulties at all. It was also won, however, after 40.\(2\)d3!, for example: 40...\(2\)d7 41.\(2\)f8 \(2\)f5+42.\(2\)e3 \(2\)c2+ 43.\(2\)f4 \(2\)g6 44.\(2\)e5 \(2\)e3 \(\frac{2}{2}\)c3 \(\frac{2}{2}\)c3 \(\frac{2}{2}\).

40.Af8? 5b5 41.5b1 a5

Also fine was 41... \$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$4}}\$.a4 \$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$4}}\$.a*b5, Black plays the simplest, 43... \$\textit{\$\

pawn exchange, forces his way to c4 with the king.

42. \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$d}}\$2 \$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$

Marshall could easily have spared himself the next fifteen moves.

46. Lg7 Lc4 47. Be3 Bb7 48. Lh6 Ba6 49. Bd2 Lf1 50. g3 Bb5 51. Bc1 Bc4 52. Bb2 c5 53. Le3 cxd4 54. Lxd4 b5 55. Lb6 a4 56. La5 d4! 57. cxd4 b4 58. Lb6 a3+59. Ba2 Bb5 60. Lc5 Ba4 0-1

Round 2

0 Nimzovich – Capablanca 1 0 Spielmann – Alekhine 1 ½ Marshall – Vidmar ½

Standings after Round 2:

Alekhine 1½
Capablanca 1½
Nimzovich 1
Vidmar 1
Marshall ½
Spielmann ½

(4) Nimzovich – Capablanca Queen's Gambit Declined [D30]

1.c4 2f6 2.2f3 e6 3.d4 d5 4.e3

As is well known, 4.2g5 and 4.2c3 are more vigorous here, and at the same time quite credible developmental moves. But that is the way it is – in New York one played against Capablanca usually in such a way, as if there were a mot d'ordre to play only the second- or third-best moves against him.

4...Qe7 5.43bd2

Why this artifice? Other moves (5.c3, 5.\(\textit{a}\)d3) were more sound, that is, more in keeping with the demands of the problem of the center.


5...0-0 6. Ad3

More in harmony with the previous move was the flank development of the queen bishop (6.b3) or first, 6.\(\textit{Le}2\).

6...c5 7.d×c5

Once again, 7.b3, together with 8.\(\mathbb{L}\)b2, would have lead to a full game with chances on both sides. The text move should result in a rapid simplification of the position.

7...4)a6



A good move, but one that should lead only to equality.

8.0-0?

That is the actual mistake, which relinquishes control of the whole board to Black. Virtually taken for granted here was 8.句b3 d×c4 (if 8...分×c5 9.分×c5 營a5+ 10.益d2 營×c5, then 11.豈c1, rather to White's advantage) 9.鼻×c4

쌍×d1+ 10.쌍×d1 ②×c5 11.②×c5 Д×c5 12.쌍e2=.

8...2 xc5 9. 2e2 b6 10.cxd5?

This systematic and uninterrupted development of the opponent in the midst of sacrificing time and space is tantamount to a positional hara-kiri. White should still play 10.b3. He refrains too long from this possibility, until he incurs a lost position just on account of the encapsulated queen bishop.

And now he seeks to trade the already developed bishop, and leaves the other one quietly sleeping. Indeed, in this game, Nimzovich is not to be recognized. Preferable was 13.单位2 增f6 14. 增b3 (e5) 15.单c3, etc.

13...曾f6!

Justifiably, Black doesn't bother in the least about further losses in tempo planned by the opponent (the exchange on a6 was otherwise surely easy to prevent with ...a6) and plays only to take advantage of the cl-bishop's lack of development. A sounder, more appropriate plan, but one, which, for a change, Capablanca doesn't implement with the necessary precision.

14. Qa6 Q×a6 15. \\ ×a6 \(\)b4(?)

This knight maneuver in particular appears to be somewhat superficially calculated and merely leads to a facilitated exchange for the opponent. Simple and strong here was 15... Ifd8, together with possibly ... e5-e4, against which

White would hardly have found a sufficient defense in the long run.


16.皆e2 買fd8 17.a3

Better than 17.2e1, whereupon the simple doubling of rooks (17...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d7) would be very strong.

17... 白d3 18. 白e1 白×e1 19. 萬×e1 閏ac8 20. 買b1 皆e5

This so-much admired queen move should have just as little success as everything else: Black just threw away the substance of his advantage with his unfortunate knight maneuver. Certainly White may not now successfully play 21.b4, on account of 21...\$\text{2d6}\$ 22. g2-g3 \$\text{g}\$e5-e4, with the subsequent penetration of the rooks. But he had simpler ways out in the following play.

21.g3



This new, highly precarious debilitation of the light squares was hard to avoid, since with the plausible move 21.皇d2, Black would get the advantage in the following way: 21...皇d6 22.g3 置c2 23.營d3 置b2! 24. 皇c3 置xb1 25. 皇xe5 置e1+ 26. 雲g2 皇e7, etc.

21...皆d5!

The right move, because with it, a further weakness is forced. On the other hand, Capablanca's assertion (in his written commentary to this game for the English tournament book) that 21...皆e4 would have won a pawn is based on an error: that is to say, after 22.虽d2, Black couldn't have played 22...虽×a3?, because then the missing Luft would have become disastrous for him; for example, 23.b×a3 邑c2 24.邑bc1! 邑b2 25.邑ed1 曾d5 26.e4! 曾d7 27.虽b4!, and wins.

With the unpleasant threat 24...a5.


24.\alpha 1?

A weak palliative. To save the game, he should play 24.\(\mathcal{B}\)bdl! – for example, (1) 24.\(\mathcal{E}\)\(\mathcal{A}\)d1 25.\(\mathcal{E}\)\(\mathcal{A}\)d1 a5 26.\(\mathcal{D}\)\(\mathcal{A}\)a5 (or 26...\(\mathcal{Q}\)\(\mathcal{A}\)a3 27.\(\mathcal{B}\)a6!) 27.\(\mathcal{B}\)a6 \(\mathcal{E}\)c2 28.\(\mathcal{E}\)d8 \(\mathcal{B}\)\(\mathcal{A}\)b2 (or 28...\(\mathcal{E}\)\(\mathcal{D}\)b2 29.\(\mathcal{E}\)\(\mathcal{A}\)ft, etc., with perpetual check) 29.\(\mathcal{B}\)d6; or (2) 24...a5 25.\(\mathcal{E}\)\(\mathcal{A}\)d8 \(\mathcal{E}\)\(\mathcal{A}\)d4!, etc., with sufficient counter threats.

24...曾b3 25.Qd4?

Even now 25. Zac1 could still occur, with variations similar to those mentioned above. The d4-square is not secure for the bishop, since ...e5 hovers continuously in the air.

25...買c2 26.皆a6?



With this, the game is finally lost. (It's strange, by the way, how many weak moves White had to make in order to get to this result!) To be sure, it looked bad anyway — but after 26. 營f1 or 26. 營d1 (intending 邑e2), there were still some hopes of rescue.

26...e5!

The beginning of a forceful endgame, which in a way compensated for the mutual omissions of the previous phase.

Nice is the "main variation," 28.宣f1 徵×e3! (as in so many problems and studies, there's also a sideline cook here, by the way: 28...竳d5, together with ...竳f3) 29.皇f4 莒×f2!, with early mate. And 28.ভf1 would not have saved the game – for example, 28...竳d5 29. 总d4, 營h5! (indicated by Capablanca, and much better than 29...쌀f3, which could be answered with 30.罝ac1) 30.h4 (otherwise, 30...罝×f2, etc., with a sufficient pawn preponderance) 30...쌀f3, with annihilation.

28...買×f2 29.g4 皆e6 30.具g3 買×h2!

A second nice twist: if 31. 4×h2, then 31... 学×g4+ 32. 管h1 管h3!, together with mate. Weaker in contrast would be 30... 学×g4 on account of 31. 适f1, etc.

31.皆f3 買hg2+ 32.皆×g2 買×g2+ 33.皆×g2 皆×g4

The rest is already quite easy.

34. ad1 h5 35. ad4 曾g5 36. ah2 a5 37. ae2 a×b4 38. a×b4 鱼e7

39.莒e4 夏f6 40.莒f2 曾d5 41.莒e8+ 曾h7 0-1

(5) Spielmann – Alekhine Sicilian Defense [B40]

1.e4 c5 2.分f3 e6 3.d4 c×d4 4.分×d4 分f6 5.Дd3

With this move, in my opinion, Black gets easy equality. More promising – but also more double-edged, on account of Black's possible pressure on the c-file – is 5.5/c3.

5...2c6 6.2xc6

To 6.2e3, 6... d5 7.2d2 e5!, etc., suffices for equality.

6...d×c6

After 6...b×c6, the mobilization plan of 7. ₩e2, together with 8.0-0 and 9.c4!, etc., would have been unpleasant for Black.

7. **公d2**

The knight, for whom no fine future beckons from c3, is steered to more promising squares. It's plain, though, that this procedure can cause Black no great difficulties.

7...e5 8.5)c4 Ac5! 9.Ae3

Not 9.2×e5? \d4, etc.

9...⊈×e3 10.ᡚ×e3 ⊈e6 11.0-0 0-0

Black stands a tad better, mainly on account of the blockage on e4, which somewhat limits the freedom of movement of the white pieces. Still, an early

draw is anticipated following the hardto-avoid rook exchange on the only open line.

12.皆e2皆b6 13.c3 莒ad8 14.莒fd1 皆c5

Unfortunately, White can't so easily get around to doubling the rooks on the d-file, since after 14... \(\mathbb{Z}\)d7, there follows 15.\(\mathbb{L}\)c4!, rather to White's advantage.

15.\ac1 a5

Otherwise 16.b2-b4.

16. Ab1 g6

17. Ed2 a4 18. Ecd1 皆b6 19.g3

Although at the moment White influences the open file somewhat more than his opponent, White can't strengthen Black's position so easily—after 19.h3, for example, 19... 2h5 could well enough follow. The text move, however, which also should serve as preparation for a possible f4, allows the following simplifying maneuver.

19...買×d2 20.骨×d2

If 20.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\times d2, then of course, 20...\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} d8, etc.

20...2 g4!

With this, Black apparently gets the advantage – but only just apparently. Certainly 21.包f1 曾g7, with the threat 目f8-d8, etc., as well as 21.包×g4

A×g4, together with \(\beta\)d8, etc., looks rather uncomfortable for White, but he has a face-saver in ...

21.4\f5!

- which at least eliminates the unpleasant enemy bishop.

21...A×f5

There was no choice, since the variation 21...g×f5 22.e×f5 增×f2+ 23. ∀xf2 ♠xf2 24. ∀xf2 ♣d5 25.f6! ☐e8 26. ♠f5!, etc., would obviously be very favorable for White.

22.exf5 分f6

Or first of all 22... \$g7.

23.骨d6

If 23. 曾g5, then 23... 互d8!, etc.


23...曾g7 24.閏d2 閏e8 25.f×g6 h×g6 26.皆b4

Because of the threatened thrust of the e-pawn, White has hardly anything better than this offer to exchange, which, however, should suffice.

26...骨×b4

If Black wanted to play for a win, then he could have pulled the queen back to a7 without risk. After the queen exchange, it would have been the most reasonable for him to accept the opponent's correctly offered draw.

27.c×b4



27...a3

To his regret, the author has to state that this, his brain child – although it looks quite aesthetic on the surface – in no way merits the exclamation mark awarded it by most all critics. To the contrary, this move should have led, with correct technique on the part of the first player, to a compromise of the black position, and after 27... 2d5 28.a3 (or b5) f5, etc., to an easy draw.

28.b×a3 買a8 29.買d3 e4 30.買e3

As desired, although not yet jeopardizing Black's game; on the other hand, 30.\(\mathbb{Z}\)b3! would have put a rather difficult task in front of the opponent, becauseafter 30... \(\mathbb{Z}\)d8, then 31.a4! would follow – with the threat of speedily using the queen side pawn preponderance by means of a5, a4, together with b5, etc. Admittedly, different counterattacks - like ... \mathbb{I}d1+, together with ... \mathbb{I}d2 and ... 2g4; or ...e3, together with ... \(\mathbb{I}\)d2, etc. - were then at Black's disposal. Yet, even so, a draw would be Black's best result and this only after a tough battle. If, however, 30. \(\bar{2}\) b5, then 31. \(\bar{2}\) f1, and the Blackrook couldn't penetrate. Now Black forces a quite pleasant rook endgame.

30.... 句d5! 31. 萬×e4 句c3 32. 萬e1 萬×a3 33. 當f1 當f6 34. h4 勾×b1

Black's position is not really strengthened, especially since White threatens to free up a corner pawn; if, for example, 34... \(\tilde{\text{Z}} \) a 4 35. \(\tilde{\text{Z}} \) c 1 \(\tilde{\text{Z}} \) 36. \(\text{D5} \)! c \(\tilde{\text{D5}} \) 37. \(\tilde{\text{Z}} \) c, etc.

35.買×b1 買×a2 36.買e1?

Hardly had the rook endgame begun, when White already commits the decisive error. As becomes immediately apparent, the idea to defend the b-pawn from the fourth rank is quite an unfortunate one, and the intended cordoning off of the black king from the queenside is not executable. Correct was 36. Eb3!, in connection with an immediate exploitation of the kingside chances; for example, 36...\$e5 37.\$\mathbb{E}e3+\$\mathbb{G}\$d5 38.\$\mathbb{E}f5\$ 39.h5! g×h5 40.\$\mathbb{E}*f5+\$\mathbb{G}\$c4 41.\$\mathbb{E}*h5\$ \$\mathbb{E}*b4 42.g4, etc. Then a drawn ending could hardly fail to materialize.

36...≌a4 37.≌e4 c5

As a result, Black obtains a winning position, since after \mathbb{I}f4+, the pawn obviously still can't be taken.

38.闰f4+ 曾e6 39.闰e4+ 曾f6


Although not in great time pressure, Black favors figuring out the not-so-easy-to-calculate consequences of the king move to d5 only after the time control at move 40. At this moment, he is certainly still able to allow himself this luxury. But his next, indifferent, move seriously imperils the win.

40.耳f4+ 曾e7(?)

The king had to move specifically to e6, in order to be able to go from there immediately to d5, because he mustn't

go to f6 any more – since the position would repeat for the third time. After this omission, White again gets chances for a draw.

41. 其e4+ 内d7



If 41...\$f8, then 42.\(\mathbb{I}\)e5 c×b4 43.\(\mathbb{I}\)b5 e7-f8, etc. – draw.

42.g4

His only chance; insufficient would be 42.\(\mathbb{I}\)f4 \(\mathbb{B}\)e6 43.\(\mathbb{I}\)e4+ \(\mathbb{B}\)d5! 44.\(\mathbb{I}\)e7 c×b4! (not so clear by far are the consequences of 44...\(\mathbb{I}\)×b4 45.\(\mathbb{I}\)×f7, etc.) 45.\(\mathbb{I}\)×b7 \(\mathbb{B}\)c4!; for example, 46.\(\mathbb{I}\)c7+ \(\mathbb{B}\)d3 47.\(\mathbb{I}\)d7+ \(\mathbb{B}\)c2 48.\(\mathbb{I}\)c7+ \(\mathbb{B}\)b2 49.\(\mathbb{I}\)×f7 b3 50.\(\mathbb{I}\)f6 \(\mathbb{B}\)a3!, etc. With his 40th move, Black gave up precisely this advantage out of convenience.

42...c×b4

43.h5 b5

Contrived; after the simpler 43...g×h5 44.g×h5 b5, White would have a difficult game – for example, 45.h6 b3 46.豆e3 b2 47.豆b3 含c6! 48.豆×b2 豆h4∓, etc.

But after 46. 基×a4 (instead of 46. 基e3) 46... b×a4 47.h7 b2 48.h8 b1 b+49. \$g2, the queen endgame would have been very difficult, if possible at all, for Black to win.

44.h6 b3 45.\(\mathbb{A}\)e3

The rook exchange would clearly be less favorable now than in the variation above. On the other hand, now the fourth rank is blocked at the moment by the white gpawn, so that White succeeds in capturing the enemy passed pawn, without having to surrender his own.

45...b2 46.買b3 當c6

Of course not 46... 프a1+ 47. 출g2 b1 발 48. 프×b1, together with h7.

47. **営×b2(?)**

This should also suffice; but 47.f3! \(\mathre{\pi}\)a2 (47...\(\mathre{\pi}\)a2 48.\(\mathre{\pi}\)g1!) 48.\(\mathre{\pi}\)xb2 \(\mathre{\pi}\)xf3+ 49.\(\mathre{\pi}\)g2\(\mathre{\pi}\)e3 (-d3, -a3) 50.\(\mathre{\pi}\)f2, etc., was much easier.

47...買×g4 48.買c2+ 當b6

Black has to let the enemy rook advance to the eighth rank – since 48...\$b7 49.\$\mathbb{Z}\$c5 b4?, would be a worse trap to fall into because of 50.\$\mathbb{Z}\$h5!.

49.買c8 買h4 50.買h8 b4 51.愛e2 愛c7

Obviously, the king may not move forward because of h7, and the last, weak chance of a win for Black now consists in his crossing over, where possible, to the kingside.

52.曾d3 宣h3+ 53.曾c2 b3+

54. 當c1!

More exact than 54.\$\displays b2 \displays d6 55.\$\displays b8 \displays e5! 56.\$\displays xh6 \displays, etc.

54... 国h1+ 55. 曾b2 曾d6

The winning of the f2-pawn with 55... \(\mathbb{E}\) h2 was still of no importance on account of a later \(\mathbb{E}\) f8, etc.

56.曾×b3

Here White appears to have seen a ghost, since otherwise he would have chosen the quite simple path to a draw: 56.h7 含e7 57.含×b3 含f6 58.含c3 含g7 59. 三a8 含×h7 60.含d2, etc. Even so, White can allow himself some things in this position.

56...曾e5! 57.曾c4

After an inferior move – again quite a good one. His idea consists in answering the threatening advance of the black king in case of need with an analogous maneuver of his own – for example, 57...\$e4 58.\$c5! \$f3 59.\$d6 \$xf2 60.\$e7 f5 61.\$f6, etc., draw. What's more, 58. \$d3 looms, with a fully secure position.

57... 闰h3!

Black still tries everything possible, but should not have succeeded.


58.**萬e8+**

In connection with the following, probably the simplest process.

58...當f5 59.當d4! 莒×h6 60.當e3 當g4 61.罝e4+

With this, the next mistake is prepared. Safest was to reach a draw with 61. De2! Ah1 62. De4+ Df5 63. Da4, etc.

61...**\$**h3



62.耳f4?

With this instructive mistake, White allows the decisive encircling of his remaining pawn. 62. \$\div 2\$, etc., would still have sufficed for a draw.

62...f5 63. 互f3+

Loses quickly, but after 63.\(\mathbb{\pi}\) a4, as well as after 63.\(\mathbb{\pi}\) e2, Black would have ultimately won with 63...\(\mathbb{\pi}\) g2, etc.

63...曾h2! 64.閏f4 閏h3+ 0-1

There would follow 65. ... \$\display 22, where-upon the white pawn obviously can't be saved.

(6) Marshall – Vidmar Four Knights Game [C49]

1.e4 e5 2.句f3 වc6 3.වc3 වf6 4.ቧb5 ቧb4 5.0-0 0-0 6.d3 ቧ×c3 7.b×c3 d6 8.ቧg5 발e7

The well-known Metger Defense, which usually leads to difficult positional battles after 9. He1 2c6-d8-e6, and lately is preferred, especially by Rubinstein. It's not so dangerous for White, however, that he has to immediately lay waste to the position by the following unimaginative exchange.

9. A×c6(?) b×c6 10. 互b1

If the first player let himself be misled into the exchange on c6 because of his ensuing occupation of the b-file, then he evidently overestimated the value of this pressure – because the penetration-point b7 is protected for now, and even if the white rook succeeds in occupying it for a moment, this fact wouldn't have great meaning in most cases.

10...h6 11. A×f6

After 11.2h4, ...g5 could have occurred quite harmlessly.


11...曾×f6 12.曾e2

More prudent first would be 12.c4, in order not to have to work with the dubious sacrificial offers that follow.

12...曾e6!

Not only is $\forall \times 2$ threatened, but also f5 14. exf5 $\forall \times 6$ 5, etc., with a clear positional advantage. Therefore Marshall decides to go all out.

13.4)h4!?



13...骨f6?

This queen move, in connection with the following repetition, bears witness to a timidity in no way resembling the usual Dr. Vidmar. After 13...曾×a2, what dangers hovered before him? After 14.c4 (otherwise the queen heads back immediately), 14...曾a5 15.f4 (or 15.曾e3 皇c7) 15...e×f4 (or first 15...曾c5+) 16.宣×f4 曾g5 17.旦bf1 a5 16. Rflxf4, Qa5-g5 17. Rbl-fl, a7-a5, etc., White probably would have sought in vain for compensation for the dangerous passed pawn. In any case, the position was worth playing out.

14.句f3 쌀e6 15.句h4

Encouraged by the opponent's apparent peacefulness, for the second time White lets the pawn hang.

15...皆f6? 16.幻f3 皆e6 ½-½

Draw!

Round 3

1 Capablanca – Marshall 0 ½ Alekhine – Nimzovich ½ ½ Vidmar – Spielmann ½

Standings after Round 3:

Capablanca 2 ½
Alekhine 2
Nimzovich1½
Vidmar 1½
Spielmann 1
Marshall ½

(7) Capablanca – Marshall Bogo-Indian Defense [E11]

1.d4 &f6 2.&f3 e6 3.c4 &b4+ 4.&d2 &xd2+5.&bxd2 d5?

Just after White had taken back with the knight, it was entirely out of place to introduce the prospect of a piece coming to the c4-square by bringing about a balanced position in the center. Instead, now 5...d6, together with ...e5, is in accord with the bishop exchange on the fourth move – in order to occupy the dark squares, no longer guarded by the bishop – which disappeared so quickly – with pawns.

6.g3 0-07.Ձg2 幻bd7 8.0-0龄e7

Likewise, the immediate 8...b6 came under consideration here. But the text move is not as bad as the commentators have said.

9.皆c2 b6 (!)

Looks like a kind of blunder, but in reality exactly calculated. Neither could

White have obtained a tangible and strong advantage with continuations other than the one he chose – for example, 10.2e5 2×e5 11.d×e5 2g4! 12.c×d5 e×d5 13.2×d5 □b8, and e5 falls.

Or instead of the 11th move played in the game (11. e4), 11.a3, then 11...c5!, and Black, who would sometimes have the tempo-gainer 12... a6 at his disposal, would apparently emerge unscathed.

10.c×d5 ᡚ×d5 11.e4 ᡚb4!

The point of the relief maneuver, introduced with 9...b6. On the other hand, unsatisfactory would be 11...\25f6 12.\subseteq xc7\(\textit{La6}\) 13.\(\textit{Efc8}\) 14.\subseteq f4\subseteq b4, on account of 15.\(\textit{2b}\) 3 or 15.b3, etc.


12.皆c3 (!)

In this way, at least the troublesome knight is driven to the modest a6-square. Wrong, of course, would be 12.營×c7? because of 12....Qa6, together with 国fc8, etc.

12...c5

Not 12... 2a6?, because of 13.a3! 2xf1 14.2xf1, etc.

13.a3 Da6



Unfavorable would be 13... \(\) 2c6, on account of 14.d5!, etc.

14.d×c5

Very characteristic of Capablanca's style, a resolution of tension that, admittedly, eliminates even the idea of the danger of a loss for him, but met with a correct – and a very obvious – response, should lead to very little. A more complicated game – and in my opinion one in White's favor – would result from 14. Efe1! Ab7 15.d5, or the immediate 14.d5.

14...b×c5?

Unbelievable, since taking back with the queen appears to be a downright matter of course. After 14...增×c5 15.且ac1 (or 15.增d3 包e5, or 15.包c4 b5, etc.) 15...增×c3 16.且×c3 息b7 17.b4 包f6, together with 且ad8, etc. Black would have reached a draw without difficulty. Instead he gets an incurable pawn weakness on the queenside without any offsetting counter-attack. A sad game!

15.43c4 Ab7 16.43fe5!

Again, a true Capablanca move, but this time, a flawless one. The idea, to keep just the "good" c4-knight against the "bad one" on a6 – while he eliminates the other two through exchange – is convincing.

16...公×e5 17.對×e5 里ad8 18.置fd1


Threatens the unpleasant invasion of the knight to d6.

18...f6 19.皆c3 買×d1+ 20.買×d1 買d8 21.買d3

Also, the immediate 21.\(\mathbb{\pi}\xd8+\), together with 22.\(\mathbb{\phi}\bar{b}3\), was strong, although not yet decisive.

21...幻b8

Apparently Capablanca had waited for this attempt to lead the knight back to lively regions, in order to take advantage, where possible, of the momentarily adjourned position of the black pieces on the b-file. With proper defense, it shouldn't have been so easy for him to succeed



24...¿c6?

It's clear at first sight that Black isn't exactly sitting pretty. But that he decides to give away the threatened pawn without a fight can be explained only through a combinational miscalculation or an unreal notion of attack. In fact, after 24...学f7 – although this move appears risky enough – no direct benefit for White can be established; for example, 25.②e3 營c8! – and now 26.②f5 營c7, as well as 26.②xe6+ 營xe6 27.營xb8 營xe4 28.營xa7+ ②b7, etc., is to no avail. White would have to look for (but would he find?) subtler ways

to give the game a make-or-break twist after 24...\$f7.

25. & xe6+ \$h8 26. & d5

Any thought of attack by Black is nipped in the bud by the guarded central position of the white bishop.

26... ①d4 27. 曾a4 夏×c4 28. 曾×c4 曾c8 29. 曾g2 曾g4

Desperation, since White, among other things, threatens 30.b4.

30.e5!

Decisive.

30...f×e5 31.營×c5 h5 32.營f8+ 當h7 33.負g8+ 當h6 34.營d6+ g6 35.營f8+ 1-0

(8) Alekhine – Nimzovich English Opening [A14]

1.ରୁ f 3 ରୁ f 6 2.c4 e 6 3.ରୁ c 3 b 6 4.g 3

Other than this system of development, which was very popular a few years ago mainly because of Réti's successes with it, White can very well use one of the following variations: (1) 4.d4 \(\Delta b7 \) 5.\(\Delta g5 \), together with e3, 7.\(\Delta d3 \), etc.; (2) 4.e4 \(\Delta b7 \) 5.d3 (5.e5? \(\Delta e4 \) - this last according to a stratagem introduced, not without success, by Nimzovich in Dresden 1926.

4... \(\text{\(b7 5. \text{\(g2 c5 6.0-0 \text{\

After 7.d4 c×d4 8.2×d4 2×g2 9.2×g2, etc., things would be good for White (see a similar position in the

Capablanca-Vidmar game from the fourth round). But now the opponent succeeds in seizing the initiative.


7...d5! 8. 2e5

Recognizing the inexpediency of his last move, White wants at any cost to complicate the game with a defensive position sufficient for a draw, instead of simply 8.c×d5 2×d5 9.2 2f6, etc.

8...分bd7 9.f4

The consequence of the previous move, since any exchange in the center would only further the enemy's development.

9... Ad6 10.c×d5



10...e×d5

A testimony to momentary lack of courage and resolve! As the conductor of the white pieces proved upon completion of the game, Black would be able to get a promising game here if he had decided on a – probably only temporarily – pawn sacrifice. For example, 10...②xe5 11.fxe5 &xe5 12.dxe6 &xg2 13.exf7+ &xf7 14.&xg2 Ee8!, with strong pressure on the center file – mainly because of the weakened position of the white king. After the text

move, White may get an advantage more easily.

11.2 c4!

Black seems to have overlooked this simple response.

11...**₩b8**!

Still the only move, since a retreat of the bishop would have had an immediate disadvantage because of 12.2e3!, etc.

12. 公×d6+12... 曾×d6 13.d3

White, dissatisfied with his handling of the opening, aspires only to a draw and frees the center. Instead of this, with the continuation 13.d40-014. 2a3, etc., he could still fashion a game quite interesting and risk-free for himself since, in this case, the pressure from White's bishops on the c- and d-pawns would have been more than sufficient compensation for any possible black counterplay on the e-file.

13...0-0 14.e4 d×e4 15.d×e4 ₩d4+

The only move, but sufficient.

16.쌍×d4 c×d4 17.ᡚd5 ᡚ×d5 18.e×d5 ᡚf6 19.Ձb2 Д×d5 20.ቧ×d4 ቧ×g2 21.쌍×g2 ½-½

Black of course plays 21. ... 신d5 and keeps the knight in this strong position.

(9) Vidmar – Spielmann Queen's Indian Defense [E14]

1.d4 4)f6 2.4)f3 c5 3.e3

By all means, very tame. If White doesn't want to opt for 3.d5, which ac-

tually has a downside, then he can well enough try 3.c4; if after that, 3...c×d4 4.\(\Delta \times d4 \) e6 5.\(\Delta c3 \), which happened, among other games, in Przepiórka-Spielmann, Munich 1926, then 6.\(\Delta b3 \) \(\Delta a6 7.g3! \(\Delta ...\)

3...b6

But this response is artificial and in this respect illogical, as White will succeed, with d5, in blocking the diagonal of the fianchettoed bishop. Instead of this, the simple 3...d5 (4.2d3 5c6, or perhaps 4...2g4, etc.), as well as the temporizing 3...e6, could occur without disadvantage.

4.c4!

Naturally.

4...c×d4 5.e×d4 e6 6.4d3 4b7 7.0-0 4e7 8.2c3 0-0 (?)

After this imprecise move, Black could have gotten into an awkward defensive position. Correct was first of all 8...d6, in order to be able to answer 9.d5 with 9...e5.

9.d5! d6

Obviously disadvantageous would be 9...e×d5 10.c×d5 ②×d5 11.②×d5 ②×d5 12.④×h7+, together with 13. ≅×d5±.

10.d×e6(?)

Playing on the apparent weaknesses, d6 and e6, is obvious, and superficially tempting. But Black gets more than sufficient counter-play in his reinvigorated queen's bishop and the open f- file. The logical consequence of the previous

move was 10.②d4! e5 (10...當c8 11.邑e1) 11.⑤f5, together with 12.f4, etc., with a positional advantage difficult to offset.

10...f×e6 11.幻d4

Offering better prospects is 11.②g5 營c8 12.迢e1 e5 13.營c2, for example, 13...h6 (better is 13...營g4) 14.盈f5 營c6 15.②d5!, etc. The advance of the knight, intended with the text move, proved meaningless.

11...骨c8! 12.骨e2

Also after 12.월e1, Black gradually would have gotten counter-play; for example, 12...e5 13.월f5 원bd7 14.월e6+ 알h8 15.일f5 딸e8 16.일×d6 원×d6 17.쌀×d6 원c5 ∓, etc.


12...e5 13. Af5 2bd7 14. Ae6+ 2b8 15. 2f5 2e8 16. 2g3

Disappointed over the failure of his imprecisely calculated expedition (16.5b5? 5c5!, etc.), Dr. Vidmar sounds the retreat rather than securing the weapon – although in this position rather harmless – of the bishop pair with 16.5×e7 **e717.\$\mathbb{L}\$ h3, etc. Now Black's counterplay on the c-file begins.

The voluntary exchange of this bishop, which was so necessary for the defense of the dark squares, is inconceivable from a player of Dr. Vidmar's class. For example, 19. Efd1 (19... 2e6 20. 2d5, etc.) was possible, when White was not at all without chances.

19...骨×c5 20.閏ac1

Still, 20.\(\mathbb{I}\)fd1 appears to be more logical.



Clearly, White overlooks that his c-pawn can be taken; otherwise he would have deflected the threat, ...d5 – for example, with 23.\(\overline{\pi}\)d3! (23...d5 24.\(\overline{\pi}\)\(\pi\)d5 25. c\(\pi\)d5 \(\overline{\pi}\)xf1 26.\(\overline{\pi}\)xf1 \(\overline{\pi}\), whereupon his position could without a doubt be held. After the text mistake, on the other hand, Black obtains a decidedly winning position.

23... A×c4!

An unpleasant surprise for White. With 24. b3?, he would not only fail to win a piece after 24...d5 25. d2 ac5 or 25. g5 g6, but would even suffer a material disadvantage. And as he plays, it's true he succeeds in momentarily avoiding the threatening pawn sacrifice, but only at the cost of further strengthening Black's pressure on both flanks.

24. ②d2 d5 25. ② × c4 d× c4 26. ₩ × e5 Q c5?

From this moment on, it is again Black who begins to play more and more

weakly, until he brings about a drawn position. More compelling than this threat on f2 was strengthening the pressure on the queenside by means of 26... 全f6! — for example, 27. 皆f4 b5 28. 皆d2 皆c5! 29. 臣c2 皇d4 or b4, etc., with threats that in the long run would be indefensible.

27. 骨h5 骨f6

Putting the queen on the f-file and thereby leaving d4 exposed is in any case clumsy preparation for 27... \(\textit{\textit{\textit{a}}}\textit{x}\) 27... \(\textit{\textit{b}}\textit{e}\) 4! (threatening 28... \(\textit{\textit{a}}\textit{x}\) f2!, etc.) 28. \(\textit{\textit{b}}\textit{1} \textit{\textit{\textit{a}}}\textit{x}\) f2, and White wouldn't get in the important defensive move g3, as he did in the game.

28.含h1! Q×f2 29.g3

The pitfall $29.\mathbb{Z} \times c4 \mathbb{Q}g3!$ was already clear ($30.\mathbb{Z}g1 \mathbb{Z}e1 31.h \times g3 \mathbb{Z} \times g1+$, together with $\mathfrak{C}f6-f1+\mathfrak{C}4$).

29...\c6+

Although the chances of winning had in large part evaporated during the last moves, there's a last attempt to make here with 29... 三e5 30. 世 d1 世 c6+31. 鱼g2 世 c5, etc.

30. **Qg2** 曾c5 31. 曾×c5 **Q**×c5 32. **只**×c4 **只**×f1+33. **Q**×f1 **E**f8 ½-½

Round 4

(10) Capablanca – Vidmar English Opening [A30]

1.d4 \(\) 16 2.\(\) 13 e6 3.c4 b6 4.g3 \(\) \(\) 45 5.\(\) 2 c5

½ Capablanca – Vidmar ½ ½ Marshall – Alekhine ½ 1 Nimzovich – Spielmann 0

Standings after Round 4:

Capablanca 3 Alekhine 2½ Nimzovich 2½ Vidmar 2 Spielmann 1 Marshall 1

I still consider this move disadvantageous because of the possibility of 6.d5, and prefer both 5...\(\textit{\Delta}\) b4+ and 5...\(\textit{\Delta}\) e7.

6.0-0

On the other hand, this answer, although sound, is quite harmless in nature, and allows Black various ways to reach equality.

6...c×d4 7.ᡚ×d4 Д×g2 8.∰×g2 Де7

But this is inconsequential, since Black absolutely had to aspire as quickly as possible to deal with the weakness on the d-file. Admittedly, with this in mind, the immediate 8...d5 wouldn't yet go well because of 9. \$\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}\$}}}\$} 4+! (Capablanca-Alekhine, third match game) — but 8...\$\text{\text{\$\$\text{\$\e

9.台c3 0-0 (?)

Still, 9... \$\text{\pmathensightarrow} c8 (10.b3 d5!, etc.) comes into keen consideration. After the text

move, the d-pawn remains perpetually underdeveloped.

10.e4! 骨c8

A tempo too late!

11.b3 쌀b7 12.f3 신c6 13.負b2 벌fd8 14.ቯe1 신 ×d4

Dr. Vidmar played less than exactly the whole first part of the game. For example, why did he need to develop the White queen here? Simpler was immediately ...d6.

15.骨×d4 Qc5 (?)

And now this obvious loss of tempo!

16.皆d3 Qe7 17. Zad1 d6

In spite of many inaccuracies, the Black position is still rather solid since, as is well known, d6 in this variation in the middle game can be defended without difficulty. In the following play, Capablanca tries to implement his only serious chance, a flank attack. Actually, this plan demands quite a rigorous defense from his opponent, who certainly possesses substantially smaller freedom of terrain.

18.罝e2 罝d7 19.罝ed2 罝ad8 20.ᡚe2

The simplest way to prevent ...d5 once and for all (because of 2×6 , etc.).

20...\a⊗a8

In order to move the knight to e8, which at this point one would he sitate to relocate because of 21.e5!.

21.皆e3 h6 22.h4 皆b7 23.a4

To prevent the liberating possibility ...b5 for all time.

Therefore White's attack has only little chance of success, because the knight on f4 is restricted in its movement since d5 is guarded. If the knight abandons this square (for h5, for example), e5 could occur much sooner. Then interesting possibilities would open up for the Black knight to break into the position. So Capablanca soon starts to prepare himself for the transition to a rook endgame.


27.\degree c3 ଦ୍ୱf8 28.g5 h×g5 29.h×g5 ବ୍ରg6!

Hear, hear! If now 30. ②h5, then 30...e5 31. 當g3 當c7, together with ... 置f8 and ... 當d8, etc. White has nothing better than to exchange.

30.ᡚ×g6 f×g6 31.龄d4 龄c6

The occupation of c5 establishes a satisfactory counter-trump for Black.

32.**曾g3 曾c5 33.f4 曾f7 34.曾g4a5** 35.**閏h2**




35...骨×d4?

Since White (1) can't trade queens without disadvantage (on account of ...bxc5, together with pressure on b3; or here even because of ...d×c5, together with advancing into the d-file); and (2) likewise White couldn't very well avoid the queen exchange (營c3 or b2) because of ...d5!, etc. - here a temporizing attitude was the simplest way to a draw. Thus correct for Black was \$28-f7-g8, etc., until White himself decided to change the position. The fact that, instead of this, Dr. Vidmar got himself into an at least dubious endgame, without being forced, is probably explained only by time pressure.

In my opinion, this strategic break ought better to occur after the next tempo; for example, 38.\(\mathbb{Z}\) 4d3! \(\mathbb{Z}\) e7 (or e8) 39.f5 gxf5+ (if39...\(\mathbb{Z}\) f7 40.fxe6+, together with 41.\(\mathbb{Z}\) d5, followed by \(\mathbb{Z}\) b5 – or sometimes, e5±). 40.exf5 exf5+ 41.\(\mathbb{Z}\) xf5 \(\mathbb{Z}\) f7 42.g6+, with a winning position. In other variations also, the positional advantage is transformed into tangible assets more easily than with the text move.

38...gxf5+39.exf5 exf5+40.\perpxf5 g6+41.\perpg4 \perpress{g}f8



The only – if temporary – save against the threat \mathbb{Z} f2+ and \mathbb{Z} f6, with a winning position. If 41...\$\mathbb{E}e8, then 42. \mathbb{Z} h2!, etc. (see below).

42.買f2+?

This leads only to a draw. The correct utilization of the painstakingly achieved advantage had to begin with a tempo move - for example, 42. \begin{aligned} 44. \b 42... 魯e8, then 43. 国h2!, and after the exchange of the rook pair, the remaining White rook would advance either to f6 or b8: 43...當f8 (or 43...当f7 44. \(\mathbb{I}\)h6, etc.) 44. \(\mathbb{I}\)f3+ \(\mathbb{B}\)g7 45. \(\mathbb{I}\)f6 (threatening 46. \mathrm{\Pi}h6) 45...\mathrm{\Pi}f8 46.\mathrm{\Pi} \times f8 \$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}\$ xf8 47.\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}\$ h8+ \$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}\$-anywhere 48.\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}\$ b8, etc. On the other hand, Capablanca forces the rook exchange with an unfavorable change in the position of his pawns, so that Dr. Vidmar saves the game easily.

42...買f743.買f6

If 43.Rfd2, then 43...Ke7=.

43...買×f6 44.g×f6 當f7 45.當g5 買e8 46.買×d6 買e5+ 47.當f4 買e6

Much simpler than ... \mathbb{I}f5+, ... \mathbb{I} \times f6.

48. **営d5** 曾×f6

The gentlemen could have saved themselves the following.

49.買b5 當e7 50.當g5 買c6 51.當h6 當f8 52.買g5 當f7 53.買g3 買e6 54.買d3 買e5 55.買d7+ 當f6 56.買d6+ 當f7 ½-½

(11) Marshall – Alekhine Torre Attack [A47]

1.d4 2f6 2.2f3 b6

It's more common recently to start with ...e6 and only then ...b6. The most played riposte, 3.c4, admittedly results in a mere transposition, and only the move applied by Marshall in this game puts the contest on another track.

3. Ag5 3. Ab7

4.5)bd2 e6

A dangerous experiment: only because of the pair of bishops does Black allow the opponent to occupy a strong central position in good old style. Less accommodating and also more in harmony with the second move here was 4...6!

5.e4 h6 6.Q×f6 營×f6 7.Qd3 d6 8.營e2 營d8

In order to develop the king's bishop, which would be questionable to do at this time because of 9.e5. Black falls

behind in development and already has to grasp at such artificial, strained maneuvers just to keep afloat. Permitting e4 without a struggle was just reprehensible.

9.0-0 Qe7 10.\angle

Until this, White had made the right moves. But here it was time, in light of his better development, to conceive a vigorous middlegame plan – for example, to construct a mighty attack position with 10.c3, and on 10...2d7, 11.2e1!, together with 12.f4, 13.2ef3, 14.Zae1, etc., without allowing the opponentany kind of a chance. The text move is certainly not bad, but has the small disadvantage of allowing the following counterblow in the center.

10...2d7 11.c3 c5 (!)

Black had to, cost what it would, somehow distract the opponent from his thoughts about mate, before he decides to castle. After 11...0-0 12.2e1!, followed by 13.f4, together possibly with 2e1-c2-2e3, would be alarming.

12.d×c5

With this, he changes his plan and wants to profit from the d-file. His next move, however, already shows that he had not quite worked out the precise details of this plausible plan.

12...b×c5 13. 4b5?

After this, Black succeeds in completely securing himself, and even gradually gets an advantage. White should try to rob his opponent of his only effective counter-weapon, the pair of bishops, and with this in mind, by all means play

13. △a6. With 13... △×a6 14. ৺×a6 △b6, etc., Black would admittedly avoid immediate material disadvantage – but the weaknesses of his queenside light squares, together with the d6-square's need for protection, would doubtlessly give him serious concerns during the further course of the game.

13...a6

Not immediately 13...0-0 because of 14.②c4 営c7 15.೩×d7! 営×d7 16.②×d6 ೩×d6 17.e5±, etc.

14. Qa4 0-0-0 15. Qc2

The bishop actually has nothing better than to retreat ruefully, because if 15. 2c4, Black would have a satisfactory parry in 15... 2b6.

15...當c7 16.分c4 買fd8 17.買d2 分f8 18.買fd1

All these efforts to take advantage of the supposed weakness on d6 remain unsuccessful and have, as a consequence, only promoted further development of the Black pieces.

18...a5


Perhaps more exact was 18... \(\tilde{\pi} \) ab8, in order to relinquish b5 to the White pieces only in an emergency. But the text move proves to be good.

19. Qd3 買ab8 20. Qa3 Qg6! 21. Qb5 對c6 22. 對e3

The knight has just advanced proudly to b5 – now events prove that he could not be kept there without an offsetting positional disadvantage. Because if the

threat 22...214 is warded off with 23.g3, then Black has the pleasant choice between 23...c4 24.2×c4 \subseteq xe4, etc., or possibly ... d5, exploiting the weakness of the h1-a8 diagonal.

22...c4 23.分bd4 曾c5 24.点b1



The second player succeeds not only in overcoming the opening difficulties, but also in getting a not-to-be-undervalued middlegame as well as an endgame target, in the form of the fixed pawn on b2. For the purpose of utilizing the opportunity, 24... 2a8, together with \$\mathref{\omega}\text{b6}\$, \$\mathref{\omega}\text{db8}\$, etc., probably makes the most sense at this juncture. Also 24... \$\mathref{\omega}\text{f8}\$, as preparation for the knight move to e5, has much to say for itself. Instead of this, a small, hasty slip occurs, which permits the opponent to force an equalizing simplification of the game.

24...2e5 (?) 25.4) ×e5 d×e5

With 25... ₩×e5, White would come by an attack with 26.f4, together with doubled rooks on the f-file, and ultimately e5.

26.2f5!

The only move, because if, for example, 26.\(\Delta\)c2, then 26...\(\Perix\) d2 27.\(\Perix\)d2 \(\Delta\)c6!, etc., to Black's clear advantage.

26...買×d2 27.分×e7+ 營×e7 28.買×d2!

After 28. **\d2 \(\Omega \cdot \text{of!}\), together with ... \(\Omega \text{a4}\), Black would remain with the advantage. Now however, the somewhat passive position of the bishop on bl and the weakness on b2 is compensated for by the fact that White controls the only open file. The game could actually already have been a draw here. But Marshall imagines things look better – obtaining, however, in the next dozen moves, only a worsening of his pawn position, whereby his kingside dark squares are weakened.

28... 具c6 29.h3 曾b7 30.曾e2 曾b5 31.曾d1 曾h7 32.曾f3 具e8 33.曾e3 具c6 34.a3

Hardly necessary at this point. This move, which condemned the b-pawn to immobility, should have occurred only in the case of ...a4.

34... 皆b7 35.皆e2 具b5 36.皆e3 具c6 37.f3 皆e7 38.具a2 具b5 39.骨h2 具a6 40.皆e2? 皆c5

After White, without an obvious reason, abandons the important diagonal g1-a7, Black's position is preferable.

41. 百d7 Ab5 42. 百d2

Obviously not 42. 基×f7? 當g8, etc.

42... 年b7 43. 4b1


From here on, with the "threat" of f4, White begins to speculate about the following discovered check. At any moment, Black was able to put an end to his opponent's hopes with ...g6, to-

gether with ... \$27, etc., but didn't want to, because he himself was dreaming of winning chances after f4.

43...Qa4 44.Qa2 Qb5 45.Qb1 Qa4 46.&h1

So that after f4×e5, the black queen recaptures without check.

46...∄b6



If Black didn't want to decide on ...g6, then 46... \(\beta b \)8 would be better here. If White then hadn't also been fooled into f4, he certainly would have slowly fallen into a disadvantage anyway.

47.f4

This strategically defective move is still playable here on account of a tactical trick. As will be seen, Black now could well-nigh force a drawn ending – but since White couldn't win without this move, the break through is not to be blamed.

47...Qb3

It's clear that 47...e×f4 would be disadvantageous because of 48.e5+, ...g6 49. \(\mathref{\pm}\)d4, etc. But by the same token, the c4-pawn has to be covered somehow because of the threat 48.f×e5, together with $\forall \times c4$. With this in mind, other than the text move, only 47...\$\textit{\textit{L}}b5\$ and ...\$\textit{\textit{\textit{L}}}c6\$ come under consideration. With the former, White probably would have chosen the same continuation as in the game and with approximately the same effect; but in the second case, the continuation 48. f×e5 \$\textit{\textit{L}}e5 \textit{L}\$ 49. \$\textit{L}\$d5!, \$\textit{L}\$f4! 50. e5+, g651. \$\textit{L}\$\textit{\textit{L}}\$\textit{\textit{L}}\$ etc., would have been more unpleasant for the Black.

48.f×e5 對×e5 49.對e3!

Now the downsides of Black's 46th move are clearly evident, since this important queen move can occur with an attack tempo. On the other hand, the immediate 49. \(\mathbb{\pi} \)d5 would fail because of 49... \(\mathbb{\pi} \)f4! 50. e5+, g6 51. \(\mathbb{\pi} \)d2, \(\mathbb{\pi} \)b5, etc., when Black would have the advantage.

49...買c6

With 49... \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}} \) 50.e5+ g651. \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}}}} \) \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}}} \) \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}}} \) \(\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}} \) \(\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}} \) \(\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}} \) \(\text{\text{\text{g}}} \) \(\text{\text{g}} \) \(\text{\tex

50.闰d5!

The entire change of attack initiated with move 47 is based on this riposte. The bishop, immobile for so long, finally has his say and as a result, his gamboling on the diagonal b1-h7 will cause the opponent a series of difficulties.

50...曾c7 51.e5+ 曾g8

After 51...g6 52.\(\mathbb{I}\)d4, with the threat of 53.\(\mathbb{I}\)h4, would be unbearable.


52. 其d4 由f8

The king needs to remove himself as quickly as possible from the bishop's diagonal. By the way, 52... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c5 would obviously be premature because of 53.\(\mathre{\phi}\)e4, etc.

53.\degree f4

With the strong threat 54. 2g6, perhaps together with 55. 2d8+.

53...曾e7



54.Qh7!

A very strong move, whose idea consists mainly of getting the bishop off the back rank without loss of time, which should be of great importance. First of all, there's the very strong threat of 55.2g8, etc., forcing the next retreat of the queen.

54...曾b8 55.曾g3! 莒c5

Black has to try this counterattack, since with the defense 55...\$f8, the move

56. 宣 4! would be very unpleasant; for example, 56... g6 57. 鱼 × g6! f × g6 58. 邑 × g6, etc., or 56... g5 57. 曾 f3, 邑 c5 58. 邑 e4!, etc., with decisive advantage.

56.\(\mathbb{E}\)e4 (?)

Marshall took advantage of Black's cocky 49th move quite nicely, and at last gets the advantage. But instead of choosing an obvious continuation, which would have assured him a favorable endgame, he can't resist, considering his style of play, the attempt to go for further complexities – be it also *per nefas* – in the hope of mating his opponent ...

Correct here was 56.營×g7!, with the consequence, say, of 56...營×e5 (56...遌×e5 57.營g3±!) 57.營×h6 邑d5 58.邑×d5 營×d5, etc., when Black's chances of a draw are not unlikely.

56...**\$**f8!

With that Black avoids the interesting trap 56... 當h8 57. 當f2 (the same move would of course win immediately after 56... 鱼c2?), 57... 邑d5 58. 邑f4 當e8 59. 鱼e4! 邑xe5 60. 曾a7+ 曾f8 61. 鱼c6!, and wins.

57.Ag6

Ineffective, as is everything else; the real chances utterly disappeared after the previous speculative move.

57...f5

With 57...f6, a draw could be forced: 58.營f2! 邑×e5 59.邑×e5 營×e5 60.營a7 營e1+, etc. – perpetual check.

The text move is a last attempt at a win.

58.買d4!

According to circumstances, still the best, since after a rook retreat on the efile, 58... 量d5 (which wouldn't be advantageous on the previous move because of 罩f4, ... 罩d7, 쌀f3, etc.), would be to Black's clear advantage.

58...\#×e5

Of course not 58... \(\mathbb{Z}\times 6\) on account of 59.\(\mathbb{Z}\)d7, with a winning position.

59. 骨h4 骨f6 60. 骨g3 骨e5 61. 骨h4

If 61.曾×e5 莒×e5 62.莒d7, then 62...莒e263.莒f7+曾e8!64.莒×f5+曾e7 65.莒f7+曾d6∓.

61...**對f**6

If Black hadn't had only two and a half minutes for the next 18 moves, here he probably would have tried 61... 是d5; but after 62.是xd5 營xd5 63.營f4!, with White threatening 營c7 or 營b8+, Black's material advantage would hardly have shined.

62. 曾g3 曾e5 ½-½

(12) Nimzovich – Spielmann Nimzo-Larsen Opening [A03]

1. ሷ f 3 d 5 2. b 3 c 5 3. ዿ b 2 ሷ c 6 4. e 3 ሷ f 6

Why so resigned to relinquish control over e5 to White? At any rate, 4...24 or 4...26 first, in order to reserve the choice between different plans of development, would have been more vigorous.

5.Ab5 Ad7 6.0-0 e6 7.d3 Ae7

He has to settle for this modest square of development, since 7...2d6 is answered by 8.e4! (...dxe4 9.dxe4 5xe4 10.\(\mathbb{E}\)e1±) and would hardly be pleasant.

8.幻bd2 0-0 9.Q×c6

This exchange belongs to the overall plan of development, and there's no good purpose in putting it off further. The most plausible alternative was 9. #e2, but after 9... #c8 or 9... #c7 (the consequence of ... @d4 would be advantageous for White), he'd be out of business without the occupation of e5.

9.... A×c6 10. 公e5 置c8

In the game from the next round, Dr. Vidmar chooses (as White) the deployment 10...當c7, ... ad8, but then also didn't get a fully satisfactory game. Here White unquestionably stands better.

11.f4 幻d7 12.世g4

A specious but tempting move (after It has, of course, a fundamental disadvantage: from here on White puts all his hopes in a direct attack (and of course in all the material advantages obtained in connection with this), and as a result, an array of his other positional trumps (like the wonderful diagonals for the Ab2, and the flexibility of the central pawn position) more or less steps into the shadows. With these considerations. I would have favored here the dry follow-up 12. වxc6 필xc6 13.e4. But when all is said and done, it's a matter of taste and style: play as he does, Nimzovitch gets in any case a good,

secure game with some winning chances


12...∮×e5 13.Д×e5

13.f ×e5 would have been feeble on account of 13... 2g5!, etc.

13... Qf6 14. 互f3 Q×e5

On other moves, Black steps up the pressure with 15.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}af1, etc.

15.f×e5 曾c7 16.曾h5



16...h6

One defensive move too many, after which the opponent finally seizes positional control. Advisable instead of this was 16... 2e8! (not ...f5, because White would have e×f6, with a later \g4+), after which the - at first glance - the intimidating, and apparently decisive sacrifice 17.\(\mathbb{I}\)f6!? wouldn't really have led to anything consequential after the natural 17...曾a5 18.包f3 h6! (19.萬×h6? g×h6 20. 對×h6 f6 21.e×f6 罩c7). White would have had to settle for the modest continuation 17. Zh3, which after 17...h6 18.句f3 f5 19.曾h4 曾d8, etc., would have lead to absolutely defensible positions.

17.\(\mathbb{Z}\)af1 g6?

18. 告×h6 告×e5 19. 互f6! 告h5

The only defense against \(\mathbb{I}\)f1-f3-h3.

20. 對×h5 g×h5 21. 勾f3

Also \(\mathbb{H}\) h6×h5 should have been enough.

21...買c7!

Again, the only move against the threat 22. 2g5, after which he would just answer 22... 2e7. White must aim for a lowly pawn-reward, after all.

22.\(\mathbb{H}\)h6 f6 23.\(\mathbb{H}\)h4 \(\mathbb{A}\)e8

The f-pawn obviously can't be protected.

24. 閏h×f6 閏×f6 25. 閏×f6 閏e7 26. 當f2

Not 26. 296 because of ... 27!, and after the rook exchange, the knight would go astray. But he's not exactly happy now standing on the rim. Because of that, White has a great deal of trouble putting his advantage into effect in the following play – because he can't secure a central square for the horse.

26...曾g7 27.罝f4 Qd7 28.曾e2(?)

After 28. Pel!, the following answer, nullifying the problem "e5," would not have yet been possible.

28...e5! 29.買f5

Now useless, because h5 is indirectly protected by the possibility of ... \(\textit{Q}g4+. \)

29...買e8 30.買f2 e4 31.買f4

Not the immediate 31. \$\ddot{2}\$ d2 because of 31...d4!.


31... 囯e5 32. 當d2 b5 33.g3

The knight should be lead again to busy regions – by the advance of the black e-pawn, the f4-square has opened up for the horseman, and after the following pawn exchange in the center, e3 also becomes free.

33... **Q**h3 34.d4! c×d4 35.e×d4 **置**g5 36.c3 a5 37.**置**f2 a4 38.**含**e3 a3 39.**罩**c2!

The very strong threat 40.c4 now forces the bishop to give up guarding g2.

39... 負f1 40.買c1 負d3 41.包g2 買f5 42.句f4 曾f7 43.買d1



43...曾e7?

A way to win probably would have been found for White after 43... Ac2 as well (44. Ad2 Ab1). For example, Ag1, h4, g4, etc. – but even so, Black could have tried this line. After the loss of the second pawn, his situation becomes hopeless.

44.5)×d3 e×d3 45.b4!

Another subtlety: after 45.當×d3 買f3+46.當c2 b4! 47.c×b4 當d6, etc., he would have had some technical difficulties.

45...曾d6 46.曾×d3 閏f2 47.閏d2 閏f3+ 48.曾c2 曾e6 49.罝e2+ 曾d6 50.曾b3 罝d3 51.罝e5 h4 52.g×h4 罝h3 53.罝h5 曾c6 54.罝h6+ 曾b7 55.h5 1-0

Round 5

0 Alekhine – Capablanca 1 0 Vidmar – Nimzovich 1 ½ Spielmann – Marshall ½

Standings after Round 5:

Capablanca 4 Nimzovich 3½ Alekhine 2½ Vidmar 2 Spielmann 2 Marshall 1½

(13) Alekhine – Capablanca Queen's Indian Defense [E15]

1.d4 \(\Delta f 6 \) 2.c4 e6 3.\(\Delta f 3 \) b6 4.g3 \(\Delta b 7 \) 5.\(\Delta g 2 \) c5 6.d5

I made this move, without further consideration, to avoid a draw. It's also

pretty good, but requires subsequently precise, purposeful play. Castling or 6.d×c5 would have undertaken less.

6...e×d5 7.5)h4

According to the method recommended by Rubinstein in Collijn's handbook. Also the newer maneuver 7. 2g5, introduced by V. Bürger, together with possibly 2h3-2f4 (or f2), is interesting and full of opportunities.

7...g68.公c3 Ag79.0-0

Indeed, some have criticized this reasonable move, and instead advised 9.2b5. I can't share this opinion, since after the simple 9...0-0 10.2d6 2a6, White would find no use for the infiltrated knight. No, the actual omission or mistake comes only later.

9...0-0 10. Af4

Not a happy thought, although White was able to get quite a decent game. The following opportunity-rich continuations came into consideration, however.

(1) 10.c×d5 d6 11.e4 ②bd7 12.f4 罩e8 13.罝e1 a6 14.a4, and the push e5 hangs in the air (Dr. Vajda-Monticelli, Budapest 1926); (2) 10.童g5 h6 11.鱼×f6 營×f6 (not 11...鱼×f6?, List-Sämisch, Berlin 1927, whereupon 12.②×g6!, etc., follows—with a winning position) 12.②×d5 ④×d5 13. 營×d5 ②c6 14. 營×d7 莒ac8, with some positional compensation for Black for the lost pawn; and (3) 10.f4 d6 11.f5, with active piece play against weak points on both sides.

Indeed, this compilation of a number of not unfavorable continuations for

White shows well enough that the move 6. d5 is definitely not to be written off, as the general criticism wanted to convince the larger audience after the game.

10...d6 11.c×d5

More consistent than 11.②×d5 ②×d5 12.△×d5 △×d5 13. ⊕×d5 ②a6!, etc., with a probable draw, since White wanted to avoid exactly this result.

11...分h5 12.Qd2 幻d7 13.f4(?)


From here on begins too much artificiality: admittedly the text move dwells in the position, but much more important first was 13. e4 with the (positional) threat 14. ②f5!. A fter 13...②h5-f6 14. f4 could quite possibly occur, when the opportunities in the center should not be underestimated. Why I neglected the double-step of the e-pawn is now quite inconceivable to me.

13...a6 14.Af3

A totally weak move, after which the game is hard to save. Losing time, only to place one's own piece on a worse square in order to force an opponent's to a better one — I've done such teamwork only extremely rarely, even in the beginning of my chess career.

Certainly 14.e4 was no longer as good as on the previous move – for example, 14. ...b5 15. ②f5 b4! 16. ②a4 gxf5 17. ③xh5 fxe4 18. ②xe4 ③f6∓ – but 14.a4 was completely in keeping; in the case of ...c4, White could then have gotten some counter-play through 15. ②e3, together with ②f3, and occupation of d4.

14...2 hf6 15.a4



15...c4!

White, through entirely illogical positioning, has eliminated any hope of occupying d4 with his knight in the event of Black's push, so this idea becomes the strategic plan. The first threat is 16...b5 17.a×b5 a×b5 18.②×b5? ♥b6+, etc.

16. Ae3 \c7 17.g4

The explanation for this and the following pawn moves consists solely in the fact that, after the 15th move, I gave the game up as lost, and just dragged myself, not played, through the game. By the way, it's clear that here 17. \(\textit{L}\)d4 wouldn't have helped, because \(\textit{D}\)d7-c5-b3 would follow.

17...公c5 18.g5 公fd7 19.f5 置fe8 20.负f4 Qe5 21.负g4

White's systematic distancing of his pieces from the protection of the center squares facilitates the work of his opponent. Attempting to bolster his position with 21. 2g2 could have put up more resistance.

21...分b3 22.f×g6 h×g6 23.置b1 &×c3

The fate of d5 is sealed.

24.b×c3 발c5+ 25.e3 신e5 26.요f3 이d3! 27.밤h1 요×d5

The beginning of the slaughter.

28.買×b3 幻×f4 29.買b1 買×e3 30.幻g2 買×f3! 31.買×f3 幻×g2 32.費×g2買e8 33.蛩f1

Here White could safely resign, but felt in too much time pressure to choose the right moment for that. This explains the last moves.

33... 魚×f3 34. ৬×f3 ৬×g5 35. 트e1 E×e1+ 36. ⑤×e1 ৬g1+ 37. ⑤d2 쌍×h2+ 38. ⑤c1 ৬e5 39. ⑤b2 ⑤g7 40. 쌍f2 b5 41. 쌍b6 b×a4 42. 쌍×a6 쌍e2+ 0-1

I feel ashamed of this game, but readily admit that my opponent took impeccable advantage of my errors.

(14) Vidmar – Nimzovich Bogo-Indian Defense [E11]

1.d4 句f6 2.句f3 e6 3.c4 負b4+ 4.負d2 曾e7 5.句c3

This natural move is, in my opinion, unjustly blamed by many commentators: it's definitely no worse than 5.g3, for example, perhaps even better with Black's chosen reply.

5...0-0

In order to control e4 (of course without playing 5...d5), 5...b6 was appropriate here. But then 6.g3 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{0}}}} \) 7.\(\text{\text{\text{\text{0}}}} \) g2 could have followed – and normally in such positions, the vis-\(\text{\text{\text{a}}} - \text{vis white} \) bishop proves itself somewhat superior. Black's bishop check on the third move does not, however, yield equal play.


6.e3(?)

This is a needlessly passive move, which robbed White of prospects for an opening advantage. After the obvious 6.\(\text{\textit{B}}\)c2!, together with e4, \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{B}}}}\)d3, etc., it would not have been at all easy for Black to come by a game.

6...d6

White's previous move was so ill-advised that the second player, before fianchettoing his queen's bishop, permits himself the luxury of flirting with the threat ...e5, and so induces his opponent to play the tamer \(\Omega\)e2 (instead of \(\Omega\)d3). In contrast, after 6.\(\omega\)c2, the text move would be unsuccessful because of 7.a3 \(\Omega\)xc3, etc.

7.Qe2 b6 8.0-0 Qb7 9.曾c2 勾bd7



If Black sets great store in the occupation of e4, then here he should have now played 9... 2×c3 10.2×c3 2e4. After the text move, the maneuver could be prevented.

10.\ad1

Since sooner or later, the d-file will open, in general the occupation of that file by the rook is appropriate. But at this point there was another method of play for White, which would have made it possible for him to weaken the pressure on the central squares from the enemy's queen's bishop. This was 10.2g5!. If after this, 10...h611.2f3d5, then the simple 12.2h3, and if g5, then $13.c\times d5!$, $e\times d5$ (13...g414.d6) 14.2f5, etc. — with a fully equal game.

10... **£**×c3

Black is correct not to make further reinforcing moves, but rather to strike out immediately. In fact, in the current position, he can in no way decide which file his rooks should occupy – and there weren't other wait-and-see maneuvers.

11. 🏻 xc3 වe4 12. 🗘 e1

Considering Black's tangible superiority in the center, the bishop pair embodies White's future chances, although not particularly promising. After 12. 2d 2 2xc3! 13. 2xc3 e5, White would remain entirely without counter-play.

12...f5 13.骨b3

If immediately 13. 2d2, then 13... 曾g5, which virtually forces the reply 14.f4. But apparently White wants to avoid this.

13...c5

Played in order to force a clearing in the center before he undertakes a flank attack. Certainly the process costs him the d-file, and considering this fact, many would have chosen a different preparation for e5, like 13...\$h8, for example, instead of the text move, which weakens d6. But... fortune favors the brave.

14. 公d2 公×d2 15. 置×d2 e5 16. d×e5 d×e5 17. f3

Sooner or later this move is unavoidable. Played at this point, it offers a quite definite leveling tendency: namely, in the case of the reasonable 17...2f6, White's move permits the pin of the knight with 18. Ah4. He can then exchange these minor pieces, and then already, without difficulty, force general simplification by the pressure on the open file. Nimzovich thwarts this plan in an intriguingly simple way.

17...g5!

An unprejudiced, beautiful move, which sets before the opponent the difficult problem of defending himself from now on against two equilateral break-through threats – ...e4 and ...g4. In addition, the knight is protected from an exchange now and later.

18. Qf2 勾f6 19. 互fd1 互ae8!

With this, Black shows that he absolutely wants to win – and further developments give him that right. The endeavor is so much the more commendable because it's contingent upon the final relinquishing of the open file, a gamble against which many an experienced master would have bristled. My recent experiences with players of the very first class have shown me that in analogous situations, without thinking, they would place both rooks on the file for exchange and afterwards complain

that the art of chess approaches death from draws... I have to admit I could never get used to the thought of such a danger. If one would examine, for example, the games of Nimzovich or Bogoljubow – just to name the most successful – from the last few years, one easily becomes convinced that still many, many years will pass until fighters for a draw can feel fully safe!

20.皆a4

Black's reply brings home the futility of this sortie. Somewhat better here seems 20.2g3, with which, first of all, the threat e4 is parried.


20...**≜**a8!

21.\mathbb{\ma

21.໘d6

An eviction notice for White's queen's bishop, on its way to c3; no indifferent plan – only White gives it up on the next move. Otherwise, 21. Ag3 still came under consideration.

21... **省g7!**



A sinister reinforcement of Black's breakthrough threats! Somewhat premature would be 21...e4, on account of 22.f4 – for example, 22...g×f4 23.\(\mathbb{L}\)h4! f3 24.\(\mathbb{L}\)×f6\(\mathbb{E}\)×f6\

22. Qf1?

Inconsistent and weak. He absolutely had to consider the threat ...e4, and with this in mind, play 22.\(\textit{Q}\)e1!. If ...e4(?), then 23.\(\textit{Q}\)c3, and White would have some play. Therefore Black probably would have favored 22...g4, but then the outcome would also not be entirely certain, in spite of his undeniable advantage – for example, 23.f\(\textit{g}\)4 \(\textit{Q}\)\(\textit{g}\)4 \(\textit{Q}\)\(\textit{g}\)4 \(\textit{Q}\)\(\textit{g}\)4 \(\textit{Q}\)\(\textit{g}\)6 25.\(\textit{G}\)c2, etc.

22...e4

Of course.

23.**⊈e**1

23...e×f3 24.Дc3 當e7!

Decisive, since mate would follow 25.\(\mathbb{L}\)×f6 in four moves (25...\(\mathbb{L}\)×e3+26.\(\mathbb{L}\)h1 f×g2+, etc.).

A sad retreat.

Sometimes even "in-between moves" don't help. Also, 27.\$xg2 \$\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$e}}\$4+, etc.,}}\$ leads quickly to mate.

27...皆e4! 28.閏1d2 具h3 29.具c3 皆g4+ 0-1

It's mate in two moves.

(15) Spielmann – Marshall Vienna Game [C29]

1.e4 e5 2.බc3 බf6 3.f4 d5 4.f×e5 බ×e4 5.බf3 ቧc5

One of the good moves at Black's disposal here. As is well known, sufficient for speedy equality is 5... \(\) 2e7, together with ... 0-0 and ... \(6. \)

6.d4

Exactly what Black wanted to force with his bishop move. However, the less forthcoming 6. Dec 2 should be considered; if 6... f5, then 7. d1!, when f2 would be covered, and White is prepared to dislodge Black's central knight by means of d3.

6... Qb4 7. 皆d3

The queen stands awkwardly here – but after 7.2d2 c5, etc. the complications in the center would likewise turn out quite in favor of Black.

7...c5 8.d×c5 包×c5

The c-pawn wouldn't run away, and Black could first quietly strengthen his position through further development (8...②c6). But Black's game is already so favorable that his move does well.


9.\e3 ରୁର୍ପ 10.\ab5 ରୁର୍

Prevents castling and renews the threat of a fork. One has to wonder that White still succeeds in emerging from this position unscathed.

11.a3 **Qa5** 12.b4 **Qb6** 13.皆d3 0-0!

Of course it would be lamentable after 13...d4 14. De4, etc., to allow the opponent to castle short without further ado. The pawn sacrifice is consequential and good.

14.骨×d5



Or 14.2×d5 2×e5 15.2×e5 2d4 – to Black's advantage; for example, 16.c3 2×e5 17.0-0 a6 18.2c4 b5 19.2b3 2b7, etc.

14...ഉed4

It's curious that the attacking player Marshall doesn't feel the necessity of his queen's cooperation in the calculated exploitation of the open white king's position. Admittedly, 14...當c7 (or ...\rightarrower) would have been useless with this in mind because of 15.\delta\d6 but after 14... 2d7, White would get into an awkward situation; because if then 15. Ad3 or 15. \delta e4 (Black's main threat is 15... ac7 16. ae4 a×b5, together with ...2×b4 or ...2×e5, etc.) – then 15. ...2d4!, with the idea of2f5, etc. In any case, the e5-pawn would be a condemned man, and after his disappearance, the king wouldn't be able to find peace anywhere. After the text move, the black advantage totally evaporates, bit by bit.

15.營×d8 買×d8 16.分×d4 Д×d4 17.Дb2(!)

After 17. 2d2 5xe5 18.0-0-0, the reply 18... 2g4 would have in fact proven strong.

17... ②×e5 18.0-0-0 **Ag4**

Perhaps he overlooked the countermove, because any other developmental move of the bishop (18...\$\tilde{\textit{\textit{2}}}618...\$\tilde{\textit{2}}f5) would have hindered Black's work to level the game.

19. de2! d×e2

19... \(\text{Q} \times c 3 \) 20. \(\text{Q} \times c 3 \) \(\text{Q} \times e 2 \) 21. \(\text{E} \times \) d8+, together with \(\text{Q} \times e 5 \), etc., clearly leads to nothing.

20.බ×e2 &×b2+ 21.ෂ×b2 බc4+ 22.ቄb3 බd2+ 23.ቄb2 බc4+ 24.ቄb3 බe3


The play for a win is unfounded, since with his pawn superiority, White is ahead by a couple of tempi. Black should have repeated moves.

After 26... \(\mathbb{I}\) d2, White saves himself with 27. \(\mathbb{I}\) c3! \(\mathbb{I}\) f2 28. \(\mathbb{I}\) etc.

27. 公d3 買c8 28. 買c1 f5 29.g3 當f7 30.c4 買d8(?)

Correct was 30...\$f6, and only after 31.c5, then 31...\$\mathbb{L}\$d8 32.\$\mathbb{L}\$c3 f4! 33.gxf4, \$\mathbb{L}\$d5+, etc. Now White gets an advantage.

31.當c3 句g4 32.買f1 當f6 33.買e1 當f7



Obviously there would be no boon from 33...②×h2, on account of 34.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)h1 - together with \(\mathbb{\pi}\)×h7, etc.

34.買f1

Again, one of the many games in this tournament in which Spielmann, in spite of better endgame chances, declares himself in agreement with a draw! Instead of the text move, which is indeed synonymous with an offer of peace, the simple approach 34.c5 came strongly under consideration; for example, 34...h6 35.\(\mathbb{E}\)e2 \(\Delta\)f6 36.\(\mathbb{E}\)c4 and now - whether Black now swaps the rooks (36...\Ze8), or whether he plays 36...වe4 (whereupon a4-a5 follows) winning chances would always be on the side of the first player. With such a good-natured disposition, one can't hope for a reward, of course, in spite of a strong and prudent game.

34...曾f6 35.閏e1 曾f7 36.閏f1 曾f6 ½-½

Cycle II

Round 6

0 Marshall - Capablanca 1 1 Nimzovich - Alekhine 0 ½ Spielmann - Vidmar ½

Standings after Round 6:

Capablanca 5 Nimzovich 4½ Alekhine 2½ Vidmar 2½ Spielmann 2 Marshall 1½

(16) Marshall – Capablanca Torre Attack [A46]

1.d4 2f6 2.2f3 e6 3.4g5

Perhaps the fashion for tomorrow. These days one still almost always plays 3.c4.

3...c5 4.c3

Allowing Black an easy equality. The conventional move is 4.e3 – but 4.e4 deserves more recognition, in my opinion, than it's been given up to now.

4... 皆b6 5.皆c2 c×d4 6. 分×d4

More tolerable would be 6.c×d4, although Black would also stand excellently then after 6... 2c6 7.e3 d5, together with 2d7, 2c8, etc. After the text move, Black gets a much clearer advantage – a mobile pawn superiority in the center.


6...白c6 7.e3 d5 8.白d2 Ad7 9.白2f3?

In the long run, a position cannot endure so many inferior moves. Advisable was 9.\mathbb{Z}c1 in order to take the queen back to b1 after 9...\mathbb{Z}c8, then to develop the king's bishop and castle short.

9...2e4 10.2f4?

Relatively better was 10. \$\textit{\textit{L}}\$h4.

10...f6



11.Ad3??

Afterall, White's position wasn't so bad that he had to "sacrifice" a piece in despair. Either 11.2e2, or first 11.2g3, was possible. What comes now is horrible.

11...e5 12.**≜**×e4 d×e4 13.**쌀**×e4 0-0-0

Crucial.

14.**Ag**3?

With 14.4×e5 or 14.0-0-0, he could have retained two pawns for the piece and – in case he still wanted to play on – achieved a longer resistance.

14...e×d4 15.0-0

Or 15.2×d4 Ze8, together with 2×d4, etc., or 15.c×d4 Zb4+, with an easy win.

15...d×e3 16.a4

Another "aggressive" move.

16... 三e8 17. 曾d3 exf2+ 18. 曾h1 曾e3 19. 曾d1

Since, for reasons difficult to understand, White doesn't want to give up in spite of a piece minus, it becomes an amusing cat-and-mouse game.

Black had a threat that couldn't be parried: 35... \(\tilde{\tilde{L}} \) d1!, etc.

It's really unbelievable how self-consciously and weakly Marshall always played against Capablanca! He put up quite a different resistance opposite the other participants in New York – in spite of his apparently inferior shape. One could compare, for example, his games with Dr. Vidmar from the Cycles II and IV!

(17) Nimzovich – Alekhine Réti Opening [A05]

1.5)f3 5)f6 2.b3 d6

This reply appears to be more logical to me than the usual 2...d5, with which the

e5-square, whose occupation White apparently strives for with the flank development of his queen bishop, is ceded to the opponent without a struggle.

3.g3

So, the purest "hypermodernry." In the current game, it probably wouldn't have brought the first player any laurels if his opponent hadn't overestimated the position and imagined that such a formation could be finished off in any old way.

3...e5 4.c4

Otherwise Black has even easier play, with the unimpeded thrust of his central pawns.


4...e4

This move is therefore reasonable, because with it White is as good as forced into the following escapade; since after 5.2d4 d5! 6.c×d5 \widetilde{\psi} \times d5 7.e3 \widetilde{\psi} = 5, etc., his position would inspire anything but confidence.

5. 公h4 d5

For the moment, quieter and also good is 5... e7. But the immediate clearing in the center is more logical.

$6.c \times d5$



6...對×d5

So Black hopes to bring about positions similar to the one mentioned above, but soon has to convince himself that the tempo White wins with \$\preceq\$c3 doesn't amount to an awfully lot. More correct was the natural 6...2×d5, which, with simple means, shows the unsoundness of the opponent's situation. Because if next 7.\(\preceq\)c2, then simply 7...\(\mathbb{e}\)e7! (the same also after 7.\(\textit{\textit{b}}\)2) 8.\(\textit{\textit{\textit{w}}}\)×e4 0-0, with unpleasant threats - for example, 9.2b2 Ee8 10.2g2 2b4!, together perhaps with ... 4f8!. Anyhow, there could be no talk in this case about a White initiative, and the "double-hole" development, proscribed with such reason, by the late opening artist Teichmann would be led again to its absurd conclusion.

7. 公c3 曾c6.

To 7... ₩e5, the reply 8.f4 was unpleasant for Black. The text move has, in any case, the advantage of as good as forcing the following white-square weakness in the enemy position.

8.e3

To 8. 2g2, Black intended 8...e3 – for example, 9.f×e3 ♣h3 10. Eg1 2g4.

8...a6

In light of the exposure of the central pawns and the possibility of a later advance to f5 by White's knight on the edge, it was less advisable to allow the queen exchange by means of 8...\$\timeg\$g4 \(\)\timeg\$ xg4! \$\timeg\$ xg4 10.\$\timeg\$b5, etc. Additionally, the pre-emptive move in the text, which bestows on the opponent a highly important developmental tempo, dis-

tinctly attests that the capture with the queen on the 6th move contained in it more dark sides than light.

9. **Ab2 Ag4**

At least deflects the white king's bishop from the planned attack on e4; but now f5 is uncovered.

10. Qe2 Q×e2 11. √2×e2!

After 11. \(\text{\text{\$\sigma}} \text{ xe2 } \(\text{\$\sigma}\) bd7, etc., Black would have had real chances to exploit the weakness of d3 and f3.

11... **勾bd7** 12. 其c1 骨b6

After this, Black gets a disadvantage and has to make great efforts in the following play to get chances for equality. On the other hand, after 12...2c5 13.0-0 2d7! 14.2xf6 gxf6, etc., a struggle with mutually strong and weak squares would arise, whose outcome would hardly be foreseeable.

13.0-0 Ad6 14.f3

Also 14.d3 came under consideration. The sharp text move leads to difficult-to-assess imbroglios, from which Black finally emerges with a sufficient positional equivalent for the sacrificed material.

14...**⊈**e5

The introductory move to the following interesting sacrificial combination, whose value, by the way, was totally misunderstood by the critics (unfortunately adapting themselves only too often just to the end result of a game). In any case, less satisfactory was

14...e×f3 15.\(\mathbb{I}\)×f3 \(\Delta\)e5 16.\(\mathbb{Q}\)×e5 \(\mathbb{Q}\)×e5 17.d4 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d6 18.\(\Delta\)c3, together with e4±.

15. £×e5

Not 15. 2 a 3 皆 a 5!, etc.

15...ව ×e5 16.f ×e4 වුd3

One of the necessary consequences of move 14; obviously deficient would be 16... ②xe4, on account of 17. \(\delta \cdot 2\), etc.

17.宫c3 0-0-0 18.曾b1!

The only move: after 18. \(\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}}}} \) \(2 \text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$b}}}} \), the d2- and e4-squares would be unprotected at the same time, and after 18. \(2 \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$d}}} \), of course the exchange sacrifice 18... \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}}}} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$d}}} \) would ensue, whose strength is apparent. Now, on the other hand, Black is forced to put still more into the deal.

18...**包×e4!**

The other sacrificial combination possible in this position, 18...②c5 19.d3 ②a4!?, would be unsuccessful in the event that White gives back the won material immediately. 20.b×a4 營×e3+21.營h1! 營×e2 22.邑fc1 邑d7 23.營b6 ②e8 24.邑b1 ②d6 25.營a7, etc., with a winning attack.

19.買×d3 幻×d2 20.買×d8+ 買×d8 21.對f5+ 對b8 22.買e1


Until the text, all counter moves by White were as good as forced; but now he had a choice again — and it's entirely unsure that he decided for the best. If the correctness of Black's positional sacrifice could be called into question at all, then it was now with 22. \(\mathbb{E} \) c1

쌀×e3+ 23.쌀f2 – but even in this case, Black's position after 23...쌀e7! (not 23...쌀e4, on account of 24...쌀×f7!, etc.) 24.②f5 쌀e5. etc., would offer chances.

After the move played, on the other hand, Black could have won yet a third pawn, and with that, at least establish a material balance.

22...皆xe3+ 23.皆f2 皆d3 24.幻f4

There wasn't anything better in view of the threat 24...g5.



24...\c3

Only after this imprecise move does White get effective counter chances. In contrast, the second player could get an adequate game with the obvious threat to a2 made with 24... \(\text{\text{\$a}}\)c2. For example:

(1) 25.邑e2 營×a2 26.營g2 g5 27.包f3 g×f4 28.②×d2 f×g3 29.h×g3 營a5!, and the queen comes with tempo to d5, whereupon it will no longer be difficult for Black to force a favorable endgame; (2) 25.包f3 ②×f3+26.營×f3 營×a2, likewise with full compensation for the sacrificed piece.

As one sees, the matter of the knight sacrifice was not so easy by far as the gentlemen critics fancied ...

25.鬨e3!

Black underestimated the effect of this good defensive move, and gets in a jam as a result.

25...骨c1+

He may no longer take the pawn a2: 25... 營a1+ 26. 登g2 營×a2 27. 分f3, 28. 分d3, etc.

26.曾g2 曾c6+ 27.句f3 g5

Through this weakening of the pawn position, the work becomes substantially easier for the opponent. The smaller evil was still 27... 公xf3 28. 當xf3 邑d2+29. 邑e2 當c2, etc.

28. 2d3! 2) xf3

A sad necessity, because if 28... 2e4, then 29. 2fe5! \displays d5 30.\displays xf7, etc.

29.骨×f3 骨c2+ 30.分f2 f5

31.闰e2 台c5 32.幻d3 台d4 33.幻e5 f4!

With the last moves, Black did what there was still to do. The following pawn exchange obviously means a boost to his drawing prospects.

34.42c4! f×g3 (?)

But here 34... \$\mathbb{I}\$f8 (threat: g4) or 34... \$\mathbb{I}\$g8 first had to be tried, because each piece exchange is obviously pleasant only for White.

35. Ed2 曾h8

Or 35...g4 36.쓸e3! 쌀f6 37.볼×d8+ 쌀×d8 38.蛰×g3, etc.

A queen exchange is probably not avoidable in the long run, since if the queen leaves the d-file (and Black doesn't have many moves), then White can provoke a new weakness through \(\bar{2}\)a5. Anyway, biding time would have prolonged the agony somewhat.

38. 曾f8+ 曾a7 39. 曾f2 曾×f2+ 40. 曾×f2 h5

Here b5 still offered a last practical chance. But that was now the 40th move...

41.當e3.

A nuance more precise was 41.\$f3. In contrast the retreat expected by the majority of the onlookers, 41.\$\text{\text{\text{d}}}2\$, after 41..\$\text{\text{\text{b}}}6\$ – with the threat of conquering the pawns on the queenside – would have at least made victory very difficult

41...c5

To 41...b5, White would have the following winning line: 42.\(\Delta\)d2 h4 43.g4 c5 44.\(\Delta\)e4! h3 45.\(\Delta\)f3 c4 46.bxc4 bxc4 47.\(\Delta\)g3 \(\Delta\)b6 48.\(\Delta\)xh3 \(\Delta\)a5 49.\(\Delta\)g3 \(\Delta\)b4 50.\(\Delta\)f3 \(\Delta\)a3 51.\(\Delta\)e3 \(\Delta\)xa2 52.\(\Delta\)d4 \(\Delta\)b3 53.\(\Delta\)c5+, etc.

42.a4 b5 43.a×b5 a×b5 44.\@d2 \@b6 45.\@e4 h4 46.g4 h3 47.\@f3 b4

Or 47...c4 48.b4, etc.

48.ᡚ×g5 c4 49.ᡚe4

49.bxc4 also won.

49...c×b3 50.g5 b2 51.幻d2 當c5 52.g6 h2 53.當g2 當d4 54.g7 當d3 55.g8營 當×d2 56.營a2 當c2 57.營c4+ 1-0

(18) Spielmann – Vidmar Four Knights Game [C47]

1.e4 e5 2.ᡚf3 ᡚc6 3.ᡚc3 ᡚf6 4.d4 exd4 5.ᡚxd4 Ձb4 6.ᡚxc6 bxc6 7.Ձd3 d5 8.exd5 cxd5

According to the experience of recent years, Bogoljubow's recommended 8... \$\to\$e7+ is here the easiest way to reach a draw; and Black can't strive for more in this line, searched in all possible directions.

9.0-0 0-0 10. Ag5 c6

Again Black chooses, to his disadvantage, an entangled method of play instead of comfortably simplifying the position after Capablanca's recipe by means of 10... 4×3 11.b $\times 3$ h6.

11.皆f3 Qe7 12.買ae1

In recent years this proved more sustainable than the more obvious 12. \(\mathbb{I}\)fe1, earlier used exclusively. The new idea allows White, after 12...\(\mathbb{I}\)bases, to pull back his knight to d1, without interrupting the alliance of his rooks, even for a short while.

12... **Ae6** 13. **Ae2**

In a game Alekhine-Em. Lasker (Moscow 1914) a very similar position occurred – only the king's rook was on el - and play continued 13.h3, with the sequel 13...h6 14.♣×h6 (retreat would also come under strong consideration, especially if, as in the current game, the bishop could distance himself to c1) 14...g×h6 15. ≝×e6! f×e6 16. ₩g3+ ♣h8 17. ₩g6, etc., with an unavoidable draw. But the text move has a lot to be said for it, especially since White only with difficulty could assume the opponent would voluntarily relinquish his bishop pair.


One decides on such an exchange only under severe coercion. Actually, after 15... \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) h4, for example, the possible threat of a sacrifice on h6 would have been rather unpleasant.

16.買×e2 Qd6 17.皆f3

Here 17. \\ h4also came under consideration.

17...買e8 18.買fe1 營a5 19.買×e8+ 買×e8

Of course, more than questionable would be 19...シ×e820.c3 쌀×a221. 쌀f5 &f6 (21...g622. 쌀d7) 22. 실×h6, etc.



Here the game was given up as a draw — a decision to be rebuked on the part of White. With two bishops and the healthier pawn position, one should have tried to bring the game to a happy end. Both after the queen exchange, 23. ... *#e7 24. *#e7 2×e7 25. b4!, etc., as well as without it, 23... c524.c3 together with *#f3 — Black would have a difficult game, defending for a considerable time.

Round 7

1/2 Spielmann – Capablanca 1/2
1/2 Vidmar – Alekhine 1/2
1/3 Nimzovich – Marshall 1/2

Standings after Round 7:

Capablanca 5½ Nimzovich 5 Alekhine 3 Vidmar 3 Spielmann 2½ Marshall 2

(19) Spielmann – Capablanca Caro-Kann Defense [B15]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.ሷc3 d×e4 4.ሷ×e4 ቯf6 5.ቯg3 ቧg4

As the course of this game shows, a bishop sortie is not to be recommended, because with it the first player is given an easy opportunity to secure the advantage of the bishop pair. If 5...e5 should also fail in this position (see the game Alekhine-Capablanca from the fifteenth round) – which I definitely don't think is impossible – then one would have to revert finally to the older move 4....\(\Delta f 6 \)).

6.骨d3!

This was – in connection with the fianchettoing of the king's bishop – already tried with success by Spielmann against Carls in Baden-Baden 1925. In any case, Black doesn't have an easy game.

6...၌bd7 7.h3 ဋ h5 8.ଶ×h5 ଶ×h5 9.ଶ୍ରf3 e6 10.g3!

Apart from the future role of $\Delta g2$, not to be underestimated, it's of special importance to secure the f4-square against a possible intrusion from the knight.

10...**⊈d**6

Both this, as well as the next developmental moves (up to the "liberating" e5), make a somewhat superficial, schematic impression and are in fact hardly the best. Here, for example, it came under strong consideration to complicate, through 10... \$\mathbe{e}a5+(!)\$, the possible fianchettoing of the white queen's bishop—with 11.\$\mathbe{L}d2\$ or 11.c3. Exactly through the omission of such details can one all too often get into difficulty.

11.Qg2 0-0 12.0-0 曾c7 13.b3

Very correct! Also the mentioned Spielmann-Carls game developed in this manner, by the way.

13...2hf6 14. ♣b2 e5

After this obvious relief maneuver, White's advantage becomes quite clear. Black already had to make up his mind to accept this, since otherwise White would further strengthen his position without difficulty: \(\mathbb{I}\)fe1, \(\mathbb{I}\)ad1, a3, c4, etc., with difficult-to-endure pressure.

Here and with the next moves, White averts the opposition of the enemy bishop on e5.

16...買fe8 17.買fe1 公×f3+ 18.Q×f3 買×e1+

In turn, there's nothing better than the double rook exchange.

19.買×e1 買e8 20.買×e8+ 公×e8 21.**Qg**4!

Spielmann handles this game very nicely up to a certain moment. The text move, for example, contains the strong threat 22. \(\mathbb{C}8!\), and forces the opponent into complex defensive maneuvers.

21...曾e7 22.曾f1


Not 22.營c8, on account of 22...營e1+, together with 23. ... 鱼c5, etc.

22... \(\bar{A}\) b4 23.c3

Also, 23.曾e5 was good, securing an endgame advantage.

But this diversion is certainly contrived. It was much more obvious, through 25.b4 \(\text{Qc7} \) (or 25...\(\text{Qb6} \) 26.c4 c5 27.\(\text{Wd5!} \), etc.) 26.c4, to re-open the nice diagonal for the bishop! If next 26.\(\text{We4} \), then 27.\(\text{Wxe4} \) \(\text{Nxe4} \) \(\text{Nxe4} \) 28.\(\text{Pe2} \), etc. — with more pleasant prospects than in the "ending position."

25....皇c7 26.c4 皆e5 27.皆e2 皆×e2+ 28.昏×e2 b6 ½-½



Here Spielmann made the decisive mistake of accepting the draw offered him. The position with the two bishops and centralized king was, without a doubt, worth playing out. Both 29.c5 (29...©b5 30.c×b6, together with \(\Delta b2, \) or 29...\(\Delta e4 \) 30.\(\Delta f3!, \) etc.), as well as 29.\(\Delta d3 \) c5 30.b4, etc., would have assured him an obvious endgame superiority, and Black would have to fight a long time for an uncertain draw.

Capablanca was therefore able to split the point without a fight in the text position due only to the halo of his title at the time.

(20) Vidmar – Alekhine Bogo-Indian Defense [E11]

1.d4 \$\(\)f6 2.\$\(\)f3 e6 3.c4 \$\(\)b4+ 4.\$\(\)d2

In accordance with recent experience, the avoidance of the bishop exchange through 4. Dbd2 leads to no satisfying result for White; for example, 4.0-0 5.g3 b6 6. Ag2 Ab7 7.0-0 d5 (also ... Ee8, together possibly with ... Af8, etc., comes into consideration) 8.a3 Ae7 9.b4 c5!= (Rubinstein-Alekhine, Semmering 1926).

4...\equiv e7 5.g3

Nimzovich's move, which isn't worse than the immediate exchange, since the queen in this line invariably has to be developed to e7.

5.g3

Dr. Vidmar played 5.2c3 against Nimzovich (see game number 14), and then had to fight against enemy pressure on e4. As is generally known, through flank development, White gets a very secure game – but little initiative.

5...0-0

With that, Black, on his part, foregoes fianchettoing the bishop, which in such cases is actually the logical counter-play for him. Although his plan, using the queen bishop on the c8-h3 diagonal, proves partially successful in this game, it's still hardly to be recommended – because, as becomes evident from the following, White could have opposed him forcefully.

6.⊈g2 ⊈×d2+ 7.ᡚb×d2

Here, for example, it would have been more advisable for him, when faced with the intended advance ...d6, together with ...e5, to capture with the queen and to develop his knight to c3, with which (1) d5 would be more effectively guarded; and (2). the possible opening of the d-file by means of dxe5 would have gained a lot of strength — but Black would, in this case, have played not ...e5, but rather ...c5, after appropriate preparation.

7...d6 8.0-0 e5 9.\dot{\psi}c2 \dot{\partial}c6 10.e3 \dd7

Played in order to develop the queen's rook to e8, and in this way to follow through with the move ...e4, which didn't work yet because of 2g5. But this idea could have been carried out at least as well by means of 10...h6, whereby, in addition, the important retreat square for the knight, h7, would be opened in preparation for f5.

11.a3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)ae8 12.d5

Played mainly in order to be able to move his knight to d4 in case of its attack by...e4. Moreover, an admittedly rather harmless demonstration on the queenside is planned in order to divert the opponent from the methodical and quiet utilization of his attacking chances on the kingside.

12...2d8 13.b4 e4

Although his pieces stood somewhat congested, Black's position was completely capable of development and, the main thing, currently displayed no weak points. Instead of the text maneuver through which an outpost is indeed established, which is not exactly pleasant for White, but in return a weakness on d6 is accepted - the simple, further intensification of pressure on the kingside, by means of 2h5, together with f5, came into consideration. Then the possible advance of the White queen to c7 wouldn't be feared. For example, 13...2h5 14.c5 f5 15.c×d6 c×d6 16.\delta c7 2\text{ f6 17.2c4} △b5!, etc., with a favorable game.

14.2)d4 c6

The quickest liberation of the d8-knight was indispensable. After the immediate 14... ₩e5, White would have been

able to force a very favorable file opening – for example, through 15. \(\mathbb{Z}\) ae1, together with f3, etc.

15.d×c6 包×c6 16.置fe1

Aimed at 16... 2×d4: together with e3, etc.

16...曾e5 17.幻e2!

White wants to keep the key e4-square under fire as many times as possible, which significantly complicates the further development of the enemy attack plans.


17...Qf5 18.公c3 罩e7!

A clearance move for the king's rook, which should be used on the open c-file.

19.h3

Preparation of the offense against the weakling d6.

19...h5 20.買ad1 買c8 21.骨b3 幻d8



With 21...쓸e6, White would have been able to get a draw more easily than in the game: 22. 2d5 트ee8 23. 2f4 쓸e7 (23...쓸d7 24.c5! ±) 24. 2d5, etc.

22.f4!

Through this ingenious coup, White escapes any serious danger. With other moves, by contrast, he gets a disadvantage slowly but surely — on the one hand, since the position of the unhappy knight on d2 would impede the formation of an effective attack against d6, but on the other hand, because Black's pressure on the c-file can be rather easily strengthened by means of ...a6, together with ...\(\mathbb{E}\)c7, and possibly ...\(\mathbb{E}\)e6.

22...e×f3

For his part, Black also has nothing better than to accept the transitional pawn sacrifice, since 22... \$\div e6 23.\$\div h2\$, together with \$\Displays 5 (or \$\Displays 2) - d4\$ would look quite friendly for White.

23. 원×f3 增×g3 24. 원e2 발g6 25. 원f4 발g3 26. 원e2 발g6 27. 원f4

If instead of this quiet draw offer (after 27... \$\text{\text{\$\text{\$}}}g3\$, the game would automatically be a draw because of the three-time repetition of the same position), White had let himself be tempted into 27.\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}}\$}\$xd6\$, then he would get a decisive disadvantage after 27...\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}\$}xd8\$ | 28.\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}\$}4\$ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}}\$} xd8 + \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}\$}xd8} | 30.\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}\$}g3}\$, with the threats \$31...\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}\$}}\$}xd8\$ | \$\text{\$\$\text{\$\te

27...骨h7

Black decides to play for a win – actually not incorrectly, since mutual chances at this moment can be regarded as approximately equal (prospects of a king attack for Black, balanced against White's pawn superiority queenside), and further development of the conflict

anticipates many interesting complications to come.

28.買×d6 勾e6

After 28... De4, a later 29. Dd5 would have been unpleasant.

29.公×e6 &×e6 30.公g5 皆f5

With 30... ♠×c4, White could reply with 31. Ēc1, as well as with simply 31. ♠×h7 and ♠×f6+.

31. 公 ×e6 罩×e6 32. 罩d4!

Better than obvious 32. Exe6 營xe6 33. Axb7, whereupon Black would have had the choice, either to force perpetual check through 33... 资xh3 34. Axc8 资g3+, etc., or to play for further complications with 33... Exc4.

32...買ce8 33.皆d3 包e4 34.買f1 皆g6(?)

Black absolutely had to prevent the following exchange, which makes his enemy's defense easier, with 34... \(\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$g}\$}}}\)5, after which nothing better would remain for White than to play for a draw with 35.\(\text{\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$

Finally, with this important move he's secure. Far weaker would be 37.曾d7, because of 37...曾g5! (also threatening ...邑g6) 38.曾d3 f5, etc.

37... **公g3 38.**置f3 h4

Mainly in the hope that White will take the b7-pawn immediately: 39.增×b7 包e2+ 40.費h2 (40.費f2 曾c2, etc.) 40... 三×e3!!, etc., would assure Black of an offense leading at least to a draw. But Dr. Vidmar played more accurately:

39.當h2!

- whereupon nothing better remained for Black than a pawn sacrifice leading to a difficult endgame:

39...宣d6! 40.曾×f7

Again, not 40. \ b×b7, because of 40...\ d2 41.\ d5 \ d5! \ ≠.

40...買d2 41.眥×g6+

Interesting here would be 41. \(\mathbb{I}\)f2, for after 41... 互×f2 42. 增×f2, together with ₩f4, etc., White would plainly stand superior. It's questionable, however, whether he would also retain real winning chances after the queen exchange - for example, 41... 包f1+! 42. 魯g1! 曾×f7 43. 里×f7 包×e3 44. 单e4+ 曾h6 45. 里×b7 ್ರ×c4 46.\\=xa7 \\=b2\\\. With this last move, Black prevents the White passed pawn from advancing, and Black, with ... \begin{aligned} \text{Bb3}, as well as with the king's march ...\$g5-f4, etc. (possibly along with the pawn advance g5 and g4), threatens to get sufficient counter-chances. After all. the immediate queen exchange in the text would definitely put before him a less-than-easy defense, or differently put, a counter-attack problem.

41...曾×g6 42.c5! 置a2 43.e4

With this conciliatory counter-sacrifice, White hopes to bring the knight to side paths, which would allow him to assert

his queenside superiority. The results of the other winning attempt, 43. \mathbb{I}f4, would have been very interesting. With that, the plausible ... 215 would have been highly precarious; for example, 44. 魯g1! 罩a1+ 45. 罩f1 罩×f1+ 46. 鱼×f1! (the instructive pawn endgame after 46. මxf1 වxe3+ 47. මf2 වxg2 48. මxg2 \$f5 49.\$f3 a6! would, one could be convinced, even be won for Black), 46...회×e3 47.요d3+ 합f6 (47...합g5 48. ⊈e4, etc.) 48. ⊈f2! (stronger than 48. ⊈e4 \$e5, together with ... €22, etc.), 48... 2d5 49. 2f3, and Black would hardly be able to successfully oppose the enemy's penetration on both flanks (especially dangerous could be the seemingly harmless pawn h3, supported by the bishop).

Therefore, to 43.\(\mathbb{I}\)f4, he should not play 43... 2f5, but rather 43... \$\displays g5! - with consequences something like: (1) 44. 国g4+ 雪h5 45. 雪g1 (if 45. 国×g7, then ... af5 46.፱×b7 a×e3 47.፱g7 \$h6 48. 里g8 雪h7 49. 里g5 雪h6, etc., draw) 45...වe2+ 46.මf2 වd4+! 47.මe1 වc2+ 48. ම්d2 (48. ම්e2 වxb4+ 49. ම්f3 වd3) 48...ව×b4+ 49.ම්c3 ව්a6!=; and (2) 44.罝f7 &f5 45.ቄg1 (or 45.罝×b7 &×e3, etc. - similar to 1) 45...\(\mathbb{I}\)a1+ 46.\(\mathbb{I}\)f2 且a2+ 47.曾f3 日×a3 48.曾e4 g6! since 50.c6 doesn't work, on account with 2d6+ and 2b7, etc. - All difficult and at times quite interesting lines!

43...ᡚ×e444.ቯf4ᡚg545.a4ᡚe6!

Through this recent pawn sacrifice, Black secures the f4-square for his knight, which permits him the complete use of the enemy's pinned position. The final image is quite piquant.


46.買×h4 曾f5 47.買g4

Or 47. \$\pig3 \boxed{\pi} \times a4 48. \boxed{\pi} \times b7 g5 49. \boxed{\pi} c4 a5, etc. - draw.

47...g5 48.\dag{3} \(\overline{1} \)f4!

The most stringent.

49.Q×b7 罩a3+ 50.Qf3



After 50.\$h2 \(\mathbb{Z}\times h3+\) 51.\$\\geq g1 \(\mathbb{E}\times g4\) 52.\$\(\mathbb{L}\times c8+\)\$\\geq 53.\$\(\mathbb{L}\times h3\)\$\(\mathbb{E}\times h3\), together with ...\$\(\mathbb{L}\times c_0\), etc., Black would of course win.

50...買a2! ½-½

Black threatens 51... h5 checkmate! Perpetual check with the knight follows 51.h4, and perpetual with the rook follows a bishop move to c6, b7, a8. But if 51. d1 (in order after 51... a3+, to be able to play 52. f2), then 51... d2!, with which Black's winning chances would obviously be in the past. Therefore ... draw.

(21) Nimzovich – Marshall Réti Opening [A06]

1.2f3 4f6 2.e3 d5

Since with his second move White has foregone, *de facto*, the fianchettoing of

his king's bishop, 2...b7, etc., certainly wouldn't be a bad thing here.

3.b3 **≜g**4

The move is good, since it solves the problem of the queen's bishop and at the same time permits White the occupation of e5 only after some effort. On the other hand, the older 3...c5 (Nimzovich-Spielmann, Cycle I) is at least very doubtful, because it virtually forces the pinning move \(\Delta\)b5, so advantageous in the struggle for e5.

4. 4b2 2bd7 5.h3

Temporarily not necessary, and – as became apparent, especially in the Nimzovich-Dr. Vidmar game in the tenth round, begun in this way – definitely not harmless. Instead, 5. 2e2 commits to little, together with d3, 2bd2, 2h4, with the further idea of f4, etc.

5... Ah5 6.d3 h6

Probably in order to retain the bishop threatened with exchange through 7.g4 ≜g6 8.€h4, but which was hardly worth the effort. The immediate, and more obvious, 6.e6 appears better.

7.分bd2 e6 8.骨e2

Contrived, and hardly worthy of imitation. The proceeding had only partial success because Marshall – as opposed to his usual habit – in the following played merely for simplifications. Instead of this, 8. 2e2 would have lead to an equal position – very well known, by the way, with colors reversed.

8...**Q**b4 9.g4

With the apparent intention of castling long. The dark queenside squares are very weak however, and this circumstance could have had unpleasant consequences for him.


9...⊈g6 10. 2e5

The temporary control of e5 is only faint consolation here.

10... ②×e5 11. Q×e5 Qd6

Why lose so much time? Immediately consequent was 11... ₩e7, together with 12...0-0-0, etc.

12.包f3 曾e7 13.Qg2 0-0-0 14.0-0-0



14...**Q**×e5(?)

So the white knight comes unexpectedly to the longed-for square, and will have to be removed by further exchange – and finally a balanced game results with mutual weaknesses. But instead of this, Black could, with 14...243+15.261 (15.262 e5 =) 15...268! and a follow-up ...f6, finally take the essquare from the opponent, which also would have resulted in the exchange of White's dark-square bishop (if not, then its blocking: 17.293 e5, etc.) – but with

a tremendous difference, compared to the text continuation. A much greater future would have beckoned to both the black knight (from d6) and his g6-bishop (on account of possible respective use on f7 and on the e8-a4 diagonal). After this omission, the play degenerates noticeably and consists for considerable time of small, easily clear tactical points. Not until the rook endgame does it become interesting again.

15.6) ×e5 Ah7 16.c4!

The central knight covers d3. Besides, this move makes possible the queen's involvement on the queenside and converts the weakness of the dark squares into a strength (definitely not a rare instance).

16... **包**d7

Otherwise, White would really get an advantage.

17. 公×d7 買×d7 18.c×d5

Removes the frontal pressure against d3.

18...e×d5 19.骨b2!

Here the queen stands resplendent – and it's in no way surprising that her pressure on the center squares completely counterbalances the small weakness of the loosened kingside.

19...f5

Of course!

20.買d2 買f8

Looks likewise very reasonable. But upon further consideration, the pressure on f2 proves harmless. Perhaps, therefore, the effects of 20... \(\mathbb{H}\) hd8 (intending d4) would have been more long-lasting.

21.g×f5

Otherwise Black plays ... f4.

21...Q×f5 22.\hd1

The infamous "over-protection" – this time bound with some tactical conditional ideas – for example, 23.e4 d×e4 24.d×e4 \(\beta\)×d2 25.\(\beta\)×d2 \(\beta\)×e4? 26.\(\beta\)d7+, together with checkmate in two moves. Therefore, it would have been expedient for Black on the next move to play 22...a6 to open an outlet for himself. Then he probably would have stood still a nuance better.

22... 骨g5 (?)

This failure, however, leads finally to a simplification that is in no way favorable. But even now, with halfway careful play, he wouldn't need to worry about a draw

23.f4 世g3 24.世e5!

24.Qd4 (if ...c5 25.\mathbb{\pi}c2, etc.) worked too. But the text move is more compelling.

24...Q×h3

If 24...c6 25.\(\mathbb{Z}\)c2, with the renewed threat 26.\(\mathbb{L}\)xd5.

25. 4×d5

The white pieces in the center now threaten many squares, and Black has to seek his salvation in simplification. The exchange of d5 against h3 was certainly not good business.

25...\g6

With the threat 26... \square 15.

26.Qe4 曾f6 27.曾×f6 莒×f6 28.闰g1

Introduces a small threat to play on the g-file, but which should not have meaningful consequences, given the unavoidable bishop exchange.

28... Qf5 29. 国dg2 (!) Q×e4

Here 29...g5! was simpler; for example, 30.f×g5 h×g5 31. \(\mathbb{I}\times g5\) \(\mathbb{L}\times e4\) 32.d×e4 \(\mathbb{I}\times f2!\) – and whether White exchanges a rook pair or not, Black would be able without difficulty to hold a draw.

30.d×e4 \(\mathbb{A}\)d3

An effective and sufficient counterplay, much more purposeful than the passive behavior by means of 30... \(\mathbb{I}\)ff7, etc.

The position is a clear draw after the exchange brought about by this. But also 34.\(\mathbb{E}\)c8 wouldn't have been sufficient – for example, 34...\(\mathbb{E}\)x64 35.\(\mathbb{E}\)cxc7+ \(\mathbb{E}\)d6 36.\(\mathbb{E}\)xb7 \(\mathbb{E}\)f2! 37.\(\mathbb{E}\)bd7+ \(\mathbb{E}\)c6 38.\(\mathbb{E}\)c7+ \(\mathbb{E}\)d6, etc. – draw.


34...\gd6!

The simplest – the white king is driven to the edge.

35.e5 莒e1+ 36.曾b2 莒e2+ 37.曾a3 莒×g6 38.莒×g6+ 曾d5 39.莒×h6 a5 40.闰h7 莒c2

But now Marshall begins to contrive and thereby endangers his play. Simple was 40...\$c6, because if 41.\(\mathbb{E}e7\), then 41.\(\mathbb{E}f2\), and the White pawns wouldn't advance. But the text move spoils nothing for now.

41.闰e7 b5 42.b4



If immediately 42.f5, then 42...b4+ 43.\$\mathbb{\mathbb{G}} a4 \mathbb{\mathbb{G}} \times a2+ 44.\$\mathbb{\mathbb{G}} b5 c6+!, together with ...a4, etc. - draw.

42...a4?

The continuation of an unrealizable dream of mate. Correct was 42...a×b4+43.\Disphi\text{\$\Disphi\$}\text{\$\Dis

43.f5 c5

Actually contains no threat $(44... 2c4? 45. \Xi c7, etc.)$.

44.f6?

A mistake, but a rather excusable one. In hindsight it was noticed that White

was able to win with 44.e6!. Before the text, this move had the important advantage that it made possible the banishment of the king from d5 with \mathbb{I}d7+, and thereby would have ensured the advance of the passed pawn. The logical further development of play would then be (44.e6!) 44...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c3+ 45.\(\mathbb{D}\)b2 c×b4 46. 單d7+ 當c6 47. 單d8 a3+ 48.當b1 罩e3 49.f6 b3 50.a×b3 罩e1+ 51. 魯a2! b4 52.e7 罩e2+ 53. 魯b1 罩e1+ 54.當c2 a2 55.罩a8 當d7 56.f7 (not 56. E×a2? Ee2+, and a draw through perpetual check!), and wins. As one sees, this was in no way an easy line, and therefore one can hardly blame Nimzovich, at the board, for underestimating its strength.

44...買c3+ 45.曾b2 c×b4 ½-½

After that, nothing better remains for White – since 46.\(\mathbb{I}\)d7+ doesn't work – other than 46.f7, with the result 46...a3+ 47.\(\mathbb{D}\)b \(\mathbb{I}\)f3 48.e6 \(\mathbb{I}\)f1+ 49.\(\mathbb{D}\)c \(\mathbb{I}\)f3 51.a×b3 a2=, etc. Therefore, draw.

Round 8

½ Capablanca – Nimzovich ½ ½ Alekhine – Spielmann ½ 0 Vidmar – Marshall 1

Standings after Round 8:


Capablanca 6 Nimzovich 5 ½ Alekhine 3½ Vidmar 3 Spielmann 3 Marshall 3

(22) Capablanca – Nimzowitsch Torre Attack [A46]

1.d4 ପ୍ରf6 2.ପ୍ରf3 e6 3.ୟg5 h6

More usual and undoubtedly good is 3...c5 (compare Marshall – Capablanca from the fourth round). But in case Black absolutely wants to develop the queen's bishop to b7, then the text move has to happen exactly at this time, so that White either immediately exchanges on f6 (after which Black can choose the pawn configuration corresponding to the piece material reduced in this way), or gets around to e4, but only after some effort.

4. \(\text{h} \) 4 b6 5. \(\text{D} \) bd2 \(\text{D} \) b7 6.e3 \(\text{Q} \) e7 7. \(\text{A} \) d3 d6 8.c3 0-0



Before he informs the opponent of his king's address, he would have done better, by means of 8...c5, to initiate play in the center immediately. The bishop check on b5 then wouldn't have been at all disturbing, because after 9...\(\int\)c6, he could have guarded the pinned knight three or four times in case of need. Of course, Black's somewhat early castling could be exploited only with a fairly energetic, reckless approach – and Capablanca was accustomed to playing like that only in the rarest of cases.

9.h3

At this point hardly suitable, since a possible g4 before safeguarding the king's position would be a strike at nothing – for example, (after 9...c5) 10.c×d4 ②d5 11.2g3 ②b4∓. In contrast, far more unpleasant for Black would have been the quiet – but still directed at a kingside attack – further mobilization of the white fighting force; for example, 9.8e2 c5 10.0-0-0 ②c6 11.3b1 – and only then (even as a possible pawn sacrifice) g4, etc., with a promising fight. Instead the game degenerates completely after a few moves.

9...c5 10.0-0 夕c6 11.쌀e2 幻h5

Seeking to keep the queen's bishop with 11...\(\mathbelle{\mathbel

Naturally!

13...分f6 14.買fd1 買fd8 15.e4

Played not in the hope of getting an initiative – he has no more chance of that – but rather merely in an attempt to force the opening of the file in order to trade the difficult pieces.

15... **Q**×a6 16. ₩×a6 ₩c7

Prevents e5.

17.\(\mathbb{E}\)ac1\(\mathbb{E}\)d7(!)

A preventive maneuver against possible d(or b)×c5.

18.b4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)ad8

Of course not 18...cxb4 19.cxb4 Nxb4? 20.Qa4, etc.

19.曾e2 夕e7

Black distances the knight and queen from the c-file in order to be able to offer quick opposition to the rooks – a drawn game deeply thought through.

20.**萬e**1

Not 20.e5, because of $20...d\times e5$ $21.0\times e5$ $\Xi d5 \mp .$

20.... 2g6 21.g3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c8 22.b×c5 d×c5!

After 22...bxc5 23. \(\begin{aligned} \text{Eb1}, etc., the Black queenside could become weak. \end{aligned} \)

23. **公b3 c×d4 24.c×d4 骨b7**

Finally, an exchange!

Rather more favorable for White would be 29...②×e4 30.⑤×e4 皆e1+ 31.⑤h2 皆×e4 32.皆×a7, etc.

30.曾e2 曾c3 31.曾a6 曾c7 ½-½

(23) Alekhine – Spielmann Queen's Pawn Game [D02]

1.4)f3 d5 2.d4 e6 3.4f4

This continuation, especially favored by Rubinstein back in his day, is doubtlessly entirely solid, but has the disadvantage of being pointed only in a small measure toward pressure on the center, and so gives the opponent a larger choice between different types of development.

3...c5 4.e3 骨b6 5.骨c1

White's leader made this passive move only because he wanted to try an improvement of the usual line; otherwise he would have chosen perhaps the vigorous developmental move 5.全c3, which leads to peculiar play; for example: (1) 5...曾xb2 6. 6.包b5 包a6 7.邑b1 曾xa2 8.邑a1 曾b2 9.邑xa6, etc.; (2) 5...c4 6.e4! 曾xb2 7.总d2±. After other moves follows 8.邑b1, and White will develop unfettered.

5...ᡚc6 6.c3 Дd7 7.Дe2!

This is the mentioned improvement: if White plays 7.2d3, then he will not be able to prevent the exchange of his valuable king's bishop after 7...2f6 8.h3 (otherwise, of course, ... 2h5, etc.) 8... 프c8 9.0-0 c×d4 10.e×d4 2b4, and after 11. 2e2 2b5 12. 2d2 2xe2 13. \\ e2 \(\text{2c6}, \text{ has to content himself} \) with a position that is still solid, but offers little promise beyond that. With the game move, White's thought is to first finish his development undisturbed, and only then position the bishop on the important b1-h7 diagonal. As we will see, the plan in this game was partly successful.

7...公f68.h3 c×d4

This exchange certainly wasn't necessary yet; but after 8... 2d2 9. ₩b1, together with Ad3 and 0-0, White would

have as good as forced the pawn trade on account of the positional threat $d \times c5$: together with e4.

9.e×d4 **Qe7** 10.0-0 0-0 11.**分bd2** 買ac8 12.**쌍b1 分a5** 13.**買e1!**


This prevents the bishop exchange, since with 13....\(\textit{Q}\)b5, simply 14.\(\textit{Q}\)d1 would follow. It becomes more and more clear that Black is biting on a granite queenside.

13...互fd8 14.公e5 Qe8 15.Qd3

Threatens 16. 25 (16...g6 17. 294) to force 16... h6, probably a decisive weakness.

15...g6!

Thanks to this appropriate defense plan, the black position soon gets a hold. Indeed, however, it probably would have been different if White had continued resolutely.



16.Ag5

A stereotypical thought that cheats White out of the fruits of his rational opening approach. After Black had unavoidably weakened his kingside, White was able, and had first and foremost, to free his boxed-in queen on b1 (and thus also the queen's rook) with b4!, (immediately or after \(\mathbb{L} \)e3, for example). He must accept the weakness c3, which would be quite easy to defend.

After 16.b4 \(\times\)c6, he could have continued promisingly with 17.a4 (17...\(\times\)xe5 18.dxe5, together with \(\times\)e3-d4, etc.) or 17.\(\times\)b3 or 17.\(\times\)e3, together with f4, etc. After the text move, on the other hand, Black succeeds without effort in consolidating.

16...曾g7 17.皆c1

The threat connected with 18.2g4 2g8 19.4xe7 2xe7 20.2c4, together with 4h6+ and 2f6 mate, is parried sufficiently through the next retraction.

17... ിg8 18. 🎗 ×e7 ව ×e7 19. ിdf3 f6

Through which the main hole is sealed and the actual danger therefore is eliminated, because the weakness on e6 is readily guarded by a number of pieces.

20.幻g4 幻g8 21.罝e2 具f7 22.眥d2

After 22. \(\frac{1}{2}\)c2, 22...\(\frac{1}{2}\)c6, would follow, with a gain of tempo (...\(\frac{1}{2}\)b4).

22... 公c4 23. 骨c2 骨d6

Threatens with the not-to-be-underestimated counterattack b5-b4 (or first a5), etc.

24. **≜**×c4

White uses the last moment to get rid of the troublesome knight, without opening the b-file to the enemy.

24...買×c4 25.分e1 (!)

With a double intention - 2f4 and (if ...b5?), 2c5.

25...買c7 26. 公d3 公e7 27. 當d2 公f5 28. 買ae1 買e8 29. 當f4 (?)

But this is surely played too weakly; in better shape I would have made the doubtless risk-free attempt to conquer the e5-square by means of 2g4-h2-f3, together with g4-g5.

29... 🖰 × f4 30. 🖸 × f4 🗒 ce7 31. 🖸 e3 🗗 × e3 32. 🗒 × e3 e5 33. d× e5

The try 33.f3(!) was a last attempt at a win. But after 33...當f8], not much would come of it.

33...f×e5 34. 公d3 當f6 35. 當f3+ 當g7 36. 當fe3 當f6 37. 當f3+ ½-½

(24) Vidmar – Marshall Bogo-Indian [E11]

1.d4 2f6 2.2f3 e6 3.c4 4b4+ 4.4d2 4xd2+5.2bxd2 d5

As already noticed (compare the game Capablanca-Marshall from the first Cycle), in this variation *luft* can be made for the black queen's bishop either with ...b6 or ...d6, together possibly with ...e5 – without weakening the dark squares. The text move provides the first player in all cases a certain, if also not entirely convertible, positional advantage.

6.e3

The Capablancan 6.g2-g3 is also good.

6...0-0 7.骨c2 勾bd7 8. Ad3 h6 (?)



Rudolf Spielmann

José Raúl Capablanca






Aron Nimzovich



Alexander Alekhine



Frank Marshall



This weakening of the kingside is not harmless. After this a move, a more temperamental opponent probably would have tried to orchestrate an immediate offense by means of, for example, $\Xi g1$, g4-g5, and castling long. But Dr. Vidmar apparently hopes to hold onto his advantage also through quite simple developmental moves.

9.0-0

He could also first play 9.\(\mathbb{Z}\)c1, in order to make ...c5 still more difficult. But this wasn't necessary, since after the disintegration in the center that now ensues, he gets a position promising victory.

9...c5

So it was foreseen with the previous move: The knight was freed from guarding h7, in order to be able finally to attack the white c5-pawn from a6(!) after a curious zigzag movement ... But such a plan with a half-developed position had to be unsound, and in fact, finds its rebuttal. But Black's strategic situation was inferior at this moment, and the game of defense introduced by the pater peccavi-move ...c6 looked likewise uninviting.

After these six forced moves, it turns out that Black made no progress in the solution of the queen's bishop problem, but opened up files for the action of the opponent's rooks. White uses this circumstance very skillfully.

16.買fd1 幻b6 17.皆b3 皆d5

Looks daring, since the queen in the center, where she can be attacked too easily, has only a few squares at her disposal. But on the move 17... #e7, at first glance more natural, White would force a new, probably decisive weakening of the enemy kingside: 18. #d3 f5 19. 4e5, etc.

18.骨b2 且d7

What else?

19.4)e4


From here on, a vexing position arises, in which apparently several paths lead to Rome, but in fact, more often than not, there's barely one single salvation for Black. At this moment, for example, the moves 19.a4 and 19.ae4 appear enormously strong. But in the first case, Black would have pulled himself completely out of a fix with 19...\$\mathref{\omega}\$d6! - and halfway in the second with 19...\$\mathref{\omega}\$b5 20.ae57 \cdot a4 (20...\$\mathref{\omega}\$ab8), with a pawn sacrifice. The text move is stronger.

19...皆b5 20.a3

With the main threat 21.2e5!, together with 2d6, and wins.

20...Ac6!

A bold defensive move, which gives him the most prospects for enemy carelessness.



21.2)d4(?)

Apparently tired from the struggle against the allure of various will-o'-thewisps of the previous moves, Dr. Vidmar goes astray at this moment, when things weren't so hard. He relinquishes his whole positional advantage. The precarious position of Black's small heaps of pieces queenside, and above all of his queen, could have been taken advantage of here in two ways.

(1) 21.2e5 A×e4 (if [a] 21...2a4? 22. **≜**×a4 **≅**×a4 23. **2**c5; [b] 21... **2**c4 22.包×c4 營×c4 23.具d3 營d5 24.b5, with a winning advantage in both cases) 22. 2×e4 2c5 (or 2a4 23. \dd4±) 23. Af3, and now for Black, neither 23... Dca4 24. \dd4, nor 23. Dba4 24. ₩c2, etc., is satisfactory). In this line, Black would in the long run hardly be able to avoid the loss of a pawn; and (2) 21.2d3! (not 21.2d6, on account of 21...2c4! 22.2xc4 4xf3!, etc.) 21...2c4 (or [a] 21...2a4 22.2×b5 ව×b2 23.೩×c6 b×c6! 24.\alphadc1 \alpha ac8 25.包e5±, etc.; [b] 21...\text{\text{\text{b}}}h5 22.\text{\text{2}g3}, together with 23.h3 or 23.2a6, and wins) 22.\equiv e2 \(\mathbb{Q} \times e4 \) 23.\(\mathbb{Q} \times e4, \) and Black wouldn't have a sufficient defense against the threats 24.2d4 or 24. Ad3, together with \(\mathbb{Z}\) ac1, etc. The weak text move - followed, by the way, by a still weaker one - permits Marshall the only time in the tournament to demonstrate his otherwise so feared tactical proficiency.

21... 當e5 22.f4?

Usually one makes such moves, weakening the entire center position, only if they are connected to a desirable change. So did White spot such a thing here in the driving back of the opponent's king's knight to the original place? He could have maintained a small advantage with the simple 22. \begin{aligned}
blue{1} 1 (unpins and protects!).

22...발c7 23.ᡚ×c6 b×c6 24.負d3 원b8!

Indeed the only move (or else 25.2d6, etc.), but fine, since the knight can very soon get to better squares. Chances now score approximately equal.

The beginning of the counter-play in the center, enabled by White's careless 22nd move.

26. 骨f2 a5 27.b5 骨b6

Threatens two pawns, neither of which is good to sacrifice. Therefore, it was now White's turn to make unpleasant forced moves.

A "risk-everything" play, which is unlike the leader of the white pieces. With 30.h3 (preparing the move \$\Delta e4\$, which doesn't work immediately because of 30. ...\$\Delta c3!\$, etc.), he could have kept a balanced game.


30...2) de7 31.h4

Everything in the same style. The second player will determine that White will perish only because of his weak points in the center and kingside, arising from the many pawn moves.

31...買d5!

The beginning of a long, calculated maneuver, which aims at the conquest of the black center squares.

32.e4



To 32.2a4, ... \$\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned

32...買d4!

This move signifies the actual crisis of the game – for if Black were compelled here to draw back his rook, then White would get an advantage with the occupation of the b-file. But now he goes downhill rather quickly.

33.f5

To his misfortune, White has to convince himself that the instant win of the exchange with 33.包d7 would ultimately change into a loss of a piece — for example, 33...營d8 34.包xf8 鼍xd3 35.鼍xd3 營xd3 36.f5 exf5 37.exf5 營g8! 38.f6 gxf6, etc.

33...e×f5 34.g×f5 ᡚe5!

For the knights, which in the first part of the game had to wait so grimly for better days on a6 or b6 – bright new horizons are opening up; and in the end it will be their lot to deal the enemy the

deathblow. The end phase makes quite a pleasing impression as an illustration on the subject of "Crime and Punishment."

35.Qe2 買×d1+ 36.買×d1 買d8 37.買×d8+ 費×d8 38.f6

The tendency to simplify is probably understandable with the overall relaxed position. But it brings only slight relief, since there are still enough pawns remaining on the board to render a decision.

38... 夕7c6 39.f×g7+ 當×g7 40.當g2

The attempt 40.2d3 would also prove insufficient after 40...2×d3 41. \$\mathref{g}_3+ \mathref{g}_1 + 42. \$\mathref{k}_2 \mathref{d}_3 \mathref{g}_1 + 43. \$\mathref{g}_1 \mathref{g}_5, etc. The tragedy for White lies in the fact that the endgame is equally as hopeless for him as the middle game.

40... 2g6 41. \$h3

Also 41.h5 쓸g5+, together with ... 2)f4, etc., would be unpleasant.

41...皆d6!

Threatens to win a piece with ... 2f4+, etc.

42.曾g2 幻d4 43.幻b7

Forced, since after 43. ②d3, Black wins a piece with 43... ②×e2 44. ₩×e2 ₩×d3!.


43...曾e5 44.曾f1

He already begins to hope for a "miracle": 44...營xe4? 45.營xf7+!, together with 46.②d6+, etc., draw!

44...5 f4

The bishop will soon be compelled to keep company with the knight in exile

(see White's 47th move). The position, which represents the complete triumph of the strategy on the black central squares, deserves a diagram.



45.世g3+ 雪h7 46.具d3 幻de6

With the threat 47... \\disparent a1+ -b2+×b7.

47.且a6 曾a1+ 48.曾e1 曾b2! 49.曾e3

If 49. 쌀f2, then 49... 쌀c1+, together with ... 쌀c6, winning a piece.

49... 曾g2+ 50.曾e1 曾c2! 51.曾f3!

In order to be able to answer 51...當c6 with 52.當f1. A truly heroic resistance!

51... 2g2+ 52. af1 2ef4!

Threatens 53...當c1+ 54.當f2 當e1 checkmate.

53.曾g1 公×h4

Finally comes the harvest!

Spite chess.

To 57. 當×f4 comes 57... 當d5+. Mate in three.

57...f5 0-1

Round 9

½ Vidmar – Capablanca ½ 1 Alekhine – Marshall 0 0 Spielmann – Nimzovich 1

Standings after Round 9:

Capablanca 6½ Nimzovich 6½ Alekhine 4½ Vidmar 3½ Spielmann 3 Marshall 3

(25) Vidmar – Capablanca Queen's Gambit Declined [D30]

1.d4 ᡚf6 2.ᡚf3 e6 3.c4 d5 4.e3

With the voluntary confinement of his queen's bishop, in my opinion White abandons the hope of getting an advantage in the opening. Oddly enough, in New York against Capablanca (see also Nimzovich-Capablanca, Round II), the best opening moves (4.255 or 4.2c3) were missed for mysterious reasons.

4...**包bd7**

Against Nimzovich, Capablanca played 4...\$\textit{\textit{2}}e7\$, together with ...0-0, which I also like better, because with that, Black reserves for himself the developmental possibility ...c5, together with ...\$\textit{2}c6\$.

5.Ad3

But the Merano line isn't so strong for Black that White has to waive the nor-

mal move 5.Nc3 just to avoid it! To the text move, Capablanca tries a new, noteworthy developmental maneuver.

5...d×c4 6.Д×c4 c5 7.0-0 �b6 (!)

Enables a quick queenside mobilization. Inexpedient with this system would be the zwischenzug 7...a6, since after 8.a4 ab6 9.ad3, Black would always have to take into account a5.

8. Ad3 Ad7 9. 公c3 Ec8 10. 對e2

10...c×d4 11. 公×d4

The isolation of the central pawn through 11.e×d4 didn't come under consideration, since in conjunction with it, White couldn't expect a halfway serious attacking game.

11...**£**b4

As the answer reveals, the developmental square for the bishop isn't selected very happily. It was appropriate to look at the d4-knight with 11...\$\(\textit{\textit{\textit{a}}}\)c5, in order possibly to lead him astray; for example, 12.\$\(\textit{\textit{a}}\)b3 \$\(\textit{\textit{a}}\)e7 13.e4 e5 14.f4 0-0! 15.f×e5 \$\(\textit{\textit{a}}\)g4 16.\$\(\textit{\textit{a}}\)f4 \$\(\textit{\textit{a}}\)g5 17.\$\(\textit{\textit{a}}\)g3 \$\(\textit{\textit{c}}\)e8!—and with good play, Black would take back the e5-square.

12.e4 e5

Not 12... \$\(\text{\pi}\) xc3 13.b×c3 e5 (otherwise 14.e5±) 14.\(\text{\pi}\)f3, together with \$\(\text{\pi}\)c1-a3,

with excellent play for White, thanks to the might of his black-square bishop.

13.43c2(?)

But here either 13. 2f3! or 13. 2b3 is preferable. If in this last case, 13... 2xc3 14.bxc3 0-0, then 15. 2a3 Ee8 16. 2c5 – rather in favor of White. But otherwise he would avoid the weakness on c3 (2d2 or also possibly 2d5) and keep a small developmental advantage.

13... 2×c3 14.b×c3 0-0

Now Black is again at the helm.


15. De3 Da4!

It's true that this permits White to change his weakling c3 into a passed pawn that's sound at the core – but at the cost of further weakening the entire area on the left side of the board. Only a few players probably would have conceived this idea.

16.c4 &c5 17.&d5 &xd5 18.cxd5 쌈a5

Threatens to win an exchange (19... \(\delta \times d3\), etc.).

19.買d1



19...公×d3(?)

Strangely, Capablanca foregoes the obvious move 19...\$\mathbb{L}_a4\$, which would have assured him leading the game either after 20.\$\mathbb{L}_d2\$\mathbb{L}_xd2 21.\$\mathbb{L}_xd2 \Delta xd3 22.\$\mathbb{L}_xd3\$\mathbb{L}_c4\$ (c2), together with doubling the rooks and moving the king to d7 - or also after 20.\$\mathbb{L}_d2\$\mathbb{L}_xd3\$\mathbb{L}_c3\$. On the other hand, following the hasty exchange, he can count only on a draw.

20.骨×d3 骨c3

If now 20... 2a4 or 20... 2c3, then 21. 2d2!.

21. 鱼e3 曾×d3 22. 置×d3 a5 23. a4 氧c4 24. f3 ½-½

Now suddenly White stands better, since after 24.... \(\times \) × a 4 25. \(\times \) b6. he wins back the pawn, whereupon White's guarded d-pawn would have greater value than the Black pawn on b7. But the game, of course, was not to be won against proper defense.

(26) Alekhine – Marshall Queen's Gambit Declined [D30]

1.d4 5f6 2.5f3 e6 3.c4 d5 4. Lg5 h6

The praxis of the last tournament seems to suggest that White will have no trouble securing a lasting initiative after this move. Usually Black plays the move only out of "fear" of White's later plans of development recommended by Capablanca – according to which the knight on d2 must be developed in order to take again on c4, in case Black plays ...d×d4. It's very questionable, however, whether this system can se-

cure White a significant advantage, if Black, instead of the passive move ... c7-c6 (necessary if White develops his knight on c3), at the right moment liberates the play in the center with ... c7-c5!. In any case, this line still has been examined too little to be dismissed.

5. A×f6 骨×f6 6. 公c3 Ab4

Relatively the best. If Black tries to thwart the exchange of the bishop with 6...c6, then 7.7. \$\precep\$b3!, together with e4, etc., with superior play for White (B\u00fcrger-Sir Thomas, Hastings 1927).

7.曾b3 c5

If this counterattack were correct, then we would be forced to regard as insufficient the White maneuver from 4.2g5 on. But in reality, the double step of the c-pawn gives some counter chances only in case of imprecise play on the part of the first to move, as was the case, for example, in the game Bogoljubow-Marshall, Moscow 1925. On the other hand, the simple liquidation of the tension in the center ensures White a real advantage – either positional or material.

8.c×d5

This move, also used by Bogoljubow in the mentioned game, is probably not the strongest. More correct is 8.d×c5! \(\times c6 \) 9.c×d5 e×d5 10.a3! \(\times xc3+! \) (or 10...\(\times xc5 \) 11.e3, etc.) 11.b×c3, and Black will have great difficulty winning back the gambit-pawn.

8...c×d4


An interesting idea, which promises Black more than 8...e×d5 anyway

(Marshall-Bogoljubow), whereupon White would have replied not 9.a3 (Bogoljubow), but rather simply 9.d×c5, etc., as in the previous comment.

9.骨×b4

And not 9.d×e6 ②c6! 10.e×f7+ �f8∓, etc.

9...d×c3 10.d×e6



The only possibility to play for a win, since after 10. 臣c1 exd5 11. 當xc3 當xc3+12. 臣xc3 包c6, etc., White would have only a quite insignificant advantage.

10... **\\ \Delta \times e6**

Apparently Marshall was already demoralized to such an extent at this point in the tournament that he chose to avoid all complexities, even at the cost of a pawn. More corresponding to his style – and also better objectively – was 10...c×b2 11.e×f7+ \$xf7 12.\Bb1 \Af5 13.\Bxb2 \Bc28! (and not 13...\2c6 14.\Bc28*xb7+\Bc286 15.\Bc28*xc6!, etc.), whereupon White must continue with great caution in order to keep his material advantage and convert it to a win.

11.쌍×c3

White has nothing more to fear, and the only question posed is the following: whether or not Black's small advance in development suffices to offset the advantage of the extra pawn, which White kept after the gambit move 7...c5.

11...**₽c6**

This move – a kind of trap – is illogical, since Black has to swap queens anyway. A little better was 11... ⇔xc3+12.bxc3 ②d7!, so that this knight could participate in the attack on the White c-pawn (via b6 or f6-d5 or a4, etc.).

12.e3!

The simplest, and better than 12. \(\text{\text{\$\section}}\) xf6 gxf6 13.a3, (preventing \(\text{\text{\$\delta}}\)b4) 13...0-0-0!, when Black's pressure on the open files (d- and g-) could become unpleasant

12...曾×c3+

Or 12...0-0 13. \\ sf6 g×f6 14.a3±, etc.

13.b×c3 罩c8 14.Qd3

In order to be able to play \(\times \)d4, which now, because of 14...\(\times \)\(\times \)d4 15.c\(\times \)d4 \(\times \)C2, etc., would be premature.

14...0-0 15. 公d4 Ad5 16.f3

Of course not 16.0-0, because 2e5, etc.

16...**幻e5 17.曾d2 罩c5 18.e4**

Black's pressure on the c-pawn has become rather unpleasant – above all, since White, for now, has no real counter chances. White tries with the text move to bring about a simplification, which will allow him to occupy the d-file just in time to neutralize the opponent's impact on the c-file.

18...Qc4 19.Q×c4

If 19.2c2, then 19... Efc8, with the threat 2a6!, etc.

19... 句×c4+ 20. 曾e2 幻a3! 21. 置ac1 置fc8

The previous move of the knight was excellent, since it impeded a possible counterattack on the b-file, and so limited the possibilities for White to come to the defense of his c-pawn. But here Black doesn't pay attention and permits the enemy to keep his material advantage through a concealed maneuver. The correct move was 21...g6!, preventing the penetration of the knight via f5, after which White would still have great tactical difficulties asserting his advantage.


22.分f5! 耳8c7

After 22...\$f8, White's next move would be stronger yet.

23.闰hd1! 幻b5

Or 23... 三×c3 24. 三×c3 三×c3 25. 三d8+ 会h7 26. 三d7 三c2+ 27. 会d3 三×g2 28. 三×f7, and White's passed e-pawn would obviously be superior. With the text move, Black hopes finally to capture the c-pawn, without ceding the seventh rank to White.

24.c4 5)a3



25.**公e**3!

The point of the maneuver begun with the 22nd move: the c-pawn, which cannot be taken now because of the reply 26. 2d5! (winning the exchange), will turn out to be a terrible weapon after some moves, against which Black will have no defense whatsoever. The final phase doesn't lack a certain piquancy.

25...當h7

Practically forced.

26. 型d5 型5c6 27. 當d3 b5

White threatened 28. Za5, et al.

28.c5 b4

In order to steer the knight to c3 - via b5.

29.分f5 買g6 30.分d4!

Prevents the plan mentioned above and prepares the triumphant pawn march.

30...買×g231.c6買×a232.買d7買c8 33.買×a7!

And not 33.c7 immediately, because of 33...b3! 34.\(\Delta\times\text{b3}\) \(\Delta\text{b5}\), etc., with some prospects.

33...b3

Despair!

34.ᡚ×b3 分c2

Or 34...\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d8+ 35.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d7!+ (not 35.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d4? because of 35...\(\mathbb{\pi}\)×d4+, etc.).

35.買×a2 匀b4+ 36.曾d4 匀×a2 37.買c4 曾g6 38.曾c5 曾f6 39.閏d4

Or immediately 39.\$\dispheta 6, etc. On the other hand, 39.\$\dispheta c2 would be mistaken because of ...\$\displet \times c6+!.

39... 公c3 40. 囯c4 公e2 41. 曾b6 囯b8+ 42. 曾a7 囯×b3 43.c7 囯a3+ 44. 曾b7 耳b3+ 45. 曾c6 1-0

(27) Spielmann – Nimzowitsch Nimzovich Defense [C02]

1.e4 2c6 2.2f3 e6 3.d4 d5 4.e5

If Black can't devise something good after 1.... ac6 in order to avoid the current position, then certainly this move has no future. In fact, the black pieces are allocated to desperately few squares, and a demolition of the debilitating white pawn complex lies far in the future. Nimzovich's next queenside operations are admittedly debonair and original, but remain without success, because his opponent attacks on the other side.

4...b6

Since without ...c5, this idea isn't possible, I would try 4...2a5!? here – and only with 5.c3, then ...b6, etc. At the next move, 5...2a5 therefore also came under consideration.

5.c3 {3ce7(?)


6.Ad3 a5

The move has no success because of the obvious reply, and so could have been better replaced with the immediate 6...c5. But Black's position was not satisfactory anyway.

7.皆e2 幻f5 8.h4

Threatening 9.g4 and forces the counter move, which further immobilizes Black's kingside.

8...h5 9.**公**g5



9...g6?

Until now, the position could perhaps still have withstood the eccentricities. because they caused no irreparable weaknesses in their own camp. (The light squares queenside are certainly easy to "fill," like a bad tooth). But such a nasty weakening of f6 (and as a consequence, of its neighbors: since the squares of the same color have a common inner life - the fate of one most often exerts a corresponding influence upon the others), together with the absence of stabile and effective squares for the black pieces, transforms Black's situation into a hopeless one. The way Spielmann resolves the situation, up to the unruffled winning position he obtained, is instructive.

Instead, with 9... 2ge7, together with ... 2g6, ... 2e7, etc., the position could be given a face, although White's chances in this case would also be decidedly more favorable.

10. ව d2! ව ge7

10... ②×h4 is prohibited because of 11. △b5+.

11.分f1

With the irrefutable plan to oust \$\alpha f5\$ through f3, together with g4.

11...c5 12.f3 c4 13.\(\mathbb{Q}\) c2 b5

The last three pawn moves form only a pseudo-demonstration, since the fate of the combat must be decided on the other flank. But even a halfway satisfactory defense set-up wasn't to be found there.

14.g4! **2**)g7

After 14...h×g4, 15.f×g4 ②×h4 16.\degree f2, etc., rupturing f7.

15. **包g3 包c6 16. 世g2!**

Very nice: after the opening of the gfile, unavoidable for Black, the queen will unfurl a deadly operation from here.

16... £e7?

With this, Black makes the team play of the defending pieces still more difficult. But also after the relatively better 16... 三a7, favorable combinations would have stood at White's disposal; for example, 17.g×h5 包×h5 (or 17...gxh5 18.Nh7!±) 18.包×h5 三xh5 19.包×f7! 三xf7 20.显xg6 三xh4 21.显xf7+ 含xf7 22.三g1±, etc.


17.g×h5 g×h5

Forced, of course, since after 17...\(2\times\text{h5?}\), the exchange on h5, together with \(2\times\text{f7}\), would immediately decide for White.

18. **g**1

From here on, different paths lead to Rome – and it's really Spielmann's bad luck that he thought of almost the only line that brought him, instead of to the eternal city, directly to hell ... Instead of the reasonable amplification of pressure on the g-file, the immediate sacrifice on f7, as well as the simpler £h7-f6+, came under strong consideration.

18... 🗒 a 7



19.公×f7

Although this sacrifice - as proved under later examination at some length also should lead to a win, in my opinion it in no way deserves an exclamation mark, because it certainly isn't the simplest way to a win. From the standpoint of economical reasoning, 19.\(\frac{1}{2}\)e2! is certainly preferable here, which would leave the opponent completely without a halfway satisfactory countermove, and whereby all the sacrificial twists lying in wait in the text position would be maintained - but in decidedly intensified form. After 19... 4f8, White would have 20.2×f7!, etc., but after other moves, the knight sacrifice on f7 also follows rapidly.

19...曾×f7 20. 公×h5??

The relative weakness of the previous moves was precisely that they connected with many enticements and side lines, and so placed unnecessary, heavy demands on White. Certainly the text move actually didn't come under consideration at all, because it is based on quite a gross oversight. In contrast, it wasn't at all easy to assess which of the four reasonable attacking continuations

is the best: (1) 20.Ձg6+; (2) 20.Ձe4; (3) 20.Ձf5; or (4) 20.Ձe2.

The palm branch falls to the last method of play – with the rationale (20.2e2!) 20...4×h4+ 21.2d1 2g8 22.2f4 2f7 23.2g6 2e7 24.2×h8 2×h8 25.2g6!, together with mate in some moves. It may be that White also could win with any of the other above moves in a complicated way. But in my opinion, this assessment wouldn't have had any significance for the aesthetic value of the sacrificial combination.

20...Q×h4+21.曾e2

Strange that Spielmann overlooked this actually natural, indeed sole, escape move. In the following, Black had quite an easy task and could have played differently in various places.

24. 世g7+ Qe7 25. Qf7 闰h2+ 26. 世d1 世c7 27. Qf4 闰×b2 28. 世h7 世b6 29. 闰g8 世c7 30. 世h8 公d8 31. Qg6 闰g2

Still simpler was immediately 31...b4.

32. 對h1 買×g6 33. 買×g6 b4 34. 買g7 對c6 35. 對h8 對a4+ 36. 對e1 勾c6!

The return of the piece is actually the quickest way to checkmate.

37.曾×c8 具h4+ 38.具g3 罝×g7 39.具×h4 皆c2 40.具d8+ 白×d8 41.皆b8+ 分b7 0-1

Round 10

½ Capablanca – Alekhine ½ 0 Nimzovich – Vidmar 1 ½ Marshall – Spielmann ½

Standings after Round 10:

Capablanca 7 Nimzovich 6½ Alekhine 5 Vidmar 4½ Spielmann 3½ Marshall 3½

(28) Capablanca – Alekhine Semi-Slav Defense [D47]

1.d4 2)f6 2.2)f3 d5 3.c4 c6 4.e3

Hasn't the move 4.\$\timesc3\$, used almost exclusively earlier, been placed into the archives somewhat too early? After 4...dxc4 5.a4 \$\timesc4\$5.6.\$\timesc5\$ e6 7.f3!, together with e4, etc., White appears to get a game full of opportunity.

4...e6

Safer than 4...요f5 5.c×d5! c×d5 (or 5...②×d5 6.②bd2!) 6.알b3, with initiative for White on the queenside.

5.43c3

This leads to the equalizing Meran variation. (I don't believe in the supposed strengthening for White found in the very nick of time in this method of play.) Probably 5.43 promises somewhat more, in order possibly to develop the queen knight to d2.

5...Qbd7 6.Qd3 d×c4 7.Q×c4 b5! 8.Qe2

In case White wants to pass on the double-edged 9.e4 (after 8.\(\textit{A}\)d3 a6), then it's certainly most expedient for him not to interfere on the d-file with his bishop. Rubinstein also pulled his bishop back to e2 against Lasker (Moscow 1925).

8...a6 9.0-0 **Qb7** 10.a3

In the game mentioned, 10.b3 occurred instead of this, whereupon Black preferred to first mobilize his kingside, and only after 10...\$\textit{Qe7}\$, to play 11.\$\textit{Qb2}\$ 0-0 12.\$\textit{Qe5}\$ c5. On the other hand, after the text move, the immediate advance of the c-pawn is most advisable – since White, having prevented the possibility of ...b4, threatens 11.e4.

10...c5 11.d×c5 **⟨**2×c5 (?)

Fearful fumbling for a draw as a result of inferior shape and unfavorable tournament standing! Full-value was only to be had in 11...\$\text{\scalar}\$c5 12.b4 \$\text{\scalar}\$e7 13.\$\text{\scalar}\$b2 0-0 - and Black, who would have more chances than White to make the most of c4 with the corresponding c5-square, would stand with more promise. The position would, by the way, have similarities to the 21st match game in Buenos Aires, where the pressure on the c-file soon provided the Black with a superior position.


After the illogical moves which occurred, White wins a couple of tempi and, as a result, gets greater freedom of space.

12.b4 曾×d1 13.罝×d1 匀ce4 14.具b2 匀×c3 15.鼠×c3 鼠e7

16.閏ac1 0-0 17.幻e5 閏fd8 18.買×d8+ 買×d8 19.Дd4!

Capablanca doesn't seem content yet with a draw – and justifiably, since Black still has to play carefully in order to equalize completely. After the exchange of the second rook, for example, White would certainly stand better (19... \(\beta \) c8 \(20. \(\beta \) c8! \(\beta \) c8 \(21. \(\beta \) c6!, together with 22. \(\beta \) f3 \(\beta \).

19...Qd6 20.Qf3



20... 包d5!

As a result, c6 is sufficiently defended (21. 2c6? 별c8 and wins), and consequently the winning chances of the opponent are neutralized. More amusing than this position, and even the whole game, is the fact, however, that - apparently as a result of an error in the telegraphic transmission of the game the South American and European chess newspapers and columns described the text move as 20...\$\delta e4?? And all - but all - assumed it as quite a matter of course that Black, in doing so, didn't anticipate the quite obvious decisive countermove 21.50c6, and that White likewise didn't notice it ...

21.47d3

It's not hard to see that this move, which after [the erroneously reported, ed.] 20... 2e4 would have been a blatant error of omission, is here the most reasonable.

21...曾f8 22.分c5 &xc5 23.&xc5+

Also 23.b×c5 &c6, etc., would have been hopeless for the purpose of a win.

23...**⊈**e8

If the knight had stood on e4 after White's 23rd move [as in the false reports, ed.], then 23...②×c5 24.b×c5 (or 24.E×c5 Q×f3 25.g×f3 Ed1+ 26.母g2 Ea1 27. Ec3 母e7=) 24...Q×f3 25.g×f3 母e7, etc., provides Black a superior rook endgame. But also this consideration awakened in the gentlemen commentators no doubt about the correctness of the text of the game.

24.曾f1 宣c8 25.曾e1 宣c7 26.Q×d5

In the European chess columns – and also in the Russian tournament book – the moves appear as 26. Axe4 Axe4 and in the next move – 27...Ad3. So all is in beautiful order!

26... **Q** ×d5 27.f3 **Q**c4 28.**E**d1 **E**d7 ½-½

(29) Nimzovich – Vidmar Réti Opening [A06]

1.e3 d5 2.\(\Delta\)f3 \(\Delta\)f6 3.b3 \(\Delta\)g4 4.\(\Delta\)b2 \(\Delta\)bd7 5.h3

Nimzovich played like this against Marshall in the seventh round. But if in the following play 2e2 was deliberate, then h3 could calmly be omitted, and the bishop move take place immediately. Because after 5.2e2 2×f3(?) 6.2×f3 e5 7.d3, together with 2d2, etc., White could have put a lot of faith in his white-square bishop.

5...Ah5 6.Ae2

In the game mentioned, 6.d3 occurred here, which in my opinion absolutely belongs to the system and must come sooner or later. White gets a disadvantage in this game only because he completely omits the move.

6...e6 7. 2) e5 (?)

In connection with the following, this serves the development of the opponent. Still appropriate was 7.d3, together with \(\Delta \text{bd2}. \)


7... A xe2 8. 對 xe2 Ad6 9. 分 xd7

A sad necessity, since 9.f4 is prohibited because of 9... \(\textit{\Omega} \times 610.f \times 62e4 \mpsi, etc.)\)

9... 骨×d7 10.c4 c6 11.0-0 (?)

It isn't serious that the castled-short position is weakly defended right now – because Black isn't quite ready for attack. But what's really bad is that, in the future, there's no sensible way apparent for the white minor pieces to play across to the other flank in order to help their king. Therefore White would do much better to wait and see where the opponent castled – and with this idea, first play 11. ♠c3.

11...0-0-0!



12.**2** c3?

This actually rather reasonable move is branded by the opponent in a very convincing way as a positional error of serious consequence. After the previous small omission, White's position no longer looks very good, but after 12.d3!, it would perhaps still get a face. Namely, if 12.\(\textit{Q}\)c7, then 13.\(\textit{E}\)d1 \(\textit{E}\)d6 14.f4, with a center in need of protection, it's true, but flexible, and – which is the main thing here – with the real hope of co-operation from the bishop and knight.

Dr. Vidmar leads the following attack – as, by the way, the whole game – with great panache and precision.

12...Qc7! 13.d4

Rather forced, for if 13.d3 (or 13.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\text{ad1}), then 13...\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\text{d6 14.f4 (14.g3 h5) 14...d4, etc., with a clear advantage.

13...h5 14.c5?

But now his best chance is in a pawn sacrifice: 14.e4! dxc4 (after 14...dxe4 15.②xe4 ②xe4 16.營xe4 營d6 17.f4, etc., White has defenses) 15.罩fd1! (not 15.e5, since after ...②d5, exchanging

and winning back a pawn, d4 remains miserably weak) 15...c×b3 16.a×b3, with a pawn center, open files and frolicking pieces. Instead of this, the bishop is demoted to a sleeping extra, and the knight will be scouting around in vain for useful squares. So the game is no more to be saved.

14...g5 15.b4 h4

Also 15...g4 16.h4 g3 17.f×g3 £g4, etc., was strong. But the text move seems more aesthetic because of its inner consistency.

16.b5 \(\mathbb{E}\)dg8!

Threatens ...g4 and, at the same time, allows the king the invulnerable d8-square. A powerful move!

17.b×c6 b×c6 18.f3

As a result, the threat ...g4 is deferred only a very few moves. But, anyway, the rest would be hopeless as well.


18...分h5 19.e4 f5! 20.e×d5 e×d5 21.閏ae1

Black no longer has to consider even this threat to swap queens.

21...g4! 22.h×g4 f×g4 23.f×g4

If 23.\\exists e6, now or on the next move, ...h3! decides.

23...買×g4



24.47×d5

Ingenious, but not hard to refute. Black was even able to take the sacrificial animal – for example, 24...c×d5 25.c6! 營g7 26.營e6+登b8 27.營×d5, and now 27...h3!, etc. – but his reply is more compelling, since it wins the queen.

24... h3! 25.分e7+ 曾b7 26.闰f3

Black threatened 26...h2+, etc.

26...買×g2+ 27.費×g2 h×g2 28.d5 費g4! 29.買b3+費a8 30.夏×h8 費h4 31.d6

Otherwise, mate.

31...曾×e1+ 32.曾×g2 Qd8 33.Qd4

The last trump, and a very little one (33... 👑 e4+ 34. 智h2 營×d4?? 35. 🗵 b8+! ± etc.

33...Q×e7! 34.d×e7 營×e7 35.Qf2 份e4+ 0-1

A truly flawlessly implemented bout by Black.

(30) Marshall – Spielmann Sicilian Defense [B80]

1.d4 e6 2.4)f3 c5 3.e4

Also 3.c4 comes under strong consideration here.

3...c×d4 4.2×d4 2f6 5.2c3

To 5.Ad3, 5... ac6 is good (see Spielmann-Alekhine, Cycle I). The so-called "Scheveningen" position, originating after Black's next move, contains a series of interdependent, and therefore not easy to fathom, strategic problems.

5...d6 6. **Q** d3 **Q** e7 7.0-0 0-0 8. **Q** e3 **⊘** bd7 9. **⋈** e2 (?)


Marshall doesn't belong to those who, in the space of 64 squares, seeks to solve riddles. He "develops" his pieces gradually in their own camp - apparently without worrying in which exact sequence these should be moved. Therefore, as preparation for f4 - which obviously is intended after Ad3 - 8.\$h1 comes much more under consideration according to Maróczy's recipe, because on e3, the bishop can possibly serve the opponent as an object of attack, and after all, stands in the way of White's own pieces. So instead of the text move, 9.f4 has to happen immediately in order to then lead the queen - via f3 or e1 - in two tempi to g3. As the outcome shows, this loss of time will be bitterly avenged.

9...a6 10.f4 當c7 11.當f3 b5 12.∏ae1

White had time for this later. More pressing was the strategic yet necessary 12.a3. It's clear, by the way, that 12.e5

would be unfavorable because of 12... 4b7.

12...Qb7



13. 曾g3 (?)

An adventure as a consequence of White's discontent with what he has achieved so far in this game. In fact, after 13.a3 ac5, Black would gradually have assumed control of the game – as he mostly succeeds, by the way, in the Sicilian in the case of a fortunately survived opening battle. But there was really no cause for White to grab at such desperate means. And Spielmann was completely correct in accepting the only apparently poisoned gift.

13...b4 14. 公d5

The point – but a harmless one.

14...分×d5

As the outcome teaches, even this is sufficient to secure a positional advantage for Black. But why not simply 14...\$\text{45}\$ (of course not 14...exd5 15.\$\text{2}f5\text{5}\$) 15.exd5 \$\text{2}xd5\$, whereupon 16.\$\text{\text{\text{b}}}\$13 would be easily and readily parried by 16...\$\text{2}7f6\$ and 16.f5 by 16...\$\text{2}xe3\$, etc.

Much worse things occur in the following, by the way.

15.e×d5 &×d5 16.f5!

This must now be answered exactly, because 17. Ah6 and 17. Ah3 are threatening – and if 16...e5, for example, then 17.f6! A×f6 18. Ah6 could have followed, with disconcerting threats.

16...分f6

Precisely and well calculated.

17. Qh6 勾h5 18. 世g4 Qf6!

An important tempo.

19.分f3 曾h8 20.曾×h5

Or 20.\(\mathbb{L}\)c1 g6±.

20.g×h6 21.世×h6 營e7

White did win back the pawn, but meanwhile Black's positional advantage – central pawns and the strong king's bishop – emerged critically. Unfortunately, Black soon stumbles into a position technically easy for White.

22.负e4 负×e4 23.邑×e4 a5 (!)

Not 23...d5, because after 24. ☐ e3 (e2), he would not get around to the advance of the e-pawn (24...e5? 25. ②×e5 Д×e5 26.f6±, etc.).

24.\fe1 e5


Now, of course, ...d5 is threatened, together with ...e4; and after the defensive move 25.\(\mathbb{I}\)4e2, Black would find

comfortable play on the c- and g-files. Black stands brilliantly.

25.c4 b×c3 26.b×c3 d5

Good, but also necessary, because otherwise, 27.c4.

27. 耳4e3



27...買g8?

A regrettable oversight, thanks to which the advantage acquired through excellent play gets lost without a trace. Instead of this, 27...e4 was necessary and strong. If 28.c4 (what else?), then 28...曾d8! 29.②e5!? 且g5! (29...且×e5? 30.邑h3) 30.曾h5 요×e3+31.邑×e3 曾b6, and wins easily. Other lines would hardly be better — White was already on the wrong track with his sacrificial attack, and only by this accident gets away with a black-eye-draw.

28.分×e5!

Spielmann must have calculated imprecisely the results of this obvious reply, because otherwise he certainly would have chosen 27...e4.

28... **Qg5** 29. 曾×g5!

In this way he saves not only the exchange, but subsequently wins a pawn. But since now and then there is justice, in the rook endgame this advantage turns out to be insufficient for a win.

Quite correct: in the end, the Black rook succeeds in placing himself behind the passed pawn, whereupon the draw is unavoidable. A rather lively game.

Of course he can afford all that, but the question is what for?

47...g×h5 48.閏a8 h4 49.a6 當f4 50.a7 閏a1 ½-½

Cycle III

Round 11

½ Capablanca – Marshall ½ 1 Alekhine – Nimozovitch 0 ½ Vidmar-Spielmann ½

Standings after Round 11:

Capablanca 7½ Nimzovich 6½ Alekhine 6 Vidmar 5 Spielmann 4 Marshall 4 (31) Capablanca – Marshall Modern Benoni Defense [A62]

1.d4 ᡚf6 2.ᡚf3 c5 3.d5

Hardly the best, because with this stiffening of the pawn position in the center, an all-too-great a choice between different plausible plans of development is left to the opponent. More flexible is 3.c4 with good prospects of getting sovereignty over the center squares.

3...e6

I would prefer 3...d6 with subsequent development of the bishop to f5 or g4.

4.c4 d6

The intended mobilization plan is not to be condemned off-hand; it has, after all, the advantage of bringing the black king's bishop to a gleaming diagonal. The disadvantage of the line is in the ceding to the opponent the important strategic square c4 – a circumstance, which would be energetically taken advantage of especially by Nimzovich against Marshall (Round XVII). On the other hand, the manner of development chosen here by Capablanca lacks any particular sting.

5.公c3 e×d5 6.c×d5 g6 7.g3

In the game mentioned, Nimzovich played 7. 2d2.

7...負g7 8.負g2 0-0 9.0-0 畳e8 10.勾d2

Now the maneuver is not at all so effective, since the knight – even with the defense chosen by Marshall, in my

opinion definitely not best – ultimately can't hold his ground on c4. But White has no other reasonable plan.

10...分bd7 11.h3

A "psychologically" preventive move: In case of ... 2e5, White can now play f4, without the reply ... 2g4, and wants to suggest to Black that the knight move to e5 doesn't work anyway ...

11...2b6(?)

Marshall actually lets himself be influenced! But on impartial reflection, he would have easily been able to recognize that it was decidedly in his favor to provoke the move f4, because as a result, the White center position would be weakened without proper compensation. Without f4, however, after ... \(\Delta = 5, \text{White would not have been able either to occupy the c4-square, or to complete his development well at all. Therefore, 11... \(\Delta = 5 12.f4 \) \(\Delta d7 \) was the right path for Black.

12.a4 Ad7


The move 12...a5 would have had purpose only if the knight were still on b8 and had, via a6, an easy way to b4.

13.a5 分c8 14.分c4 當c7 15.e4

Apparently White convinced himself that he can't effectively prevent the liberating move ...b5 (15.\disphabs b5! 16.\disphabs b5?\disphabs, etc.) – and now tries to engage the opponent in the center. In any case, the game doesn't make a unified impression.

With the threat 19.e5, etc.

18... Zab8 19. 當h2



19...2c8(?)

Marshall, who up until now had acquitted himself quite well after a dubious opening, begins now to play in an affected manner, allowing his opponent ultimately to get a material advantage in a purely tactical way. Correct here was 19...\$\textit{\textit{L}} c8!!\$ with the double intention: (1) to keep a6 covered; and (2) to open the way to e5 (possibly c5) via d7 for the knight. If 20.f4, then 20...\$\textit{\textit{L}} fd7, and Black can, after 21.e5, accept the pawn sacrifice and also first answer with 21...\$\textit{L} b7. In any case, it was inconsistent for him to cede the c4-square again to White without a fight.}

20.具f1 皆b7 21.皆d3 買a8 22.皆f3!

Threatens 23.4 g5, etc. – certainly a surprising turn, but one which bears only the smallest intrinsic relationship with the course of the struggle up to now.

22...h6

Since after 23.4×h6 4×h6 24.4×f6 4g7, etc., b2 would remain unsecured. But White has – everything a result of 19...\(2c8(?)\) – strengthening moves.

23. 2 c4 ⊈b5

With 23... h7, the h7-pawn would be held for the moment. But in this case, White would stand decidedly better. (Weaknesses on a6 and d6 because of the unhappy positions of the black knights!)


24. 勾a5 曾d7 25. Q×h6 Q×h6 26. 曾×f6 Qg7 27. 曾f3 勾b6 28. 曾g2 외a4?

In spite of the loss of the pawn, the Black position was definitely not yet hopeless, if here he had played, for example, 28...c4. After the incomprehensible text move, on the other hand, a second pawn is lost, and with that, the game actually should have been over.

29.ᡚ×a4 Д×a4 30.ᡚc4

With the simultaneous, indefensible threats 30.2b6 and 30.2×d6.

30... **国ab8** 31. **公**×d6 **皆**×d6 32. **日**×a4 **日**×b2 33. **日**×a6 **皆**e5



34.闰e2?

This oversight (compare also Capablanca-Vidmar, Round IV) substantiates, among other things, that his mistake in my twelfth match game in Buenos Aires with Capablanca was absolutely not such a rare exception, as many wanted to suggest.

After the loss of one of the extra pawns and the queen exchange, the endgame here is most likely a draw, thanks to the opposite-color bishops. However, no special immersion in the diagrammed position is needed in order to be convinced that White is headed for a win. and that more than one road leads to Rome for him: both 34.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\ a4 and 34.d6 were good enough, but most forceful was 34.\(\mathbb{\Z}\)a7! – for example, 34... f5 (or 34...¤e7 35.¤×e7 增×e7 36.♣c4, together with Ze2, etc.) 35.d6! 쌀×d6 (or 35...f×e4 36.皆f7+, 當h7 37. 罩e7!, etc.) 36.e5 ⊈×e5 (or 36...¤×e5 37.¤×g7+ 魯×g7 38. 曾c3, etc.) 37. 4c4+, 魯h8 38. Af7, etc. Black could play differently, but in all cases White would maintain, besides the material advantage, an attacking position promising a win.

Now the white passed pawn is never allowed to go further, and White's kingside superiority can't be made tangible without additional, leveling pawn exchanges. The following attempts at a win are therefore nearly hopeless.

39.囯d8 曾g7 40.曾e3 f5

Absolutely appropriate, since sooner or later, on account of the eventual threat of ...f4+ (together with ...£h6), he forces the fixing of the pawn position with f4.

41.Qd3 Qe7 42.Ed7 &f8 43.f4 &e8 44.Qb5 &f8 45.h4

After 45.g4, 45... \ b4, etc., suffices for a draw.

The last attempt.

50... Q×h4! 51.g×h4 E×b5 52. Ee7 Eb4 53.h5 g×h5 54. Ee5 Ed4 55. E×f5+ 曾g7 56. E×h5 E×d6 57. E×c5 Ed4 58. Ef5 曾g6 59. Ef8 曾g7 60. 曾c3 Ea4 ½-½

(32) Alekhine – Nimzovich Nimzo-Indian Defense [E32]

1.d4 ᢒf6 2.c4 e6 3.ᢒc3 Ձb4 4.₩c2 d6

In this position, various moves stand at Black's disposal, but none seems to lead to an entirely satisfactory result. (1) 4...b6 5.e4 \(\text{Ab7} \) 6.\(\text{Ad3} \) \(\text{Axc3} + 7.\text{bxc3} \) d6 8.f4, together with 9.\(\text{Df3} \) \(\text{2} \) 4...c5 5.\(\text{dxc5}! \) \(\text{Dc6} \) (5...\(\text{Da6} \) 6.\(\text{2} \) 3.\(\text{Ac5} \) \(\text{Ac5} \) 3.\(\text{Ac5} \) 2.\(\text{Ag5} \) \(\text{c, case may be} \) be - e4 or e3, etc.; and (3) 4...d5 5.\(\text{Df3} \) c5 6.c.\(\text{d5} \) exd5 exd5 7.\(\text{Ag5} \) \(\text{c, case may be} \) is not much better, as the continuation shows.

5. **Qg5 公bd7** 6.e3

The "occupation of the center" by means of 6.e4 would obviously have only limited the effectiveness of his own pieces.

6...b67.Qd3 Qb7 8.f3!

In any case, less clichéd than 8.2f3, with which a position, occurring rather often in recent years and notably against my opponent, was brought about. In fact, with the current flexibility of the enemy pawn position in the center, it's not easy for Black to work out a further plan of development that promises success

8... & xc3+

And already from this moment on, his play begins to suffer from a certain vacillation; for example, he in no way needed to surrender readily his bishop pair to the opponent. Probably 8...c5 9. 2ge2 2c8, together possibly with ...cxd4 and ...d5, etc., would have been a continuation full of opportunity.

9.曾×c3 c5 10.幻h3!

Surprising at first glance – but the only correct thing; to the more reasonable 10.2e2 (or 10.2d1), Black would have been able to force a simplification with a likely drawn conclusion by means of ...2d5!.

10...h6 11.**Д**f4

And not 11.2h4, because of the possibility of the tactical sortie ...g5-g4, etc.

11...骨e7

Threatening 12...e5 13.d×e5 d×e5 14. \(\textit{Lg3} \) e4!, etc.

12.**\(\) g**3!

But with this simple retreat, White retains his positional advantage.

12...e5 (?)

The lesser of two evils was still castling short (but not 12... \(\mathbb{Z} \) c8 13. \(\mathbb{Z} \) a 3!), whereupon it wouldn't yet be easy for White to intensify his pressure decidedly on the enemy dark squares.

13.d×e5! d×e5 14.0-0-0

On the other hand, now Black will not be able to withstand the enemy pressure on the central file in the long run, since in addition, his pieces are committed to guarding the pawn, which has become weak.

14...g6

Not immediately 14...0-0-0, because of 15.£f5 g6 16.£xe5! gxf5 17.£xd7, together with 18.£xf6 (or £xh8), etc.±. It's evident, by the way, that castling short would be at least as questionable as the chosen continuation, with which the king can function not merely as attack object, but also as a defensive piece (eventual guarding of the d6-d8 squares).

15.♠c2

The bishop must obviously move to the a4-e8 diagonal, where he can accomplish a lot.

15...0-0-0 16. **Qa4** 買he8 17. **公**f2 曾e6

The bishop should be opposed on c6. To Black's misfortune, this can't happen without longer preparation, and White calmly uses this time to intensify his pressure on the d-file. Likewise unsatisfactory would be 17... 全为5 18. 邑d2, etc.


18. 公d3 宫e7

Or 18. ... \(\Delta\hd{h}5\), 19. \(\Edlad{d}2\), \(\Delta\times g3\) 20. h×g3 h5 21. \(\Edlad{h}d1\), etc., eventually winning a pawn.

19.買d2 買de8 20.買hd1 &c6

Finally, this unpinning move can be played, since e5 is sufficiently guarded. But after the following retreat, another, still more serious evil comes into being – d6 has become incurably weak in the meantime, and with the impossibility of finding protection for it, Black is put at a difficult material disadvantage.

21. Ac2! 分h5



Also with other moves, a knight-discovery, together with \(\mathbb{I} \) d6, would have followed.

22. 公×c5!

With this, the fight is actually decided, because White wins the queen and a pawn for a rook and knight. Why the game still lasts so long is explained by the fact that this type of endgame usually requires very many moves — and especially if, as here, the stronger party possesses no passed pawns, and the opponent initially has no assailable squares.

In order to bring about a further simplification, since the retention of the current piece- material would only concede chances to the opponent.

26... **公b7** 27. **三**×c6 **三**×c6 28. **Q** a4 **三**ee6 29. **Q**×c6 **三**×c6 30. **以**×e5

This pawn exchange is clearly favorable, since it crucially simplifies the later penetration of the king.

32. \(\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{

32.a3

Or also immediately 32.e4, etc.

32... 宣c7 33. 曾e8+ **公d8** 34.e4 宣d7+ 35.曾e3 **宣**c7 36.曾f4

Also good was 36.\$f2, together with \$g1-h2, etc., (see below). But Black pursues another plan, which likewise certainly leads to a win.

36...買c3 37.a4 買c2 38.營e7 買c7 39.營f6

Temporizing.

39... 互c2 40. 曾e7 互c7 41. 曾d6!

That's the correct way – the queen should be put on d5, whereby Black is doomed to total passivity on account of the threat \delta d5-a8+, etc.

41...ᡚe6+ 42.ਊe5

The winning procedure could also go: \$\frac{1}{2}f^2-e^3-f^2-g^1-h^2\$, together with f^3-f^4-f^5\$, ...g^6\times f^5\$, e^4\times f^5\$, capturing the h-pawn with the queen, and finally advancing both g-pawns. White's plan to win is essentially the same. But the king immediately plays an active role — which, however, permits the opponent some harmless counter threats.

42... 幻d8 43. 骨d5! 囯c6

The continuation 43...a5 44.\(\text{\text{\$\psi}}\)a8+, together with ...b5, would have led to similar positions as the one reached by White after the 52nd move.


44. af4!

Not immediately 44.f4, on account of 44...a5!, which in this case would really be unpleasant.

44...句e6+ 45.ᇦe3 莒c3+ 46.ᇦe2 莒c7 47.f4 句d8 48.ᇦe3 莒c3+ 49.ిgd4 莒c7 50.৯e5! a5

Practically forced, because after 50...로c6 51.f5! a5, the queen sacrifice already prevails: 52.b×a5 로c5 53.f×g6 f×g6 54.a×b6 로×d5+ 55.e×d5 괄b7 56.a5 괄a6 57.蛰d6! 원b7+ 58.蛰c7 원×a5 59.d6 원b7 60.d7 g5 61.d8쌀 원×d8 62.蛰×d8, etc. — with a winning pawn endgame.

51.皆a8+ 曾d7 52.b5 曾e7



The current confinement of the queen by means of 52...\begin{align*} 52...\begin{align*} 52...\begin{align*} 52...\begin{align*} 53...\begin{align*} 64...\begin{align*} 53...\begin{align*} 64...\begin{align*} 53...\begin{align*} 64...\begin{align*} 53...\begin{align*} 54...\begin{align*} 53...\begin{align*} 54...\begin{align*} 54...\begin{align

53.f5!

This advance finally occurs, which forces the winning of a second pawn. By the way, an awful trap here would be 53. 쌀b8? 일e6!, with mate or the win of the queen!

53...f6+ 54.曾d4 莒d7+ 55.曾e3 g×f5 56.e×f5 到f7 57.曾f3! 到e5

This good knight position offers only temporary solace for the additional loss of material. 58.曾×h5 買d3+ 59.雷f2 買d2+ 60.雷f1 買d461.皆h7+ 雷d6

62.曾b7 **公d**7 63.曾c6+ **曾e**7 64.曾e6+ **曾d**8 65.曾b3 **莒b**4 66.曾**d**1

Temporizing.

66...曾e7 67.曾e2+ 曾d8 68.曾a2 曾e7 69.曾e2! 莒e4+

After 69...\$\d8 would follow 70.\$\d8 g8+, g4, etc.

70.曾f3 莒b4 71.曾e3 公c5 72.曾g8 公d7 73.g4!

Decisive!

This check was sealed by White at adjournment, since he saw a forced repetition of moves and didn't feel like further contemplation after the strenuous, five-hour game. However, on resumption, Nimzovich resigned the game immediately — because further details are already quite clear: 81...堂c7 82.堂c6+ 登d8 83.g6!: (1) 83...晋xf6: 84.g7, etc.; or (2) 83...①xf6 84. 堂d6+, ①d7 85.g7 罝g5 86.堂f8+ ②f8: 87 gxf8堂+, together with winning a rook in another three moves.

(33) Vidmar – Spielmann Semi-Slav Defense [D46]

1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3. 2 f3 2 d7 4.e3

The move ... ad7 is probably not so strong that it demanded self-restraint. As it became convincingly apparent in other games in this tournament, the natural move 4. ac3 is quite favorable for White.

4... 2gf6 5. Qd3 c6

Black appears to want to bring about by all means a difficult line of the Slav Defense, not unjustly unpopular in general. Easier means of equalizing were offered by 5...c5.

6.分bd2 Qd6

Even now – after White waived early pressure against d5 by means of the development of the knight to d2 – ...c5 still came under consideration.


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With this, a well-known position is reached, in which White's space advantage is brought to bear only with exact play.

10...\c7 11.\c2

This withdrawal would occur also on 10...c5 or 10...2f6. It has the dual purpose of not only preventing Black's possible win of a later tempo (...2f6, ...f5), but also especially preparing an attack against h7, which should force a change in the pawn position disadvantageous to Black.

11...h6



Black is clearly determined, in the case of \(\mathref{\text{d}} \)d3, to accept the weakening of e6. The idea is more active, and therefore probably more promising, than the moves attempted by Bogoljubow in this position: 11...c5 or 11...\(\mathref{E} \)d8 (together with ...\(\mathref{D} \)f8).

12.b3

Owing to this restrained method of development, Black gets time to eliminate the main disadvantage of his position – the unemployment of the queen's bishop – and to reap sufficient counterplay in the center. And 12.\dd3 would be inexpedient, since it would force a move (...f5) that Black wants to make anyway. More logical would be, on the other hand, 12.\mathbb{Z}e1! (with the intention of \d3), which would probably have caused a change in the opponent's plans - for example, 12...\mathbb{\m protect h7 with the aid of ... 218. But just after that, White would have been able to position his queen more effectively than in the game on the a1-h8 diagonal – for example, 13. Ad2 c5 14. d×c5! <a>2×c5 15. <a>2 e2, together with possible $16.4c3 \pm .$

In the following, White makes only small difficulties for the enemy.

12...b6 13.虽b2 虽b7 14.皆d3 f5 15.罝fe1 罝ae8 16.包e5 (?)

With that, the opening advantage is definitely given away. Correct was 16. \(\mathbb{Z}\) ad1, which would have prevented both 16...c5 and 16...e5 (17.c5!, etc.). But if 16...\(\Delta\)f6, then 17.c5, b×c5 18. \(\mathbb{Z}\)c4!, etc. with complications favorable to White.

16...c5!

A small combination, the only one in this dry game, by the way. If namely 17. ②×d7 ③×d7 18. d×c5, then, to begin with, 18... ③c6!, together with ... △d6×c5(+)∓, etc.

17. \alpha ad1 公f6

After 17... ♣e4, White would probably sacrifice the exchange: 18. ☐×e4 f×e4 19. ⊕×e4 &f6 20. ⊕g6 c×d4 21. &g4, with an attack guaranteeing a draw.

18. #e2 c×d4 19. Q×d4 De4 20.f4

With this, e5 is finally secured – but at the price of e4. The mutual strong knight positions now prevent (as often occurs with Stonewall formations) the development of a halfway promising fight. Considering this, the decision to draw appears justified after a half dozen moves.

Round 12

1 Capablanca – Vidmar 0 ½ Marshall – Alekhine ½ ½ Nimzovich – Spielmann ½

Standings after Round 12:

Capablanca 8½
Nimzovich 7
Alekhine 6½
Vidmar 5
Spielmann 4½
Marshall 4½

(34) Capablanca – Vidmar Ruy Lopez [C98]

1.e4 e5 2.ᡚf3 ᡚc6 3.Ձb5 a6 4.ቧa4 ᡚf6 5.0-0 ቧe7 6.ቯe1 b5 7.ቧb3 d6 8.c3 ᡚa5

Lately 8...0-0 has become more usual, whereupon, as is generally known, White's best is 9.h3.

9.Ձc2c5 10.d4 tc7 11.ᡚbd2 0-0

Since White omits 11.h3, here 11... 2g4 came under consideration first. As Black plays, we come to a position (with transposition of moves) from the match Lasker-Tarrasch, long since known and analyzed.

12.h3 2c6 13.d5

Certainly more solid than Lasker's pawn sacrifice 13.2f1 c×d4 14.c×d4 e×d4!, etc. (Leonhardt-Rubinstein, San Sebastian 1912). On the other hand, 13.d×c5 d×c5 14.2f1 – which was tried initially by Bogoljubow and then by Wagner – is absolutely not as harmless as it appears at first sight.


13... **公d8 14.a4!**

A timely move, which should bring about at least one critical queenside position; for example, 14...置b8 15.a×b5 a×b5 16.c4!, or 14...置a7 15.營e2, etc. – but Black chooses a greater evil.

14...b4 (?)

Relinquishes the highly important square c4 to the opponent without compensation. Of course, Capablanca doesn't leave the favorable opportunity unused.

15.5)c4 a5



Otherwise 16.a5, among others, would be unpleasant. The text move is relatively the best, since Black actually doesn't need to fear the following tactical diversion.

16.分f×e5

This much-admired exchange combination leads to a certainly somewhat more favorable, but not absolutely won endgame, which Black finally loses only by imprecise play. More sustainable was 16.♣e3 (16...♠d7 17.♠fd2), in order first to temporize until the

dominating knight position on c4 forces the opponent into unfavorable operations.

16...**⊈**a6

The zwischenzug is not a bad thing. Only Black doesn't use his tactical consequences properly in the following.

17. **\$\text{\$\text{\$b3\$}}\$** d×e5 18.d6 **\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$x\$}}\$** d6 19. **\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$x\$}}\$}\$** d6 20. **\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$x\$}}\$** d6 2b7?

Why voluntarily surrender the weapon of the bishop pair to the opponent?

Obvious was 20...\(\mathbb{E}\)b8, and if 21.\(\mathbb{L}\)c4, then 21...\(\mathbb{L}\)×c4 22.\(\varthi\)×c4 \(\varthi\)c6, etc. — with a definitely defensible game.

21. 公×b7 Q×b7 22.c×b4 c×b4?

A further omission. Good was 22...a×b4 23.f3 \(\textit{\textit{a}} \) a6!, together possibly with ...c4, with sufficient counter-play.

23.f3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)fd8(?)

Black's position has become unsure because of the weakening of the dark squares. But it simplifies victory for the opponent by a quite haphazard defense. A better defense opportunity was offered here, for example, by 23... 全d7 24. 全e3 罩fc8! 25. 罩ac1 (25. 罩ed1 罩c7) 25... 掌f8. etc.

24. Le3 h6

To what end?

25.買ed1 &c6 26.買ac1 &e8 27.當f2

Also, 27. 2b6 could also occur. But White doesn't need to hurry, since 2a5 can't evade him any longer.

27...買×d1 28.買×d1 買c8 29.g4

Not yet 29. ♠b6, on account of 29... ♠d7 30. ♠×a5 ♠c5, etc.

29... Ad7?

A last mistake, which has as a result an immediate loss in material. After 29...\$\Delta f8\$, for example, the agony probably would have lasted longer.

30.Ab6 Ae6

Or 30... \(\mathbb{Z}\) a8, then 31. \(\mathbb{L}\) c7, etc.

31. A × e6 f × e6

If 31... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2+ 32. \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 f×e6, then of course 33. \(\mathbb{Z}\)d2, etc.

32. 国d8+ 国×d8 33. Q×d8 匀d7 34. Q×a5 幻c5 35.b3!

In distinctly winning positions, Capablanca plays always most accurately. Of course, 35.4×b4 2×a4 36.b3 2b6 37.4d6 2d7 38.8e3, etc., also wins easily.

35... ე×b3 36. Д×b4 ეd4 37.a5 1-0

A generally clear and consistent game by Capablanca – on the other hand, quite weakly played by Dr. Vidmar.

(35) Marshall – Alekhine French Defense [C01]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.4) c3 Ab4 4.e×d5

Interesting but not recommended here is 4.\(\textit{a}\)d3 c5 5.e×d5 \(\textit{a}\)×d5 6.\(\textit{a}\)f1 \(\textit{a}\)×c3 7.b×c3 \(\textit{a}\)c6 8.\(\textit{a}\)f3 \(\textit{a}\)f6 – and White is

hardly likely to find a successful use for his bishop pair.

4...e×d5 5.മൂർ3 ഉറേ 6.മge2

More solid than 6. ₩f3, recommended here by various commentators, where-upon Black could very well play 6...c5! 7.d×c5 d4 8.a3 ₩a5, etc. But, on the other hand, 6. ₩h5 came under strong consideration.

6...**ᡚbc6** 7.0-0 **Дg4**

In the attempt to fashion more involved play where possible. Simpler – but drier still – is the usual 7.... 4f5.

8.a3 Aa5

Again, the bishop retreat to d6 was simpler and healthier, and would certainly allow the trade for the enemy knight (9.\$\Delta\$). With the text move, Black succeeds in making his own imprint on the game, but hardly in his favor.

9.h3 Ae6

Also after 9... h5 10.f4!, White's game would be favored a bit.

10.2a4!

With that, the opponent's king's bishop is condemned sooner or later to disappear from the battlefield.

10.... **Qb6** 11.c3 曾d7 12. 囯e1 0-0 13. 勾f4 **Q**f5

So Black is forced into this exchange of bishops, with which it is once again demonstrated that in this dreary line, neither of the opponents can allow himself escapades from the theoretical path to a draw, if he doesn't want to risk being put at a disadvantage.

14.b4

With the threat 15.b5, together with $\mathbb{Z} \times e7$, etc.

14...買fe8 15.買a2


Actually, the quickest way to unite the rooks.

15... 夕g6 16. 置ae2 置×e2 17. 鱼×e2

Forced. If 17. Exe2, then 17... ②xf4 18. Axf4 Axd3 19. 公xd3 ②xd4!, etc., winning a pawn.

17...買e8

It would be more exact to exchange the knights initially, thus preventing the next sortie. But in the end this also works.



18.47h5!

Threatens to win immediately with 19.4h6!, etc., and there's nothing else for Black to do than the following withdrawal, in which he frees the opponent's queen from the little worry over the

knight on the rim. With more initiative on the part of White, the game could have now become quite interesting. But an inglorious deforestation followed.

18...曾d8! 19.皇f3 莒×e1+ 20.曾×e1 皇e6 21.曾e2 分ce7 22.皇g5

Why not at least $22.\mathfrak{D}f4 \mathfrak{D} \times f4 23.\mathfrak{A} \times f4 \mathfrak{D}g6 24.\mathfrak{A}g3 (24...\mathfrak{D}h4 25.\mathfrak{A}g4\pm)$, in order possibly to keep the bishop pair?

22...h6 23.夏×e7 皆×e7 24.皆e3 皆g5 25.皆×g5 h×g5 26.g4 匀e7 27.夏e2 皆f8

Preparation for a possible ...g6.

28.公×b6

Finally! Certainly he still could have temporized until Black played ... \(\textit{a}\)d7, for example. But, of course, nothing really would have changed.

28...a×b6 29. 4d3 2c8 30. 2g3

The knight must go to e2 in order to make f4 possible

Otherwise, Black would get somewhat of an advantage with 34...f5, etc.

34...ቴ xe6 35.ቴf2 b5 36.ቴf3 c6 37.ቴe3 ቴf6 38.ቴf3 ሷc8 39.ቴe2 ሷb6 40.ቴd2 ቴe7 41.ቴe2 ½-½

(36) Nimzovich – Spielmann Four Knights Game [C48]

1.e4 e5 2.\(\)f3 \(\)f6 3.\(\)c3 \(\)c6 4.\(\)b5 \(\)d4 5.\(\)c4 e×d4 6.e5

dxc3 7.exf6 對xf6 8.dxc3 Qe7

Since the very popular 8... \$\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ge}}}}}\$+ (see Vidmar-Capablanca, Cycle IV), actually doesn't force the queen exchange (9.\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{qe}}}}}}\$), the text move appears simpler and more logical. In fact Black achieves complete equality very soon.

9.0-0 0-0 10. **4** d3 d6 11. **4**e2

A let-down, of course, would be 11. \(\text{\text{\$h}} \) 5 h6, etc.


11...買e8 12.씱e4

Forces ...g6, but which here has no great significance, since the queen stands too exposed to elude the exchange (and consequently killing any chance of offense).

12...g613.且e3 曾e614.皆f3 皆g4(!)

With that, the game actually could have already been given up as a draw. Curiously, Black subsequently still gets small chances, but only because Spielmann, who apparently is all too confident, treats the position somewhat carelessly.

15.營×g4 **Q**×g4 16.h3 **Q**e6 17.c4 d5?



He wants to immediately resolve the position and underestimates the reply. The idea of ...d5 was adequate, but only after 17...c5! 18.\(\mathbb{E}\)ad1 \(\mathbb{E}\)ad8, etc.

18.c5!

Secures d4 for the bishop and at the same time gets a real chance at a pawn storm on the queenside. Whether this chance could suffice for a win, of course, couldn't be foreseen at this point – but in any case, from here the game again gains some content and interest.

18...c5! 具f6 19.c3 罩ad8 20.罩fd1 c6

A mistake would be 20...d4 21.c×d4 \(\textit{\Delta}\times d4 22.\textit{\Delta}\textit{b5!}\), winning a pawn.

The first consequence of the omission on the 17th move: after the undoubling of the White c-pawns, the pawn complex c6, d5 finally is fixed, and White needs only to follow the plan that the position itself dictates: a pawn attack against c6 (therefore b4-b5, and sometimes a4-a5-a6), bound with the threat of opening the file and the infiltration of the rook. On the other hand, Black has to invent something.

23...Qf5(!)24.Qf1

If $24. \triangle \times f5$ g×f5 25. $\Xi e1$, then 25... f4, etc., with quite easy play to draw.

24...h5 25.h4

The threat of ...h4 was not so dangerous as to lose a tempo and in addition

give the opponent the chance at a welcome pawn exchange. Therefore, correct here appears to be 25.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e1 (not immediately 25.b4, on account of 25...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c2!, together with ...\(\mathbb{Z}\)a4 and ...a6), together with b4, a4, etc.

It really wasn't worth playing on so long after the drawish opening phase for this! If something was to be gotten from the position, it was of course not through the rook exchange, but rather through the systematic continuation of the suggested plan. After 33.\(\mathbb{E}\) b1! g4 34.f\(\times\)g4 \(\times\)g4 (34...\(\mathbb{E}\)e4) 35.a5!, Black would still have to exert himself in order to force a draw. The further moves are reasonable

Round 13

1 Capablanca – Spielmann 0 ½ Alekhine – Vidmar ½ ½ Marshall – Nimzovich ½

Standings after Round 13:

Capablanca 9½ Nimzovich 7½ Alekhine 5½ Vidmar 5½ Marshall 5 Spielmann 4½ (37) Capablanca – Spielmann Queen's Gambit Declined [D38]

1.d4 d5 2.白f3 e6 3.c4 白d7 4.白c3 白gf6 5.且g5 且b4 6.c×d5 e×d5 7.皆a4(!)

In any case, stronger than 7. \$\times b3\$, which occurred in game 1. But whether the queen sortie is more compelling than the simple 7.e3 wasn't yet established by this game, in my opinion, since Spielmann offers inadequate resistance.

7... 🚨 × c 3+ (?)

Already this exchange is very questionable. Why not 7... \$\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$e}}}}\$} 7, with the idea of leading the game along the track of a well-known variation of the Orthodox Defense – for example, 8.e3 c6 9.\$\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$d}}\$}}\$ 3 h6 10.\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\eta\$}\$}}\$}}\$}etc.\$}} discreption{\text{\$\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$}\$}}}}}}}}}}}}}} dolernown}}}}}}} bhout be and the following advance of the c-pawn as far as c4, the darks of the cases of the c-pawn as far as c4, the darks of the cases of the cases


8.b×c3 0-0 9.e3 c5(?)

Weakens d5 without apparent benefit, and occurs evidently only in the attempt to somehow justify the maneuver ...\$\(\textit{L}\)68-b4×c3. But with other continuations as well, the pin of \$\textit{L}\)66 remains uncomfortable. For example, 9...\$\(\textit{L}\)e8 came under deliberation, to answer 10.\$\textit{L}\)3 with 10...\$\(\textit{L}\)e5!; but White would have first played 10.\$\textit{L}\)c2.

10.Qd3 c4 11.Qc2 皆e7(?)

This unpinning process costs too much time, and, in addition, the queen will have to suffer as an object of attack. Instead of this, the odd maneuver 11... Ee8 12.0-0 Ee6!, together with ... Ea6-b6, etc., aimed at ousting the troublesome white queen, could have been tried.

12.0-0 a6 13.闰fe1 皆e6 14.幻d2 b5 15.皆a5



15...**ᡚe4?**

An awful move, after which White easily succeeds in busting up the enemy pawn chain and deciding the game by means of an obvious sacrificial combination. After the downright self-evident development 15...\(\textit{\textit{B}}\)b7 (16.\(\textit{\textit{B}}\)c7 \(\textit{\textit{C}}\)c6 or 16...\(\textit{\textit{B}}\)c6), this wouldn't have been so simple, in spite of White's positional superiority.

16. 公×e4 d×e4 17.a4 替d5

Otherwise, the many threatened squares were no longer able to be protected – for example, 17... 這b8 18. 這eb1 營d5 19. 鱼f4 買b6 20.a×b5 買×b5 21. 萬×b5 a×b5 22. 鱼a4, etc.

18.a×b5! 眥×g5

Likewise, 18... 2b7 19.b×a6, etc., was hopeless.

19. **Q×e4 罩b8**

20.b×a6! 用b5

After the queen exchange, the a-pawn would immediately cost him a piece. But the text move is also hopeless.

21. 台c7 幻b6 22.a7 Ah3 23. 其eb1!

The most exact.

23... 🗒 × b1+ 24. 🗒 × b1 f5 25. 🚨 f3 f4 26. e× f4 1-0

For this game, impeccably carried out by Capablanca, he receives the first special award for the best played game – when the judge specifically declared at the concluding banquet that, if the award had been a brilliancy prize, he would have chosen a different game.

(38) Alekhine – Vidmar Queen's Gambit Declined [D35]

1.d4 d5 2.\(\Delta\)f3 e6 3.c4 \(\Delta\)d7 4.\(\Delta\)c3 \(\Delta\)gf6 5.c×d5

The best move is probably 5. 2g5, since White has no reason to avoid the line arising after 5... 2b4.

5...e×d5 6.4f4

The move introduced by Sämisch. In my opinion, it leads to a game with about equal chances.

6...c6 7.e3 Ae7

Simpler and better than 7... h5 (played in the game Alekhine-Lasker, New York 1924), when White can continue advantageously with 8. 2e5 f6 9. 2g3, etc.

8. 4d3 0-0 9.h3

Sooner or later necessary, after all, because of the possible threat ... 2h5.

9... 其e8 10.0-0 勾f8 11. 勾e5

As the outcome shows, a daring plan of assault. But to any other move, Black would continue his development without difficulty with 11... 2g6, together with ... 2d6.


11... **∆**d6 12. **∆**h2

When White decided on this move, he had to calculate in the end the following sacrificial combinations. Instead of this, with the retreat of the bishop to g3, he was able to prevent Black's next move (if 12...26d7, then 13.2×f7, etc.), but in any case, after 12.2g3 the reply 12...c5 – which immediately introduces a counterattack in the center – appears unpleasant to him, because he would then no longer command (as in the game) a direct kingside attack that includes the advance of his g-pawn.

12...分6d7

Dr. Vidmar wants to be rid of the unpleasant knight immediately! As the consequence shows, this maneuver leads to a forced draw. It's very questionable whether more was to be gotten from the position with 12...c5.

13.f4 f6 14.2)g4 h5



Otherwise, White would quietly further strengthen his position with 15.皆f3, 16. 且ae1, etc.

15.**包e5!**

A positional sacrifice; after 15...fxe5 16.fxe5, and the retreat of the bishop on d6, 17.\dispxh5, etc., White would have no direct threats, but it's clear that in this case, two pawns and a continuous attacking position would offer him far more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece.

15...f×e5 16.f×e5 **≜**×e5!

And not 16...②×e5 17.d×e5 Q×e5 18. \sigma×h5 and wins.

17.d×e5 公×e5 18.買×f8+!

The point of the first sacrifice, whereby an immediate draw is reached.

Unfortunately there's nothing better, because both 20.쌀h8+ 含f7 21.필f1+ 쌓g6! and 20.쌀h7 쌀g5! are insufficient.

(39) Marshall – Nimzovich French Defense [C01]

As is well known, here 6. \$\text{\text{\text{\text{B}}}\text{\text{f}}}\$ is not very comfortable for Black. Therefore, 5...\$\text{\text{C}}\$ is preferable to the move chosen.

6... Af5 7.0-0 0-0

After 7... abc6, the position from my first match game with Capablanca would arise, in which White, instead of 8.2×f5(?), would probably play 8.2g3 2g6 9.2ce2, etc., with similar results as in the game.

8.2g3 Ag6 9.2ce2

Obviously influenced by the loss in the first cycle to the same opponent, at the first opportunity Marshall withdraws his knight from the exchange on c3. But in an enterprising mood, he would perhaps have tried 9.25, in order to get out of the way as quickly as possible of the bleak, symmetrical piece-formations.

A position has arisen which, for purpose of a win, is hopeless for both sides, since each can nearly force the exchange of both rooks on the only open file. But to his misfortune, Marshall allows himself the luxury for a moment of affecting a plan, and thereby incurs

a clear, if not necessary decisive, disadvantage.

13...4)c8

From d6, the knight would like to be able to have an effect on e4 and c4, respectively. The idea is good, but of a harmless nature – especially if White, instead of unnecessarily pulling back his bishop, would have chosen the "symmetrical" move 14.2c1 (or perhaps first h3, in order to prevent possible ... \$\mathref{g4}\$. It would have come very quickly to a peace settlement.

14. Le3 26e7 15. 2f4

But this also had to go rather painlessly...

15...Q×f4 16.Q×f4 Q×d3 17.增×d3 Qg6 18.增f3 (?)

...if only White hadn't lost this important tempo and thereby allowed ...f5. Correct was immediate 18.2d2, for example, 18...2d6 19.2×e8+ 20.2e12×e1+21.2×e1 242.2b1!, and in spite of the momentary awkwardness of his bishop, White would have nothing serious to fear.

18...f5!


Since the invasion points on the e-file (e5-e8) are sufficiently protected, this aggressive move has only bright sides here.

19. Qd2 買×e1 20. 買×e1 f4

The additional restriction stands to reason and is apparently also forced. But White defends himself quite imagina-

tively in the following. Perhaps considering the subsequent surprising windup, the more cold-blooded 20... 2b6 would offer somewhat better chances; but to anticipate – let alone calculate in advance – this was really not easy.

21.分e2 曾f5



There is no more time for 21... 2b6 (21...c6), because White threatens 22.2xf42xf423.2xf4g524.曾g3!, etc. – also 21...2h4 would have been unsuccessful because of 22.曾h5, etc.

22.c4!

Strange, but true - in spite of the obvious flaws that come about in the White camp as a result of this move (d4, the half-dead bishop on c3), it forms White's only, and perhaps sufficient counter-chances. It was uncommonly important for him, exactly at this moment (Black threatened ... \cong c2, as well as possibly ... 2h4) to free the e4-square for his queen, and, if possible, also to exchange the idle knight. If ...c6 had occurred at an earlier moment, then the White game would stand completely at a loss. But here, 22...d×c4 23. \\$×b7, etc., would merely weaken Black's pawn position, without compensation.

22...എb6 23.c×d5 എ×d5

Or 23...쓸×d5 24.쓸×d5+ ②×d5 25.②c3 (25...②b4 26.②b5!) 24.... 프d8, with a positional advantage for Black that is likewise hardly sufficient.

24.2c3 2xc3 25.2xc3 c6

Of course Black still stands better, although his direct chances of offense are significantly diminished as a result of the release of the e4-square. For this reason, he should have tried in the following to utilize the prospects of the ideal d5-square for the knight after the queen exchange. Instead of this, he maneuvers too long — until his opponent gets the chance to rid himself of the *isolani* in a favorable way.

26. Qb4 国d8 27. 曾e4 曾f7

The first missed opportunity to exchange of queens. But a couple of others are coming.

28.a3 h6 29.g3!

In the correct understanding that f4 is here more a weapon of restriction than a target of attack, White seeks to dispose of it by exchange. But Marshall probably didn'teven dream at this point that he would succeed in exchanging the pawn on f4, of all things, for the weakling on d4.

29...皆f6 30.皇c3 莒d5 31.皆e8+ 含h7 32.皆e4 皆f5 33.皆g2 皆g4

At the previous move, the swap was offered; now it is avoided again. Admittedly nothing is spoiled by that yet, but it is inconsistent. By the way, after 33... 曾本e4+34. 基本e4 fxg3 35. hxg3 智g8 36. 量e8+ 曾行 37. 量b8 量d7 38. 曾行 急e7

39. \$\delta \dds,\$ together with ... \$\delta f + and positioning the king toward d5, it would have come to an interesting, and for Black, unassailable, endgame. That Nimzovich avoided it so persistently can probably be explained only by time trouble.

34.f3 曾g5?

He should have pulled the queen back to f5 or d7.

35.Qd2!

An embarrassing surprise for Black.

35...曾f6 36.Q×f4 貫×d4 37.曾c2

Threatens 38.2e5. Instead of the next move by Black, the immediate 37... ad would have made the crossing over of the bishop to the a1-h8 diagonal somewhat difficult.

37... 互d5 (?) 38. Qd2! 曾d8 39. Qc3

White's advantage is now clear: a wonderfully lively bishop, the pinning of the knight, otherwise powerless on open board; finally the possibility to force the queen exchange at any time. And yet, all this appears not to suffice for a win with correct counter-play! Truly one must at times make very many mistakes in order to completely ruin a position.

39...買d3 40.買e4 皆d5 41.皆e2 皆d7!

White threatened 42. \(\begin{align*} \text{b4}, \text{ which would} \) have forced a fateful weakening of the Black pawn position.


42.h4

This reasonable pawn move makes Black's later draw combination possible. But so does its omission: 42. \(\mathbb{Z} = 8\), \(\mathbb{Z} \) d1 43. \(\mathbb{Z} = 8\) a6 44. \(\mathbb{Z} = b8\), and if Black simply replies 44...\(\mathbb{Z} = d5\), a win for White would not be evident either in the middle game or in the endgame.

42...h5 43.買e8 買d1!

The introductory move to the following handsome twist.

44.買a8 a6 45.買b8 (?)



Black was lying in wait just for this. With 45. \$\pmeq\$e4, White would still be able to play a while for a win, but hardly with success: Black would most simply reply 45. \$\pmeq\$d5 and further merely make rook moves on the fifth rank (d5-f5-d5). In case of the queen exchange on e8, the rook would come to d7 on the other hand, and then the knight to d5 via e7. The conclusion in the text is more fun.

45...買h1!

A nice final effect, which surprised Marshall in such a way that he thought an hour before it became clear to him that the game was now an unavoidable draw. In fact, his next move is forced, as emerges from the following variations: (1) 46. 當c4 ②×h4+ 47.g×h4 (47. 當f2 邑h2+, etc.) 47... 當h3+ 48. 當f2 當h2+, together with 49. ... 當×b8, and wins; (2) 46. 當e8 ②f4+! 47.g×f4 當h3+ 48. 當f2 邑f1+ 49. 當e3 營×f3+ 50. 當d4 當d5+, together with mate in three moves.

46.ᇦ×h1 쌀h3+ 47.쌀h2 쌀f1+ 48.쌀g1 쌀h3+ ½-½

A game with small jokes, small mistakes, small commotions. Indeed the boring opening variation gives very little room for unfettered flights of imagination ...

Round 14

½ Alekhine – Capabanca ½
 1 Vidmar – Nimzovich 0
 1 Spielmann – Marshall 0

Standings after Round 14:

Capablanca 10 Alekhine 7½ Nimzovich 7½ Vidmar 6½ Spielmann 5½ Marshall 5

(40) Alekhine – Capablanca Caro-Kann Defense [B15]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.\(\partial\) c3 d×e4 4.\(\partial\)×e4 \(\partial\)f6

Black usually has fewer difficulties with the development of his queen's bishop with 4...\$\Delta 55.

5.2g3 e5

Not quite risk-free, because d6 becomes somewhat weakened by the following

exchange. The whole line needs a further practical inspection, however.

6.分f3 e×d4 7.對×d4

On account of the weakness mentioned. especially noticeable in the endgame, White was not wrong to seek simplification. The more involved 7.2×d4 probably would only be strong if Black answered with 7...&c5. Then 8.\delta e2+! could quite well follow - as happened in my Kecskemet game with Dr. Tartakover - with the idea of at least nailing down the advantage of the bishop pair after 8... \end{array}e7 9.\end{array}exe7+ Axe7 10. 2df5, etc. But if on 7. 2×d4, Black continues quietly with 7... 2e7, then on the other hand, middlegame chances are likely to be estimated as mutually balanced.

7...曾×d4 8. 2×d4 Qc5 9. 2df5

Of course not immediately 9.4e3, because of 9...2g4 or 9...2d5, etc.

9...0-0 10.Qe3 Q×e3 11.Q×e3 Qe6 12.0-0-0 Qbd7 13.Qc4 Qc5

This knight maneuver appears affected and, in fact, puts Black at something of a disadvantage. In any case, simpler was 13... \(\mathbb{E} e8, \) together with \(... \(\mathbb{D} b6, \) etc.


14. 🗓 × e6 🖸 × e6 15. 🗗 gf 5 🗗 e4

Other defensive moves against the infiltration of the knight to d6 also have their downsides.

16.買hf1

To 16.臣d7, Black would have had a comfortable defense in 16.②4c5 17.臣7 臣fe8, etc.

16...g6



17.43d6 (?)

Superficial, weak play! With 17.f3!, White was able to maintain a clear positional advantage, since after 17...g×f5 18.f×e4 f×e4 (18...f4 19.�f5, etc. wouldn't be better) 19.�f5, he would have quite easily won back the pawn and Black would be left with a seriously disrupted kingside. Therefore, on 17.f3!, it still would have been best for him to decide on 17...�4c5 18.�d6 a5 19.�ec4±, etc. In Buenos Aires, as a rule, I didn't miss such opportunities ...

17...シ×d6 18.買×d6 買fd8 19.買fd1 買×d6 20.買×d6 買d8 21.買×d8+ シ×d8 22.毀d2 蛩f8 23.蛩d3 蛩e7 24.蛩d4 シe6+ 25.蛩e4 f6 26.f4

This move was transmitted telegraphically to Europe as 26.c4 – which certainly made little difference here. But in general one should arrange in future American tournaments more precise wired information to the foreign press. Already in 1924, for example, a similar error lead to quite a false assessment of Marshall's interesting won game against Rèti. And regarding this tournament, it suffices to point out the quid pro quo in game 28.

26...②c5+ 27.蛩d4 ②e6+ 28.蛩e4 ⑤c5+ ½-½

(41) Vidmar – Nimzovich Catalan Opening [E01]

1.d4 2f6 2.2f3 e6 3.g3

Even though this move isn't entirely worthless, even so it causes the opponent no problems in development anyway. Generally, in my point of view, the moves 1.d4 2.\(\Delta\)f3 and 3.g3 go together badly, since altogether they don't accomplish anything at all either for pressure on the central squares (such as 3.c4) or for defense of the same (e4 unprotected!)

It's even stranger that Nimzovich gets a decisive disadvantage so quickly in the game at hand.

3...d5

Other than this somewhat old-fashioned-seeming reply, a series of other manners of development – such as 3...c5 (4.c4!) 3...b6 or even 3...b5 – came under consideration, but they were hardly better than the one chosen. Already at the next move, Black had to look for compensation for the weakening (whether momentary or lasting can't be determined here) of e5 in aggressive conduct in the center – either in the next moves by means of ...c5 or somewhat later by ...e5. But since he intends to go without both, the move ...d5 loses any internal substance.


4.இg2 **වbd7**

4...c5 5.c3 2c6 6.0-02d6, etc., was good.

5.0-0**⊉d**6

Also, 5...c5 was playable here.

6.b3



6...c6(?)

Can one as Black really hope through such half-development moves - which even for purposes of defense don't have absolute value (...c6 strengthens d5, but weakens d6, a circumstance which can be of greater importance in the opening of lines) - to get an advantage, and because of them to forego simple equalizing (not drawing) continuations? Such a move existed here in 6...e5: if thereupon 7.4b2, then 7...e4 8.2e5 \estime e7: but if 7.d×e5 &×e5 8. Ab2, then 8... ②×f3+, together with – depending on how White takes back, 9...0-0 or 9...c6 - with a full-value game. But if Black wants to play more complicatedly, then this is also possible: 6...වe4 7.c4 c6, together with ...f5 - a kind of Dutch Stonewall - certainly not to everyone's taste, but probably playable.

7.分bd2

Prevented the last mentioned possibility, but still allowed ...e5, even though with somewhat less favorable circumstances (2d2 is an unavoidable tempo, ...c6 is, on the other hand, not always necessary.)

7...0-08. **Ab2**

With that, a line of the Réti Opening is just about reached (it lacks only c4, following in the near future) – but on what detours and thanks to what bizarre (because clichéd ideas, if they are managed ad absurdum, do make the same impression as eccentric ones) counter-play by Black!

8...曾e7 9.c4

After that, 9... a3 10. c1 a×b2 11. b2 would lead to a distressing weakening of the dark squares in Black's camp – and 9...e5 to the ultimate isolation of d5. But all this would be more tolerable for Black than the move he found:

9...b5?

Considering the bishop on g2, to weaken the squares in such a way on the long diagonal certainly takes courage – but also momentary blindness.

10.4 e5!

The rebuttal.

10... £×e5?

With that he already gets into a lost position. More bearable – although very unpleasant at any rate – was 10...4b7 11.e4!. etc.

11.d×e5 ᡚg4 12.e4!

From here on and up to the conclusion, Dr. Vidmar plays always the most accurate move.

Cycle III: Round 14

12... 包g×e5 13.e×d5 e×d5

If here or in the next move ... ②d3, then simply 14.d×c6! ②×b2 \(\varphic2, etc.

14.c×d5 c×d5 15.Q×d5 買b8 16.用e1 皆d6


Again, forced.

17. 分f3!

Through its simplicity, an amazing decision: Black has to trade the central knight, and his remaining pieces stand undeveloped or committed. The end is very near.

Among others, the move 19.\(\mathbb{I}\)e8!, etc., was threatened.

19.買ac1 買b6



The agony would have lasted a couple of moves more with 19...f6.

20. 耳×c8!

Beautiful, even though obvious.

Or 21... 2f6 22. 4×f6 g×f6 23. Ee7, etc.

22.骨×d7 1-0

Upon 22... ≦f8, 23. ዿf7, etc., now wins most easily.

A horrible debacle!

(42) Spielmann – Marshall Scotch Game [C47]

1.e4 e5 2.ሷf3 ሷc6 3.ሷc3 ሷf6 4.d4 e×d4 5.ሷ×d4 ቧb4 6.ሷ×c6 b×c6 7.ቧd3 0-0

Occasionally one first plays 7...d5. But Black can still defer this a tempo, since White can obviously undertake nothing real before he castles.

8.0-0 \mathbb{\mathbb{H}}e8

Already playing with fire!

The known 8...d5 9.e×d5 (or 9.e5 ag4 10.af4 =e8±) 9...c×d5, together with axc3, etc. would have led to equalizing lines. The tendency to organize a piece attack against e4 contradicts, on the other hand, the spirit of the position and is punished accordingly.

9.骨f3 h6

Now already upon 9...d5 could follow 10. ≜g5!, keeping the tension in the center.

10.Af4

In order to be able to answer the present 10...d5 with 11.e5.

10...d6 11.h3

Should serve among other things as preparation for the following knight maneuver.


11...Qb7 (?)

Consistent, but – mainly in light of the position of 2b4 – played rather carelessly. Black still had the opportunity, by means of $11...2\times c3$: $12. b\times c3$ 2d7(!), etc., to bring about an approximately balanced game.

12.4)e2!

With this move, the inadequacy of the following enemy maneuvers must have already been recognized.

12...c5 13.4)g3



13...c4?

I believe, by the way, that even against best defense, Spielmann would have won the position in the diagram; but even so, it would have been interesting to see how he'd have executed the attack victoriously – so within his style of play.

14.Q×c4 Q×e4 15.\b3!

Thereupon, Black could have actually given up confidently, since the realization of the advantage of material in open positions – where one can so easily get rid of dispensable wood – has become child's play with present-day technique.

15...d5 16.Qb5 Qd6 17.Q×d6 買b8 18.營a4!

As one sees, White had to foresee his the results of his 12th and 13th moves far and exactly. But to his bad luck, the combination can't make much of an impression on the reader, because it is based on an adversarial blunder.

18... 買×b5 19.曾×b5 曾×d6 20.公×e4 買×e4 21.曾b8+ 曾h7 22.曾×a7 曾e5 23.曾a5

In order possibly to offer opposition to e1.

A real slaughter!

25...買×c2 26.買ab1 營e5 27.買b7營g5

Upon 27... 2h5, 28. 프e7 발g5 29.h4 발g4 30. 발xd5, etc., clinches things.

28.h4

Forced queen exchange or win of the knight – which mean the same thing here.

28...世g4 29.世×f6 1-0

Round 15

0 Nimzovich – Capablanca 1 ½ Spielmann – Alekhine ½ 0 Marshall – Vidmar 1

Standings after Round 15:

Capablanca 11 Alekhine 8 Nimzovich 7½ Vidmar 7½ Spielmann 6 Marshall 5

(43) Nimzovich – Capablanca Caro-Kann Defense [B12]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.e5 且f5 4.且d3 且×d3 5.₩×d3 e6 6.ᡚc3

Most often played here is 6.2e2, where-upon Black, through ... ₩a5+-... ₩a6 (or ... ₩b5), trades or displaces the enemy queen. The text move, which aims at quick piece development in the midst of mutually eliminated tension in the center by means of d×c5, should lead, with the correct continuation, to a game with equal chances – but probably not any more. The move 3.e5 simply obligates White too much, and Black will always find the necessary time to adapt himself to the rigid position in the center.

6...曾b6 7.句ge2 c5 8.d×c5 Q×c5 9.0-0

Upon 9.曾g3 could have likewise followed9... 白e7! (10.曾×g7 莒g8 11.曾×h7 莒×g2 =).

9...2e7 10.2a4

This obvious exchange is indeed sufficient for equality, but 10.a3(!) came into consideration, whereupon Black had nothing better than first to occupy the knight c6-square with the queen (10... 當c7 11. 包b5!, etc.). Anyhow, the alternative move would have introduced some disturbance in Black's mobilization plans. On the other hand, the attempt to take by surprise, 10.b4, leads to nothing good: 10...曾xb4! 11.包b5 包a6 12.皇a3 曾a5 13.皇xc5 包xc5 14.包d6+ 曾d7! (14...曾f8 15.曾f3±) 15.曾g3 邑hg8 16.包xf7 包f5, etc., with advantage for Black.

10...曾c6 11.包×c5 曾×c5 12.虽e3 曾c7 13.f4

A necessary reinforcing move, but which weakens still further the light squares in the central region. Ultimately, White loses only because he doesn't recognize this curse in his position in time and doesn't seek to remedy it by immediately opening files.


13...2f5 14.c3(?)

This and the next move are based in my opinion on a total misjudgment of the situation, which absolutely had to be treated dynamically because of its weak points. Therefore, 14. ☐ ac1! ②c6 15. ☐ 12 h5 16.c4 d×c4 17. ☐ xc4 0-0 18. ☐ 13, with ②c3-e4, when White in no way should lose.

14...公c6 15.置ad1 (?)

What's the rook looking for on the d-file? White could still play 15.2f2 h5 16.2ac1, etc., as preparation for the above, outlined plan.

15...g6



16.g4??

An unbelievable maneuver for a player of Nimzovich's class. White deprives himself of any prospect on the kingside, frees the enemy from a possible concern about his dark squares - and gives him a completely free hand on the queenside as a result, where he ultimately must break through on the c-file! From here on White's game is to be regarded as strategically lost, although it still requires good technique on the part of Black in order to establish the win. By the way, the correct thing for White in this somewhat disadvantageous position was 16. Af2 h5 17. Ad2 (unfortunately not 17.c4, because of 17...2b4, etc. - a result of the imprecise 14th and 15th moves), together with 18.\mathbb{Z}c1, with the intent c4, etc.

16...**包×e3 17.**費×e3 h5

Almost taken for granted.

18.g5


Or $18.h3 \text{ h} \times \text{g4} 19.h \times \text{g4} 0\text{-}0\text{-}0$ (or immediately 19...g5), with the threats 20...g5 and ... $\mathbb{E}\text{h4} \mp$.

18...0-0 19.**公**d4 曾b6 20.買f2 買fc8 21.a3

A new weakening, but one which Black is always easily able to force.

21... \(\mathbb{G}\)c7 22.\(\mathbb{G}\)d3

Perhaps in order to ease the situation somewhat by exchanging knights.



22...4)a5

Contrary to his habit, Capablanca here tries to solve the problem of playing for the win in a combinative way, and only loses time. The correct procedure was – as happened also in the following – 22... 2e7, and, if White should take up the best defense position \(\mathbb{E} \)d3, \(\mathbb{E} \)f2 – Black would proceed with ...\(\mathbb{E} \)ac8, ...\(\mathbb{E} \)ac6, ...\(\mathbb{E} \)5, ...\(\mathbb{E} \)b6 ...\(\mathbb{E} \)6 in connection with the possibility of ...\(\mathbb{E} \)f5, etc., which was carried out in the game, would ultimately decide the day.

23.買e2 買e8

Apparently Black convinced himself that the winning a pawn with 23...2c4 24.\(\delta\)f2 \(2\times a3!\)?, on which he had based his moves, would not be absolutely safe because of the reply 25.f5!. Therefore the preventive moves in the text.

24.曾g2 公c6 25.莒ed2

A far better practical chance at a draw was offered here by the continuation 25.호×c6 쌀×c6! 26.트d4 (not 26.쌀×a7? b6 27.쌀a6 트a8, etc.), when the opponent would be punished to a certain degree for his imprecision on the 22nd move. In this case also, he would certainly have had to win with best play.

25...買ec8 26.買e2

The opportunity for a facilitating exchange was still there.

26...夕e7!

Now begins the final phase, which is finished by Capablanca without misstep. For students, the game has considerable didactical value.

27. 囯ed2 囯c4 28. 對h3 (?)

As already said, 28. \$\forall f2\$ was appropriate here; the queen has nothing to look for on h3.

28...할g7 29.필f2 a5 30.필e2 신f5! 31.신×f5+

The game would have lasted somewhat longer after 31. Eed2 ②×d4 32. E×d4 E×d4 33.c×d4 Ec4 34. 世e3 a4±, etc.

31...g×f5 32.世f3

If 32.營×h5, then 32...互h8 33.營f3 互h4, with a winning position.

32...曾g6 33.莒ed2 莒e4! 34.莒d4 莒c4 35.皆f2 皆b5! 36.曾g3

Here 36. 基xc4 當xc4 37. 基d4 could still to be tried, which Black probably would have answered with 37... 當b3 ∓.

36... 宮c×d4 37.c×d4

Obviously forced (37.\mathbb{I} \times d4 \mathbb{I} e2, etc.)

37...曾c4 38.曾g2 b5

The pawn moves occur in order first to eliminate the superfluous elements for the victory. A typical train of thought for the Cuban grandmaster.

39. ቴ g1 b4 40.a×b4 a×b4 41. ቴ g2 ቴ c1 42. ቴ g3

It's clear that with other moves also, White would finally perish of zugzwang.

42...曾h1! 43.囯d3 囯e1 44.囯f3 囯d1 45.b3 囯c1! 46.囯e3

Upon king moves, 47. ... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1−c2 wins.

46...買f1 0-1

(44) Spielmann – Alekhine French Defense [C09]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.2)d2

Apparently Spielmann wants to avoid the dull line 3.0c3 \(\textit{L}\)b4!, proven successful in this tournament. But as is generally known, Black can also easily obtain equality with the text move, with some caution.

3...c5! 4.d×c5 &×c5 5. &d3

If 5.2b3 4b6 6.e×d5, then 6...2f6, etc.

5...5)c6

Probably easier than 5... 2f6 (Spielmann-Nimzovich, Cycle IV),

which not only allows the constricting e5, but even provokes it. Besides the text move, certainly 5... 2e7 comes under deliberation, in order to take again with this piece in the case of 6.e×d5. Anyway, Black doesn't have a difficult opening game here.

6.e×d5 e×d5

In contrast, this isolation of the central pawn is neither necessary nor pleasant. With the simple 6... 當×d5, Black would have emphasized not only the inexpediency of the knight development to d2 (the impossibility for this knight to bother the queen from c3), but also provide himself a flexible pawn position in the center (...e5!) for the coming middlegame. Then neither 7.②e4 总b6 8.c4 營d8!, nor 7.營g4 ②e5! 8.營×g7 ②d49.營g3 ②f6, etc. would have led to worthwhile complexities for White.

7.പ്പി 🌡 🖟 8.പ്പി പ്രൂട്ടെ 🗸 🗸 7.പ്പി 🧸 🧸 7.പ്പി 🧸 9.പ്പി 🧸 9.പ്പി 🧸 9.പ്പി 9.പ്പി

Again artificial. The usual development of the knight to f6 in such positions is also the most suitable, since the pinning move £g5 would have led at the most to an early exchange of this bishop for the knight, and as a consequence to the intensification of the pressure of the b6-bishop on the respective squares. In addition, as we will presently see, the knight position on e7 makes the rational development of the queen's bishop difficult for a purely tactical reason.

9.0-0 0-0

If 9... \(\tilde{Q}g4\), then after 10.\(\tilde{E}e1\), for example, castling would not be feasible because of 11.\(\tilde{Q} \times h7+\). On the other hand, for the same reason, the move

11... ag4 would be impossible. So Black had to choose between two – albeit minor – evils

10.c3 曾d6 11.囯e1 幻g6 12.Qe3

It stands to reason that any exchange can be desirable only for White, since only after the disappearance of the enemy opportunities for a kingside attack will White be able to proceed to play against the weakling d5 (whether through direct threat or, as in the game, indirectly).

12...Q×e3 13.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×e3 \(\mathbb{Q}\)g4

For the reasons discussed, Black had to take pains whenever possible to complicate the game – and to this aim, 13... 14 was undoubtedly more advisable here, since the knight could be ousted from this square only at the price of weakening the white kingside, and this would have had a disturbing effect.

14. 2×g6

At the precise moment.

14...f×g6!

This truly difficult decision (on account of the weakening of e6-square and thereby indirectly the entire e-file, which soon turns into a mighty base of operations for the white rooks) is justified because the apparently secure 14...h×g6 would have left absolutely no chance of even halfway promising counter-play for Black. And the weakness on d5 would ultimately have been ruinous to him. On the other hand, as he plays, a small consolation remains for him in the open f-file.

15.h3 Af5

As becomes immediately apparent, the attempt to keep both rooks for a while involves a great deal of danger. But further simplification, by means of 15... \(\textit{L} \times f3, \text{ etc.}, \) already appeared all too emasculating.

16.分bd4 胃ad8

Even less worthwhile were the consequences of 16...皇e4 – for example, 17.②×c6 Q×f3 (17...營×c6 18.②d4, together with 19.f3±) 18.②e7+ 資×e7 19.萬×e7 Q×d1 20.萬×d1, etc.


With that begins the pressure on the open file. Of course both here and in the next move, ...d4 would be unsatisfactory because of 19.\(\mathbb{Z}\)d3, etc.

18... Idf8 19. Ie1 皆c5

Black's position has become very difficult. At this point, the queen has to depart d6 without fail, in order to make possible ...h6, which here would be bad obviously, because of Ξ e6, etc.; and it wasn't easy to decide which of the two queen moves – to c5 or f4 – is the correct one. Finally, Black decides on the text move, because in so doing, he has in mind the hidden defense square in the seemingly most dangerous line.

20. **걸e8 h6 21. 對e6+ 對h7 22. 對c8!**

With that he threatens 23.\delta\times b7, and 22...b6 loses immediately because of 23.b4, etc.



22...d4!

By this surprising double sacrifice (pawn plus tempo), Black obtains excellent chances at a draw. The point of the pawn move lies in the fact that it enables the queen move to d6, which at this point would be insufficient because of simple 23. *\(\text{\text{\text{w}}} \times b7\), threatening \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{E}}}} \text{\text{e}} 6\).

23.c×d4 皆d6!

Not 23... 발b4, 24.a3, etc. But now everything is in order, since neither 24. 월1e6 발f4, etc. nor 24. 발×b7 シ×d4, etc., would lead to anything tangible for White. In addition, 24... 원e7 is threatened, which causes White to decide on the following windup.

24. 🗒 xf8 🗒 xf8 25. 曾e6 曾b4!

Again the most promising, since White, if he now wanted to avoid the queen exchange, would have to decide on the unclear sacrifice 26.曾e4. The result would be then 26...曾xb2 27.鼍b1 營xa2 28.鼍xb7 營c4! 29.鼍c7 鼍f6, etc., with sufficient defense, since 30.包e5 would be answered with 30...營xd4.

26.骨b3

But now in the following endgame, Black has sufficient counter chances for a draw in White's weakened pawn position.

26...曾×b3 27.a×b3 国d8 28.国e4 国d5 29.曾f1 国b5 30.国e3 a5!

Preventing 31. 20 − whereupon obviously 31...a4! would follow − and in this way compelling the opponent to the following rook move, which allows the black king to cross over the center.

More exact than 34...\$d6 (it was reported thus by mistake in the European chess press – with the result 35.\(\mathbb{E}\)e3.\(\mathbb{E}\)e3.\(\mathbb{E}\)e3.\(\mathbb{E}\)d2!,

35.**罩e3**+

Of course not 35. \$\displace{4} \displace{1}\displace{

35... ቴ d6 36. ቴ c2 ව d5 37. ፭ e4 ව b4+ 38. ቴ d2 ව d5 39. ቴ c2

The winning attempt 39.2e5 would remain without success because of 39... $\mathbb{Z} \times b3$ 40.2c4+ 2c7 41. 2c5 2b6!, etc.

39... 5b4+ 40. \$\d2 \d5 41. \$\d2 \\'-\'2

(45) Marshall – Vidmar Slav Defense [D13]

1.d4 2f6 2.2f3 d5 3.c4 c6 4.c×d5 c×d5 5.2c3 2c6

The "Slav Four Knights Game" is hardly appropriate for securing White

a noteworthy advantage; since with it, although Black is nearly forced to leave his queen bishop at home in contrast to the enemy's, his position remains unweakened, and prospects for development are therefore quite favorable.

6. Qf4 e6 7.e3 Qd6

In New York 1924, Dr. Lasker twice played here 7... 2e7, but without success. With the text move (which, by the way, Spielmann originated versus A. Nilson), the advance of the e-pawn, which totally changes the overall picture of the position, had to be planned – because with other continuations, the drawbacks of the exchange gradually emerge more and more clearly. (The king's bishop is actually destined with this pawn constellation to guard against the possible penetrating of the White knight – to e5 and especially c5.)

Although this move, like Black's whole game layout, is definitely not to my taste, Black can count on a draw (but no more) with counter-play halfway agreeable with the position. Despite the isolated pawn and the absence of a bishop to protect the neighboring squares, I have to admit, that the text position promises Black a wood-exchanging draw in the easiest way. The occupation of the central squares. in connection with the open c-file, normally forces White to exchange the most pieces he can, soon.

11.**幻b**5


Now something really odd occurs: up to the 18th move, Marshall follows the (uncertain) train of thought of Nilson in the previously mentioned game, and just like him, very quickly gets into a lost position! Instead of the – not directly bad, but affected – text move, the simple 11.d×e5 ②×e5 12.\(\textit{Le}\)2, etc. came under primary consideration.

11...曾e7 12.d×e5 公×e5 13.罩c1(?)

White is playing with fire; since Ae2 was after all positionally unavoidable, it should have occurred immediately.

13... Ag4

A good move – but actually self-evident.



14.\二c7?

A sickly idea, which doesn't at all resemble Marshall. The now necessary defensive move – 14. 2e2 – would still secure him a comfortable equality.

14....**씱d8**

Thereupon White is already without a good reply, since ...a6 is threatened, winning a piece, as well as ...\(\int xf3+, followed by ...\(\int h3, \) with a mating attack.

15.萬×b7 公×f3+ 16.g×f3 具h3 17.萬e1

Always in the same suicidal style. The exchange sacrifice 17. \$\displaystyle h1(!)\$ would pose Black a somewhat more difficult problem.

17...包e4!

With the threat of mate in two. The reply is forced.


18.f4 替h4 (?)

Less convincing anyway than the move chosen by Spielmann against Nilson, 18... ②c5, for example, 19. 三×a7! 三×a7 20. ②×a7 ②×d3 21. 營×d3 營a5 22. b4! 營×a7 23. e4 營d7! 24. e×d5 是e6, and White, in spite of the pawn material, must perish because of his disrupted king position.

19.**≜**×e4

Forced, since 19. 쌀f3 &c5 would now win quite easily.

19...d×e4 20.公d4 呂ac8



21.闰b5??

Obviously on this day, Marshall was struck with chess blindness. Instead of

using the imprecise 18th move of his opponent to persistently defend now with 21. \cong c2!, he falls victim to a transparent, one-move trap!

After the queen move, Black would have had to slave away before he would have strengthened his attacking position: if 21...Ec5, then 22.f3!; and if 21...f5, then 22.De6! Ef6 23.Dg5!, when ...Eh6 or ...Eg6 would be a decisive mistake – 24.Bc4+!. So Black would have had to devise more complicated attacks, for example, 21...Efd8 22.f3 Ed6, whose irresistibility White absolutely should have made Black prove. Now it's over, of course.

21...買c1! 22.買g5 買×d1 23.買×d1 負g4 24.買c1 h6 0-1

Cycle IV

Round 16

0 Marshall – Capablanca 1 ½ Nimzovich – Alekhine ½ ½ Spielmann – Vidmar ½

Standings after Round 16:

Capablanca 12 Alekhine 8½ Nimzovich 8 Vidmar 8 Spielmann 6½ Marshall 5

(46) Marshall – Capablanca Caro-Kann Defense [B18]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.\(\Delta\)c3 d\(\time\)e4 4.\(\Delta\)\(\time\)e4 \(\Delta\)f5 5.\(\Delta\)g3 \(\Delta\)g6 6.f4 (?)

Through the advance of the f-pawn, a number of central squares are critically

weakened. Therefore it can then be good only if it serves attacking purposes which are concrete, clearly definable, and mostly connected with file openings. That's absolutely not the case here, and the move — curiously enough no more inferior than that recommended by the classicist Maróczy—in my opinion, didn't come under consideration at all. But it requires the refined opening technique of a Capablanca to reduce it to absurdity.

6...e6 7. 2) f3 Ad6 (!)

With the correct idea of developing the knight to e7 and consequently making still more difficult the possible advance of the f-pawn.

8.요d3 නe7 9.0-0 නd7 10.當h1(?)

A "preventive move" (against what?), which here means a loss of tempo. Instead of this, White should have abandoned the idea of f5 and first centralize the king's knight again (10.至4). After 10...至c7 11.c3, together with 營e2, 且d2, 置ae1, and possibly 至e5, White's position would still possibly develop validity—sufficient, anyway, to face any danger of loss.


10...皆c7 11.幻e5 貫d8!

Serves, among other things, as preparation to the following exchange, which should displace 2e5. White has to acquiesce, since the opening of the h-file after 2×g6 or 4×g6 would obviously be still worse business for him.

12. 當e2 A×d3

Not 12...2×e5 13.f×e5 2×d3 14.c×d3!, with a splendid attacking game for White.

13.公×d3 0-0



14.Ad2

The results of the "pseudo-classical" line are quite unsavory for White. Without any prospect of initiative, he stands, moreover, with awkwardly covered central squares, before the threatening specter of a fairly catastrophic endgame, in which the enemy would seize the only open file and perhaps the shining knight square f5! Under such conditions, one has to decide on heroic means, for better or for worse - and I catch sight of such a one in the certainly unaesthetic-looking move 14.b4!, which, in that it directly would have prevented ...c5, would initiate play on the left side of the board. This play perhaps would have led to some pawn exchanges and consequently the threat of file openings, which would have increased White's chances. That Marshall does not take this and other possibilities into account (in the following) shows me that he was not at all aware of the latent danger he was already in.

14...c5 15.2e4(?)

And now this crude snare, which rightfully turns against him! Advisable was simply 15.d×c5 ②×c5 16.②×c5 ②×c5 17.\(\mathbb{Z}\)ad1(!), etc., with a tenable game.

15...分f5!

So comes the knight to this key square, from which he has a powerful effect on the whole board. Of course, 15...c×d4 didn't work because of 16.2×d6, together with 17.2b4. But now, on the other hand, White must not play 16.2×d6, on account of 16...2×d4, with the win of a pawn. Therefore White has to cast his lot with a repeated exchange under deteriorated circumstances.

Flirts with the "threat" 19.216+, which, by the way – if it would come to that – would be quietly answered by Black with 19... 18. However, 18.c3 (whereupon Black would simply double his rooks on the d-file) would have its downsides as well.


18...Qd4!

Everything simple and forced.

19.買ad1 魚×c3 20.勺×c3 買×d1 21.勺×d1 買d8

Not yet 21... 20d4 because of 22. 쌀e4! (22... 2)xc2 23. 20c3 2a3 24. 또c1 20c4 25. 2b5); but now Black threatens the knight move.

22.公c3



22...骨b6(?)

Until now, Black has handled the game quite flawlessly; but here, in my opinion, he commits a hasty move that should substantially simplify the defense. Why not first 22...h6, which would once and for all prevent the opposition of the enemy rook? Thereupon a viable defensive plan would not be entirely obvious.

23.営d1! 営×d1+ 24.分×d1 皆b4 25.皆f2?

Permits the following strengthening of Black's position and gives his king luft, along with the fortification of the knight. And it meanwhile places his own queen on a bad square! No wonder that after this, a pawn and consequently the game are lost under duress. Necessary was 25.g3 (25...2d4 26.\d3!), since the opening of the h1a8 diagonal - which before the rook exchange would probably evoke a decisive attack - was, with the two remaining pieces, connected here with no real danger. Probably the game would be a draw after 25.g3, whereby Black's omission on the 27th move would have found its just retribution. But in New York, Capablanca fought under an especially lucky star ...

25...h5! 26.a3

Here everything is already bad: if, for example, 26.g3, then 26... \ddd! 27.\dc3 b5! 28.a3 a5! ∓, etc.

26...曾d6 27.公c3 曾d4!

Decisive, since White, in order not to die of asphyxiation, (for example,

28. 當g1 包e3! 29. 當h1 — otherwise ... ①xc2 - 29... a630.h3 g631. 當f3 當d232. 當h2 h4!, etc.) gets himself into an endgame, which is hopeless in the long run.

With this Black definitely secures for himself the material plus (31.2×b7 2c4, etc.).

31.a4 **3**d5 32.**3**×b7

Despair, since it was clear that the black king can be played to the queenside sooner than its colleague. But also 32.g3 b6 33.\$\pmedg2\$\$f8 34.\$\pmedf3\$ a6 35.\$\pmedf2\$\$e4 g6! 36.\$\pmedf2\$\$e5 \$\pmedf2\$\$e7, etc., was grim.

Marshall probably could have saved himself the rest.

45. ቴe4 බd6+ 46. ቴd5 ቴd7 47. බc6 බc8 48. බb8+ ቴe7 49. බc6+ ቴf7 50. බd8+ ቴe8 0-1

Here the game was adjourned and – after he had convinced himself that his pieces can be forced back quite easily – White resigned.

(47) Nimzovich – Alekhine Alekhine's Defense [B02]

1.e4 **1**f6 2.d3 e5

In the Dresden tournament game between the same opponents occurred here 2...c5 3.c4 \(\)

3.f4 2)c6

This interesting move was examined thoroughly by Oscar Tenner, the Berlin master living in New York and, on his advice, successfully tried in a correspondence game played in 1923 between the Capital Chess Club in Washington (White) and Manhattan Chess Club in New York (Black). Whether it is the best in this position certainly remains anyone's guess. Under strong consideration comes, for example, 3...d5 4.fxe5 2g4!, winning back the pawn with excellent development.

4.f×e5

Besides this obvious capture, only 4. 2 f3 comes under deliberation, which was also played in the mentioned original game of this line. There followed 4...d5 5.e×d5 2×d5 6.f×e5 2g4 7.2e2 Ac5 (also good is 7...A×f3 8.A×f3 ₩h4+, which occurred in the game Maróczy-Alekhine: for example 9.g3! 쌉d4 10.쌉e2 0-0-0 11.c3 쌉×e5 12.0-0 쌀×e2 13.요×e2 f6= or 13...요e7=, etc.) 8.2g5? (a move unfavorable to the position, which spoils everything; correct was 8.c3 🗓 xf3 9.🗓 xf3 ป xe5 10.d4 ②×f3+ 11.營×f3 具d6! 12.0-0 0-0, whereupon Black likewise would stand quite well - for example, 13.2d2 c5!, etc. - White's game would be kept alive)

8... \$\delta 7 9.\$\Delta c3\$ (now 9.c3 would have been able to be answered with the decisive file opening 9...f6, etc.), 9...\$\Delta e3\$ 10.\$\Delta \times e3\$ \$\Delta \times e3\$ 11.\$\Delta e4\$ 0-0-0 12.\$\Delta f2\$ \$\Delta \times f3\$ \$\Delta \times f2\$ \$\Delta f2\$ \$\Delta d4+\$. White resigned, because after 15...\$\Delta \times e5\$, his game collapses like a house of cards. As will be seen, the text move poses Black more difficult problems.

4...2 xe5 5.2f3!

After 5.d4 2g6 6.e5 2e4, etc., things would obviously be going very well for Black.

5... 包×f3+

The results of 5... 2g6 6. 4e2 (also 6.c4 would come under consideration), 6...d5 (otherwise the pawn position in the center remains too strong) 7.e5 2d7 8.d4 f6 9.0-0! fxe5 10. 2g5 2f6 11. 4h5, etc., seem unsavory for the second to move.

6.骨×f3

Better than 6.g×f3 42h5, etc.

6...d5!

This counterthrust, which works only in connection with the following queen move, is already the only chance for Black to come to the game to some extent; because after 6...d6 7.\(\mathbb{L}\)e2 \(\mathbb{L}\)g4 \(\text{8.}\)\(\mathbb{E}\)f2 \(\mathbb{L}\)×e2 9.\(\mathbb{E}\)×e2, together with 0-0, etc., White's position soon becomes overpowering, thanks to the open f-file.

7.e5 曾e7! 8.d4

With his previous move, Black had been concerned mostly with 8.2f4, which at

first glance looked unpleasant for him. But ultimately he relied on the following line: 8...쌀b4+ 9.신d2 요g4 10.쌀g3 신h5 11.쌀×g4 신xf4 — with comfortable equality because of the threat 12...신xd3+, etc. Following the text move, the black knight even comes to e4, which for Black is certainly pleasant.

8... 白e4 9. Qd3 替h4+

So he forces an approximately equal endgame. But possibly there was still more to obtain with 9...f5 10.0-0 \$\textit{2}e6\$ (11.\$\textit{2}\textit{x}e4\$ dxe4! 12.\$\textit{2}g3\$ \$\textit{3}d7\$\textit{7}\$), together with ...0-0-0, etc. The quieter text continuation is explained by Black's striving at the end of the tournament to further risk, under no circumstances, the loss of the initiative he fought so hard for opposite his main competitor.

10.g3 曾g4 11.幻d2

To avoid the queen exchange would be inadvisable – for example, 11. \(\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{

11...曾×f3 12. 公×f3 Qe7

Now, in case of 13. 2×e4 d×e4 14. 2g5, Black can force a definitely favorable endgame, in spite of the bishops of opposite color, with ... 2×g5, together with ... 2g4 and ... 2f3, etc.

13. A e 3 A h 3 14. A × e 4

With that, a double-edged position is again brought about: Black keeps the bishop pair, besides the chance of success-promising pressure on the weak light squares in the opponent's camp. In turn, White will try repeatedly to attack the exposed black e-pawn. On the other hand, 14.2d2, together with a knight exchange, would presumably lead speedily to a drawn ending.

14...d×e415.2d20-0-016.0-0-0f6

Played in the knowledge that the e-pawn still needs head-on protection. The attempt to play on the d-file by doubling the rooks, together possibly with ...c5, would probably be unsuccessful. For example, 16... \$\mathbb{\pi}\$d7 17. \$\mathbb{\pi}\$hg1 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$f5 18. \$\mathbb{\pi}\$de1 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$hd8 19.h4! (threatens g4, etc.), 19...h5 20.c3, together with 21. \$\mathbb{\pi}\$f2±, etc.

17.e×f6 &×f6 18.c3 置he8 19.置de1 置e6

Black hopes to be able to activate the rook on the sixth rank, but it doesn't come to that. More cautious therefore was 19... \(\mathbb{Z} e7, \) in order not to allow the opponent to gain a tempo with d5.

20.閏e2 h5 21.閏he1 閏de8 22.負f4

In order to provoke where possible ... g5, to weaken squares on the f-file in Black's camp.

22...Qf5

And yet the pawn move would have been more logical, because after 22...g5 23.2e3 c5!, White would have been able to execute the redeployment maneuver $\mathfrak{L}f1(c4)$ -e3 only under unfavorable circumstances. If, for example, 24.2g1 $\mathfrak{L}f5$ 25.2c4 ($\mathfrak{L}f1$) and Black continues with ...2g4-...2f3, etc. Af-

ter the text move, White should actually get something of an advantage.

23.d5!

At the right moment, since the rook must now leave the sixth rank: 23... \(\begin{array}{c} 24. \(\omega \times 4 \) \(\omega \times 4 \) \(25. \omega \times 4 \) \(\omega \times 4 \) \(25. \omega \times 4 \) \(\o

23... 耳6e7 24.h4

The immediate 24.d6 would have shown itself to be a let-down after 24... Ee6! 25.d×c7 g5. together with x×c7, etc. But now Black undertakes something against this threat.


24...b5!

The rescue-move: upon 25.a4 now follows simply 25...a6 and upon 25.c4(!), then 25...宣d8! suffices (not 25...b×c4 26.d6! c×d6 27.②×c4 宣c7 28.宣c2!±) 26.②×e4 b×c4! 27.②d6+ (or 27.②×f6 ত=e2, etc.), 27...c×d6 28.ভ×e7 鱼×e7 29.ভ×e7 宣d7, etc., suffices – just barely – for a draw.

25.d6

This tempting advance, in fact. opens some files to Black's advantage. Correct was 25. 2f1-(2e3), in order at least to block the passed pawn, which apparently isn't to be won. Only after this maneuver would White have been able to try to gain the initiative on the queenside – for example, through \$\cdot\cdot c2\$, a4, together with the occupation of the a-file. On the other hand, the text move brings him into danger.

25...c×d6 26.Q×d6 罩e6 27.Qc5



Also, after 27.\(\textit{Q}\)f4 b4! 28.c4 \(\textit{E}\)c6, etc, White would get into difficulties.

Now it's Black who misses a favorable opportunity: after 27...a5!, he would have held on to some winning chances, because upon 28.2f1, then 28... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c6! 29. Af 2 b4 =, etc., could have followed. And after 28.2b3, the following combination would have been possible: 28... 2g4 29. \(\text{Ze3} \) (otherwise ... e3), 29...g5 30.2d4 gxh4! 31.2xe6, when 31...\,\bar{\pi} \times e6 now wins upon 32.\bar{\pi} \times e4 Ag5+, together with ... Af5, etc., and after 32.g×h4 &×h4, Black recaptures the exchange with ease and keeps with his two passed pawns and splendid chances for a win. After the tame text move, White succeeds in evading the danger.

28.**分f1! Qg**4

If now 28... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c6, then 29.\(\mathbb{L}\)b4!, etc.

The interesting move 30...e3 doesn't work because of 31.\mathbb{\mathb

31. Le3 Le7 32. Lf4 Lc5 33. De3

With that, the knight has reached the correct position, and a draw is unavoidable for Black.

33... **∆**×e3

Otherwise the knight comes to d5 or (with ...\$\mathbb{L}\$f3) to f5.

34. 4 × e3 ½-½

(48) Spielmann – Vidmar Ruy Lopez [C65]

1.e4 e5 2.ବିf3 ବିc6 3.Ձb5 ବିf6 4.d4 e×d4 5.e5 ବିe4 6.0-0 Ձe7 7.ବି×d4 0-0 8.ବିf5 d5

Until now, everything as in the first match game (Dr. Lasker-Marshall). where the American innovator continued here with 9.4×c6 b×c6 10.4×e7+. etc., and was soon at a disadvantage. Dr Tarrasch, who annotated the games of this competition, was of the opinion that the white game, after 9.2×e7+ ②×e7 10. 2d3, would have had a valid face because of the two bishops and the pawn on e5. (Collijns' textbook recommends, on the other hand, 10.f3 &c5 11.f4, etc., with double-edged play.) But, as the present game seems to establish, this face can be called anything but beautiful. The downsides of the Barry line consist precisely in the certainly exaggerated hopping around of the king's knight during the neglected development.

9.分×e7+ 分×e7 10. Qd3

The developmental move 10.2 d2 offered better chances of equality.

10...分c5 11.点e2

And now the third move with this bishop! No wonder that Black soon gets a meaningful positional advantage without effort.

11...c6 12.c3 (?)

White treated the opening rather uneconomically, and now, instead of becoming aware of the danger in his position and thinking about the protection of his advanced central pawn, with the text move he makes a direct tactical error. Here or in the next move, f4 should occur nolens volens.

12...曾c7 13.b4?

Very weak, as the reply shows.

13...2e4! 14. Ad3

Clearly White overlooked that upon 14.f3?, Black would win with 14... 쌀b6+15. 쌀d4 &xc3!. Now he has to be happy that he doesn't lose a pawn ... but the helplessly weakened queenside!


14... 曾×e5 15. 罩e1 皆f6

The simplest, since the opponent, in order to establish the material balance, has to exchange his "Spanish" bishop and remains behind in the development.

16.Q×e4 d×e4 17.월×e4 Qf5 18.월d4 Qd5

Threatens 19... \(\textit{\Delta} \times b1, and thereby compels the white bishop to a very unobtrusive post. \)

19. Qb2 Zad8 20. 公d2?



Another oversight, after which Black should have quite an easy game; for better or worse, probably 20.2a3 had to happen here.

20...\$\b6?

So everything vanishes into thin air; on the other hand, entirely natural and instinctual was 20...②xc3 21.☐xd8 ☐xd8 22.營b3 ②e2+23.營h1 營e6!, etc., with a sound pawn majority in the endgame. It's really remarkable that Dr. Vidmar did not take into account this simple opportunity.

21.**分b3 分c4** 22.**皆e2 b5** 23.**囯e1** ½-½

Discontinued as a draw at Black's suggestion. Actually. in the last couple of moves, Black spoiled his prospects to such an extent that one can regard the game as balanced.

Round 17

(49) Spielmann – Capablanca Caro-Kann Defense [B19]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.ᡚc3 d×e4 4.ᡚ×e4 ቧf5 5.ᡚg3 ቧg6 6.ᡚf3 ፍ)d7 7.h4 ½ Spielmann – Capablanca ½ ½ Vidmar – Alekhine ½ 1 Nimzovich – Marshall 0

Standings after Round 17:

Capablanca 12½
Alekhine 9
Nimzovich 9
Vidmar 8½
Spielmann 7
Marshall 5

This pawn move, in connection with castling long, is probably one of the oldest systems for White in the Caro-Kann. Chigorin, Pillsbury (for example, against Caro, Vienna 1898) and others played in this way - and not without success. But later it was proven that Black can easily free himself by a timely counter-thrust in the center (...c5), and the whole line gradually went out of style. Strangely, in this game Capablanca doesn't use the mentioned possibility for exoneration, and consequently gets a clear disadvantage. By the way, I would play in lieu of 7. h4(?), 7.2d3, with the further plan of development 0-0, \delta e2, c4, together with d2-c3, etc.

7...h68.Qd3 Q×d39.×d3 幻gf6 10.Qd2

If 10.2f4, Black could develop the queen with tempo to a5.

10...e6 11.0-0-0 **Ad**6

With this and the next moves, Black aspires now to an exchange – an inclination that is in no way in harmony with the given position. Obvious and good was 11... $\$ c7, together with ...0-0-0 and possibly ...c5, with initiative in the center.

12. 白e4 白×e4 13. 쌀×e4 쌀c7 14. 뛰he1 위f6

What's more, immediate 14...0-0-0 was still simpler and better here.

15.骨e2 且f4(?)


What did the harmless bishop d2 do to him? On the other hand, the black bishop guarded, among other things, e5, from which the white knight otherwise can be driven only with effort.

As a result of the imprecise enemy treatment of the opening, now White exercises a bothersome pressure against f7, and all of his pieces have more room in general than the black ones.

18...買hf8

With the intent of 19...2d7 (20.2×f7? 2b6), but he doesn't have time for it.

19. **曾g3 g6?**



One commits tactical errors more easily in inferior positions than in good ones. The pawn move, which at first glance looks so unprejudiced and there-

fore impressive, is believed to have been based on some oversight. Instead of this, there was nothing better than 19... \models g8.

20.骨a3?

If Spielmann had been a little less hypnotized by the idea of Capablanca's invincibility, then he probably would have decided on obvious 20.曾f4!. If then 20...包h5 21.曾×h6 智a5, then simply 22.曾b1, with the follow-up 曾e3, etc.; but if 20...包g8, then 21.置e3! (intending 22.置f3) 21...包e7 22.置a3, whereupon both black corner pawns would be attacked. After the inconsistent text move, White's advantage rightfully evaporates completely, and Black ultimately even comes to a counter-attack.

20....**含b8 21**.**罩e**3

Here this move has little power. Capablanca immediately utilizes the first opportunity given him for risk-free counter-play.


21...g5! 22.h×g5 h×g5 23.፰f3 幻e4 24.፰e2 幻d6

Capablanca is especially great with knight maneuvers. From d6, the horse covers f7 and, at the same time, threatens d4 (... 2b5).

25.c3

With that, the white queen is questionably cut from the main battlefield. After his unhappy 20th move, White appears to have lost the thread altogether.

25...買h8 26.買e1 買h2 27.買g3



27...分f5

Capablanca settles for a draw through move-repetition just at the moment when excellent chances of victory were waving at him with 27... Edh8 (reserving all threats for himself). Indeed, even with this half point, it became mathematically certain that the first prize was his (3½ points advantage with three remaining rounds).

28.፱g4 幻d6 29.፱g3 幻f5 ½-½

(50) Vidmar - Alekhine Queen's Indian Defense[E16]

1.d4 句f6 2.句f3 e6 3.c4 b6 4.g3 且b7 5.且g2 且b4+ 6.且d2 且×d2+ 7.曾×d2 0-0 8.0-0 d6 9.句c3

Until this, everything has already been seen before. Instead of the text move, 9. ⊕c2 was tried (9... £e4? 10. £fd2!, etc.), which at best is answered with 9... £e4. White already lost the opening fight concerning the e4-square, and afterward has to aspire to at least making up for the failure in the next phase of the game.

9... **包e4! 10.**曾c2

Capablanca plays in a similar position against Nimzovich (19th round) 10. ave4 ave4 11. and finally got an advantage, but only thanks to the imprecise play of his opponent. Better than the text move, which throws away a tempo, is probably the immediate exchange.

Of course not 11.2g5, on account of 11...2×e2+.


11... 公d7 12. 置ad1 曾e7 13. 置fe1 f5!

With that, Black threatens, by means of ...e5 or possibly ...f4, to gather a dangerous attack; therefore White strives for the most immediate simplification.

14. 의 h 4! 요 × g2 15. 의 × g2 의 f6 16. f3 필ae8

Prepares the advance of the e-pawn, which White can't prevent in the long run.

17. gc2 g6



Here the game was given a draw at White's suggestion. That the players in the approximately balanced position at the end of the strenuous tournament were peacefully disposed is not inconceivable. But it was much more astonishing that the tournament management (or more correctly, a reputable member of the tournament committee, Mr. Walter Shipley, to whom Dr. Vidmar appealed on this occasion against the decision by master Maróczy) – although according to plan, they had the complete right to force a master to play until the 40th move – permitted a premature conclusion in this way with a crowded board...

As far as the position itself is concerned, the chances are approximately equal. It's true that in the diagrammed position, White could hardly play 18.e4 on account of 18...fxe4 19.fxe4 e5 20.d5 ♠g4 21.\(\mathbb{E}\)f1 \(\mathbb{E}\)g5 \(\mathbb{E}\). But, for example, after 18.a3 e5 19.e3 e4 20.f4, together with b4, etc., he would have secured himself an initiative of sorts on the left side of the board as compensation for the unhappy knight position.

(51) Nimzovich – Marshall Modern Benoni Defense [A61]

1.c4 5)f6 2.d4

Otherwise, Nimzovich almost never makes this move at such an early stage. But just against Marshall, who in this tournament defended insecurely against the Queen's Gambit and Queen's Pawn Game respectively, the choice of this old form of development was deliberate.

2...e6 3.4)f3 c5

Whether the move is a chess mistake remains undecided – but it is a psychological one, surely enough. Marshall had to have known that his opponent as good as never played a proper Queen's Gambit (that is, with \$\omega\$5 and pressure on d5), and as a result in this opening hardly can feel especially at home (compare also the game Nimzovich-Capablanca, Round 2). Therefore 3...d5 is here the "correct" move – that's something that the older masters of our chess generation (Dr. Lasker excepted), the current forty-year-olds (approximately) – have to profess.

It's not guile, which only too often is evidence of character weakness, but rather the conviction acquired through experience that in chess, in chess battles, insight into human nature and penetration into the opponent's psyche is necessary above all. Earlier one played only with pieces - we play however (or aspire at least) with the opponent, the enemy - with his will, his nerves, his special propensities, outlandishness, and - not in the least-with his vanity. Marshall had to lose the game at hand because he sought only to bring disorder to the enemy pieces; his opponent, however, in addition sought to rattle the psyche of the black army's commander and not in a small way. And that's how it happened.

4.d5 d6 5.\2c3 exd5 6.cxd5 g6 7.\3d2!

This appears more logical to me than the Capablancan 7.g3, because with it, in the midst of marking the weakness d6, the battle is immediately initiated around the center-point c4. Certainly, however, Black's opening is hardly refuted with the move.

7...分bd7

In order to sour the c4-knight right away.

8.4)c4

Wasn't first 8.e4 more expedient here? If 8... \(\Delta \) b6, then 9.a4, and White expels the knight or (after 9.a4) conquers the b5-square. Otherwise, White has time for the maneuver \(\Delta \) c4-e3, which in the game – but \(per nefas - \text{ brought him an advantage.} \)

8... 4)b6 9.e4 Ag7?

He had to take the knight, with a game with mutual chances. (Black would have the nice al-h8 diagonal, but d6 would remain weak.)

10.4)e3!

The result of purely strategic, impeccable reasoning; at the appropriate time, a4 will happen, whereupon one of two things occur: (1) either Black allows a5, when the knight on b6 is repulsed to d7 (possible c8) and his white colleague gets c4 again; or (2) Black plays ...a5, thereby surrendering b5, and weakens the knight position on b6, which, through \bar{b}3!, in this case, could be attacked forcibly.

White's whole set-up is logical and thereby aesthetic. Only too bad that with the imprecision of the 8th move, the overall picture became somewhat distorted

10...0-0 11.点d3 分h5

The occupation at the moment of the dark squares brings no blessings upon him, since the main disadvantages of the position – the weakness of d6 and above all, the unhealthy development of 2c8 – are in no way eliminated by that. Instead of this, the leading concern should be first quite a modest one – namely just to secure the connection of the rooks; for example,11....2c7 12.0-0 2c7 13. a4 2c8 14.a5 2c8, with a constricted, but still rather solid position.

12.0-0 **Дe**5

To expose the bishop in this way was careless; because if it comes to exchanging it, the kingside loses any stability ... more consistent therefore is the immediate 12... 214.

13.a4 ᡚf4 14.a5 ᡚd7 15.ᡚc4 ᡚ×d3 16.쌀×d3 f5

Much resembles an act of despair.

17.e×f5 買×f5 18.f4!

Also good was the move 18. 2e4, given by Nimzovich. But he has to go all out, absolutely right psychologically, even sacrificing material. With an undeveloped queenside and compromised king position, Black's position has to collapse quite quickly after a simple file opening.

18... Ad4+

The white bishop has to be provoked to e3, where he blocks the main file and takes an important square from the knight. Quite shrewd – if it weren't already too late to play subtly ...


19. Qe3 Q×c3 20. 對×c3 勾f6

Very strong also was the immediate 20...\mathbb{Z}\times d5: among others, 21.f5! g\times f5 22.\mathbb{E}f3, etc.

21.骨b3!

A well considered positional move, which is connected superfluously with some tactical ideas. Therefore, relatively best for Black is 21...g4, in order to ensure a retreat for the rook; but he would always stand awkwardly.

21...買×d5?



This move is refuted neatly. Upon 21...②×d5, which looks somewhat better, Nimzovich indicates the strong file occupation 21.\(\mathbb{A}\)ae1! as sufficient for a win.

22.f5!

This move all of a sudden makes the rook and bishop vital. If Black takes the pawn with the bishop, then he remains likewise without defense after 23.2g5.

22...g×f5 23.Qg5 買d4

Or 23... 2e6 24. 2 × b7 ☐ c8 25. ☐ ae1!, and wins.

24.分b6+ c4 25.皆c3 a×b6 26.皆×d4皆g7 27.置ae1!

With ideas of mate.

27...b×a5 28.置e8! 營×e8 29.營×f6+ 營g8 30.众h6 1-0

The game received the third special award.

Round 18

½ Vidmar – Capablanca ½

1 Alekhine – Marshall 0

½ Spielmann – Nimzovich ½

Standings after Round 18:

Capablanca 13 Alekhine 10 Nimzovich 9½ Vidmar 9 Spielmann 7½ Marshall 5

(52) Vidmar – Capablanca Four KnightsGame [C48]

1.e4 e5 2.包f3 包c6 3.包c3 包f6 4.见b5 包d4 5.包×d4 e×d4 6.e5 d×c3 7.e×f6 營×f6 8.d×c3 營e5+

The entire line was played for the first time by Capablanca against me in St. Petersburg in 1914. It leads to an easy draw for Black, if White immediately exchanges queens – but this is definitely unnecessary. Under consideration comes instead 9.2e2 2c5 10.0-0 0-0 11.2f3 – with the idea of causing, in contrast to the text game, the exchange of the black-square bishops, whereupon the mutual pawn set-up would be rather favorable to White.


11... Af5 12. Ab5+

Was it really worth the effort, to spoil the opponent's castling? He was assured of a simple draw with 12.4 f4! 0-0-0 13.4 d3, etc.

12...c6 13.莒e1+ 曾d7 14.臬d3 鼠×d3 15.c×d3 鼠d6

Black kept the correct bishop, that is, the one that can possibly attack the fixed pawns on the white queenside. This means only a very small advantage here, but is better than nothing.

16.d4 買he8 17.Qd2 f5 18.g3 g6 19.蛩g2買e4 20.f3 買×e1 21.買×e1 b5



The game was given up as a draw in this position—in my opinion, somewhat prematurely, since Black possessed some chances of forcing a file-opening queenside in his favor (if now 22. \(\mathbb{Z} = 1 \), then 22...\(\mathbb{Z} b8! \)). Anyway, a couple more moves could have been made.

(53) Alekhine – Marshall Queen's Pawn Game [A46]

1.d4 幻f6 2.c4 e6 3.幻f3 幻e4

A move that stands in contrast to all principles – both with the older formula ("don't make different moves with the same piece in the opening") as well as the modern notion ("pressure on the central squares is generally more effective than their occupation"). In addition, Black has the disadvantage of unnecessary voluntary agreement, which allows the opponent already to elaborate the entire further battle plan with the next moves. In short: it forms a characteristic opening mistake, which I label as "illegitimate disturbances of the balance."

4.分fd2!

The logical reply, whereby the opponent is forced either to give up the fight for e4 immediately, or to decide upon the "Stonewall" setup, which will seriously weaken his dark squares.

4...**Qb**4

A typical Marshall trap: if now 5.a3, then 5... \(\text{\text{\$\geq}}\) f6 and wins!

5.皆c2! d5

If 5...f5, then 6.a3, forcing the exchange of the developed black pieces.

6.公c3 f5 7.公d×e4

White's further operations are prescribed clearly through the situation which has arisen: first e4 should be eliminated by means of f3, then a possible e4 forces a file opening, and fi-

nally, follow up with the utilization of the weakness e6, exposed in this way. In fact, Black loses in something of a different way – but only because he tries to face the plan with forcing, combinational means.

7...f×e48.4f4

This bishop development destroys all Black's hopes of a kingside attack, of which he otherwise could dream. based on the open f-file.

8...0-0 9.e3 c6

Otherwise White would have forced the exchange of \(\mathbb{Q}b4 \) through 10.a3 (10...\(\mathbb{Q}d6\)? 11.\(\mathbb{Q} \times d6\), together with c×d5 e×d5 \(\alpha \times d5\)!, etc.).

10.Qe2 幻d7

Or 10...Qd6 11.Q×d6 \widehards 12.0-0, together with f3, etc. Also, the attempt to take advantage, in a tactical way, of the somewhat exposed position of the bishop on f4 would have ultimately proved insufficient – for example, 10...c5 11.a3 \widehards 12.d×c5 d4 13.b4 d×c3 14.b×a5 \widehards ×a5 15.\widehards d6, together with 0-0±

11.a3

This seemed to me to be easier than the line 11.0-0 af 6 12.f3 ah 5 13.f × e 4 (13.2e5 & g5) 13...a × f 4 14. E × f 4 E × f 4 15.e × f 4 d × c 4, etc.

11...Qe7

Following the exchange, the dark squares would be left quite unprotected, and White, without difficulty, would have achieved a strong attack on the king by means of castling long, together with opening the g-file with f3, ...exf3, gxf3.

12.0-0 Ag5

There probably isn't anything better.

13.f3! Q×f4 14.e×f4 日×f4

To be sure, Black's position was unenviable also without this – but with 14...e×f3 15. \(\mathbb{I}\)×f3 \(\mathbb{O}\)f6, together with queenside development, he would still have been able to carry out extended resistance. Obviously, the text move already prepares the following forcible liberation attempt in the center.


15.f×e4 \ X×f1+ 16. \ X×f1 e5

Leads to dramatic complexities. After 16...d×c4 17.요×c4 වb6, White would get an advantage with 18.쌀f2.

17.皆d2!

The beginning of the decisive combination. It's clear that both 17.d×e5 d4 and 17.c×d5 (or exd5) 17...e×d4 would not yet directly contribute.

17...c5



There was actually no choice for him, since any exchange in the center clearly would be only grist for the opponent's mill, and against 17... 當b6, I had prepared the following winning line: 18.c5 當a5 19.e×d5 e×d4 20.b4! d×c3 21.當g5 當c7 22.d6, etc.

18.d×e5! d4 19.骨f4!

Doubtless the quickest and surest path to a win. On the other hand, questionable on move 18 was 18.2×d5 c×d4 19.\delta b4, on account of 19...\delta f6!, and on move 19 - 19.\delta d5, because of 19...\delta xe5:, together with ...\delta d6, etc.

19...d×c3

Forced.

20.皆f7+ 當h8 21.b×c3!

This "quiet" move is the actual point of the whole combination. With the natural 21.e6, the following defense would be at Black's disposal: 21...包f6 22.e7 營g8! 23.單xf6 鱼g4! 24.營xg8+ 登xg8 25.單d6 單e8∓, etc.

This protects him at least from one of the threats (23.e6 \$\oldot 6 24.e5 \$\oldot h7!).

23. Ah5!

The death blow.

23...a5

Or 23...쌀xc4 24.월f7; or 23...쌀h7 24.e6 ᢒb6 (24...원f6 25.萬xf6) 25.萬f8 and wins.

24.e6 g6 25.e×d7 Q×d7 26.臣f7 1-0


The arbiter, Mr. L. Mayer, declared this game the most beautiful in the tournament, but it nevertheless received only the second special award, because the quality of the Capablanca-Spielmann game was said to be supposedly higher.

(54) Spielmann – Nimzovich French Defense [C07]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.\(\)d2 c5 4.d×c5 \(\) \(\)x<c5 5.\(\) \(\)d3 \(\)f6

An active move, which just as 5...2c6 (see Spielmann-Alekhine, Cycle III), is pretty playable. Only Black mustn't lose a single tempo during the center battle in the opening phase, which in the current game – as will become convincingly clear – absolutely isn't the case.

6.e5 到fd7 7. 到gf3 到c6 8. \delta e2



8...**②b4 (?)**

There we have it! Instead of capturing the central point e5 with 8...f6! – even at the cost of some more superficial weaknesses (given by Nimzovich himself after the game) – Black loses time to eliminate the seemingly innocent white king's bishop. At the same time,

a valuable protection of the d4-square (②c6) disappears. After 8...f6 9.e×f6

**xf6 10.②b3 h6 (simplest) 11.②×c5
②×c5, the Black position would even be favored because of the central pawns' flexibility. Against correct counter-play, White's knight move to d2 can't be advantageous!

9.0-0 쉯×d3 10.쌉×d3 0-0 11.싟b3 Ae7

Otherwise 2g5, etc.

12.囯e1 幻b6 13.幻bd4

In the good old, pre-war times (San Sebastian 1911 to St. Petersburg 1914), where many of his opponents didn't yet grasp well that this – ceteris paribus – already meant half the victory, Nimzovich himself had invested enough games with such a central position for the knight and won most of them. No wonder that, here a defender, he doesn't feel comfortable and gets more and more into a jam. In contrast, Spielmann's following positional play appears very aesthetic.

13...Qd7 14.b3 罩c8 15.Qd2 幻a8

The knight seeks in vain for halfway reasonable squares. Black's move confines him in such a way that he can in no way secure his dark-square bishop from the exchange, and so has to abandon the hope of the bishop pair.

16.a3 &c7 17.&b4 &a6 18.&xe7 쌉xe7 19.b4 &c7 (?)

Permits a further strengthening of the white position on the queenside: namely, Black can never profit from the

open c-file, since his own pieces stand in the way of each other. For defensive purposes, first 19... 24 would have been more useful.

20.a4! **Дe8**

After 20... \delta × b4, White would get s clear advantage with \delta e1-b1-b7:, etc.

21.c3 f6

No heroic resolve, but rather an avowal that there's no other way to conduct business. In fact, if Black permits the opponent a couple of tempi – for example, in order to double the rooks on the e-file for the purpose of preventing the text move – then he would soon fall victim to a direct attack on the king. Certainly, the wonderful animals on d4 and e5 look formidable now, but a direct path to a win is more difficult to find.

22.e×f6 曾×f6 23.皆e3 皆f4!

Again the lesser evil, since after 24. \subseteq xf4 \subseteq xf4 25. \subseteq xe6 \subseteq xe6 26. \subseteq xe6, he would get more than sufficient compensation with 26... \subseteq fc4!, etc., for the loss of a pawn.

24. 夕e5 曾×e3 25. 里×e3 耳f6

The threat was ... 2d3-c5, etc.

26.g3


With the apparent purpose of finally making the weakness on e6 permanent by means of f4. As the reply shows, the way chosen was not correct, and the preparatory move 26.h4(!) was recommendable. If after that, 26...h6, then 27.g3, when 27...g5 wouldn't work because of 28.2g4, etc. Small omissions

of that kind usually suffice to transform a totally superior position gradually into an equal one.

26...g5! 27.b5 曾f8 28.買b1 b6 29.買be1

In spite of the imprecision of the 26th move, White still has a position that promises a win, since three to four pieces of the opponent are in stalemate. Instead of the text move, which threatens to win a pawn (30.2g4), also 29.2b4 comes under consideration here – albeit with a different plan – if after that 29...2d8 (in order to prevent c4), then first \$\mathbb{G}g2\$, together with \$\mathbb{E}e1-a1\$ and finally, if Black still conducts himself passively (and what else can he do?), a5, opening a file.

29...a6



Quick-witted and bold, yet in the case of a proper answer, inadequate. Since 29...\$\delta 7\$ still works in the short term, for example, (1) 30.\delta 94 \delta 631.\delta f5+\$\delta 82.\delta 6 \delta d8, etc.; or (2) 30.\delta dc6+\$\delta \times 631.\delta \times 64 \delta 632.\delta \times a7 \delta a8, etc. He should have chosen this move, for better or worse, to cover e6.

30.b×a6?

With that, in my opinion, Spielmann misses out on a win. Correct was 30.a5!,

with the following lines: (1) 30...\(\mathbb{B}\) 31.\(\mathbb{\omega}\) c6 (21.\(\mathbb{A}\) × c6 (22.\(\mathbb{A}\) × c6 (23.\(\mathbb{A}\) × c4 (2

30... 🗒 a8! 31. ᢒ b5 ᢒ ×a6 32. ᢒg4

Now quite harmless, since after 32... \(\begin{aligned} & 32... \(\begin{aligned} & 36. \\ & 36. \end{aligned} & 34. \\ & 26. \end{aligned} & 36. \\ \ & 36. \\ & 36. \\ & 36. \\ & 36. \\ & 36. \\ & 36. \\ & 36

32... 国g6 33. 白e5 国f6 34. 白g4

Otherwise Black generates counter-play with ... 2c5, etc. Too bad for the game, which up to achieving a winning position, was implemented so well by Spielmann!

34.\(\mathbb{Z}\)g6\\\%-\\%

Round 19

½ Capablanca – Nimzovich ½

1 Alekhine – Spielmann 0
½ Vidmar – Marshall ½

Standings after Round 19:

Capablanca 13½
Alekhine 11
Nimzovich 10
Vidmar 9½
Spielmann 7½
Marshall 5½

(55) Capablanca - Nimzovich French Defense [E16]

1.d4 2f6 2.2f3 e6 3.c4 b6 4.g3

Ab7 5.Ag2 Ab4+ 6.Ad2 A×d2+ 7. 份×d2 0-0 8. 分c3

Up until now, everything is identical with the game Vidmar-Alekhine from the 17th round, in which White played 8. 0-0 here. The text move permits the following exchange, facilitating it for Black.

8...5)e4 9.5)×e4 A×e4 10.0-0 d6 11.5\e1

A simplifying initiative, necessary sooner or later, which has the advantage of pledging the knight on g2 interesting evolutionary possibilities (e3, f4). And yet here I would have preferred first 11.\mathbb{I}fd1, in order to hamper, if possible, the strategic counterattack ...c5.

11...**Q**×g2 12.**Q**×g2 **Q**d7

An imprecise developing move, which reveals an inadequate assimilation of the details of the position - certainly a rare case with Nimzovich! Correct was 12... ₩e7!, in order to answer 13.e4 with 13...c5! and 14.\(\mathbb{I}\)fd1 with ...f5!, which in both cases would have secured full counter-play for Black.

13.e4 e5?

A move entirely contrary to position which weakens d5 and f5 without compensation – 13...c5! is still possible; for example, 14.d5 De5!, or 14. \(\mathre{A}\) ad1 \(\mathre{A}\) c8

14.De3 Af6

Probably 14...e×d4 15.\×d4 \f6 16. \sigma\xf6 \Oxf6 17.f3, etc., offers a better chance at a draw - with only a small positional advantage for White.

15.f3 c5?

With that, he hurls the game at the opponent. For better or worse, 15...g6, together with ...\epsilon etc. should be played.

16.d×e5 d×e5 17. 🗒 ad1 🖶 ×d2

Or 17...\\cong c7 18.\cdot f5 ±.


18. 耳×d2

Control of the only open file, in connection with the penetration point for the knight, should now decide the conflict in White's favor without considerable difficulties.

18...買fd8 19.買fd1 買×d2

It would be useless to play 19...\alpha d4 20.වf5, etc.

20. E×d2 g6



20... \$\Delta f 8 doesn't help because of 21.\(\mathbb{I}\)doesdot!, etc.

21.由f2?

With this move, we see most clearly that Capablanca had absolutely no interest in the outcome of this game. Otherwise he wouldn't have possibly overlooked the entirely obvious invading move 21.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d6 (not 21.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d5 because of 21...\(\mathbb{\pi}\)g7!). Now against 21...\(\mathbb{\pi}\)g7, Capablanca would have the choice of either first bringing the king to the center – or by means of 22.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d5 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xd5 23.exd5 (23...\(\mathbb{\pi}\)g8 24.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d7 e4 25.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)f2!, etc.), bringing about an endgame not technically difficult to win.

21... 由f8 22. 勾d5

On the other hand, White gets nothing more now from 22. \(\mathbb{E}\)d6, on account of 22...\(\mathbb{P}\)e7!, since then 23. \(\mathbb{E}\)c6? would be a direct mistake because of 23...\(\mathbb{E}\)e8!, together with ...\(\mathbb{E}\)d7.

22... 互d8 23. 曾e3 公×d5+ ½-½

Actually, after 24\(\mathbb{Z}\)×d5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×d5 (or 25.c×d5 b5!, etc.) 25...f5 26.g4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e7 27.g×f5 g×f5 28.\(\mathbb{Z}\)f2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d6 29.\(\mathbb{Z}\)g3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e7 30.\(\mathbb{Z}\)h4 h6! 31.\(\mathbb{Z}\)h5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d6, etc., White can't win the pawn endgame, since his king can't move forward because of ...e4. But that could have been shown to the New York public.

(56) Alekhine – Spielmann French Defense [C13]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.ପ୍ରc3 ପ୍ରf 6 4.ପ୍ରg5 Qe7 5.e×d5

A quite harmless variation. Whether Black recaptures with the knight or with the pawn, he can always achieve equality without effort.

5...公×d5 6.具×e7 皆×e7 7.皆d2 皆b4

This move, which has already been made here occasionally, forces an approximately equivalent endgame – but only just approximately. And by the way, why should Black be in such a hurry for simplification? Playing first 7...0-0, and, for example, not until 8.0-0-0, playing 8... \$\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$}}} 4\$, etc., would have spared him the following unpleasantness.

8. 公×d5 曾×d2+ 9. 曾×d2 e×d5 10. 莒e1+ Qe6?

In the games Schlechter-Maróczy and Schlechter-Spielmann (San Sebastian, 1911) 10...\$f8 occurred, and in both cases Black reached a draw, although not without a certain effort. It's hard to comprehend why Spielmann — who therefore was not unfamiliar with this position — decided on the self-pinning of the bishop.

11.47h3!

Very strong, since the knight will be able to develop versatile activity from f4: (1) pressure on d5 and e6; (2) impact on c5 or e5 respectively via d3; and (3) possibility of the flank attack, ♠f4-h5.

11...包c6

Gradually Black gets a decided disadvantage. But also 11...0-0 12.2f4 2c6

13.c3 a6 (otherwise \(\text{Qb5} \)), \(\text{Qe2-f3}, \) etc., was of little benefit to him.


12.众b5 曾d7 13.分f4 莒ae8 14.c4 曾d6

All this is as good as forced.

15.c5+ 曾d7 16.囯e5

Another likewise more promising continuation was 16.邑e3, when Black couldn't very well play 16...a6 – for example, 17.鱼×c6+ 每×c6 18.邑he1 母d7 (after 18...鱼d7, White wins by means of 19.邑×e8, together with 包h5, etc.) 19.包h5 邑hg8 (or 19...邑eg8) 20.邑g3, etc.; but after 16...f6 17.鱼×c6+! b×c6 18.邑a3 邑b8 19.②×e6 每×e6 20.邑e1+, etc., it would ultimately have come to similar positions as in the game.

16...f6 17.買×e6 買×e6 18.ᡚ×e6 蛩×e6 19.鼻×c6 b×c6



White brings about a rook endgame, which indeed must be winning, but still requires quite precise handling.

20.**営e1**+

In almost every endgame, it's important to drive the enemy king out from a central position; but especially here, where the rook can be lead to both flanks, according to need, to attack the enemy pawns.

20...當d7

Relatively better than 20...\$f7, where-upon White would have won by implementing the following plan: 21.\$c3! \$\Box\$b8 22.\$\Box\$e3. Now the black rook has to watch the b-file, and Black cannot prevent the following moves: a3!, \$\Gox\$c2, f3!, \$\Box\$b3, after which the rook would penetrate the enemy position following ...\$\Box\$e8, \$\Gox\$d2, etc. It's also interesting to find out that even with the white king's position on c2, Black can't oppose the rook, because then the pawn endgame also would be lost.

For example, ...Be8; B×e8, ...B×e8; Bb3, ...Bd7; Bb4, ...Bc8; Ba5, ...Bb7; f3! (or, in case the pawn is already on f3 – b4!). Now. after the exhaustion of the kingside pawn moves on both sides (for example, ...h5; f4!, etc.), Black will have to move ...a6 (after ...Bb8; Ba6, etc., the White win is easier still), whereupon b3!, ...Ba7; b4, ...Bb7; a4, ...Ba7; b5, ...a×b5; a×b5, ...c×b5; B×b5, ...Bb7; c6+, etc. follows, with a clear win for White. An instructive pawn endgame!

21.曾c3

Corresponding to the foregoing implementation, 21. Ee3 could also be played immediately, because after that 21... Ee8 doesn't work. But 21... Eb8, etc., would just amount to a transposition of moves.

21...買b8 22.買e3 買f8 23.買g3! 買f7 24.對b4

From here on, White starts to become somewhat indecisive; the correct way is – as also happens further on – 24. \(\text{Z}h \) 3.

24... 囯e7 25.曾c3


After 25.\$\dot\delta\$5, the counterattack 25...\delta\$e2! 26.\delta\$\times\$g7+\delta\$c8., etc., would probably lead to a draw.

25...買f7 26.買h3 h6 27.曾d2!

Threatens 28. 三 a3, against which Black actually has no defense, since upon ... 金 c8-b7, the rook infiltrates to e8 via e3; and after 27... 三 f8 28. 三 a3 三 b8 (or 28... 三 a8 29. 三 a6) 29. 金 c3 三 b7 30. 三 a6, Black would finally perish by zugzwang.

27... 洋e7

An attempt.



28. **異**a3

With the logical move 28. Ξ e3 (intended with the previous maneuver), White could have compelled a victory-promising pawn endgame. Because after 28. Ξ e3! Ξ ×e3 29. Ξ ×e3 Ξ e6 30. Ξ f4 g6 (30...g5+?31. Ξ g4, etc.) 31.g4, Black

obviously will not be able to prevent the total barricading of the kingside, and White penetrates finally on the queenside. For example, 31...g5+ 32.魯e3 魯d7 (32...f5 33.f3) 33.魯d3 \$c834.\$c3\$b735.\$b4\$a636.\$a4 \$b737.\$a5 a6 (in case of \$\bar{2}\$-any, then White plays \$26, together with 24, b4b5, and after ...c6×b5, a×b5 and b6, with an easy win) 38.a4 \$a7 39.b3! \$b7 40.b4 \$a7 41.b5 axb5 42.axb5 \$b7! 43.b6! (White had not sufficiently appreciated exactly this point in his calculations; after 43.b×c6+? \$b7-b8-a8. etc., the game is already a draw) 43...c×b6+ 44.c×b6 \$b8 45.\$a6! c5 46.d×c5 d4 47.b7 d3 48. \$b6 d2 49.c6 d1骨 50.c7#.

Not a very easy variation – but in better shape, the leader of the White pieces doubtlessly could have and should have figured it out. Now comes an endgame on quite a different track.

28... 宣e4 29. 宣a4 曾c8 30.f3 宣h4

With the corner position of the enemy rook, White promised himself somewhat too much with his 28th move.

31.h3 曾b7 32.曾e3 f5!

The correct way to free the rook, since White can't really prevent ...f4+, together with ...\(\mathbb{H} 4-h5-f5, \) etc.

33. 旦b4+ 曾c8 34.a4

With other moves as well, for example, \(\begin{aligned} \Beta b 3, & nothing much more might result after 34...f4+, etc. \end{aligned}

34...g5 (?)

From here on, Black, for his part, starts to take great pains. Simplest, of course, was 34...f4+35.\$f2\$\tilde{\text{B}}h5\$- for example, 36.\$\tilde{\text{B}}b3\$ (36.a5 a6) 36...\$\tilde{\text{B}}f5\$ 37.\$\tilde{\text{B}}d3\$\tilde{\text{B}}f7\$ 38.\$\tilde{\text{B}}d2\$\tilde{\text{B}}e7\$ 39.\$\tilde{\text{B}}e2+, together with ...a5!, with a dead draw.

35.a5 g4

After the previous mistake, probably still the best practical chance. Because after 35...a6 36.\$\mathbb{E}f2!\$, Black's rook would remain perpetually closed off after White, through the threat \$\mathbb{E}g3-h2\$, together with g3, etc., would force Black to play ...f4, and finally the playing of the rook on the e-file, together with its unavoidable infiltration, would bring White a decisive advantage.

36.h×g4 f×g4 37.a6! g×f3

Upon 37...g3 38.f4, etc., wins.

38.g×f3 買h1 39.買b7 買e1+

With his 38th move, Black probably overlookedthat 39... Ea1 would now be baneful because of 40. E×a7 學b8 41. Eb7+ 學c8 42. Eb3! E×a6 43. Ea3 學b7 44. f4!, etc.

The counterattack on the d-pawn forms therefore his only chance of salvation.


40.曾f4!

Through 40. \$\Pid2 \mathbb{\pi}e7! 41. \$\mathbb{\pi} \times a7 \mathbb{\pi}b8 \\ 42. \$\mathbb{\pi}b7+ \mathbb{\pi}a8!, etc., it's true, a pawn was to be won, but not the game.

40...買d1 41.曾e5 買e1+ 42.曾f5 買d1 43.買×a7!

This pawn exchange occurs in the correct knowledge that the white king will succeed in rendering both enemy passed pawns harmless, as well as effectively supporting his own f-pawn. The final phase is instructive in technical respects.

43...買×d4 44.買a8+ 當d7 45.f4 買a4 46.a7! h5



Or46...d4 47.\(\text{\$\text{\$d}\$} \) 48.\(\text{\$b}\$ \) \(\text{\$\text{\$E}\$} \) 1 49.\(\text{\$f}\$ \) \(\text{\$\text{\$d}\$} \) 50.\(\text{\$\text{\$d}\$} \) 4 h4 51.\(\text{\$\text{\$e}\$} \) 5, and wins.

47.b3!

The winning move; since it's clear that White's main task consists in standing sentinel with the king over the dangerous d-pawn – the h-pawn can be stopped in a pinch with the rook by sacrifice of the a-pawn. And b3 allows the king to move to e5, which would be obviously pointless at the moment because of 47...He4+.

47...買a1 48.曾e5 買e1+ 49.曾f6

Gaining time on the clock.

49...買a1 50.曾e5 買e1+ 51.曾d4! 買d1+ 52.曾c3 買a1 53.f5! 曾e7

Forced, because of the deadly threat f6, etc.

54.曾d4 h4 55.曾e5 莒e1+ 56.曾f4 罝a1 57.曾g5 罝g1+

A difficult decision. But upon 57...h3 comes 58. 国h8 国×a7 59. 国×h3 国a1 60.f6+! 雪f7 61. 国h7+ 雪f8 62. 国×c7, with an easy win.

58.當×h4 閏a1 59.曾g5 閏g1+ 60.曾f4閏a161.曾e5閏e1+62.曾d4 閏a1 63.曾c3 閏a3 64.曾b2 閏a6 65.b4

Now the approach of this pawn immediately decides.

65...曾f7 66.曾b3 莒a1 67.f6! 莒a6 68.b5 c×b5 69.曾b4 1-0

(57) Vidmar – Marshall Queen's Pawn Game [A46]

1.d4 &f6 2.&f3 e6 3.c4 &e4 4.쌈c2

A good move, but which can't be regarded as a strengthening compared to 4. 2fd2 (Alekhine-Marshall), since it's clear that the e4-outpost must be attacked at least by the knight. It's less clear, on the other hand, that $rac{1}{2}$ belongs in all variations.

4...d5

More precise seems first ...f5, and provided 5.2c3, then 5...2b4, with the eventual threat of causing for the weak white pawn complex c3, c4, d4 so typical of the Dutch game. It's strange how little importance Marshall places on the nuances of the opening phase!

5.2c3 f5 6.2f4 2d6 7.e3

A well known idea with the Stonewall, which supposedly originated with Pillsbury. Following the exchange on f4, White should press against e6. But as a rule, Black doesn't need to swap at all, and in the text game he could also avoid this easily.

7...c6 8. **Q**e2 0-0 9.0-0 **\(\text{\$e} \) (?)**

When one takes a back seat in the development, one can't miss the opportunity to lead new fighting forces into the battle. Here for example, 9...2d7 is tactically possible (10.2×e4 4×f4), and ought to happen immediately. Then, upon 10.c5, the bishop would have had a comfortable retro move ...4b8. After the text move, White gets an advantage.

10.c5! **A**×f4

If 10...Ac7, then simply 11.b4 together with a4, b5, etc. — using the circumstance that Black in this case couldn't develop his queenside further. But now White has a still easier play — ousting or encircling the knight on e4.


11.e×f4 **公d7** 12.b4 營f6

Black attempts not incorrectly to get some kingside counter-play, because with a simpler continuation, for example, 12...2df6 13.2e5 Ad7 14.f3 2xc3 15.2xc3, together with a4, b5, etc., he would have perished anyway, slowly but surely.

13.Ad3

A clearance move for the queen's knight.

13...皆h6 14.幻e2 幻df6



15.皆c1(?)

From here on, White starts to play hyper-fine chess. Indeed his position is strong enough to endure all kinds of artificiality - but gradually he lets the win get away from him. On the other hand, the crystal-clear plan to drive away knight on e4 with f3 would strengthen his positional advantage without greater effort. We examine 15.2e5: (1) 15...g5 16.f3 g×f4 17.f×e4 thanks to White's complete control of the dark squares; (2) 15...2h5 16.f3 Def6 17. \d2!, with the unstoppable threat, without drawbacks, of 18.g4.

15... 勾h5 16.a4 a6 17. 且a3 (?)

And now still 17. 2e5, together with f3, was tremendously strong.

17... 2ef6 18. 4b1

Now 18.2e5 could have been met with 18...2d7. In this way Black survived the worst.

18...**2**]g4!

In order to take h3-square away from the white rook.

19.h3

Not 19. 2e5? 2g3!, and wins.

19...ටgf6 20.ටe5 වුd7 21.ටd3 වුhf6

Now Black's fighting forces (up to the a-pawn) stand exactly as if he had on the 14th move played ... 2e4-f6. But what's strange is that White, during this whole time, not only took no step forward, but, to the contrary, rather worsened both his piece positions (2d3 instead of 2f3, 2b1 instead of 2d3), and his pawn configuration (h3 instead of h2)! – Dr. Vidmar didn't have a good day.

22.骨e3 骨h8

The most economical protection of e6.

23.閏e1 閏g8 24.句e5 句×e5 25.d×e5?

Already White's previous move was somewhat premature (since ... g5, to liberate the f4-square, wasn't to be feared by the White knight anyhow), and could have been better prepared, for example, by the maneuver \$\mathbb{G}f1, together with ②g1-f3. But the repositioning of the dpawn, grounded in the clear overestimation of the worth of the d4-square, robs White of his high trump - the frontal pressure against e6, and the use of the e5-square. Therefore, decidedly preferable would have been 25.\\ e5, together with 2c1-d3, and the occupation of e5 by the knight - or, in the case of ... De4, White has A×e4, together with $f3 \pm .$

25...**幻e8** 26.**쌀d4 Ձd7** 27.g4

The white pieces have too little coordination to be able to support effectively this pawn attack; it must lead at best to a further obstruction of the position. But White's advantage disappeared some time ago – he remains with merely a somewhat greater freedom of space, which can only inspire elusive hopes, given the lack of attack targets.

27...g6 28.g5 曾f8 29.a5

Black, on the one hand, can quite easily prevent the breakthrough b5 (...\$\(\circ\)c7, ...\$\(\circ\)e8), and can even ogle the counter threat ...a5 – therefore, this obstruction is justified. But it's curious that this game, which already here begins to make such a bleakly drawish impression, still has to last more than 60 more moves!

29...公c7 30.罝g3 公b5 31.營b2 h5! 32.g×h6

The only possibility to play on. But now h3 is at least as weak as g6.

32...曾×h6 33.雷h2 買g7 34.買eg1 雷g8 35.虽d3 雷f7 36.虽×b5 c×b5!

With that he gets the prospect, sometime or another, of bringing the bishop in the open with the pawn sacrifice ...d4.

37.曾d2 Qc6 38.幻d4 閏h8 39.皆e3 宫e7 40.罝g5 宫f7 41.罝1g3


One plan for White would be to bring his king to d4 and then, with the help of the knight watching the squares h4 and g5 from f3, to force a favorable liquidation by means of h4-h5. Regrettably for him, the opponent has the complete possibility of organizing counter-

play on the h-file during this longwinded maneuver.

As one sees, he is very far from his ideal – king position on d4 – and must unavoidably dissolve the tension on the kingside. The endgame that follows contains a couple of tactical finesses, to be sure, but Black easily holds the draw. In any case, it wasn't worth struggling along to the 93rd move.

47...買g8 48.h5 買×h5 49.買×h5 g×h5

Naturally not 49... 쌀×h5 50. 필h3 쌀g4 51. 쌀h2 g5 52. 필h7+ 필g7 53. 필×g7+ 쌀×g7 54. ②×e6+, together with ②×g5, with a winning position.



This is the position where White can undertake the only, and as one will see, inadequate, attempt at a win – beginning with ⊕d4, etc. At first he doesn't decide on it, and prefers to undertake a

new trip with the king. And only when this proves useless in the face of the always threatening advance of the Black central pawn, brings about the diagrammed position again (on the 87th move!). As a consequence, it's advised the less patient readers spare themselves the next 30 moves and play over only the final moves (from 88 on), starting with the diagrammed position.

57. 公d4 曾g6 58. 曾f3 Qe8 59. 曾g3 Ac6 60.21f3 Ad7 61. ah3 Ac6 62.曾g3 Ad7 63. 分h4+ 曾f7 64.\$f3 \$e6 65.\$e3 Ae8 66.\$1f3 當e7 67. **3d4 4d7** 68. 當f3 當f7 69. \$\pmu_{\text{g3}} \pmu_{\text{g6}} 70. \$\pmu_{\text{g2}} \pm_{\text{f7}} 71. \$\pmu_{\text{h2}}\$ **ቴ**g6 72.ቴg1 ቴf7 73.ቴh1 ቴg6 74.雷h2 雷f7 75.雷h3 chg6 76.曾h4 &c6 77.分e2 Ad7 78. \$\pi\h3 \pi\c6 \ 79. \pi\h2 \pi\d7 80.曾g3 Ac6 81.曾h4 Ad7 82.曾g3 Ac6 83.2d4 Ad7 84.2f3 2f7 85.\pe2\pe2686.4\f3\pe787.\pe3 Ac6

(See previous diagram.)

88.ଫ୍ରd4 ଫ୍ରe6 89.ଧ୍ରg5+ ଫ୍ରe7 90.f3 ଫ୍ରf8 91.e6 ଫ୍ରg7

Simpler still was 91... \$\mathbb{O}e7\$ with the same next move.

92. e5 d4!

So it was nevertheless granted the bishop to take some fresh air, even if only a moment before the end of the game!

93. 2×d4 2f6 1/2-1/2

Round 20

½ Capablanca – Alekhine ½ ½ Nimzovich – Vidmar ½ ½ Marshall – Spielmann ½

Final Standings

Capablanca 14 Alekhine 11½ Nimzovich 10½ Vidmar 10 Spielmann 8 Marshall 6

(58) Capablanca – Alekhine French Defense [C13]

1.d4 e6 2.ପ୍ରc3 d5 3.e4 ପ୍ରf6 4.Qg5 dxe4

In connection with the next move, good and secure. Anyway, none of the opponents against whom I played this variation (these were Aurbach, Bogoljubow, Euwe, Yates and here Capablanca), succeeded in getting an advantage in the opening.

5. 公×e4 鱼e7!

This and not $5...2d7 \times f6$ – as was earlier mostly played – is correct in my opinion. On the contrary, meanwhile the black queen knight should remain on d7, in order perhaps to be able to support the advance ...c5 or ...e5.

6.**②×f**6+

Interesting is here 6.2 xf6 2 xf67.2 e2!?, analogous to the Wolf-Bogoljubow variation of the MacCutcheon.

6...**≜**×f6 7.**≜**×f6 **₩**×f6 8.**실**f3 0-0 9.c3

Better anyway than 9.4d3 c5 10.0-0 c×d4 11.2×d4 Ed8!, (Euwe-Alekhine, Amsterdam 1926), whereupon Black would even get some advantage.

9...**2**d7 10.**2**e2


Since White can't prevent the following emancipation of the opponent, nothing better remains for him than to bring his king quickly to safety.

10...e5 11.d×e5 ᡚ×e5 12.ᡚ×e5 쌀×e5 13.0-0 ቧe6 14.ቧf3 c6

The play is dismally equal, and must sooner or later come to liquidation on the open central file.

15.皆a4 置fe8(!)

Not a trap, rather actually the invitation to a somewhat artish draw-dance. But Capablanca himself basically avoids the shade of unnecessary complications.



16.\ad1

More amusing for the public would have been the following little intermezzo: 16.\(\beta\)fe1 \(\psi\)*e1+! 17.\(\beta\)*e1 \(\beta\)b3 18.\(\psi\)e4! \(\beta\)*e4 19.\(\beta\)*e4 \(\beta\)*a2 20.\(\beta\)b4, winning back the pawn and ultimate equality – for example, 20...\(\beta\)e8 21.\(\beta\)*c6 \(\beta\)e7 22.\(\beta\)*c6!, etc.; or 20...\(\beta\)6 21.\(\beta\)*c6 \(\beta\)d8, together with 22.\(\beta\)e6=.

16...₩c5

Avoids the unpleasant weakening of b6 (after 16...a6).

17.闰fe1 曾c4 18.曾×c4 夏×c4 19.闰×e8+ 莒×e8 20.h4 曾f8

Naturally not 20...\$\mathbb{\mathbb{L}} \text{xa2}\$, on account of 21.\$\mathbb{\mathbb{L}} \text{22}\$.\$\mathbb{\mathbb{L}} \text{xa7}\$ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{L}} \text{a6}\$ \$\text{23}\$.\$\mathbb{\mathbb{L}} \text{xc6}\$ ±.

21.b3 **Q**e2 22.**Q**×e2 **E**×e2 23.**E**d7 **E**e7 24.**E**d8+ **E**e8 25.**E**d7 **E**e7 26.**E**d8+ **E**e8 ½-½

(59) Nimzovich – Vidmar Sicilian Defense [B22]

1.e4 c5 2.2) f3 e6 3.c3

With that Black easily gets a balanced game. But Nimzovich, who in accord with the tournament standing aspires only to a draw, probably wanted to reach a clarification of the pawn position in the center as quickly as possible.

3...4\f6

Otherwise, only 3...d5 4.e×d5 e×d5 5.d4, etc., comes under consideration, with quite easy strategic challenges.

4.e5 幻d5 5.d4 c×d4 6.c×d4 Qe7

With such indifferent moves, there's no hoping to obtain winning chances! If Black didn't want to decide on the fianchetto 6...b6 (or even ...b5) – which incidentally would not be very favorable for him on account of 7.\(\textit{L}\)c4 \(\textit{L}\)b7 8.\(\textit{L}\)c3, etc., then he could, and should, immediately bother the opponent in the center with 6...d6. Then he'd have the chance to make either the advanced e5-pawn or the d4-isolani an object of attack. At least that would have been more promising than drawing the enemy pawns to the center through exchange, as he does in the next move.

7.2c3 2xc3 8.bxc3 d5 (?)

In contrast, this move is all too provoking and hardly correct. How did Black want then to defend his kingside against the stereotypical attack 9.2d3, h4, together with h5, Ξ h3-g3, etc.? The course of action would have been strong even without his castling. More correct, in any case, is 8...d6.

9.e×d6

Only explained by a decided tendency to draw.

9....皆×d6 10.**总**e2

The bishop doesn't go to d3, in order not to hamper a frontal guard by d4 in case of c4.

10...0-0 11.0-0 **2**d7

This move was decorated with an exclamation point by some annotators, in my opinion incorrectly. In any case, the natural move was 11...\$\(\text{c6}\), which, af-

ter the possible c4, would have threatened to trouble White somewhat with the quadruple attack against d4 (following ... \$\mathbb{L}\$f6 and ...\$\mathbb{L}\$d8).

12.a4 曾c7 13.曾b3 b6

The mighty thrust 13...e5 would have led ultimately only to the opening of the central files, which, with the undeveloped bishop on c8, wouldn't be harmless to Black anyway. But the flank development entails the early pawn exchange on b6, which provides for a welcome object of attack for White as compensation for the pawns c4 and d4 in need of protection. The mutually strategic trains of thought are transparent and lack sharpness, right up to the conclusion (of peace).

14.c4 Qb7 15.a5 Qf6

It's clear no boon would come from taking on a5. Then 16.Ձf4 (if 16...₩b6 17.₩a4), as well as 16.Ձd2, could have followed

16.a×b6 a×b6 17.Qe3 h6 18.h3 質fc8 19.買fc1!

With that he hopes to achieve a complete simplification at the cost of a temporary pawn sacrifice. The combination is long and correct, which is: 19... 基×a 1 20. 基×f 3 21. 基×f 3! 每×c 4 22. 每×c 4 至×c 4 23. 基 a 8+ 包 f 8 24. d 5! e×d 5 25. 基×d 5 基 b 4 26. 基 b 8 是 d 4 27. 基 b 7! 包 6 28. 基×e 6 f×e 6, together with 29. 基×d 4 =×d 4 and 30. =×b 6=. But meanwhile, Black keeps up the excitement.

19... 草cb8 20. 草×a8


The aim of this file sacrifice is not obvious, on the other hand, since ... 2c5 would surely be a letdown because of \$\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}}\$c2. Therefore, more reasonable was immediately 20. 2d2. Of course, the text also works.

A result of both time pressure and the impossibility of finding a winning idea against the rock-solid white position. It's all the more commendable that Dr. Vidmar finally finds a not decisive, yet correct and surprising, witty reply, which for a moment enlivens the otherwise very bland game.

28.闰c2 具d6 29.闰c1 皆a7 30.皆d3 闰a3

If 30... \(\text{\text{\text{d}}} \) a8, then 31.c5!, etc. As a result, he therefore surrenders the h1-a8 diagonal to the white queen.

31.皆e4 幻f6 32.皆c6



Next comes the previously mentioned wit. White could prevent it with 32.營c2 but didn't need to.

32...萬×e3!

The last chance at the prize!

33.骨×d6! ½-½

After the acceptance of the exchange sacrifice, Black would actually still have chances, for example - 33.f×e3 쌀a3 34.트e1 요g3 35.트f1 쌀×e3+ 36. \$h1 \$e4 = . He could continue playing some more (if he hadn't been in awful time pressure) after the text move as well - because he was not at a disadvantage after the refusal of the sacrifice either. That is to say, that after 33... 罩e2!, the apparently strong reply 34.c5 would have found a fully sound defense in 34...\approxable a3!, and 34.d5 b5!, etc., and was not to be feared by Black either. According to this, after 33... Ze2, a fight with approximately equal chances could still have developed, but which didn't have to end so certainly in a draw.

(60) Marshall – Spielmann Scotch Game [C47]

1.e4 e5 2.ሷf3 ሷc6 3.ሷc3 ሷf6 4.d4 e×d4 5.ሷ×d4 ቧb4 6.ሷ×c6 b×c6 7.ቧd3 d5 8.e×d5 c×d5 9.0-0 0-0 10.ቧg5 c6

We most often play like this, although statistics in recent years (thanks mainly to Spielmann's efforts) force a rather favorable verdict to be conceded to White. Simpler (though of course, bound only with thoughts of a draw) appears the Capablancan relief system: 10...\$\times\$c3 11.b\times\$c3 h6 12.\$\times\$h4 (12.\$\times\$e3 \times\$g4! - Spielmann-Alekhine, Baden-Baden 1925) 12...\$\times\$e8, which would

prevent 13. \(\frac{1}{2} \) f3, because of 13...g5, together with ... \(\textit{\mathbb{L}} \) g4.

11. 骨f3 h6

Through this strange move, Black expresses his peaceful intentions quite openly. He is after a drawn endgame, without costing himself a debasing of his pawn position. The move is supposed to stem from Rubinstein, albeit certainly an after-the-war-Rubinstein. Otherwise 11... 2e7 (see game Spielmann-Vidmar, Cycle II) was the move.

12. Q×f6 增×f6 13. 增×f6 g×f6 14. 包e2(!) 置b8 15.a3 Qa5

Beginning of artificial maneuvers, less appropriate because Black's position, given his many pawn weaknesses, can still in no way be regarded as secure. With 15...Ad6 16.b4 c5, etc., he would have spared a very important tempo here, and in addition, kept the knight on f4 at bay. On the other hand, it will soon turn out that the bishop has little to do on b6.

16.b4 \(\text{\text{b}}\) b6 17.c3


Prepares 2d4, if need be.

17...c5 18.4)f4!

But after Black weakened d5, this spot is systematically undermined. Up to the 27th move, the game is Marshall's best achievement in this tournament, in my opinion.

Not yet 21.2f3, on account of 21...d4. But now White threatens the move.

21... Ac7



22.g3!

The key move to the entire attack formation against d5: it's clear that Black must not swap on f4, because in this case, a rather easy path to a win, in a technical regard, would stand at White's disposal. He would namely - at first through multiple threats on d5 (\(\mathbb{Z}\)d4, Af3; Black rooks on the d-file; in the case of ... \(\mathbb{I}\)d6, White first plays a4) in connection with the possibility f5, force the move ...f5,; then bring the king to e3, move \(\mathbb{Z}\)d4-d2, and finally occupy the central d4-square with the king. The remainder would be the exchange of rooks under threat of penetration on one of the open files (e.g., or on the queenside) - and finally the utilization of the surplus pawn on the left side.

The way chosen by Spielmann is naturally less hopeless, because he secures himself bishops of opposite color, but not yet sufficient to produce a balance again.

22... Qe5 23. Qf3 Q×c3

With 23...d4 as well, he would have lost a pawn without compensation.

24.4) ×e6!

24.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×e6 f×e6 25.\(\D\)×e6 d4!, etc., would have been favorable for Black.


24...f×e6 25.買×e6 d4 26.買c6!

One sees that the entire attack was calculated deeply and correctly His main goal consisted much less in obtaining a material gain as in securing White the following positional advantages: (1) the spreading of his pawn surplus on both flanks, a circumstance which makes almost illusory Black's hope of a draw based particularly on the opposite colors of the bishops; (2) The isolation and need for protection of the remaining black pawns; and (3) the uncertainty of the black king's position, which can be successfully utilized through a potential doubling of the white rooks on the seventh rank. One would think, therefore, that after he had reached all this, according to plan, White would solve just as successfully the final phase of the problem of winning.

26...d3

Or 26...\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}c8 27.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\timesc4, together with \mathbb{\mathbb{L}}d5+-c4, etc.

27. 其×c4 & b2



28.貫d2?


It's really a shame from the standpoint of the art of chess that Marshall, after playing so well up until now, suddenly begins to see a ghost. The doubled – and unfounded – fear of (1) the opposite bishops, and (2) the passed pawn on d2, causes him to totally underestimate his chances on the queenside and to play for further simplification.

Correct, however, was the simple 28.a4! – with the threat simply to advance the a- and b-pawns – for example, 28...d2 29.b5 \(\text{ [Efe8]}\) (what else?) 30.a5 \(\text{ [Ee1}\) 41.\(\text{ [Ee8]}\) 2 \(\text{ [Ee8]}\) 32.\(\text{ [Ee8]}\) 33.\(\text{ [Ee8]}\) 34.\(\text{ [Ee8]}\) 35.b6! \(\text{ [Ae8]}\) 36.\(\text{ [Ae8]}\) 37.b7 \(\text{ [Eg1]}\) 38.\(\text{ [Bh3]}\) and wins. Black can also play differently after 28.a4!, but a satisfactory defense is not obvious for him. On the other hand, after the contrived text move, the win, if still possible at all, is in any case exceptionally difficult.

28... Q×a3 29. 曾g2 閏f7!

Could Marshall possibly have overlooked this only defensive move in his pre-calculations? With other continuations, after the bishop exchange, he would have captured the a-pawn and prevailed easily.

30.閏a2 d2 31.閏×a3 d1皆 32.夏×d1 閏×d1 33.罝g4+ 曾h7



34.\(\mathbb{Z}\)a6 (?)

The rook has no business on the sixth rank, since f6 is quite easy to guard. On the contrary, he should occupy the fifth (34.\(\mathbb{E}\)a5!), with the idea of possibly using the king as an attack piece kingside (via h3 to h5). To prevent this, Black would have had to allow small weaknesses (...f5), and the outcome still would have been doubtful.

After the text move, a dead-drawn position arises very quickly.

34...買d5!

Spielmann immediately exploits the neglect of his opponent.

35.h4 h5 36.買f4 曾g6 37.買c6 a5

What can one still hope for here?

44... 宣b2+ 45. 當f1 宣b1+ 46. 當e2 宣b2+ 47. 當e3 宫b3+ 48. 當e4 宫b4+ 49. 當d5 宫b5+ 50. 當d4 宫b3 51. 當e4 宫b4+ 52. 當d5 宫b3 53. f4?

Finally, White loses his extra pawn. But perhaps he played on this far only because he wanted to show his opponent that in the position, he could afford a blunder.

53...曾g7! 54.莒c8 莒×g3 55.每e6 莒e3+ 56.曾f5 莒e7 57.莒c6 莒a7 58.몋e6 莒a5 59.莒d6 몋g6 60.莒b6 闰f5 61.闰b4 闰a5 62.闰b6 闰f5 ½-½

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