New York 1927
by Alexander Alekhine

Foreword by Andy Soltis

21st Century Edition!
Alekhine's Controversial Masterpiece
Finally in English!

For decades, Alexander Alekhine's account of New York 1927 was at the top of the list of works that should have been rendered into English but unaccountably were not.

This is unlike any other tournament book ever written. Not only do you have one of the greatest annotators of all time rendering some brilliant analysis, but he melds it with an exceptional agenda, an anti-Capablanca agenda. And since he wrote it after defeating Capablanca in their marathon match, he sounds like a sore loser who became a sore winner.

So, this is just a mean-spirited book, right? Nothing of the sort. Alekhine goes beyond elaborate move analysis and offers deep positional insights and psychological observations. Nikolai Grigoriev, in his foreword to the 1930 Russian edition of this book, pointed out how Alekhine broke new ground by underlining the critical moments of each game.

Why Alekhine's work was published in German, in Berlin in 1928, and not in English, is unclear. But now, after more than 80 years, it's finally available to the largest audience of chessplayers. It's about time.
New York
1927

Alexander Alekhine

Foreword by
Andy Soltis

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New York 1927

Foreword

It’s about time this book was published. For decades, Alexander Alekhine’s account of New York 1927 was at the top of the list of works that should have been rendered into English but unaccountably were not.

There is no shortage of reasons for why this book was recognized as a classic when it first appeared. First, the tournament was one of the strongest ever held. The only previous events that came close to it in average strength were St. Petersburg 1895-96 and the finals of St. Petersburg 1914. The New York organizers further ensured their place in history by luring José Capablanca back into action. He had appeared in only four tournaments since becoming world champion in 1921.

The tournament also captured a pivotal moment in the evolution of chess thinking. New ideas normally gain acceptance slowly, almost glacially. But the games played at the Manhattan Square Hotel in the final days of the winter of 1927 showed how chess thinking had been transformed by the Hypermodern revolution. Even lapsed gambiteers like Frank Marshall and Rudolf Spielmann were experimenting with Indian openings at New York 1927. New theory was being written as early as games 1 and 2, which gave us the “Manhattan Variation” of the Queen’s Gambit Declined. Put that into perspective: Can you recall a modern tournament that provided the name for an opening?

And yet... And yet the 1927 tournament and its magnificent book have garnered only a fraction of the attention that New York 1924 achieved. Why?

There are several explanations and none tells the whole story. One version is that the 1927 tournament never became what the contemporary fans hoped it would be: It was not a candidates tournament. It was not a battle royale among all the potential challengers to determine who would be Capablanca’s next match opponent. There was no need for such an event because Capa’s five-year-old “London Rules” had stipulated how challengers should be chosen, and it wasn’t by a tournament. Alekhine had already challenged Capablanca according to those rules and he threatened to boycott the tournament if it would deprive him of his place at the head of the line of challengers.

Another explanation for why New York 1927 never reached the iconic status of 1924 is that there seemed to be something missing in the scoretable. Or rather, someone. It’s always hard to identify the precise international pecking order of bygone, pre-Elo days in this case, the days of February 19-March 25, 1927. However, it’s safe to say that several world-class players were absent, beginning with Akiba Rubinstein, Yefim Bogoljubow and Emanuel Lasker.
Bogo and Lasker were invited but failed to accept. Why that happened is significant because according to an alternative ratings universe, Chessmetrics, they and not Capa or Alekhine were the two strongest players in the world at the time. Bogoljubow had an amazing year in 1925, capped off by his stunning victory at the first international tournament of the Soviet Union, at Moscow. But success had clearly gone to his head by 1927. Bogoljubow replied to his invitation by asking for an enormous appearance fee of $1,500, which is well over $20,000 in today’s dollars. If his attitude wasn’t clear enough, he added that instead of this “mediocre” tournament – his word – the New Yorkers should spend their time, money and energy on a Bogoljubow-Capablanca world championship match.

Lasker, who was used to making his own huge fee demands, had a different reason for saying “Nein” to New York. He was still angry at Norbert Lederer, the organizer of both New York tournaments, because of an incident during his game with Capablanca in 1924. Lasker blamed his loss on a faulty clock and was upset that his protest wasn’t treated properly. The former world champion did not reply to his invitation to New York 1927 and his place was taken by Spielmann.

In addition to the missing-in-action masters and the lack of “candidate” tournament status, there are other explanations of why New York 1927 doesn’t match the caché of the 1924 tournament. One is the matter of age. The 1920s seemed to cherish everything that was new and young, at the expense of anything that predated the Great War that everyone wanted to forget.

New York 1924 may not have been a tournament filled with Magnus Carlsen-like kids but at least it had Richard Réti and his 1. \( \mathcal{O}f3 \) idea. That was fresh enough. In contrast, the 1927 invitees seemed old. All of them had won their spurs at least a dozen years before. The youngest, Alekhine, was 34. The players’ average was just under 41 years. By comparison, Garry Kasparov was an ex-champion at 37 and retired at 41. It’s easy, therefore, to write off this off as a tournament of has-beens.

But that would be quite wrong. Capablanca was never stronger than he was at New York. Alekhine reached his peak three years later. Aron Nimzovich and Spielmann would have their best-ever results when they finished 1st-2nd at Carlsbad 1929. Even Marshall seemed to be getting stronger in the years before 1927. His historical rating was on the rise since his poor showing in the U.S. Championship match of 1923 against Edward Lasker. Yes, the New York invitees were ancient by today’s standard. But in those days, super-GMs hit their apex later in life than they do now.

Another stab at explaining why New York 1927 has been dimly remembered is the games. Alekhine included only two of the 20 he played (games 32 and 53) in his second best-games collection. This was significant because in those pre-Informant days, it was the GMs who established priorities and told the fans which
games were important. In contrast, Alekhine put five of his 20 games from Baden-Baden 1925 and three of his 16 games from Kecskemet 1927 in that book. Marshall could only include one of his 27 games in My 50 Years of Chess because he only won one.

But this explanation, too, has flaws. Great chess was played in New York, a lot of it. Milan Vidmar's wonderful win over Nimzovich (game 29) and Nimzo's crush of Vidmar (game 14) and of Marshall (game 51) are among the finest games they ever played. Nimzovich felt that nine of his New York games deserved to be included with 100 others in his brilliant The Praxis of My System. And, of course, there were the games of the tournament winner. Capablanca never compiled his best games. But in the Harry Golombek's book of Capa's 100 best, you'll find wins over Nimzovich (games 4 and 43), Alekhine (game 13), Vidmar (game 34) and Spielmann (game 37). All of these games deserve the ovations they received at the time.

Perhaps the most compelling reason for why New York 27 is largely forgotten is its lack of drama: The heavy favorite won easily. Only one of the invitees, the hapless Marshall, had ever beaten Capablanca before, and Capa was in no danger of losing to his old rival this time. In fact, the world champion wasn't in real jeopardy in any of his 20 games. The densely annotated collection of Capablanca games by Alexander Khalifman and Leonid Yudasin indicates he had inferior positions only three times in the tournament. Although Alekhine claims he could have put Capa in a “difficult position” in game 13, Khalifman/Yudasin deny that. They say Capa was at risk only in game 40. He held the sole lead after three rounds and never looked back. He was so far ahead in the final rounds that he telegraphed his intentions to the other players that he wouldn’t try to beat them.

So, the tournament script may fail to stir a modern reader. But Alekhine's words should. This is unlike any other tournament book ever written.

Not only do you have one of the greatest annotators of all time rendering some brilliant analysis, but he melds it with an exceptional agenda, an anti-Capablanca agenda. The extraordinary bias is a rarity for tournament books, which were often written in cool, dispassionate and boring prose. One of the few exceptions was the book of Nuremberg 1896, in which Siegbert Tarrasch ridiculed the victory of his rival, world champion Emanuel Lasker. At the end of that book, Tarrasch compiled a "luck scoretable," that claimed that Lasker scored five "luck acquired points" from bad positions, and this was more than enough to turn what should have been a poor performance into an outstanding result.

Tarrasch was being a sore loser in that appendix. But Alekhine's bitterness runs throughout the 1927 book. And since he wrote it after defeating Capablanca in their marathon match, he sounds like a sore loser who became a sore winner.
Alekhine’s theme is evident in the introduction where he derides Capa’s third place at Moscow (“the biggest disappointment he had experienced up until then in his international career”). Moscow helped reveal the truth about “the half-mythic Capablanca Uberspieler.” New York revealed more of Capablanca’s weaknesses, Alekhine adds, and that showed him how to beat the world champion in the match in Buenos Aires six months later.

Alekhine’s hostility is still raging near the very end of the book when this position arises.

![Capablanca-Nimzovich](image)

He criticizes Capa’s choice of 21.\textit{f2}? “instead of the obvious 21.\textit{d6}!” Like Bobby Fischer, Alekhine didn’t think much of what was considered Capablanca’s strong suit. “In the endgame,” he sniffs, “he is not to be feared by a first-class master.”

But Alekhine must have known that 21.\textit{f2} was not just weak but deliberately weak. Capablanca felt that if he had won this game or added other victory-lap points, it would have unfairly altered the race for second place. According to Hans Kmoch, in a 1962 Chess Review article, Capa even wrote a note that read “Please make better moves. I don’t know how to avoid a win” and passed it, through a tournament official, to Nimzovich, during the endgame.

Alekhine also took aim at Nimzovich, who, after Alekhine had won the world championship, seemed like the most likely challenger for his new title. It’s worth noting that a 1932 poll of readers of Wiener Schachzeitung found that they considered the world’s best players were Alekhine, Capablanca, and Nimozvich, followed by Bogoljubow and Spielmann, in that order.

Alekhine repeatedly trashed his rivals’ play in the New York tournament book. Nimzovich’s choice of 16.g4?? in game 43 “is unworthy of even a mediocre amateur,” he writes. “The fact is that Nimzovich, in a contest with an equal opponent
New York 1927

is probably always doomed to fall from the highest level into the abyss, and then work his way back upward," he says.

It becomes clear later in the introduction that Alekhine felt that the tournament should have been a two-man race between him and Capablanca because there was no one else worthy to compete. Once Alekhine lost his first game with the champion, he sought a draw in their subsequent games, he said, and the tournament drama disappeared.

Nevertheless Alekhine castigates his colleagues, over and over, for their pitiful play against Capablanca. “It’s really unbelievable how self-consciously and weakly Marshall always plays against Capablanca!” he writes in transparent frustration. Vidmar “played somewhat under his usual league” against the champion, and Spielmann was cowed by Capa’s reputation, he said.

So, this is just a mean-spirited book, right? Nothing of the sort.

In contrast with his New York 1924 book, here Alekhine goes beyond elaborate move analysis and offers deep positional insights and psychological observations. Nikolai Grigoriev, in his foreword to the 1930 Russian edition of this book, pointed out how Alekhine broke new ground by underlining the critical moments of each game. We see this in Alekhine’s comments to 56...$e4 in game 11, to 14...$ed4 in game 15, to 24...$ed4 in game 17, to 32...$d4 in game 24, to 19.$xf7 in game 27, to 22.c4 in game 39, for just a few examples.

Alekhine also offers some valuable positional pointers. For instance, he shows the virtues of not contesting control of an open file in game 14 and the bankruptcy of an outpost-centric strategy in game 27. After Nimzovich castles in game 3, with few of his pieces in the vicinity, Alekhine writes that a king’s capacity for self-defense “has been strongly underestimated for a considerable time (after the desperate attempt by the aging Steinitz to use this piece to attack on a full board was a miserable fiasco).” His explanation of how to win the $+$ vs. $+$+$+$ ending in game 32 and his analysis of the rook endings of games 5, 56 and 60 are among the most insightful sections of a very instructive book.

Alekhine also tosses out some remarkable and original opening ideas. For example, after 1.d4 $f6 2.$f3 e6 3.g3 in game 41, he suggests 3...b5! more than 40 years before the world appreciated its strength. He also suggests 6.$e2 in the Vienna Game, after 1.e4 e5 2.$c3 $f6 3.f4 d5 4.fxe5 $xe5 5.$f3 $c5 in game 15, with the idea of 6...$f5 7.$d1! and 8.d3. Less promising but still intriguing is game 35, where, after 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.$c3 $b4 he suggests 4.$d3 c5 5.e×d5 $×d5 6.$f1?.

Alekhine also entertains us with his use of language. Or rather languages. He was a polyglot who, at a later tournament, Kemeri 1937, could speak English with
Reuben Fine, German with Kmoch, and French with everyone at the opening ceremony. In this book you’ll find him coining terms such as “angst-moves” and “positional hari-kiri.” In game 24 he pokes fun at Marshall’s mishandling of the pawn structure by adding that he couldn’t bring himself to try to correct it with a “pater peccavi-move.” He suggests there was “a mot d’ordre to play only second- or third-best moves against” Capablanca.

Ironically, it was Capablanca who was supposed to write this book. He reached an agreement to edit it before play began. But on the eve of the Buenos Aires match, the American Chess Bulletin said that he was unable to write the notes and therefore the tournament committee had “ceded the rights for the English edition to Dr. Alekhine.” Alekhine’s notes to his own games were turning up in leading journals in Germany, Russia, Austria and Switzerland, among others, and a Russian tournament book, by Savielly Tartakower, soon appeared. Why Alekhine’s work was published in German, in Berlin in 1928, and not in English, is unclear. But now, after more than 80 years, it’s finally available to the largest audience of chessplayers. As I said, it’s about time.

Andy Soltis
New York City
December 2010
New York 1927

Editor’s Note

When the publisher came to us with the tournament book of New York 1927, published in German, we saw a chance to correct a historical injustice. It just could not stand that the book of one of the most important chess events ever held in the U.S., written by the fourth world champion, Alexander Alekhine, was not available in English. (A 78-page pamphlet by Chess Digest [Alekhine, Alexander: International Chess Tournament New York 1927, Dallas, Chess Digest 1972] made no attempt at an extensive translation.)

The project seemed ideal for our husband-and-wife team. Mary, a former German teacher and Fulbright scholar at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, worked on the translation of the text, while Al, a chess editor and writer, helped sort out the colorful and intricate chess annotations Dr. Alekhine is famous for. We worked hard to maintain faithfully Alekhine’s original thoughts, as well as his presentation of material. Along the way, we discovered the inevitable mistakes in the commonly used databases of these games, as well as challenging typos in the German source itself.

But more than anything, we found Alekhine’s brilliance, humor, and deep insight. We hope you agree that the outcome is both an important piece of history and a series of chess lessons on the highest level.

In 1927 Alekhine obviously lacked the benefit of computers. And although Al ran “Deep Rybka 4” as he played through the games and variations, we made no changes to Alekhine’s annotations and inserted no notes. What readers get is what Alekhine wrote. Many readers will, however, enjoy running such an engine and will find a few bloopers. But they will much more often find impressive instances in which Alekhine sees his way through to the truth of a confusing position. And greatly to the benefit of the serious student, Alekhine is able to explain the reasoning that leads him to that truth.

We found Alekhine’s thoughts on his great rival, world champion José Raúl Capablanca, particularly interesting, revealing as much about Alekhine himself as the great Cuban. In this regard, we should understand the author’s perspective. To maintain his undisputed position as challenger, Alekhine had to come from behind during the last stages of the 60-game tournament, which ended in late March, to secure second place behind Capablanca, who had cruised through the 60 games of the marathon without a loss, racking up a plus score against every one of his opponents. But it’s important to know that the tournament book was written only after Alekhine’s subsequent victory over Capa in the Buenos Aires match for the world title, which took place from mid-September to the end of November of the same year. The result was a surprise to the general public, if not
to Alekhine, who analyzed the games of New York 1927 to prepare for Buenos Aires while sailing there on the steamer Massilia. He writes that “Only then did it finally become clear to me how exaggerated were the general shouts of praise with which the quality of his (Capablanca’s) performance in New York was greeted.”

Indeed, Alekhine repeatedly makes the point, beginning immediately with his preface, “The New York Tournament 1927 as Prologue to the World Championship in Buenos Aires.” that the quality of Capablanca’s play in New York, despite results, was hardly worthy of the widespread public opinion that Capa was an Überspieler, or “super player.” Alekhine concedes Capa’s wonderful instincts in the middlegame, but undercuts the tribute by saying that his “ability lies much more in intuition than in critical thinking.”

On the negative side, Alekhine goes so far as to say, counter to both contemporary and modern assessments, that Capablanca was “definitely no remarkable endgame artist”! Then how did Alekhine explain Capa’s fine result? Nearly everyone was cowed by his reputation, playing below his true strength when facing the Cuban legend.

Of course, there is undoubtedly a grain of truth to this last assertion – great champions sometimes benefit from their reputations. At any rate, Alekhine’s premise affords him an ongoing context to work particularly hard throughout his book to find improvements in both Capablanca’s play and that of Capa’s opponents. Those readers who kibitz the games with an engine may, however, notice, as AI did, that the computer evaluations often agree with Capablanca’s choices. Ironically, and whatever the ultimate value of the moves themselves, Alekhine’s challenging suggestions, when brought forward to the era of chess-playing programs, may actually bolster the popular claim that Capa was the closest a human could come to being a “chess machine”!

The tournament book of New York 1927 is fascinating on many levels – as the history of one of the great chess tournaments, as a testament to the fourth world champion’s analytical skills, as a personal history of Alekhine’s preparation for his famous championship victory – and as a continuation of the great rivalry of the 1920s.

Al Lawrence
Wallkill, New York
December 2010
# New York 1927

February 19 - March 22, 1927

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New York 1927 as Prologue to the World Championship

The 1927 New York Tournament
as Prologue to the World Championship in Buenos Aires

I. We know that the year 1925 brought Capablanca the biggest disappointment he had experienced up until then in his international tournament career: in the Moscow tournament, he took third only with great effort, lost two games to players of a relatively lesser class, and escaped defeat in some other games (as against Réti or Loewenfisch, for example), mainly thanks to the kindness or carelessness of the opponents. Already at this point, one could hear the voices of, in part, the specialty press, pointing out a number of not completely credible symptoms that characterized the achievements of the Cuban grandmaster in that tournament. These symptoms gave cause to not unwarranted assumptions along the lines that Capablanca’s art was not nearly what it had promised to be during his activity in the period before the war. The blame lies in his tendency, manifest more and more over the years, toward the simpler — toward, whenever possible, the pure, technical forms of battle. This predilection gradually killed his “lively spirit,” with which his performances in San Sebastian 1911 and St. Petersburg 1914, for example, were impressively imbued. And finally, that even his attempts to rouse his former self (caused by his realization that pure technique against modern competition wasn’t enough anymore) were his undoing in the aforementioned losses (the unusually complicated — for him — game, with attacks on both wings, against Ilyin-Zhenevsky, the unprepared artifice in the opening against Verlinsky).

We may say without exaggeration that for Capablanca, the somewhat negative impression of his qualitative results during his Moscow performance cast a much more perceptible shadow over his reputation than his lost games — because even Lasker, the unsurpassed tournament fighter, was third in Hastings 1895 and shared second and third place with Janowski in Cambridge-Springs 1904, two clear places behind the victor Marshall!! But during the entire, very long period of his world championship, Lasker was never so defeated as Capablanca was by Verlinsky. It was especially this impression on the part of the general public — that he, although extremely rarely, could play absolutely weakly — that Capablanca had to try to obliterate sometime soon.

And it must be admitted that this problem — the preparation and organization of a larger tournament in the interest of the complete rehabilitation of the current world champion — was solved in the most brilliant way. By whom — by people or ... fate, with Capablanca’s help or without — is in my opinion irrelevant. So I will now draw upon facts, with the conviction that they speak clearly enough for themselves.

In the autumn of 1926, the then-champion received two challenges to a competition for the championship — one came from Aron Nimzovich, the other from me. It soon became apparent, however, that Nimzovich’s attempt was of a “platonic” nature, since he lacked a small thing, namely the financial support to fulfill the
New York 1927

conditions coming out of London. Therefore his challenge probably had much more the purpose of informing the chess world unequivocally that he, grandmaster Nimzovich, wished this contest and consequently considered himself a world championship candidate. That he was entitled to have such a position owing to the rising curve of his tournament successes in recent years is beyond doubt; but its immediate practical value, the challenge, as I said, was nil.

The case was different with the telegram I sent Capablanca in September from Buenos Aires: Sufficiently instructed by the experience of my fruitless attempts of 1921 and 1923, I was determined to send a challenge only if I would have an absolute guarantee on the part of the interested organizations that, financially, nothing would stand in the way of the realization of the match. Therefore I imagined that it would hardly be possible for the world champion – after assurances were given him that his material conditions were wholeheartedly accepted – to drag out the acceptance of the challenge; by the way, the chess world appeared to believe that as well. But it in fact turned out differently: while the challenge was not rejected, it was also not accepted. And instead of a direct answer, I got (aside from a private letter from Capablanca, the exact meaning of which got lost in generalities, but still contained a clear idea – that I should come to New York) the official program of the New York “Six Master’s Tournament.” The conditions for the event appeared immediately to take many in the chess community aback. As Capablanca had demanded for future world championships, Dr. Lasker was not invited, and the number of hours of play and also the time controls were unusual. Finally, the point, the winner of this tournament (or the runner-up, if Capablanca was first) would be declared the official world championship candidate.

The reckoning of fate, which in everything concerning the tournament in 1927 so supported the world champion, was incontestable – although it was clear that the introduction of this last point would have, as a consequence, justifiable protests from the interested masters, especially from the present writer. But what might emerge from such a protest, what came out of that really? The committee gave in formally – but meanwhile, thanks to the corresponding handling of the entire press, the whole psychological atmosphere was irrevocably created: the tournament was viewed by “public opinion” as a test for the world championship candidate, from which he had to emerge at least in second place. As a result, from a sporting point of view, in this tournament it came to a rather paradoxical situation in which the only one who risked nothing was the titleholder; because for him, in case of relative failure, a competition with the fortunate rival was as good as certain. On the other hand, both for Nimzovich as well as for me, not achieving one of the first two places was virtually synonymous with abandonment of a match with Capablanca – if not forever, then at least for a very long time.

Precisely because of this psychological handicap, I had very serious concerns before I accepted the invitation of the committee. Finally I decided – mainly for the two following reasons: (1) Despite repeated requests, both on my part and on
the part of the Argentine Chess Club, Capablanca refused to give a clear and definitive answer to my challenge and, in his letters and telegrams, gave me to understand unequivocally that it was necessary for me to come to New York if I wanted to reach an understanding with him; (2) My refusal could have been interpreted incorrectly by the chess world – that is, as a testimony of “fear” of Capablanca, which ultimately would have made it easy for him (if desirable) to replace me with the first- or second-place finisher, and then let the whole project proposed from Buenos Aires drop into the water.

And so I decided out of necessity to put at stake my perhaps unrepeatable opportunity in New York for the fight for the world title – and this, even though I could have no illusions about my form at the moment. Actually, the ten practice games that I had played about six weeks previously with Dr. Euwe in Holland had clearly convinced me that, due to a number of circumstances, among which the physical excessive fatigue following the strenuous tour in South America didn’t play the least role, I found myself in one of my periods – fortunately not occurring frequently, and not lasting long – in which my thinking about chess requires a dual strain on the nerves and incomparably more time than otherwise demanded. As a result, I became much more quickly exhausted, and only in the rarest cases able to produce consistently good play. Under those circumstances, achieving second place in New York required a very special unfolding of the forces of will – far greater than at the later match in Buenos Aires – that in general went quite as planned, according to my requirements.

In qualitative terms, my achievements in New York would have meant for me a clear step backward – especially compared with the year 1925 (Paris, Baden-Baden) – if I’d known less precisely the reasons for this internal failure. It was significant to me, among other things, that I played particularly inaccurately, and sometimes downright poorly, only up to the moment (Cycle VI, in the game with Nimzovich), when I was still able to hope for the first prize. On the other hand, when I started playing, from the seventh round on, only for the second prize, I managed to get, despite the apparently inferior state, exactly the same score as Capablanca (9 out of 14). The reasons for my failure lay, as I said, mainly in the condition of my nerves at that time. And since I knew exactly how I could improve, I was quite calm with respect to the fight – it had to be a struggle from which I, if not necessarily winning, at least should emerge with honor.

The lineup of the tournament and its technical results can be seen from the adjacent tables and annotated games. But these tables don’t speak of those who were missing. Therefore it’s not superfluous to recall those names to the readers: they were (1) Dr. Lasker, who surpassed Capablanca in all the tournaments where he met him, and took away from him an historic match-up in St. Petersburg, 1914; (2) Bogoljubow, who, ahead of Capablanca (and by how much!), emerged as first in Moscow, 1925; (3) Rubinstein, who prior to Buenos Aires, was the only master who had a better result against Capablanca (+1, = 2); (4) Réti, who in New York
1924 won the only game against Capablanca that the world champion lost, and also put up bitter resistance at other encounters (for example, see the Moscow game); and (5) Dr. Tarrasch, who has an equal result against Capablanca (+1, -1; = 2).

When you put together the successes of those absent with the fact that up until then, none of Capablanca’s invited European competitors in New York had won even one game against him – you have to admit that “the fate” of the world champion at the time was especially favorable, in that it assured him of maximum psychological preconditions for final success.

As far as the organization and management of the tournament itself is concerned, it is a pleasant duty for me to acknowledge that those were in fact quite irreproachable. In my long tournament practice, I have very few cases in memory where the contests were taking place so harmoniously and in such a pleasant, quiet atmosphere. The principal credit for this goes without doubt to the tireless secretary of the tournament competition, Dr. Norbert Lederer, who must be referred to as the soul of the whole event, and without whose cooperation the foreign masters hardly can imagine a tournament in the United States. But also grandmaster Geza Maróczy, as tournament director, and the press department director Hermann Helms, contributed in no small measure to the full outward success of the tournament. I believe myself to be pronouncing the opinion of all my European colleagues who participated in the tournament when I express the hope that all future tournaments, in technical and social respects, be organized just as perfectly as the one just discussed.

It is hardly possible to speak of the New York tournament without mentioning – at least in a sporting relationship – the sweeping role that Nimzovich was destined to play in the first half of the tournament. It’s especially to be noted that his success in this period of the competition was very well deserved – just as deserved as his failure in the second half. The fact is that Nimzovich, in a contest with an equal opponent, is probably always doomed to fall from the highest level into the abyss, and then work his way back upward. For it is truly difficult to imagine that he should succeed suddenly, after a 25-year chess career, in changing his temperament entirely – this temperament, which until now helped him at times to get very special results, both of a combinational as well as purely positional nature, but sometimes threw him into the abyss.

I see the main fault in Nimzovich’s creativity in some uncertainty in the treatment of opening positions that are unknown to him. Perhaps this uncertainty comes from his placing, in my opinion, exaggerated value on the preparation of an “opening repertoire,” and consequently he does not feel at home every time he is placed in front of a new strategic opening problem – not in terms of variations, for he possesses more than enough technique to solve such a problem. Anyway, the fact is – although we can find roughly no case where Capablanca lost as a direct result...
of the opening (the game with Verlinsky forms the only exception, which confirms the rule) – that with Nimzowich, such cases happen fairly often (compare, for example, his third game with Vidmar from this tournament, the games with Lajos Steiner from Kecskemet and Berlin in 1928, some games from Baden-Baden, 1925). Instead, he showed in New York as well the valuable work he can produce after a fortunately survived opening (see his games with Vidmar and Spielmann from the Cycle I, and with the author in Cycle II). As I said, I’m of the opinion that in New York he filled just the spot corresponding to his current strength. But it will not surprise me at all if, in the future, he does something greater, because his path seems to lead upward.

The play of the other three participants generally made a very lame impression: Dr. Vidmar played less enterprisingly than usual, Spielmann gave up most of the games as draws far too early and had some bad luck besides (in the games with Nimzovich in the Cycle II, and with the author in Cycles I and IV). Finally, Marshall lost courage after an unfortunate start and played the end of the tournament in a class lower than his real strength.

Despite the aforementioned shortcomings in the performance of individual participants, I’m of the opinion that this tournament produced a number of valuable games, most of which either were not yet published, or were accompanied by quite superficial comments. So I hope the following work of annotation, in which it seemed to me to be particularly valuable to emphasize the scientific aspects of interesting openings, will be of use to the chess community. In my view, some lines of the Queen’s Indian, the Caro-Kann, and the Dutch systems deserve special attention for opening theoreticians.

II. It’s well known that Capablanca’s sporting success in New York was brilliant. But to what extent did the internal performance, the qualitative value of the games delivered, suit him? In order to come to an unbiased judgment about that, it’s relevant to check his games against each individual opponent from an artistic point of view. Then one probably will have to come to the following conclusions.

(A) With me, really just one game was played, the first one, for in the others I played for a draw as a result of my vulnerable tournament standing and bad shape. And since such a result was quite welcome for Capablanca as a consequence of the absence of otherwise serious competition – these games actually never came to a struggle at all. So what can one say of the first game? First, the second player (Capablanca) chose a risky playing style, which with correct counter-play, as later analysis showed, would have put him in a difficult situation. But it turned out differently, because in contrast to my usual style (since at other times I play imprecisely now and then in worse opening positions, but almost never in better ones), White (me) played a number of inferior moves one after another, the refutation of which would have been easy even for an average master. Understandably, Capablanca took advantage of the opportunity accordingly and won quickly.
and surely. Thanks to my bad play, the chess value of this game was equal to zero, the psychological value, on the other hand, enormous – not for the vanquished, but rather for the vast chess audience.

There was no doubt that right after this game, some 95% of the so-called expert critics endeavored to persuade the entire chess world (and succeeded in part) that in Buenos Aires, there would be no fight at all, but rather a massacre. If these gentlemen had taken the trouble to compare this referred-to game with any number of my average performances from tournaments of the last few years, they would have had to come to a somewhat different opinion. But it was clearly their lot to remain blind up to the end of the competition. Some – Nomina sunt odiosa (names are disagreeable) – remain so even now, probably because they don’t want to see. On the other hand, you can’t fight it, of course.

(B) With Nimzovich, the four games took the following course:

(1) Nimzovich (White) played the opening very inconsistently and quite weakly; also in the following play, he missed a series of game-saving possibilities. In the first half, Capablanca’s play is by no means an example of accuracy. Admittedly the complex endgame was full of possibilities.

(2) With White, Capablanca dispenses with any kind of initiative and seeks merely continuous exchange – although the position certainly doesn’t require such a trading. As a result – a short, bland draw.

(3) One of Capablanca’s best games in the tournament – in so far that in it, he is guilty of no detectable failure. But what a helpless impression Nimzovich’s positional play makes! Move 16. g4, for example, is unworthy of even a mediocre amateur. By the way, in this game Capablanca’s play is not consistently flawless (22...c5??), and only the final part is impressive in its logical simplicity.

(4) A very bad game. Without compelling reason, Nimzovich lets his opponent have the open center file, through which a winning position is effortlessly achieved. But instead of the obvious $d6, Capablanca plays 21.$f2??, and the game is a draw!

(C) With Dr. Vidmar, the case was not so simple for the ex-world champion – he won only one game – but also in this case he had to deal with an opponent who played somewhat under his usual league:

(1) Through weak use of his middlegame opportunity on the d-file, Capablanca lets the opponent achieve an approximately balanced position, but then sets a positional trap for him (provocation to an only apparently “simplistic,” but in fact fatal queen exchange, which could easily have been avoided) and gets a won
endgame after its success. But then he fails completely and, after adjournment, allows his opponent a straightforward drawing simplification.

(2) Following fortunate opening play, Capablanca leaves unused a simple possibility to secure a positional advantage, and hurries instead through a series of exchanges to give way to a drawish endgame. In the final position, Vidmar even stands a tad better.

(3) As a result of the weak move 14...\textit{b4?}, Capablanca gets positional domination as White. But instead of trying methodically to exploit this, he immediately brings about a simplification, which ensures him of an admittedly comfortable, though not won, endgame. Black loses this endgame as a result of remarkably imprecise play.

(4) In general, no game, rather deforestation.

\textbf{(D)} Spielmann was actually the only one who didn’t play below his strength against Capablanca. His mistakes were generally not chess-related, but rather psychological in nature. That is to say, he couldn’t conceive how one can conquer the “unconquerable,” even with a better position.

(1) An unfortunate opening idea of the first player (Capablanca), in conjunction with tactically inferior implementation, whereby, as things developed, the result is a forced pawn sacrifice. Then Capablanca picks himself up and finds redemptive counter-play in a couple of the opponent’s inaccuracies.

(2) A superficial handling of the not easy – for Black, anyway – $3.\textbf{c}3$ variation of the Caro-Kann, in which the inclination to clear the board proves to be an insufficient means of equalizing. The game remained without a proper finish, because Spielmann suddenly called it a draw after he had obtained a clear advantage. It’s more than doubtful that he would have done this against any other opponent.

(3) In at-home analysis, Capablanca finds reinforcement for the variation used in Cycle I and, with Spielmann's indifferent countermoves, already obtains a winning position in the opening. The final combination is exactly calculated, but also very simple. The brilliancy game award is probably explained by the fact that Capablanca did indeed execute it so impeccably.

(4) In general, the same picture as in the second game – again the Caro-Kann, again the same tendency towards simplification in no way justified by the position. The difference is only that Spielmann forfeited his chances in an elementary way even before the “drawn ending,” and as a result Capablanca probably could have played on for a win. The overall impression of the game is that both were playing without any strong interest.
(E) With Marshall, Capablanca had – as he has so often – a very easy match:
(1) In a Queen’s Indian defended weakly by his opponent, Capablanca again
overdoes the motif of simplification, and permits Marshall a chance to equalize.
After this opportunity goes inexplicably unused (14...b5??), Capablanca plays the
conclusion in good style.

(2) Marshall again plays the opening very badly, and drops a piece on the 12th
move. The rest is silence.

(3) A less than satisfying game. Capablanca uses his opening chances impre­
cisely (especially the fight for c4 leaves a lot to be desired) and gives his oppo­
nent various opportunities to equalize chances. Finally Capablanca wins, thanks
to some tactical errors by Black, first a pawn, then a second – whereupon one
could think that the fight was over. But right afterward, he makes an elementary
blunder and, at the sacrifice of one of the extra pawns, allows a drawn endgame
with bishops of opposite color.

(4) The opening phase was handled by Capablanca, as Black, with great sophis­
tication, and gradually he got a crushing positional domination (f5 together with
the center file). But then follows a typical “simplification move” (permitting the
rook exchange), which grants the possibility of a reprieve for White. Since Marshall
blindly passes over this simple opportunity (32.g3), the subsequent endgame takes
place as if by itself to win for Capablanca.

This was roughly the impression the Capablanca games in New York made on me
as I (for the purpose of “preparation” for the match with him) reviewed them
more precisely on the steamer Massilia, which brought me to Buenos Aires. Only
then did it finally become clear to me how exaggerated were the general shouts of
praise with which the quality of his performance in New York was greeted. That’s
supposed to be a chess machine? A “champion of all times?” What absurd pro­
nouncements with respect to a player, whose overwhelming majority of games,
while with no direct mistakes, exhibits about two to three omissions each, which
either put the win in question or, countered with a suitable reply, seriously com­
promise his position.

But I have to state specifically that this “critique of the criticism” is directed
solely toward the half-mythic Capablanca Überspieler (superplayer). For when
one takes the trouble to rid his thinking of this anesthetizing legend, then one
comes, of course, to the belief that Capablanca is entirely a first-class master,
whose ability lies much more in intuition than in critical thinking. Before the
match, it seemed only appropriate to determine objectively to what extent and in
which form this, his primary quality, manifests in individual phases of the struggle.
In the process, I came to the following insights, which in the most part were
confirmed in Buenos Aires:
The Opening. As Capablanca himself tells us in one of his books (I think in *Chess Fundamentals*), in each individual chess battle he participates in, he uses basically only one or two openings or variations of the same opening. So it was in his contests with Marshall (the Spanish, and the ...$\text{e}4$ variation of the Queen’s Gambit Declined) and Lasker (again the Spanish, Steinitz Defense, and the orthodox variation of the Queen’s Gambit), so it was also – with few exceptions, which only prove the rule – in New York 1927 (the King’s Fianchetto against the Queen’s Indian as White, and Caro-Kann as Black). This limited repertoire is studied closely and in particular detail.

His opening theory knowledge, if not particularly many-sided – is characterized always with imposing depth and, above all, expediency. This economy of approach to developing an opening repertoire is definitely not to be criticized, by the way. If anything, it is much more suitable in its limited share of opening knowledge, chosen to produce lasting value, than the comprehensive and eclectic, yet unmethodical scrutinizing of the so-called “modern theoreticians.” Let’s not forget that also Lasker’s opening repertoire, for example, was rather limited during his long-lasting brilliancy period – and yet probably no one can accuse him of superficiality or a lack of will to win...

The first seemingly logical conclusion which one can draw from the above observation would be that, in a match with Capablanca, it must be useful and advantageous, where possible, to vary the openings (or its branches), in order to bring him as quickly as possible out of the explored paths. But this observation would be correct only if, especially in the recent years of Capablanca’s chess activity, a characteristic hadn’t developed beyond all measure and hadn’t traversed his entire creative work like a recurring theme. This is the instinct of self preservation to which he sacrificed so many beautiful, enticing trains of thought and placed such a number of rook pairs on the open file for exchange! This instinct, which at this stage his refined intuition serves almost exclusively, makes any attempt to gain the upper hand against Capablanca by a surprise in the opening ripe for failure from the beginning. Actually, no case is known, to me, at any rate, in which Capablanca was stumped by a complicated novelty; if anything, in such circumstances he unveils a maximum presence of mind and hits upon the only right thing (compare his familiar Spanish with Marshall, New York 1918); never has he gotten into a lost position as a result of a combinational surprise in the opening!

This extraordinary certainty in the disposal of any half-way real danger is explained by the fact that, exactly in the positions where such a thing could manifest, it was easiest for Capablanca to lead with his high trump – exactly that, which for so long secured him a predominance with regard to the other masters, even those of first class. It was this, his unmatched defensive technique, sharpened for simplification – a weapon, of which he availed himself with complete virtuosity, but only up to the unhappy moment where he (perhaps subconsciously)
began to regard it as an all-holy method in any random position. This tendency to exaggerate reveals itself in New York, of all places, thanks to which one of the main strengths of his style threatens to transform unequivocally into a serious weakness. Both in positions promising victory (in Cycle III, his game with Vidmar; in Cycle IV, with Marshall – just to name these), and in such positions where a chance to win already was eliminated for him (Cycle II and IV games with Spielmann), his use of the simplifying method was excessive by all means and, with better counter-play, could have had serious consequences. But since it was once again crowned with success, I was well able to assume that Capablanca would continue to use it (and in fact in the exaggerated way just described), particularly in the match – and from this assumption was able to profit in the following two ways:

(1) With White, to avoid none of the simplified opening problems familiar to him – in the assumption, that exactly their apparent simplicity will tempt him to want to solve it through any old system of exchange, a tendency which possibly can compromise his position. For a match, this tactic has the inestimable value that it decreases the possibility of a loss to the extreme (as is generally known, I lost no game as White) and, at the same time, not all too infrequently leads to positions that are not forced wins, but still contain within them the seed of a win. Of course, winning chances of this kind are mostly very difficult to accomplish – and therefore, of the four games in which they existed (the 8th, 22nd, 28th, 34th), I succeeded in happily finishing off only the last. But on the other hand, the tactic proved itself brilliant from a psychological point of view, in that it forced my opponent to defend himself arduously for hours in positions where he himself no longer could hope for a win – and so posed him thankless, from his point of view, unnecessary and disagreeable problems.

(2) With Black, I strove in general to use the same method of simplification as Capablanca himself does in the defense, but where possible, only without exaggeration, and always keeping in mind that positions occur only all too frequently in which the weaknesses of the defending party manifest most clearly after simplification. Since this problem was a rather new one for me, I wasn’t able, of course, to bank on 100% success. Yet in the middle of the match (games 8-24) – where on the one hand I was rid of the indisposition I suffered at the beginning of the competition, but on the other hand had not yet entered the tired period of the final phase – I found playing for a draw with Black absolutely no trouble.

(B) The Middlegame. From the moment of the competition, where detailed knowledge takes a step back from pure art, those characteristics of Capablanca’s style, which had helped establish his half-legendary reputation, appeared most clearly; above all, an exceptional swiftness in understanding, then an almost infallible, intuitive view of the positional. Curiously enough, these particular two gifts, which with appropriate application would have brought their possessor perhaps to
unimagined heights as an artist, in effect led him to an opposite result – namely, to a dead point, to the belief that the art of chess is very near its worn-out end.

How was that able to happen? In order to answer this question correctly, it’s necessary to penetrate into the psychological dangers, which the first of the above-named characteristics conceals. Actually, quickness in perception – the possibility of a nearly simultaneous overview of a series of tactical elements, which every complicated position holds within it – besides its obvious advantages (economy of thought and, as a result, self-confidence), contains the following temptation, which is difficult to avoid: all too easily, the player can lapse into the delusion that the good moves, which he sees immediately – or nearly so – by contemplation of the position, are absolutely the best, and as a result of this delusion, his creative work loses in depth what it gained in ease.

This gradual abandonment of seeking the absolute, the contentment with only good moves is unfortunately (for the art itself) characteristic of the current phase of Capablanca’s chess career. Only two cases are exceptions for him: (1) In positions where the combinational element dominates in such a way that it literally forces him into exact reasoning (as for example, in the game with Dr. Tartakower, London 1922); (2) If he – mostly as a result of one or several clearly detectable enemy mistakes – has already gained sufficient domination for a win, then suddenly the true artist awakens in him, who finds pleasure in ending the fight in the quickest and thereby most elegant way. The most peculiar thing about it is that this tendency occasionally stands in no relation to the internal aggregate value of the game itself: thus he came to the idea, for example, of a forced queen sacrifice in the second game of the New York tournament with Marshall, after the latter, in a most unaesthetic fashion, already scrapped a whole piece in the opening.

It’s clear that such cases of an awakening of the combinational spirit, caused by quite special positions, can be looked at only as exceptional occurrences. In contrast, as a rule one can observe in Capablanca’s creative work over the years an ever-decreasing immersion in the details of a position, based on his unflappable (I’m speaking of the years before Buenos Aires) belief in the infallibility of his intuition. The saddest thing indeed was that this system – to work with the “second-best moves” – was enough for him almost without exception because, in the majority of cases, more or less helpless resistance, in a positional sense, opposed him. Through this “impunity” upon execution of the second-best moves he, on the one hand, gradually became weaned from steady concentration during a chess match, which alone can give an absolute guarantee against possible elementary blunders. On the other hand his self-confidence grew in the extreme, indeed turned into self-idolization. (Before the match, for example, he wrote in an Argentine newspaper that to become a world champion ranks among the miracles.)

No wonder that, in addition to mentally flawless strategic thought, his praxis of the last years displayed relatively more and more frequent cases of neglect of
winning, or simply of more favorable tactical opportunities. As examples from recent tournaments, it will probably suffice to allude to his games (as Black) with Yates and Marshall (New York 1924), with Dr. Lasker (Moscow 1925); the third game with Marshall and the fourth with Nimzovich (New York 1927). Also, rather severe blunders occur less rarely than in the beginning of his career; nevertheless, these are not at all always exploited by his opponents (compare the games with Sir Thomas, Hastings 1919; and Morrison, London 1922), but sometimes they lead to a loss (like the loss of the queen against Chajes, New York 1916, or missing the queen check on b2 against Réti in New York 1924).

As I said, such sporadic signs of intellectual weakness can in no way be regarded as rare exceptions – for the total number of tournament games delivered by Capablanca in recent years is very small compared to the quantitative performance of other grandmasters, and proportionately the number of his mistakes is therefore significant. Thanks to these observations, I came to the somewhat seemingly paradoxical conviction that the tactician Capablanca at present stands far behind the strategist; that as a result, it is necessary not to believe him in the middle game, that is, to check each of his tactical thoughts with the utmost meticulousness – for it is by no means impossible that a demonstrable “hole” will be found. This decision, which of course has nothing in common with a potential underestimation of the opponent, helped me in no small measure to make the most of Capablanca’s omissions in a whole number of match games (1, 11, 21, 34).

(C). The Endgame. If possible, even larger tall tales were spread about Capablanca’s performances in the last, semi-technical part of the game than about his handling of the opening and middlegame. All these exaggerations probably had root in the fact that Capablanca is the victor over Lasker, whose mastery, especially in the endgame – particularly in the complicated, not purely technical ones – over the course of at the very least two decades, stood at an unattainable height. Actually, one of the four decisive games of the Havana match (the 10th) was won by Capablanca in a splendidly implemented endgame. Certainly, one can find in his twenty-year chess career some other good endgame performances (for example, with Nimzovich, Riga 1913; Bogoljubow, London 1922; Réti and Dr. Tartakower, New York 1924). But about which of the present-day grandmasters can one not say the same thing? For that reason, it seems downright amazing the (proportionally) enormous number of endgame opportunities missed by him, which is far greater than the number of his mistakes or omissions in the middlegame.

In order to get a clear overall picture, I expect it’s sufficient to review critically his games from (a) San Sebastian with Leonhardt (which he did win, but – as Dr. Tarrasch demonstrated – highly laboriously and thanks to the opponent’s help), and Rubinstein (in which he plainly failed to notice the gleaming chance at a draw by means of a rook sacrifice); (b) Havana – with Marshall (in which he lost an endgame, after standing better, if not won, in the beginning); (c) New York
1924, with the author (this game among others was a turning point in my grasping Capablanca’s chess individuality); (d) Moscow 1925 with Torre and Spielmann; and finally, (e) New York 1927, with Vidmar from Cycle I. Then one will have to come to the realization that Capablanca is definitely no remarkable endgame artist, that his proficiency in this phase of the game is decidedly of a more technical nature, and that there are other masters (like Rubinstein, for example, in rook endgames) who in some variations certainly are or were superior to him.

In order to pull the discussion together succinctly, I can formulate my overall impression of Capablanca’s method of play before the match: in the opening, he is only great as defender; the middlegame is his strongest suit, in which he now and then reveals also an attacking spirit; in the endgame he is not to be feared by a first-class master, for here he succeeds only in exceptional cases to rise above the mediocre.

As prologue to the world championship match, the New York Tournament had then a double and very real meaning – but one which differed completely from the opinion of the entire chess world concerning this last event: it gave Lady Fortune the opportunity to gift the Cuban hero with an ambiguous smile in which, besides outward encouragement, also a faint warning was imbedded; and it is really not her fault that her darling this time couldn’t decipher her smile. Moreover, the tournament allowed his future opponent, immediately before the Armageddon, to verify observations of earlier years by a number of new examples, and so to come to the correct conclusions. May also the years to come bring us the greatest surprises – in any case, in the history of chess, the New York Tournament 1927 will be in the books as the starting point to that spectacle, which finally destroyed for our art the harmful legend of the human chess machine.
Cycle I

Round 1

½ Capablanca – Spielmann ½
½ Alekhine – Vidmar ½
0 Marshall – Nimzovich ½

Standings after Round 1:

Nimzovich 1
Alekhine ½
Capablanca ½
Spielmann ½
Vidmar ½
Marshall 0

(1) Capablanca – Spielmann
Queen’s Gambit Declined [D38]

1.d4 d5 2.Qf3 e6 3.c4 Qd7

Dr. Lasker’s move, the idea of which – as I understand it – consists much less in preparing the bishop sortie to b4 in connection with ...c5, which Spielmann and Dr. Vidmar delighted in using in New York, than in reserving the possibility of the Cambridge Springs Defense for himself, and with that, preventing the opponent from choosing the fashionable line 4.Qg5 (after 3...Qf6), together possibly with Qb1–d2. With this in mind, I also used the text move in my seventh match game with Capablanca.

4.cxd5 exd5 5.Qc3 Qg6

If White wanted to force this position, then he should have played first of all 4.Qc3 and only upon 4...Qg8–f6, 5.Qg5 (as in the following game Alekhine-Vidmar), because in the text position, Black could avoid the following pin with 5...c6, completely without harm. Such small inaccuracies in handling the opening aren’t rare with Capablanca.

6.Qg5 Qb4(?)

Spielmann wants to force the counter-pin variation at all costs, questionable in any case, which he – according to his own report – had analyzed carefully with Dr. Vidmar on the way to New York. But in the available position, the idea appears illogical; indeed, usually one makes the bishop move with the intention of forcing a clarification in the center (c×d5, ...e×d5) by means of tactical threats. If, however, the opponent already decided voluntarily on this clarification beforehand, then Black can bring about long-known positions, quite harmless to him, through ...c6, together with ...

7.Qb3

Not a very happy thought – although, of course, White didn’t need to get an disadvantage because of this move alone. If he absolutely wanted to move the queen, then more appropriate was 7.Qa4 – which happened between the same players in Cycle III. I still believe that White doesn’t need to get involved here with artifice, and can fortify his opening advantage rather through simple further development (e3, Qd3, 0–0).

7...c5!

Here completely correct, since it threatens the immediate counterattack Qa5, etc., and in the process, White lacks time to bring the king into safety by castling short.
8.a3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{c}3+ \\
To 8...\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{a}5, 9.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{d}2! would be a sufficient reply.

9.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{c}3 \\
More in accord with the position was 9.\textit{\textbf{B}}\times\textsuperscript{c}3, since against this formation, Black's queenside pawn supremacy would be much more difficult to mobilize than in the actual game.

9...\textit{\textbf{c}}4! \\
The point of this good move is that now White can't play 10.e4, because of 10...\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}4, etc.

10.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{e}3+ \\
Still relatively the best move.

10...\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{e}7 11.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}7+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}7 \\

12.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{d}2? \\
Only after these \textit{angst-moves} does White find himself at a direct disadvantage, which could be avoided with the natural 12.e4 — for example, with 12...\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}4 13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{e}5! h6 (13...\textit{\textbf{B}}\times\textsuperscript{b}5 14.a4) 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{f}6+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{f}6 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{c}4, etc., whereby chances and counter-chances would balance out.

12...h6 13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{h}4 \\
In case of 13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{f}6+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{f}6 14.e4, Black would, following 14...\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}4 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}4 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{c}4 \textit{\textbf{B}}\textsuperscript{d}8 17.d5 (or 17.\textit{\textbf{B}}\textsuperscript{d}1 \textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{g}4), block the passed pawn with 17...\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{d}6, and later show his pawn supremacy to advantage on the kingside.

13...b5 14.e4 \\
Bitter necessity; otherwise the queenside pawn advance would win rather easily as a matter of technique.

14...g5 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{g}3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}4 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{e}4 17.a4 \\

17...\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{a}6? \\
Until this moment, Spielmann had played the game perfectly and was now able, with 17...f5!, to maintain his material advantage in a good position, and retain excellent chances of winning. Capablanca (and also Dr. Tartakower in the Russian tournament book) gives the following variation: 18.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\textsuperscript{c}7 \textit{\textbf{a}}\textsuperscript{a}6 19.h4 \textit{\textbf{A}}\textsuperscript{c}8 20.\textit{\textbf{Q}}\times\textsuperscript{a}5 g4 21.h5!, with prospects of a draw for White. I believe, however,
that only in absolute necessity would
Black have to make the move ...g4, de-
valuing the pawn-chain, and in the case
at hand, no such obligation existed. So
instead of this, he should have played
20...f6! in order to annul – in case of
hxg5, ...hxg5 – the effect of the white
rook on the h-file with either ...f7-g7 or
possibly ...h8. After the text moves,
White achieves a longed-for draw
through the coordination of his pieces,
precisely carried out and intensified by
a number of tactical threats.

18.a×b5 Q×b5 19.b3! Hhc8

As can be seen, Black has no more time
to play ...f5, after his failing on the 17th
move.

20.h4 a6

Strangely enough, after 20...g4, White
would have had sufficient counter re-
sources at his disposal – for example,
21.Qe2 f5 (or h5) 22.Qa5! a6 23.b×c4
Q×c4 24.Qd2!.

21.b×c4 Q×c4 22.h×g5 h×g5
23.Qh6!

With the awful threat 24.Qd6+, etc.

23...Qf6

Not 23...f6 because 24.Q×c4 Q×c4

24.Qa5!

Threatening 25.Q×c4, together with
Qe5+, etc. The rook attacks on both
flanks are interesting.

24...Qb5

Evidence that he’s already happy with a
draw. Actually, there was nothing more
here to get out of this position. If, for ex-
ample, 24...Qg4, then 25.Qb6 Q×f1
26.Qb7+ Qf8 27.Q×f1 Qc1+ 28.Qe2
Qa8-c8 29. Qb2, and White would have
had nothing more to fear, considering the
many enemy weaknesses.

25.Q×b5 a×b5 26.Qb5 Qa1+
27.Qd2 Qa2+

Insufficient is 27...e3+ after 28.Q×e3!
Qe4+ (or 28...Qa2+ 29.Qd3) 29.Qd3
Q×g3 30.Qb7+, together with Qh6-h8+
and Qc8. Capablanca proved himself
once again to be a splendid tactician and
cleverly saved a game, which strategi-
cally was inadequately conceived.

28.Qd1 Qa1+ ½–½

(2) Alekhine – Vidmar
Queen’s Gambit Declined [D38]

1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.Qf3 Qf6 4.Qc3
g5 Qb4 6.c×d5 exd5 7.e3 0–0

Lately this variation has been played
occasionally up to this move, especially
by Spielmann. Here, however, only
7...c5 seems to be in harmony with the
sharp-edged bishop sortie of the previ-
ous move, whereupon the first player
would then be forced to play a proper
gambit with all its advantages and
downsides – in fact, 8.Qd3 c4 9.Qc2
Qa5 10.0-0 Q×c3 11.b×c3 Q×c3, and
now either 12.Qb1 or 12.Qb1, both of
which make Black’s castling question-
able. For example, 12.Qb1 0-0 13.e4!
d×e4 14.Qd2 Qa3 15.Qb4 Qa6
16.Q×f8 exf3, and now – not as in the
tournament game Maróczy-
Tenner, New York 1926, 17...d7? e6 – but, of course, rather 17...b4 fxg2 18.e1, with the threat d7xh7+!, and White must win. After the imprecise text move, White in any case gets a good attack, without needing to sacrifice anything for it.

8...d3 c5 9.0-0 dxc3 10.bxc 3 c4
11.c2 a5

After this, White could try with 12.b1 to bring about variations similar to those mentioned in the previous note. But his next move is even more effective.

12.e5!

The exchange of the c3-pawn for the h7-pawn, which this move intends, damages the position of the black king much more than is noticeable at first sight; therefore, it probably would have been more advisable for Black to beware “Greeks bearing gifts” by rejecting c3 and play 12...e8 – for example, with a sequence similar to 13.d7 d7 14.d2 b5 15.a4, when White would still have kept the better prospects.

12...c3 13.d7! xd7

Quite bad, of course, would be 13...xd7 14.f6, together with f1c1, etc.

14.b1!

The point of the 12th move: because of the strong threat of 15.e7, e8 16.b4, Black has no time to save his h-pawn.

14...e8 15.d7+ h8 16.c2

In spite of opposing superior strength on the queenside, White’s advantage is entirely clear, and in spite of his proven resourcefulness, Dr. Vidmar cannot devise a sufficient parry against the many-sided threats (i.e., 17.e4, 17.d1, 17.a4).

16...f8

If 16...b6, then simply 17.a4, etc.

17.a4!

Leads to the win of a pawn plus a more powerful position. The remainder should have been simply a matter of technique.

17...e6

Forced.

18.b5

This, and not 18.f5 f6!, is correct.

18.g6 19.xd5

Should amply suffice, it’s true. More economical first, however, was 19.f4!, when it would have been quite difficult for Black to invent anything else at all.

19.b4!

Quite shrewd subterfuge: Black defends squares b7 and f8, attacks a4 and apparently threatens the other bishop with 20.e6, etc. And still White has an easy save.

20.c2 e6 21.e4

Of course not 21.e5, f6, etc. But now the bishop is covered by the possible
New York 1927

queen check on h4, and in the following, White will have all to great a choice of various winning continuations.

21...f5 22.\(\text{\textit{f}4}\)

Or 22.\(\text{\textit{h}4+}\) \(\text{\textit{h}7}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{f}4}\), etc.

22...\(\text{\textit{h}7}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{h}4}\)

This defense was planned with the previous move. But rather good also was 23.\(\text{\textit{h}4}\) \(\text{\textit{g}4}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{e}5}\), etc.

23...\(\text{\textit{x}g5}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{h}xg5}\) \(\text{\textit{e}7}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{h}4+}\)

White wants to lead the rook still further astray, and so allows his opponent some further swindles (see the remark to move 30). Incomparably simpler, in any case, was: 25.\(\text{\textit{h}2+}\) \(\text{\textit{g}8}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{f}4}\), threatening \(\text{e}4\), etc.

25...\(\text{\textit{h}6}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{g}3}\) \(\text{\textit{h}5}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{f}4}\)

Hardly stronger was 27.\(\text{\textit{e}5}\) \(\text{\textit{d}8!}\), etc.

27...\(\text{\textit{a}3}\)

With that he still provides the opponent with the most practical difficulties.

28.\(\text{\textit{f}3}\) \(\text{\textit{g}6}\) 29.\(\text{\textit{e}4!}\)

The simplest, because it forces a won endgame. Less clear by far would be 29.\(\text{\textit{ab}1}\) \(\text{\textit{d}8!}\), etc.

29...\(\text{\textit{b}2}\) 30.\(\text{\textit{x}f5}\)

Absolutely not a mistake – as some critics believed – but rather the intended consequence of the maneuver introduced by the previous move. Simpler, though, was 30.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\), and after 30...\(\text{\textit{g}7}\) (intending ...\(\text{\textit{ah}8}\)), 31.\(\text{\textit{d}1!}\), with an easy win.

30...\(\text{\textit{x}d4+}\) 31.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\)

With this move, the position is finally clarified. Black is forced into a queen exchange and very soon will have to hand over his two united passed pawns. To White’s misfortune, however, with his next move he permits himself to be distracted from the originally calculated winning plan.

31...\(\text{\textit{x}f2}\) 32.\(\text{\textit{x}f2}\)

With the rather worthless pawn-grabbing intention of this move, White misses the way to his heretofore well-earned victory. Black gains adequate counter chances in the pure rook ending.

After 32.\(\text{\textit{x}f2}\) \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) (after 32...\(\text{\textit{gxf5}\) 33.\(\text{\textit{e}1}\), etc., Black would perish because of his unfortunate bishop position) 33.\(\text{\textit{g}4!}\) \(\text{\textit{g}xg4}\) 34.\(\text{\textit{x}g6}\) \(\text{\textit{h}3}\) 35.\(\text{\textit{e}4}\) \(\text{\textit{b}8}\) 36.\(\text{\textit{f}5}\), etc., Black would very soon have had to recognize the uselessness of further resistance.

32...\(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) 33.\(\text{\textit{x}f5}\) \(\text{\textit{gxf5}}\) 34.\(\text{\textit{fd1}}\)

Winning a pawn with the threats 35.\(\text{\textit{d}7}\) or 35.\(\text{\textit{d}5/c5}\), which proved
to be insufficient, however, against determined counter-play. Likewise unclear would be 34.g4 fxg4 35.hg3, hg7!, etc.

34.h7 35.d5

On the other hand, at this moment, there was a last winning attempt: 35.g4!, fg4 36.hg3, since the opportunity to double rooks on the h-file would no longer be at the opponent’s disposal.

35.c8l 36.xf5 d7 37.e5 c3 38.e1 c2 39.e2 dc7 40.f3 b5 41.f5 g7 42.e6

With that, White expresses his peaceful intentions, since the terrible passed pawn on the seventh rank would thwart any serious attempt to win. For example, if 42.f4, then simply 42...c4+, and now the rook exchange 43.e4, after 43...e4+ 44.xe4 c3!, together with ...b4, etc., would actually seriously endanger White’s game.

42.d7

He also could have tried 42...c3+, when 43.e3 would be the simplest.

43.e2 dc7 44.e6 d7 45.e2 ½–½

(3) Marshall – Nimzovich
French Defense [C01]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.c3 b4 4.e×d5 e×d5 5.f3

With his last, White foregoes even a shade of an opening advantage – and even more: now Black gets the chance, through a possible exchange on c3, to brand the resulting doubled pawn as a permanent weakness. More frequently, 5.d3 occurs immediately.

5...e7 6.d3 bc6 7.h3

Upon immediate castling, 7...g4 isn’t so pleasant. The difference in the development of the king’s knights becomes noticeable, to the disadvantage of White.

7.e6

Encouraged by the unfortunate opening tactic of the opponent, Nimzovich did without the more obvious exchange maneuver, 7...f5, in favor of a more complicated, interesting, yet probably not-quite-correct, manner of play.

8.0–0 d7 9.f4

Simpler was 9.e2, with roughly the same game. But the text move is also not to be dismissed – and even offers good, practical chances, in that it leads the opponent to a foolhardy experiment.

9.xc3

In the last few years, the play against pawns in the center, weakened by doubling, became one of Nimzovich’s most preferred strategic motifs, and he dealt with such positions – which he knew how to bring about from the most diverse openings – with special virtuosity. Here, however, he was mistaken, because the uncertainty of his king’s position should have prevented him, in the following play, from benefiting from the weaknesses. With 9.d6, he could, of course, have had a comfortable equality.
10. bxc3 f6

The necessary supplement for the previous move: After the disappearance of the king bishop, the dark squares must be protected with pawns where possible. But now e6 becomes weak.

11. b1 g5 12. g3 0-0-0

The king takes on the defense of b7 and c7. The king’s role of defense has been strongly underestimated for a considerable time (after the desperate attempt by the aging Steinitz to use this piece to attack on a full board was a miserable fiasco) – and only the years after the war seemed to bring a gradual about-face in this respect. One can examine the games of the Buenos Aires match, for example, where the kings, already in the middle game, were used now and then to defend key squares – that is, functioning as active pieces even before the endgame.

Black’s last moves, with their original strategic approach, must make a pleasing impression on anyone who believes in the evolution and depth of chess thought. Therefore it’s almost too bad that upon closer examination of this position, it becomes clear that Black’s plan was not only not the best, but instead, with correct (and not at all abstruse) counter-play, must bring the second player a completely unenviable situation. So he would have done better to choose instead of 11... g5, the down-to-earth 11... d8, together with ...0-0, etc.

13. e2?

The opponent’s temerity breaks Marshall’s train of thought, and here and in the following play, he makes a couple of errors in precision that are hardly to be made up for. Instead of the queen move, for example, the less stereotyped (since with e2, White threatens only quite clumsily 14. a6, which is deflected in the easiest way) attack formation beginning with 13. d2! is called for. If after that, for example, 13... b8, then 14. b3 b6 15. e2 – this time with really unpleasant threats.

Therefore, Black could better answer 13. d2 with 13... a5, with the necessary idea of exchanging the enemy knight on the way to c5. But – apart from the fact that this exchange would put a better face again on the White pawn queenside position, and consequently show the inadequacy of the plan introduced with 9... x3 – in this case White wouldn’t at all have had to play 14. b3 immediately. Instead of this, c1 (or possibly a3) would have been lasting and good – and only then the knight move. As one can easily be convinced, White would have kept a lasting initiative with this method of play. Now he gets into a tight spot bit by bit.

13... e8!

Defense (making an escape square, d8, for the king) and counterattack at the same time.
14. \(\text{Bf}e1\)

If 14.\(\text{Ba}6\), then 14...\(\text{bxa6}\) 15.\(\text{Bxa6+ Bd}8\) 16.\(\text{Bb}7\) \(\text{Qf}5!\) 17.\(\text{Bxc}7\) \(\text{Bxc}7\) 18.\(\text{Bxc}7+ \text{Bxc}7\), etc., with an easily winning game.

14...\(\text{Qf}5\) 15.\(\text{Qxf}5\)

After the disappearance of this bishop, the queenside pawn complex becomes quite weak, and the prospects in the endgame become so much the grimmer. In spite of the apparent danger, 15.\(\text{Ah}2\) would have offered him more chances.

15...\(\text{Qxf}5\) 16.\(\text{Bb}5\) \(\text{Dd}8\) 17.\(\text{Cc}5?\)

The decisive mistake, because now the second player can occupy the correct queenside defense formation with gain of tempo. With 17.\(\text{Ba}5!\) (17...\(\text{Bb}8\) 18.\(\text{Cc}4\), with some chances in the complications), this would have been avoided.

17...\(\text{b}6\) 18.\(\text{Bd}3\) \(\text{Bb}7\) 19.\(\text{Bb}3\)

Beginning of the tragedy – otherwise c2 was hard to guard.

19...\(\text{Bc}6\) 20.\(\text{Bd}2\)

What on the 13th move would have meant the beginning of a very promising attack is now merely a shy defensive move against the penetration of the black knight to c4. It gets ever more gloomy.

20...\(\text{Qa}5\) 21.\(\text{Bb}2\) \(\text{Bxe}1+\) 22.\(\text{Bxe}1\) \(\text{Be}8\)

Apart from the fact that Black doesn’t need these pieces for the exploitation of his positional advantage, a purely tactical idea also forms the basis of the double-rook exchange. Black gets rid of the threat, floating in the air, of \(\text{Bb}3-\text{c}5+\) (after \(\text{Bd}2-\text{b}3\)), and with that avoids the otherwise inevitable knight exchange.

23.\(\text{Bxe}8\) \(\text{Bxe}8\) 24.\(\text{Bb}1\)

What else? With 24. \(\text{Bf}1\), for example, 24...\(\text{Qa}4\) would already be very strong.

24...\(\text{Bc}8(?\)

Probably time pressure, since otherwise the omission of 24...\(\text{De}2!\) – which after 25.\(\text{Cc}1\) puts White at a standstill, and after 25.\(\text{Bb}3\) \(\text{Cc}4\) 26.\(\text{Cc}5+ \text{Bc}8\) 27.\(\text{Dd}3\) \(\text{Dd}2\), forces material gain with a continuous attack – is inexplicable.

25.\(\text{Dd}1\) \(\text{De}6\)

Also 26...\(\text{Cc}6\) was strong.

26.\(\text{Bb}3\) \(\text{Cc}4\) 27.\(\text{Dd}2\) \(\text{Qa}3\) 28.\(\text{Bf}1\) \(\text{Qxc}2\)

The loss of this pawn perhaps would have still been bearable for White with the bishops of opposite color, if he wouldn’t have to suffer from the remaining – and incurable – weaknesses of his queenside. But as it is, he has only to wait until the opponent gives the coup de grâce.

29.\(\text{Bh}5\) \(\text{Dd}3\) 30.\(\text{Dd}1\) \(\text{De}4\) 31.\(\text{Dd}2\) \(\text{De}2!\) 32.\(\text{Bxe}2\)

After 32.\(\text{Cc}1\) \(\text{De}1!\), etc., he would gradually suffocate.

32...\(\text{Bxe}2\) 33.\(f\text{f}4\) \(\text{Qa}3\) 34.\(f\times\text{g}5\) \(f\times\text{g}5\) 35.\(\text{Df}2\)
Otherwise 35...\(\text{b}5\), together with ...
\(\text{d}3\), etc.

35...\(\text{h}5\) 36.\(\text{e}5\) g4 37.\(\text{h}x\text{g}4\)

Kingside pawn exchanges are benefi-
cial only to Black, who, on the other
side, possesses completely sufficient
material to win. Therefore, 37.h4 was
certainly more advisable from a practi-
cal point of view.

37...\(\text{x}g4\) 38.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}5\) 39.\(\text{g}7\)

\(\text{e}6!\)

Threatens to win a pawn with 40...\(\text{b}5\),
etc., which at this moment, on account
of the response c3-c4, would still be
premature. White, apparently under
time pressure (the 40th move!) misses
the threat, whereupon the endgame
causes no more difficulties at all. It was
also won, however, after 40.\(\text{d}3\)!, for
example: 40...\(\text{d}7\) 41.\(\text{f}8\) \(\text{f}5+\)
42.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}2+\) 43.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{g}6\) 44.\(\text{e}5\)
\(\text{e}3\#\).

40.\(\text{f}8?\) \(\text{b}5\) 41.\(\text{b}1\) a5

Also fine was 41...\(\text{f}5\), since after
42.a4 \(\text{x}b1\) 43.\(\text{a}x\text{b}5\), Black plays the
simplest, 43...\(\text{d}7\), together with (in the case
of \(\text{e}3\)-\(f4\)-\(e5\)) ...c6 and, after the
pawn exchange, forces his way to c4
with the king.

42.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}5\) 43.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{x}a3\)
44.\(\text{x}a3\) \(\text{b}1\) 45.\(\text{f}8\) \(\text{x}a2\)

Marshall could easily have spared him-
selves the next fifteen moves.

46.\(\text{g}7\) \(\text{c}4\) 47.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 48.\(\text{h}6\)
\(\text{a}6\) 49.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}1\) 50.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{x}b5\)
51.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{c}4\) 52.\(\text{b}2\) c5 53.\(\text{e}3\)
c\(x\text{d}4\) 54.\(\text{x}d4\) b5 55.\(\text{b}6\) a4
56.\(\text{a}5\) d4! 57.\(\text{c}x\text{d}4\) b4 58.\(\text{b}6\) a3+
59.\(\text{a}2\) \(\text{b}5\) 60.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{a}4\) 0-1

Round 2

0 Nimzovich – Capablanca 1
0 Spielmann – Alekhine 1
½ Marshall – Vidmar ½

Standings after Round 2:

Alekhine 1½
Capablanca 1½
Nimzovich 1
Vidmar 1
Marshall ½
Spielmann ½

(4) Nimzovich – Capablanca
Queen’s Gambit Declined [D30]

1.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{f}6\) 2.\(\text{f}3\) e6 3.d4 d5 4.e3

As is well known, 4.\(\text{g}5\) and 4.\(\text{c}3\) are
more vigorous here, and at the same
time quite credible developmental
moves. But that is the way it is – in New
York one played against Capablanca
usually in such a way, as if there were a
mot d’ordre to play only the second- or
third-best moves against him.
4...\(\triangle e7\) 5.\(\triangle bd2\)

Why this artifice? Other moves (5.c3, 5.\(\triangle d3\)) were more sound, that is, more in keeping with the demands of the problem of the center.

5...0-0 6.\(\triangle d3\)

More in harmony with the previous move was the flank development of the queen bishop (6.b3) or first, 6.\(\triangle e2\).

6...c5 7.dxc5

Once again, 7.b3, together with 8.\(\triangle b2\), would have lead to a full game with chances on both sides. The text move should result in a rapid simplification of the position.

7...\(\triangle a6\)

\[\text{A good move, but one that should lead only to equality.}\]

8.0-0?

That is the actual mistake, which relinquishes control of the whole board to Black. Virtually taken for granted here was 8.\(\triangle b3\) dxc4 (if 8...\(\triangle xc5\) 9.\(\triangle xc5\) \(\triangle a5+\) 10.\(\triangle d2\) \(\triangle xc5\), then 11.\(\triangle c1\), rather to White’s advantage) 9.\(\triangle xc4\) \(\triangle xd1+\) 10.\(\triangle xd1\) \(\triangle xc5\) 11.\(\triangle xc5\) \(\triangle xc5\) 12.\(\triangle e2=\).

8...\(\triangle xc5\) 9.\(\triangle e2\) b6 10.c\(\times d5\)?

This systematic and uninterrupted development of the opponent in the midst of sacrificing time and space is tantamount to a positional hara-kiri. White should still play 10.b3. He refrains too long from this possibility, until he incurs a lost position just on account of the encapsulated queen bishop.

10...\(\triangle d5\) 11.\(\triangle b3\) \(\triangle b7\) 12.\(\triangle xc5\) \(\triangle xc5\) 13.\(\triangle a4\)

And now he seeks to trade the already developed bishop, and leaves the other one quietly sleeping. Indeed, in this game, Nimzovich is not to be recognized. Preferable was 13.\(\triangle d2\) \(\triangle f6\) 14.\(\triangle b3\) (e5) 15.\(\triangle c3\), etc.

13...\(\triangle f6!\)

Justifiably, Black doesn’t bother in the least about further losses in tempo planned by the opponent (the exchange on a6 was otherwise surely easy to prevent with ...a6) and plays only to take advantage of the c1-bishop’s lack of development. A sounder, more appropriate plan, but one, which, for a change, Capablanca doesn’t implement with the necessary precision.

14.\(\triangle a6\) \(\triangle xa6\) 15.\(\triangle xa6\) \(\triangle b4\) (?)
White would hardly have found a sufficient defense in the long run.

16.\(\text{\textcopyright}e2\) \(f\text{fd8}\) 17.a3

Better than 17.\(\text{\textcopyright}e1\), whereupon the simple doubling of rooks (17...\(\text{\textcopyright}d7\)) would be very strong.

17...\(\text{\textcopyright}d3\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}e1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}\times e1\) 19.\(\text{\textcopyright}\times e1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}ac8\) 20.\(\text{\textcopyright}b1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e5\)

This so-much admired queen move should have just as little success as everything else: Black just threw away the substance of his advantage with his unfortunate knight maneuver. Certainly White may not now successfully play 21.b4, on account of 21...\(\text{\textcopyright}d6\) 22.g2-g3 \(\text{\textcopyright}e5\)-e4, with the subsequent penetration of the rooks. But he had simpler ways out in the following play.

21.g3

The right move, because with it, a further weakness is forced. On the other hand, Capablanca’s assertion (in his written commentary to this game for the English tournament book) that 21...\(\text{\textcopyright}e4\) would have won a pawn is based on an error: that is to say, after 22.\(\text{\textcopyright}d2\), Black couldn’t have played 22...\(\text{\textcopyright}\times a3\)!, because then the missing Luft would have become disastrous for him; for example, 23.b\times a3 \(\text{\textcopyright}c2\) 24.\(\text{\textcopyright}bc1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}b2\) 25.\(\text{\textcopyright}ed1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d5\) 26.e4! \(\text{\textcopyright}d7\) 27.\(\text{\textcopyright}b4\)!, and wins.

22.b4 \(\text{\textcopyright}f8\) 23.\(\text{\textcopyright}b2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}a2!\)

With the unpleasant threat 24...a5.

24.\(\text{\textcopyright}a1\)!

A weak palliative. To save the game, he should play 24.\(\text{\textcopyright}bd1\)! – for example, (1) 24...\(\text{\textcopyright}x d1\) 25.\(\text{\textcopyright}x d1\) a5 26.b\times a5 b\times a5 (or 26...\(\text{\textcopyright}x a3\) 27.\(\text{\textcopyright}a6!\) 27.\(\text{\textcopyright}a6\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c2\) 28.\(\text{\textcopyright}d8\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x b2\) (or 28...\(\text{\textcopyright}x b2\) 29.\(\text{\textcopyright}x f8+\), etc., with perpetual check) 29.\(\text{\textcopyright}d6\); or (2) 24...a5 25.\(\text{\textcopyright}x d8\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x d8\) 26.\(\text{\textcopyright}d4\), etc., with sufficient counter threats.

24...\(\text{\textcopyright}b3\) 25.\(\text{\textcopyright}d4\)?

Even now 25.\(\text{\textcopyright}ac1\) could still occur, with variations similar to those mentioned above. The d4-square is not secure for the bishop, since ...e5 hovers continuously in the air.

25...\(\text{\textcopyright}c2\) 26.\(\text{\textcopyright}a6\)?

This new, highly precarious debilitation of the light squares was hard to avoid, since with the plausible move 21.\(\text{\textcopyright}d2\), Black would get the advantage in the following way: 21...\(\text{\textcopyright}d6\) 22.g3 \(\text{\textcopyright}c2\) 23.\(\text{\textcopyright}d3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}b2!\) 24.\(\text{\textcopyright}c3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}x b1\) 25.\(\text{\textcopyright}x e5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e1+\) 26.\(\text{\textcopyright}g2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e7\), etc.

21...\(\text{\textcopyright}d5!\)
With this, the game is finally lost. (It's strange, by the way, how many weak moves White had to make in order to get to this result!) To be sure, it looked bad anyway – but after 26. \( \text{f1} \) or 26. \( \text{d1} \) (intending \( \text{e2} \)), there were still some hopes of rescue.

26...e5!

The beginning of a forceful endgame, which in a way compensated for the mutual omissions of the previous phase.

27. \( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{dd2} \) 28. \( \text{b7} \)

Nice is the “main variation,” 28. \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{xe5}! \) (as in so many problems and studies, there’s also a sideline cook here, by the way: 28... \( \text{d5} \), together with ... \( \text{f3} \)!) 29. \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf2}! \), with early mate. And 28. \( \text{f1} \) would not have saved the game – for example, 28... \( \text{d5} \) 29. \( \text{d4} \), \( \text{h5}! \) (indicated by Capablanca, and much better than 29... \( \text{f3} \), which could be answered with 30. \( \text{ac1} \) 30. \( \text{h4} \) (otherwise, 30... \( \text{xf2} \), etc., with a sufficient pawn preponderance) 30... \( \text{f3} \), with annihilation.

28... \( \text{xf2} \) 29. \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 30. \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{xh2}! \)

A second nice twist: if 31. \( \text{h2} \), then 31... \( \text{xg4}+ \) 32. \( \text{h1} \) \( \text{h3}! \), together with mate. Weaker in contrast would be 30... \( \text{xf4} \) on account of 31. \( \text{f1} \), etc.

31. \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{hg2}+ \) 32. \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{xg2}+ \) 33. \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{g4} \)

The rest is already quite easy.

34. \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{b5} \) 35. \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{g5} \) 36. \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{a5} \) 37. \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{xb4} \) 38. \( \text{a} \times \text{b4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 39. \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 40. \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{d5} \) 41. \( \text{e8+} \) \( \text{h7} \) 0-1

(5) Spielmann – Alekhine
Sicilian Defense [B40]

1.e4 \( \text{c5} \) 2. \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 3.d4 \( \text{cxd4} \) 4. \( \text{x} \times \text{d4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 5. \( \text{d3} \)

With this move, in my opinion, Black gets easy equality. More promising – but also more double-edged, on account of Black’s possible pressure on the c-file – is 5. \( \text{c3} \).

5. \( \text{c6} \) 6. \( \text{xc6} \)

To 6. \( \text{e3} \), 6... \( \text{d5} \) 7. \( \text{d2} \) e5!, etc., suffices for equality.

6. \( \text{dxc6} \)

After 6... \( \text{bxc6} \), the mobilization plan of 7. \( \text{e2} \), together with 8.0-0 and 9. \( \text{c4} \), etc., would have been unpleasant for Black.

7. \( \text{d2} \)

The knight, for whom no fine future beckons from c3, is steered to more promising squares. It’s plain, though, that this procedure can cause Black no great difficulties.

7...e5 8. \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c5}! \) 9. \( \text{e3} \)

Not 9. \( \text{xe5} ? \) \( \text{d4} \), etc.

9... \( \text{e3} \) 10. \( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 11.0-0 0-0

Black stands a tad better, mainly on account of the blockage on e4, which somewhat limits the freedom of movement of the white pieces. Still, an early
draw is anticipated following the hard-to-avoid rook exchange on the only open line.

12.\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}e2} \textit{\textbf{b}}b6 13.\textit{\textbf{c}}c3 \textit{\textbf{ad}}8 14.\textit{\textbf{fd}}1 \textit{\textbf{c}}c5

Unfortunately, White can’t so easily get around to doubling the rooks on the d-file, since after 14...\textit{\textbf{ed}}7, there follows 15.\textit{\textbf{dc}}4!, rather to White’s advantage.

15.\textit{\textbf{ac1}} a5

Otherwise 16.b2-b4.

16.\textit{\textbf{ab1}} g6

If immediately 16...a4, then 17.\textit{\textbf{xd}}8 \textit{\textbf{xd}}8 18.\textit{\textbf{ed}}1 \textit{\textbf{xd}}1+ 19.\textit{\textbf{xd}}1, and if 19...\textit{\textbf{b}}b6?, then 20.\textit{\textbf{a}}a4, threatening \textit{\textbf{a}}a8+, etc. Therefore \textit{luf}t was necessary.

17.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2 a4 18.\textit{\textbf{cd}}1 \textit{\textbf{b}}b6 19.\textit{\textbf{g}}g3

Although at the moment White influences the open file somewhat more than his opponent, White can’t strengthen Black’s position so easily – after 19.h3, for example, 19...\textit{\textbf{h}}h5 could well enough follow. The text move, however, which also should serve as preparation for a possible f4, allows the following simplifying maneuver.

19...\textit{\textbf{xd}}2 20.\textit{\textbf{xd}}2

If 20.\textit{\textbf{xd}}2, then of course, 20...\textit{\textbf{d}}d8, etc.

20...\textit{\textbf{g}}g4!

With this, Black apparently gets the advantage – but only just apparently. Certainly 21.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1 \textit{\textbf{g}}g7, with the threat ...\textit{\textbf{f}}f8-d8, etc., as well as 21.\textit{\textbf{x}}g4 \textit{\textbf{x}}g4, together with \textit{\textbf{d}}d8, etc., looks rather uncomfortable for White, but he has a face-saver in …

21.\textit{\textbf{f}}f5!

– which at least eliminates the unpleasant enemy bishop.

21...\textit{\textbf{x}}f5

There was no choice, since the variation 21...\textit{\textbf{xf}}5 22.\textit{\textbf{exf}}5 \textit{\textbf{xf}}2+ 23.\textit{\textbf{xf}}2 \textit{\textbf{xf}}2 24.\textit{\textbf{x}}f2 \textit{\textbf{d}}d5 25.\textit{\textbf{f}}f6! \textit{\textbf{e}}e8 26.\textit{\textbf{f}}f5!, etc., would obviously be very favorable for White.

22.\textit{\textbf{exf}}5 \textit{\textbf{f}}f6

Or first of all 22...\textit{\textbf{g}}g7.

23.\textit{\textbf{d}}d6

If 23.\textit{\textbf{g}}g5, then 23...\textit{\textbf{d}}d8!, etc.

23...\textit{\textbf{g}}g7 24.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2 \textit{\textbf{e}}8 25.\textit{\textbf{x}}g6 \textit{\textbf{hxg}}6 26.\textit{\textbf{b}}b4

Because of the threatened thrust of the e-pawn, White has hardly anything better than this offer to exchange, which, however, should suffice.

26...\textit{\textbf{xb}}4

If Black wanted to play for a win, then he could have pulled the queen back to a7 without risk. After the queen exchange, it would have been the most reasonable for him to accept the opponent’s correctly offered draw.

27.\textit{\textbf{cxb}}4

38
To his regret, the author has to state that this, his brain child – although it looks quite aesthetic on the surface – in no way merits the exclamation mark awarded it by most all critics. To the contrary, this move should have led, with correct technique on the part of the first player, to a compromise of the black position, and after 27...\(\text{d}5\) 28.a3 (or b5) \(\text{f}5\), etc., to an easy draw.

28.bxa3 \(\text{a}8\) 29.d3\(\text{c}4\) 30.e3

As desired, although not yet jeopardizing Black’s game; on the other hand, 30.b3! would have put a rather difficult task in front of the opponent, because after 30...\(\text{d}8\), then 31.a4! would follow – with the threat of speedily using the queenside pawn preponderance by means of a5, a4, together with b5, etc. Admittedly, different counterattacks – like ...\(\text{d}1+\), together with ...\(\text{d}2\) and ...\(\text{g}4\); or ...e3, together with ...\(\text{d}2\), etc. – were then at Black’s disposal. Yet, even so, a draw would be Black’s best result – and this only after a tough battle. If, however, 30.\(\text{b}3\) b5, then 31.\(\text{f}1\), and the Black rook couldn’t penetrate. Now Black forces a quite pleasant rook endgame.

30...\(\text{d}5\)! 31.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c}3\) 32.e1 \(\text{x}a3\) 33.f1 \(\text{f}6\) 34.h4 \(\text{x}b1\) 35.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{a}2\) 36.e1?

Hardly had the rook endgame begun, when White already commits the decisive error. As becomes immediately apparent, the idea to defend the b-pawn from the fourth rank is quite an unfortunate one, and the intended cordoning off of the black king from the queenside is not executable. Correct was 36.b3!, in connection with an immediate exploitation of the kingside chances; for example, 36...\(\text{e}5\) 37.e3+ \(\text{d}5\) 38.f3 \(\text{f}5\) 39.h5! g\(\times\)h5 40.\(\text{x}f5+\) c4 41.\(\text{x}h5\) \(\text{b}4\) 42.g4, etc. Then a drawn ending could hardly fail to materialize.

36...\(\text{a}4\) 37.e4 c5

As a result, Black obtains a winning position, since after \(\text{f}4+\), the pawn obviously still can’t be taken.

38.\(\text{f}4+\) \(\text{e}6\) 39.e4+ \(\text{f}6\)+

Although not in great time pressure, Black favors figuring out the not-so-easy-to-calculate consequences of the king move to d5 only after the time control at move 40. At this moment, he is certainly still able to allow himself this luxury. But his next, indifferent, move seriously imperils the win.

40.f4+ \(\text{e}7\) (?)

The king had to move specifically to e6, in order to be able to go from there immediately to d5, because he mustn’t.
go to f6 any more – since the position would repeat for the third time. After this omission, White again gets chances for a draw.

41. $e4+$ $d7

Contrived; after the simpler 43...$xh5 44.$xh5 b5, White would have a difficult game – for example, 45.h6 b3 46.$e3 b2 47.$b3 $c6! 48.$x$b2 $h4 =, etc.

But after 46.$xa4 (instead of 46.$e3) 46...bxa 47.h7 b2 48.$h8 $b1 $g2, the queen endgame would have been very difficult, if possible at all, for Black to win.

44.h6 b3 45.$e3

The rook exchange would clearly be less favorable now than in the variation above. On the other hand, now the fourth rank is blocked at the moment by the white g-pawn, so that White succeeds in capturing the enemy passed pawn, without having to surrender his own.

45...b2 46.$b3 $c6

Of course not 46...$a1+ 47.$g2 $b1 $g8 $x$b1, together with h7.

47.$b2(?)

This should also suffice; but 47.f3! $a3 (47...$a2 48.$g1!) 48.$x$b2 $f3+ 49.$g2 $e3 (-d3, -a3) 50.$f2, etc., was much easier.

47...$g4 48.$c2+ $b6

Black has to let the enemy rook advance to the eighth rank – since 48...$b7 49.$c5 b4?, would be a worse trap to fall into because of 50.$h5!

49.$c8 $h4 50.$h8 b4 51.$e2 $c7
Obviously, the king may not move forward because of h7, and the last, weak chance of a win for Black now consists in his crossing over, where possible, to the kingside.

52.\textit{g}d3 \textit{h}h3+ 53.\textit{c}c2 b3+

If 53...\textit{f}f3, then 54.\textit{f}f8! \textit{xf}2+ 55.\textit{b}b3 \textit{h}2 56.\textit{xf}7+, together with ...h7 – draw.

54.\textit{c}c1!

More exact than 54.\textit{tb}2 \textit{td}6 55.\textit{a}a5 \textit{e}5! 56.\textit{xb}3 \textit{x}h6 =, etc.

54...\textit{h}h1+ 55.\textit{b}b2 \textit{d}d6

The winning of the f2-pawn with 55...\textit{h}h2 was still of no importance on account of a later \textit{f}f8, etc.

56.\textit{b}b3

Here White appears to have seen a ghost, since otherwise he would have chosen the quite simple path to a draw: 56.h7 \textit{e}7 57.\textit{xb}3 \textit{f}6 58.\textit{c}c3 \textit{g}7 59.\textit{a}a8 \textit{h}7 60.\textit{d}d2, etc. Even so, White can allow himself some things in this position.

56...\textit{e}5! 57.\textit{c}c4

After an inferior move – again quite a good one. His idea consists in answering the threatening advance of the black king in case of need with an analogous maneuver of his own – for example, 57...\textit{e}4 58.\textit{c}c5! \textit{f}3 59.\textit{d}d6 \textit{xf}2 60.\textit{e}7 \textit{f}5 61.\textit{f}6, etc., draw. What’s more, 58. \textit{d}d3 looms, with a fully secure position.

57...\textit{h}3!

Black still tries everything possible, but should not have succeeded.

58.\textit{e}8+

In connection with the following, probably the simplest process.

58...\textit{f}f5 59.\textit{d}d4! \textit{h}h6 60.\textit{e}e3 \textit{g}g4 61.\textit{e}e4+

With this, the next mistake is prepared. Safest was to reach a draw with 61.\textit{e}e2! \textit{h}h1 62.\textit{e}e4+ \textit{f}f5 63.\textit{a}a4, etc.

61...\textit{h}h3

![Chess Board Diagram]

62.\textit{f}4?

With this instructive mistake, White allows the decisive encircling of his remaining pawn. 62.\textit{e}e2, etc., would still have sufficed for a draw.

62...\textit{f}5 63.\textit{f}f3+

Loses quickly, but after 63.\textit{a}a4, as well as after 63.\textit{e}e2, Black would ultimately won with 63...\textit{g}g2, etc.

63...\textit{h}h2! 64.\textit{f}f4 \textit{h}h3+ 0–1
There would follow 65. ... g2, whereupon the white pawn obviously can't be saved.

(6) Marshall – Vidmar
Four Knights Game [C49]

1.e4 e5 2.c3 c6 3.f3 f6 4.b5 b4 5.0-0 0-0 6.d3 c3+ 7.bxc3 d6 8.g5 e7

The well-known Metger Defense, which usually leads to difficult positional battles after 9.eel d8-e6, and lately is preferred, especially by Rubinstein. It's not so dangerous for White, however, that he has to immediately lay waste to the position by the following unimaginative exchange.

9.xc6(? ) bxc6 10. b1

If the first player let himself be misled into the exchange on c6 because of his ensuing occupation of the b-file, then he evidently overestimated the value of this pressure – because the penetration-point b7 is protected for now, and even if the white rook succeeds in occupying it for a moment, this fact wouldn't have great meaning in most cases.

10...h6 11. xf6

After 11.g4, ...g5 could have occurred quite harmlessly.

11... xf6 12. c2

More prudent first would be 12.c4, in order not to have to work with the dubious sacrificial offers that follow.

12... e6!

Not only is xa2 threatened, but also f5 14. exf5 xf5, etc., with a clear positional advantage. Therefore Marshall decides to go all out.

13. h4?

This queen move, in connection with the following repetition, bears witness to a timidity in no way resembling the usual Dr. Vidmar. After 13... xa2, what dangers hovered before him? After 14.c4 (otherwise the queen heads back immediately), 14... a5 15.f4 (or 15. e3 c7) 15...e5f4 (or first 15... c5+) 16. xf4 g5 17. xf1 a5 16. xf1, g5-a5, etc., White probably would have sought in vain for compensation for the dangerous passed pawn. In any case, the position was worth playing out.

14. f3 e6 15. h4

Encouraged by the opponent's apparent peacefulness, for the second time White lets the pawn hang.

15... f6? 16. f3 e6 ½-½

Draw!
Round 3

1 Capablanca – Marshall 0
½ Alekhine – Nimzovich ½
½ Vidmar – Spielmann ½

Standings after Round 3:

Capablanca 2 ½
Alekhine 2
Nimzovich 1 ½
Vidmar 1 ½
Spielmann 1
Marshall ½

(7) Capablanca – Marshall
Bogo-Indian Defense [E11]

1.d4 ½f6 2.½f3 e6 3.c4 ½b4+ 4.½d2 ½xd2+ 5.½b×d2 d5?

Just after White had taken back with the knight, it was entirely out of place to introduce the prospect of a piece coming to the c4-square by bringing about a balanced position in the center. Instead, now 5...d6, together with ...e5, is in accord with the bishop exchange on the fourth move – in order to occupy the dark squares, no longer guarded by the bishop – which disappeared so quickly – with pawns.

6.g3 0-0 7.½g2 ½bd7 8.0-0 ½e7

Likewise, the immediate 8...b6 came under consideration here. But the text move is not as bad as the commentators have said.

9.½c2 b6 (!)

Looks like a kind of blunder, but in reality exactly calculated. Neither could White have obtained a tangible and strong advantage with continuations other than the one he chose – for example, 10.½e5 ½xe5 11.dxe5 ½g4! 12.c×d5 e×d5 13.½d×d5 ½b8, and e5 falls.

Or instead of the 11th move played in the game (11. e4), 11.a3, then 11...c5!, and Black, who would sometimes have the tempo-gainer 12...½a6 at his disposal, would apparently emerge unscathed.

10.c×d5 ½×d5 11.e4 ½b4!

The point of the relief maneuver, introduced with 9...b6. On the other hand, unsatisfactory would be 11...½f6 12.½xc7 ½a6 13.½fc1 ½fc8 14.½f4 ½b4, on account of 15.½b3 or 15.b3, etc.

12.½c3 (!)

In this way, at least the troublesome knight is driven to the modest a6-square. Wrong, of course, would be 12.½xc7? because of 12...½a6, together with ½fc8, etc.

12...c5

Not 12...½a6?, because of 13.a3! ½xf1 14.½xf1, etc.

13.a3 ½a6
New York 1927

Unfavorable would be 13...\(\text{c6}\), on account of 14.d5!, etc.

14.dxc5

Very characteristic of Capablanca's style, a resolution of tension that, admittedly, eliminates even the idea of the danger of a loss for him, but met with a correct—and a very obvious—response, should lead to very little. A more complicated game—and in my opinion one in White's favor—would result from 14.\(\text{fe1}\!\!\!\,\text{b7}\) 15.d5, or the immediate 14.d5.

14...bxc5?

Unbelievable, since taking back with the queen appears to be a downright matter of course. After 14...\(\text{x}c5\) 15.\(\text{ac1}\) (or 15.\(\text{e}3\!\!\!\,\text{e}5\), or 15.\(\text{c}4\!\!\!\,\text{b}5\), etc.) 15...\(\text{x}c3\) 16.\(\text{x}c3\!\!\!\,\text{b7}\) 17.\(\text{b}4\!\!\!\,\text{e}6\), together with \(\text{ad}8\), etc. Black would have reached a draw without difficulty. Instead he gets an incurable pawn weakness on the queenside without any offsetting counter-attack. A sad game!

15.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{b}7\) 16.\(\text{fe}5\)!

Again, a true Capablanca move, but this time, a flawless one. The idea, to keep just the "good" c4-knight against the "bad one" on a6—while he eliminates the other two through exchange—is convincing.

16...\(\text{x}e5\) 17.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{ad}8\) 18.\(\text{fd}1\)

Threatens the unpleasant invasion of the knight to d6.

18...\(\text{f}6\) 19.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{x}d1+\) 20.\(\text{x}d1\) \(\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{d}3\)

Also, the immediate 21.\(\text{x}d8+\), together with 22.\(\text{b}3\), was strong, although not yet decisive.

21...\(\text{b}8\)

Apparently Capablanca had waited for this attempt to lead the knight back to lively regions, in order to take advantage, where possible, of the momentarily adjourned position of the black pieces on the b-file. With proper defense, it shouldn’t have been so easy for him to succeed.

22.\(\text{x}d8+\) \(\text{x}d8\) 23.\(\text{b}3\!\!\!\,\text{a}6\) 24.\(\text{h}3\)

It’s clear at first sight that Black isn’t exactly sitting pretty. But that he decides to give away the threatened pawn without a fight can be explained only through a combinational miscalculation or an unreal notion of attack. In fact, after 24...\(\text{f}7\)—although this move appears risky enough—no direct benefit for White can be established; for example, 25.\(\text{e}3\!\!\!\,\text{c}8\!)—and now 26.\(\text{f}5\!\!\!\,\text{c}7\), as well as 26.\(\text{xe}6+\!\!\!\,\text{xe}6\) 27.\(\text{xb}8\!\!\!\,\text{xe}4\) 28.\(\text{xa}7\!\!\!\,\text{b}7\), etc., is to no avail. White would have to look for (but would he find?) subtler ways
Cycle I: Round 3

to give the game a make-or-break twist after 24...f7.

25.\textit{\textit{d}x}e6+ \textit{\textit{h}}8 26.\textit{\textit{d}d}5

Any thought of attack by Black is nipped in the bud by the guarded central position of the white bishop.

26...\textit{\textit{d}d}4 27.\textit{\textit{a}a}4 \textit{\textit{c}c}4 28.\textit{\textit{c}c}4 \textit{\textit{c}c}8 29.\textit{\textit{g}g}2 \textit{\textit{g}g}4

Desperation, since White, among other things, threatens 30.b4.

30.e5!

Decisive.

30...fxe5 31.\textit{\textit{f}f}5 32.\textit{\textit{f}f}8+ \textit{\textit{h}h}7 33.\textit{\textit{g}g}8+ \textit{\textit{h}h}6 34.\textit{\textit{d}d}6+ g6 35.\textit{\textit{f}f}8+ 1--0

(8) Alekhine – Nimzovich
English Opening [A14]

1.\textit{\textit{f}f}3 \textit{\textit{f}f}6 2.\textit{\textit{c}c}4 e6 3.\textit{\textit{c}c}3 b6 4.\textit{g}3

Other than this system of development, which was very popular a few years ago mainly because of Réti's successes with it, White can very well use one of the following variations: (1) 4.d4 \textit{\textit{b}b}7 5.\textit{\textit{g}g}5, together with e3, 7.\textit{\textit{d}d}3, etc.; (2) 4.e4 \textit{\textit{b}b}7 5.d3 (5.e5? \textit{\textit{e}e}4) – this last according to a stratagem introduced, not without success, by Nimzovich in Dresden 1926.

4...\textit{\textit{b}b}7 5.\textit{\textit{g}g}2 c5 6.0-0 \textit{\textit{e}e}7 7.b3 (?)

After 7.d4 cxd4 8.\textit{\textit{x}x}d4 \textit{\textit{x}x}g2 9.\textit{\textit{x}x}g2, etc., things would be good for White (see a similar position in the Capablanca-Vidmar game from the fourth round). But now the opponent succeeds in seizing the initiative.

7...d5! 8.\textit{\textit{e}e}5

Recognizing the inexpediency of his last move, White wants at any cost to complicate the game with a defensive position sufficient for a draw, instead of simply 8.cxd5 \textit{\textit{d}d}5 9.\textit{\textit{b}b}2 \textit{\textit{f}f}6, etc.

8...\textit{\textit{b}b}7 9.f4

The consequence of the previous move, since any exchange in the center would only further the enemy's development.

9...\textit{\textit{d}d}6 10.cxd5

A testimony to momentary lack of courage and resolve! As the conductor of the white pieces proved upon completion of the game, Black would be able to get a promising game here if he had decided on a – probably only temporarily – pawn sacrifice. For example, 10...\textit{\textit{x}x}e5 11.fxe5 \textit{\textit{d}d}xe5 12.dxe6 \textit{\textit{x}x}g2 13.\textit{\textit{e}e}f7+ \textit{\textit{x}x}f7 14.\textit{\textit{x}x}g2 \textit{\textit{e}e}8!, with strong pressure on the center file – mainly because of the weakened position of the white king. After the text
move, White may get an advantage more easily.

11.\( \square c4! \)

Black seems to have overlooked this simple response.

11...\( \text{b}8! \)

Still the only move, since a retreat of the bishop would have had an immediate disadvantage because of 12.\( \text{e}3! \), etc.

12.\( \text{x}d6+12...\text{x}d6 13.d3 \)

White, dissatisfied with his handling of the opening, aspires only to a draw and frees the center. Instead of this, with the continuation 13.d4 0-0 14.a3, etc., he could still fashion a game quite interesting and risk-free for himself since, in this case, the pressure from White's bishops on the c- and d-pawns would have been more than sufficient compensation for any possible black counterplay on the e-file.

13...0-0 14.e4 dxe4 15.dxe4 \( \text{d}4+ \)

The only move, but sufficient.

16.\( \text{x}d4  \text{c}d4 17.\text{d}5 \text{x}d5 18.e\text{x}d5 \text{f}6 19.a2 \text{x}d5 20.\text{x}d4 \text{g}2 21.\text{g}2 \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2} \)

Black of course plays 21. ...\( \text{d}5 \) and keeps the knight in this strong position.

(9) Vidmar – Spielmann
Queen's Indian Defense [E14]

1.d4 \( \text{f}6 2.\text{f}3 \text{c}5 3.e3 \)

By all means, very tame. If White doesn't want to opt for 3.d5, which usually has a downside, then he can well enough try 3.c4; if after that, 3...\( \text{c}d4 4.\text{d}d4 \text{e}6 5.\text{c}3 \), which happened, among other games, in Przepiórka-Spielmann, Munich 1926, then 6.\( \text{b}3 \text{a}6 7.g3! \pm .

3...\( \text{b}6 \)

But this response is artificial and in this respect illogical, as White will succeed, with d5, in blocking the diagonal of the fianchettoed bishop. Instead of this, the simple 3...d5 (4.\( \text{d}3 \text{c}6 \), or perhaps 4. ...\( \text{g}4 \), etc.), as well as the temporizing 3...e6, could occur without disadvantage.

4.\( \text{c}4! \)

Naturally.

4...\( \text{c}d4 5.e\text{d}4 \text{e}6 6.\text{d}3 \text{b}7 7.0-0 \text{e}7 8.\text{c}3 0-0 (?) \)

After this imprecise move, Black could have gotten into an awkward defensive position. Correct was first of all 8...d6, in order to be able to answer 9.d5 with 9...e5.

9.d5! d6

Obviously disadvantageous would be 9...\( \text{e}d5 10.\text{c}d5 \text{d}5 11.\text{d}5 \text{h}7+ \), together with 13.\( \text{d}5 \pm.

10.\( \text{c}e6 (?) \)

Playing on the apparent weaknesses, d6 and e6, is obvious, and superficially tempting. But Black gets more than sufficient counter-play in his reinvigorated queen's bishop and the open f-file. The logical consequence of the previous
move was 10.\textit{d}d4! e5 (10...\textit{c}c8 11.\textit{e}e1) 11.\textit{f}f5, together with 12.f4, etc., with a positional advantage difficult to offset.

10...f\times e6 11.\textit{d}d4

Offering better prospects is 11.\textit{g}g5 \textit{c}c8 12.\textit{e}e1 e5 13.\textit{c}c2, for example, 13...h6 (better is 13...\textit{g}g4) 14.\textit{f}f5 \textit{c}c6 15.\textit{d}d5!, etc. The advance of the knight, intended with the text move, proved meaningless.

11...\textit{c}c8! 12.\textit{e}e2

Also after 12.\textit{e}e1, Black gradually would have gotten counter-play; for example, 12...e5 13.\textit{f}f5 \textit{bd}7 14.\textit{e}e6+ \textit{h}h8 15.\textit{f}f5 \textit{e}e8 16.\textit{x}d6 \textit{\times}d6 17.\textit{d}d5 18.\textit{\times}d5 \textit{c}c5+, etc.

12...e5 13.\textit{f}f5 \textit{bd}7 14.\textit{e}e6+ \textit{h}h8 15.\textit{f}f5 \textit{e}e8 16.\textit{g}g3

Disappointed over the failure of his imprecisely calculated expedition (16.\textit{f}f5? \textit{c}c5!, etc.), Dr. Vidmar sounds the retreat rather than securing the weapon — although in this position rather harmless — of the bishop pair with 16.\textit{\times}e7 \textit{c}c7 17.\textit{h}h3, etc. Now Black’s counter-play on the c-file begins.

16...\textit{c}c5 17.\textit{h}h3 \textit{c}c6 18.\textit{e}e3 \textit{ae}8 19.\textit{\times}c5?

The voluntary exchange of this bishop, which was so necessary for the defense of the dark squares, is inconceivable from a player of Dr. Vidmar’s class. For example, 19.\textit{fd}1 (19...\textit{e}e6 20.\textit{d}d5, etc.) was possible, when White was not at all without chances.

19...\textit{\times}c5 20.\textit{ac}1

Still, 20.\textit{fd}1 appears to be more logical.

20...\textit{a}a6! 21.\textit{ce}4 \textit{xe}4 22.\textit{xe}4 \textit{ac}6 23.\textit{ae}3?

Clearly, White overlooks that his c-pawn can be taken; otherwise he would have deflected the threat, ...d5 — for example, with 23.\textit{d}d3! (23...d5 24.\textit{\times}d5, \textit{\times}d5 25.\textit{d}d5 \textit{xf}1 26.\textit{xf}1, whereupon his position could without a doubt be held. After the text mistake, on the other hand, Black obtains a decidedly winning position.

23...\textit{xc}4!

An unpleasant surprise for White. With 24.\textit{b}3?, he would not only fail to win a piece after 24...d5 25.\textit{d}d2 \textit{ac}5 or 25.\textit{g}g5 \textit{gg}6, but would even suffer a material disadvantage. And as he plays, it’s true he succeeds in momentarily avoiding the threatening pawn sacrifice, but only at the cost of further strengthening Black’s pressure on both flanks.

24.\textit{d}d2 d5 25.\textit{xc}4 \textit{dxc}4 26.\textit{\times}e5 \textit{xc}5?

From this moment on, it is again Black who begins to play more and more
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weakly, until he brings about a drawn position. More compelling than this threat on f2 was strengthening the pressure on the queenside by means of 26...Qf6! – for example, 27.g4 b5 28.Qd2 Qc5! 29.Qc2 Qd4 or b4, etc., with threats that in the long run would be indefensible.

27.Qh5 Qf6

Putting the queen on the f-file and thereby leaving d4 exposed is in any case clumsy preparation for 27...Qxf2+. Strong was 27...Qe4! (threatening 28...Qxh2!, etc.) 28.Qh1 Qxf2, and White wouldn’t get in the important defensive move g3, as he did in the game.

28.Qh1! Qxf2 29.g3

The pitfall 29.Qxc4 Qg3! was already clear (30.Qg1 Qe1 31.hxg3 Qxg1+, together with Qf6-f1+xc4).

29...Qc6+

Although the chances of winning had in large part evaporated during the last moves, there’s a last attempt to make here with 29...Qe5 30.Qd1 Qc6+ 31.Qg2 Qc5, etc.

30.Qg2 Qc5 31.Qxc5 Qxc5 32.Qxc4 Qxf1+ 33.Qxf1 Qf8 ½-½

Round 4

(10) Capablanca – Vidmar
English Opening [A30]

1.d4 Qf6 2.Qf3 e6 3.c4 b6 4.g3 Qb7 5.Qg2 c5

½ Capablanca – Vidmar ½
½ Marshall – Alekhine ½
1 Nimzovich – Spielmann 0

Standings after Round 4:

- Capablanca 3
- Alekhine 2½
- Nimzovich 2½
- Vidmar 2
- Spielmann 1
- Marshall 1

I still consider this move disadvantageous because of the possibility of 6.d5, and prefer both 5...Qb4+ and 5...Qe7.

6.0-0

On the other hand, this answer, although sound, is quite harmless in nature, and allows Black various ways to reach equality.

6...cxd4 7.Qxd4 Qxg2 8.Qxg2 Qe7

But this is inconsequential, since Black absolutely had to aspire as quickly as possible to deal with the weakness on the d-file. Admittedly, with this in mind, the immediate 8...d5 wouldn’t yet go well because of 9.Qa4+! (Capablanca-Alekhine, third match game) – but 8...Qc8! would have been the proper preparation to this end; for example, 9.b3 (9.Qd3 Qc6!) 9...Qe7 10.Qb2 Qb7+ 11.f3 d5 12.cxd5 Qxd5 13.Qd2 0-0 14.e4 Qf6, etc.

9.Qc3 0-0 (?)

Still, 9...Qc8 (10.b3 d5!, etc.) comes into keen consideration. After the text
move, the d-pawn remains perpetually underdeveloped.

10.e4!  £c8

A tempo too late!

11.b3  £b7  12.f3  £c6  13.Bb2  £fd8  14.Be1  £xd4

Dr. Vidmar played less than exactly the whole first part of the game. For example, why did he need to develop the White queen here? Simpler was immediately ...d6.

15.£xd4  £c5 (?)

And now this obvious loss of tempo!

16.£d3  £e7  17.£ad1  d6

In spite of many inaccuracies, the Black position is still rather solid since, as is well known, d6 in this variation in the middle game can be defended without difficulty. In the following play, Capablanca tries to implement his only serious chance, a flank attack. Actually, this plan demands quite a rigorous defense from his opponent, who certainly possesses substantially smaller freedom of terrain.

18.£e2  £d7  19.£ed2  £ad8  20.£e2

The simplest way to prevent ...d5 once and for all (because of £xf6, etc.).

20...£a8

In order to move the knight to e8, which at this point one would hesitate to relocate because of 21.e5!.

21.£e3  h6  22.h4  £b7  23.a4

To prevent the liberating possibility ...b5 for all time.

23...£e8  24.£f4  £f6  25.£xf6  £x£f6  26.g4  £h7

Therefore White's attack has only little chance of success, because the knight on f4 is restricted in its movement since d5 is guarded. If the knight abandons this square (for h5, for example), e5 could occur much sooner. Then interesting possibilities would open up for the Black knight to break into the position. So Capablanca soon starts to prepare himself for the transition to a rook endgame.

27.£c3  £f8  28.g5  hxg5  29.hxg5  £h7

Hear, hear! If now 30...£h5, then 30...e5 31.£g3  £c7, together with ...£f8 and ...£d8, etc. White has nothing better than to exchange.

30.£xg6  fxg6  31.£d4  £c6

The occupation of c5 establishes a satisfactory counter-trump for Black.

32.£g3  £c5  33.f4  £f7  34.£g4  a5  35.£h2
35...\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}4?}

Since White (1) can't trade queens without disadvantage (on account of ...\textit{bxc5}, together with pressure on b3; or here even because of ...\textit{dxc5}, together with advancing into the d-file); and (2) likewise White couldn't very well avoid the queen exchange (\textit{c3} or \textit{b2}) because of ...\textit{d5!}, etc. – here a temporizing attitude was the simplest way to a draw. Thus correct for Black was \textit{g8-f7-g8}, etc., until White himself decided to change the position. The fact that, instead of this, Dr. Vidmar got himself into an at least dubious endgame, without being forced, is probably explained only by time pressure.

36.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xe}7 37.\textit{hd}2 \textit{ed}7 38.f5

In my opinion, this strategic break ought better to occur after the next tempo; for example, 38.\textit{fd}3! \textit{e}7 (or \textit{e}8) 39.f5 \textit{xf}5+ (if 39...\textit{xf}7 40.f6, together with 41.\textit{d}5, followed by \textit{b}5 – or sometimes, \textit{e}5 ±). 40.\textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}5+ 41.\textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}7 42.g6+, with a winning position. In other variations also, the positional advantage is transformed into tangible assets more easily than with the text move.

38...\textit{gf}5+ 39.\textit{ef}5 \textit{xf}5+ 40.\textit{xf}5 \textit{g}6+ 41.\textit{gf}4 \textit{f}8

The only – if temporary – save against the threat \textit{f}2+ and \textit{f}6, with a winning position. If 41...\textit{e}8, then 42.\textit{h}2!, etc. (see below).

42.\textit{mf}2+?

This leads only to a draw. The correct utilization of the painstakingly achieved advantage had to begin with a tempo move – for example, 42.\textit{d}4! If next 42...\textit{e}8, then 43.\textit{h}2!, and after the exchange of the rook pair, the remaining White rook would advance either to \textit{f}6 or \textit{b}8: 43...\textit{xf}8 (or 43...\textit{xf}7 44.\textit{h}6, etc.) 44.\textit{f}3+ \textit{g}7 45.\textit{f}6 (threatening 46.\textit{h}6) 45...\textit{xf}8 46.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 47.\textit{h}8+ \textit{g}7 – anywhere 48.\textit{b}8, etc. On the other hand, Capablanca forces the rook exchange with an unfavorable change in the position of his pawns, so that Dr. Vidmar saves the game easily.

42...\textit{f}7 43.\textit{mf}6

If 43.Rfd2, then 43...\textit{Ke}7=.

43...\textit{x}6 44.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}7 45.\textit{g}5 \textit{e}8 46.\textit{x}6 \textit{e}5+ 47.\textit{f}4 \textit{e}6

Much simpler than ...\textit{f}5+, ...\textit{x}6.

48.\textit{d}5 \textit{xf}6

The gentlemen could have saved themselves the following.

49.\textit{b}5 \textit{e}7 50.\textit{g}5 \textit{c}6 51.\textit{h}6 \textit{f}8 52.\textit{g}5 \textit{f}7 53.\textit{g}3 \textit{e}6 54.\textit{d}3 \textit{e}5 55.\textit{h}7+ \textit{f}6 56.\textit{d}6+ \textit{f}7 \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}
(11) Marshall – Alekhine  
Torre Attack [A47]  

1.d4 Ιf6 2.Ιf3 b6  

It’s more common recently to start with ...e6 and only then ...b6. The most played riposte, 3.c4, admittedly results in a mere transposition, and only the move applied by Marshall in this game puts the contest on another track.  

3.Ιg5 3.Ιb7  

If Black had played ...e6 on the second move, then 3...c5, together with ...ιb8, etc., would have been available, as is well known. On the other hand, here 3...c5 would be unfavorable because of the response 4.d5. Other than the move played, only the answer 3...ιe4 came into consideration for Black – for example, with the continuance 4.ιh4 ιb7 5.ιbd2 ιxd2 6.ιxd2 (6.ιxd2 c5!, ...g6, together with ...ιg7, etc.) – when the not-so-easily eliminated bishop pressure on e7 would create an Achilles’ Heel.  

4.ιbd2 e6  

A dangerous experiment: only because of the pair of bishops does Black allow the opponent to occupy a strong central position in good old style. Less accommodating and also more in harmony with the second move here was 4...c5!.  

5.e4 h6 6.ιxf6 ιxf6 7.ιd3 d6 8.ιe2 ιd8  

In order to develop the king’s bishop, which would be questionable to do at this time because of 9.e5. Black falls behind in development and already has to grasp at such artificial, strained maneuvers just to keep afloat. Permitting e4 without a struggle was just reprehensible.  

9.0-0 ιe7 10.ιad1  

Until this, White had made the right moves. But here it was time, in light of his better development, to conceive a vigorous middlegame plan – for example, to construct a mighty attack position with 10.ιc3, and on 10...ιd7, 11.ιe1!!, together with 12.f4, 13.ιe3, 14.ιe1, etc., without allowing the opponent any kind of a chance. The text move is certainly not bad, but has the small disadvantage of allowing the following counterblow in the center.  

10...ιd7 11.c3 c5 (!)  

Black had to, cost what it would, somehow distract the opponent from his thoughts about mate, before he decides to castle. After 11...0-0 12.ιe1!!, followed by 13.f4, together possibly with ιe1-c2-ιe3, would be alarming.  

12.ιxc5  

With this, he changes his plan and wants to profit from the d-file. His next move, however, already shows that he had not quite worked out the precise details of this plausible plan.  

12...ιxc5 13.ιb5?  

After this, Black succeeds in completely securing himself, and even gradually gets an advantage. White should try to rob his opponent of his only effective counter-weapon, the pair of bishops, and with this in mind, by all means play
13...a6. With 13...\texttt{a}x\texttt{a}6 14.\texttt{w}x\texttt{a}6 \texttt{b}b6, etc., Black would admittedly avoid immediate material disadvantage – but the weaknesses of his queenside light squares, together with the d6-square’s need for protection, would doubtlessly give him serious concerns during the further course of the game.

13...a6

Not immediately 13...0-0 because of 14.\texttt{c}c4 \texttt{c}7 15.\texttt{x}d7! \texttt{x}d7 16.\texttt{c}x\texttt{d}6 \texttt{a}x\texttt{d}6 17.e5±, etc.

14.\texttt{a}a4 0-0-0 15.\texttt{c}c2

The bishop actually has nothing better than to retreat ruefully, because if 15.\texttt{c}c4, Black would have a satisfactory parry in 15...\texttt{b}b6.

15...\texttt{c}7 16.\texttt{c}c4 \texttt{f}d8 17.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{f}8 18.\texttt{f}d1

All these efforts to take advantage of the supposed weakness on d6 remain unsuccessful and have, as a consequence, only promoted further development of the Black pieces.

18...a5

Perhaps more exact was 18...\texttt{b}b8, in order to relinquish b5 to the White pieces only in an emergency. But the text move proves to be good.

19.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{ab}8 20.\texttt{a}a3 \texttt{g}6!

The knight has just advanced proudly to b5 – now events prove that he could not be kept there without an offsetting positional disadvantage. Because if the threat 22...\texttt{f}4 is warded off with 23.g3, then Black has the pleasant choice between 23...c4 24.\texttt{c}x\texttt{c}4 \texttt{x}e4, etc., or possibly ...d5, exploiting the weakness of the h1-a8 diagonal.

22...c4 23.\texttt{b}d4 \texttt{c}5 24.\texttt{b}1

The second player succeeds not only in overcoming the opening difficulties, but also in getting a not-to-be-undervalued middlegame as well as an endgame target, in the form of the fixed pawn on b2. For the purpose of utilizing the opportunity, 24...\texttt{a}8, together with \texttt{b}b6, \texttt{db}8, etc., probably makes the most sense at this juncture. Also 24...\texttt{f}8, as preparation for the knight move to e5, has much to say for itself. Instead of this, a small, hasty slip occurs, which permits the opponent to force an equalizing simplification of the game.

24...\texttt{e}5 (?) 25.\texttt{x}e5 dxe5

With 25...\texttt{e}5, White would come by an attack with 26.f4, together with doubled rooks on the f-file, and ultimately e5.

26.\texttt{f}5!

The only move, because if, for example, 26.\texttt{c}c2, then 26...\texttt{x}d2 27.\texttt{x}d2 \texttt{c}6!, etc., to Black’s clear advantage.
26...\x{03C4}x d2 27.\x{03A6}xe7+ \x{03A6}xe7 28.\x{03C4}x d2!

After 28.\x{03C4}x d2 \x{03A6}c6!, together with ...\x{03A6}a4, Black would remain with the advantage. Now however, the somewhat passive position of the bishop on b1 and the weakness on b2 is compensated for by the fact that White controls the only open file. The game could actually already have been a draw here. But Marshall imagines things look better - obtaining, however, in the next dozen moves, only a worsening of his pawn position, whereby his kingside dark squares are weakened.

28...\x{03A6}c6 29.h3 \x{03A6}b7 30.\x{03A6}e2 \x{03A6}b5 31.\x{03A6}d1 \x{03A6}h7 32.\x{03A6}f3 \x{03A6}e8 33.\x{03A6}e3 \x{03A6}c6 34.a3

Hardly necessary at this point. This move, which condemned the b-pawn to immobility, should have occurred only in the case of ...a4.

34...\x{03A6}b7 35.\x{03A6}e2 \x{03A6}b5 36.\x{03A6}e3 \x{03A6}c6 37.f3 \x{03A6}e7 38.\x{03A6}a2 \x{03A6}b5 39.\x{03A6}h2 \x{03A6}a6 40.\x{03A6}e2? \x{03A6}c5

After White, without an obvious reason, abandons the important diagonal g1-a7, Black’s position is preferable.

41.\x{03A6}d7 \x{03A6}b5 42.\x{03A6}d2

Obviously not 42.\x{03A6}xf7? \x{03A6}g8, etc.

42...\x{03A6}b7 43.\x{03A6}b1

From here on, with the “threat” of f4, White begins to speculate about the following discovered check. At any moment, Black was able to put an end to his opponent’s hopes with ...g6, to-

gether with ...\x{03A6}g7, etc., but didn’t want to, because he himself was dreaming of winning chances after f4.

43...\x{03A6}a4 44.\x{03A6}a2 \x{03A6}b5 45.\x{03A6}b1 \x{03A6}a4 46.\x{03A6}h1

So that after f4xe5, the black queen recaptures without check.

46...\x{03A6}b6

If Black didn’t want to decide on ...g6, then 46...\x{03A6}b8 would be better here. If White then hadn’t also been fooled into f4, he certainly would have slowly fallen into a disadvantage anyway.

47.f4

This strategically defective move is still playable here on account of a tactical trick. As will be seen, Black now could well-nigh force a drawn ending – but since White couldn’t win without this move, the break through is not to be blamed.

47...\x{03A6}b3

It’s clear that 47...exf4 would be disadvantageous because of 48.e5+, ...g6 49.\x{03A6}d4, etc. But by the same token, the c4-pawn has to be covered somehow
because of the threat 48.fxe5, together with \( \text{c}4 \). With this in mind, other than the text move, only 47...\( \text{b}5 \) and \( \text{c}6 \) come under consideration. With the former, White probably would have chosen the same continuation as in the game and with approximately the same effect; but in the second case, the continuation 48. fxe5 \( \text{e}5 \) 49. \( \text{d}5 \), \( \text{f}4 \)! 50. e5+, \( \text{g}6 \) 51. \( \text{x}a5 \), etc., would have been more unpleasant for the Black.

48.fxe5 \( \text{e}5 \) 49.\( \text{e}3 \)!

Now the downsides of Black's 46th move are clearly evident, since this important queen move can occur with an attack tempo. On the other hand, the immediate 49. \( \text{d}5 \) would fail because of 49...\( \text{f}4 \)!
50. e5+, \( \text{g}6 \) 51. \( \text{d}2 \), \( \text{b}5 \), etc., when Black would have the advantage.

49...\( \text{c}6 \)

With 49...\( \text{g}5 \) 50.e5+ \( \text{g}6 \) 51.\( \text{f}3 \)
52.\( \text{x}f7 \) 53.\( \text{f}8 \)\! 54.\( \text{x}g6 \)\! 55.\( \text{f}6 \), \( \text{h}7 \), etc., Black was immediately able to force a draw. With the text move, he goes for complications in the hope of withstanding the dangerous-looking attack and then being able successfully to assail the somewhat exposed e-pawn. As the outcome shows, the plan is far too risky and should ultimately turn out to his disadvantage.

50.\( \text{d}5 \)!

The entire change of attack initiated with move 47 is based on this riposte. The bishop, immobile for so long, finally has his say and as a result, his gamboling on the diagonal b1-h7 will cause the opponent a series of difficulties.

50...\( \text{c}7 \) 51.e5+ \( \text{g}8 \)

After 51...\( \text{g}6 \) 52.\( \text{d}4 \), with the threat of 53.\( \text{h}4 \), would be unbearable.

52.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{f}8 \)

The king needs to remove himself as quickly as possible from the bishop's diagonal. By the way, 52...\( \text{c}5 \) would obviously be premature because of 53.\( \text{e}4 \), etc.

53.\( \text{f}4 \)

With the strong threat 54.\( \text{g}6 \), perhaps together with 55.\( \text{d}8+ \).

53...\( \text{e}7 \)

54.\( \text{h}7! \)

A very strong move, whose idea consists mainly of getting the bishop off the back rank without loss of time, which should be of great importance. First of all, there's the very strong threat of 55.\( \text{g}8 \), etc., forcing the next retreat of the queen.

54...\( \text{b}8 \) 55.\( \text{g}3! \) \( \text{c}5 \)

Black has to try this counterattack, since with the defense 55...\( \text{f}8 \), the move
56.\textit{\textcopyright{}}g4! would be very unpleasant; for example, 56...\textit{\textcopyright{}}g6 57.\textit{\textcopyright{}}x\textit{\textcopyright{}}g6! f\textit{\textcopyright{}}xg6 58.\textit{\textcopyright{}}xg6, etc., or 56...g5 57.\textit{\textcopyright{}}f3, \textit{\textcopyright{}}c5 58.\textit{\textcopyright{}}e4!, etc., with decisive advantage.

56.\textit{\textcopyright{}}e4 (?)

Marshall took advantage of Black's cocky 49th move quite nicely, and at last gets the advantage. But instead of choosing an obvious continuation, which would have assured him a favorable endgame, he can't resist, considering his style of play, the attempt to go for further complexities – be it also \textit{per nefas} - in the hope of mating his opponent ...

Correct here was 56.\textit{\textcopyright{}}xg7!, with the consequence, say, of 56...\textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 (56...\textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 57.\textit{\textcopyright{}}g3 \pm!) 57.\textit{\textcopyright{}}h6 \textit{\textcopyright{}}d5 58.\textit{\textcopyright{}}xd5 \textit{\textcopyright{}}x\textit{\textcopyright{}}d5, etc., when Black's chances of a draw are not unlikely.

56...\textit{\textcopyright{}}f8!

With that Black avoids the interesting trap 56...\textit{\textcopyright{}}h8 57.\textit{\textcopyright{}}f2 (the same move would of course win immediately after 56...\textit{\textcopyright{}}c2?), 57...\textit{\textcopyright{}}d5 58.\textit{\textcopyright{}}f4 \textit{\textcopyright{}}e8 59.\textit{\textcopyright{}}e4! \textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 60.\textit{\textcopyright{}}a7+ \textit{\textcopyright{}}f8 61.\textit{\textcopyright{}}c6!, and wins.

57.\textit{\textcopyright{}}g6

Ineffective, as is everything else; the real chances utterly disappeared after the previous speculative move.

57...\textit{\textcopyright{}}f5

With 57...f6, a draw could be forced: 58.\textit{\textcopyright{}}f2! \textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 59.\textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 \textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 60.\textit{\textcopyright{}}a7 \textit{\textcopyright{}}e1+, etc. – perpetual check.

The text move is a last attempt at a win.

58.\textit{\textcopyright{}}d4!

According to circumstances, still the best, since after a rook retreat on the e-file, 58.\textit{\textcopyright{}}d5 (which wouldn't be advantageous on the previous move because of \textit{\textcopyright{}}f4, ...\textit{\textcopyright{}}d7, \textit{\textcopyright{}}f3, etc.), would be to Black's clear advantage.

58...\textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5

Of course not 58...\textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 on account of 59.\textit{\textcopyright{}}d7, with a winning position.

59.\textit{\textcopyright{}}h4 \textit{\textcopyright{}}f6 60.\textit{\textcopyright{}}g3 \textit{\textcopyright{}}e5 61.\textit{\textcopyright{}}h4

If 61...\textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 \textit{\textcopyright{}}xe5 62.\textit{\textcopyright{}}d7, then 62...\textit{\textcopyright{}}d2 63.\textit{\textcopyright{}}f7+ \textit{\textcopyright{}}e8! 64.\textit{\textcopyright{}}x\textit{\textcopyright{}}f5+ \textit{\textcopyright{}}e7 65.\textit{\textcopyright{}}f7+ \textit{\textcopyright{}}d6+.

61...\textit{\textcopyright{}}f6

If Black hadn't had only two and a half minutes for the next 18 moves, here he probably would have tried 61...\textit{\textcopyright{}}d5; but after 62.\textit{\textcopyright{}}xd5 \textit{\textcopyright{}}xd5 63.\textit{\textcopyright{}}f4!, with White threatening \textit{\textcopyright{}}c7 or \textit{\textcopyright{}}b8+, Black's material advantage would hardly have shined.

62.\textit{\textcopyright{}}g3 \textit{\textcopyright{}}e5 ½–½

(12) Nimzovich – Spielmann
Nimzo-Larsen Opening [A03]

1.\textit{\textcopyright{}}f3 \textit{\textcopyright{}}d5 2.\textit{\textcopyright{}}b3 \textit{\textcopyright{}}c5 3.\textit{\textcopyright{}}b2 \textit{\textcopyright{}}c6 4.e3 \textit{\textcopyright{}}f6

Why so resigned to relinquish control over e5 to White? At any rate, 4...\textit{\textcopyright{}}g4 or 4...a6 first, in order to reserve the choice between different plans of development, would have been more vigorous.
New York 1927

5.\textit{b5} \textit{d7} 6.0-0 \textit{e6} 7.d3 \textit{e7}

He has to settle for this modest square of development, since 7...\textit{d6} is answered by 8.e4! (...\textit{dxe4} 9.dxe4 \textit{e}xe4 10.\textit{e}e1 \pm) and would hardly be pleasant.

8.\textit{bd2} 0-0 9.\textit{xc6}

This exchange belongs to the overall plan of development, and there’s no good purpose in putting it off further. The most plausible alternative was 9.\textit{e}2, but after 9...\textit{c}8 or 9...\textit{c}7 (the consequence of ...\textit{d}d4 would be advantageous for White), he'd be out of business without the occupation of e5.

9...\textit{xc6} 10.\textit{e}5 \textit{c8}

In the game from the next round, Dr. Vidmar chooses (as White) the deployment 10...\textit{c}7, ...\textit{ad}8, but then also didn’t get a fully satisfactory game. Here White unquestionably stands better.

11.f4 \textit{d7} 12.\textit{g4}

A specious but tempting move (after 12...\textit{f}5 comes namely 13.\textit{g}g7\textit{+}, etc.). It has, of course, a fundamental disadvantage: from here on White puts all his hopes in a direct attack (and of course in all the material advantages obtained in connection with this), and as a result, an array of his other positional trumps (like the wonderful diagonals for the \textit{b}2, and the flexibility of the central pawn position) more or less steps into the shadows. With these considerations, I would have favored here the dry follow-up 12.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} 13.e4. But when all is said and done, it’s a matter of taste and style: play as he does, Nimzovitch gets in any case a good, secure game with some winning chances.

12...\textit{x}e5 13.\textit{x}e5

13.fxe5 would have been feeble on account of 13...\textit{g}5\textit{+}, etc.

13...\textit{f}6 14.\textit{f}3 \textit{xe5}

On other moves, Black steps up the pressure with 15.\textit{af}1, etc.

15.fxe5 \textit{c}7 16.\textit{h}5

16...\textit{h}6

One defensive move too many, after which the opponent finally seizes positional control. Advisable instead of this was 16...\textit{e}8! (not ...\textit{f}5, because White would have e\textit{xf}6, with a later \textit{g}g4\textit{+}), after which the – at first glance – the intimidating, and apparently decisive sacrifice 17.\textit{f}6\textit{+} wouldn't really have led to anything consequential after the natural 17...\textit{a}5 18.\textit{f}3 \textit{h}6! (19.\textit{h}g\textit{h}6? \textit{g}h\textit{h}6 20.\textit{h}h\textit{h}6 \textit{f}6 21.\textit{e}xf6 \textit{c}7). White would have had to settle for the modest continuation 17.\textit{h}3, which after 17...\textit{h}6 18.\textit{f}3 \textit{f}5 19.\textit{h}4 \textit{d}8, etc., would have lead to absolutely defensible positions.
17...\textit{g}f1 \textit{g}6?

Now 17...\textit{e}e8 would have been already less effective than at the previous move, since White would exchange the e5-pawn for h6: 18.\textit{g}g3 \textit{f}5 19.\textit{x}h6 \textit{x}e5 20.\textit{x}f4!, together with 21.\textit{h}h3+. But for all that, there was no cause for the pawn sacrifice in the text, which leads to an admittedly slow, yet certainly lost endgame. Spielmann must have seen some ghost in the game position.

18.\textit{x}h6 \textit{x}e5 19.\textit{f}6! \textit{h}5

The only defense against \textit{f}1-f3-h3.

19.\textit{x}h5 \textit{g}xh5 21.\textit{f}3

Also \textit{h}6xh5 should have been enough.

21...\textit{c}7!

Again, the only move against the threat 22.\textit{g}5, after which he would just answer 22...\textit{e}e7. White must aim for a lowly pawn-reward, after all.

22.\textit{h}6 \textit{f}6 23.\textit{h}4 \textit{e}e8

The f-pawn obviously can't be protected.

24.\textit{h}x\textit{f}6 \textit{x}f6 25.\textit{x}f6 \textit{e}7 26.\textit{f}2

Not 26.\textit{g}6 because of ...\textit{g}7!, and after the rook exchange, the knight would go astray. But he's not exactly happy now standing on the rim. Because of that, White has a great deal of trouble putting his advantage into effect in the following play - because he can't secure a central square for the horse.

26...\textit{g}7 27.\textit{f}4 \textit{d}7 28.\textit{e}2(?)

After 28.\textit{e}1!, the following answer, nullifying the problem “e5,” would not have yet been possible.

28...\textit{e}5! 29.\textit{f}5

Now useless, because h5 is indirectly protected by the possibility of ...\textit{g}4+.

29...\textit{e}e8 30.\textit{f}2 \textit{e}4 31.\textit{f}4

Not the immediate 31.\textit{d}2 because of 31...\textit{d}4!.

31...\textit{e}5 32.\textit{d}2 \textit{b}5 33.\textit{g}3

The knight should be lead again to busy regions - by the advance of the black e-pawn, the f4-square has opened up for the horseman, and after the following pawn exchange in the center, e3 also becomes free.

33...\textit{h}3 34.\textit{d}4 \textit{x}d4 35.\textit{x}d4 \textit{g}5 36.\textit{c}3 \textit{a}5 37.\textit{f}2 \textit{a}4 38.\textit{e}3 \textit{a}3 39.\textit{c}2!

The very strong threat 40.\textit{c}4 now forces the bishop to give up guarding g2.

39...\textit{f}1 40.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}3 41.\textit{g}2 \textit{f}5 42.\textit{f}4 \textit{f}7 43.\textit{d}1
43...\(\text{e}7\)?

A way to win probably would have been found for White after 43...\(\text{c}2\) as well (44.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}1\)). For example, \(\text{g}1\), \(\text{h}4\), \(\text{g}4\), etc. – but even so, Black could have tried this line. After the loss of the second pawn, his situation becomes hopeless.

44.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}3\) 45.\(\text{b}4\)!

Another subtlety: after 45.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}3\)+ 46.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}4\) 47.\(\text{c}b4\) \(\text{d}6\), etc., he would have had some technical difficulties.

45...\(\text{d}6\) 46.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}2\) 47.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}3\)+ 48.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 49.\(\text{e}2\)+ \(\text{d}6\) 50.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{d}3\) 51.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{h}4\) 52.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{h}4\) \(\text{h}3\) 53.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{c}6\) 54.\(\text{h}6\)+ \(\text{b}7\) 55.\(\text{h}5\) 1–0

Round 5

0 Alekhine – Capablanca 1 0 Vidmar – Nimzovich 1 ½ Spielmann – Marshall ½

Standings after Round 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Capablanca</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimzovich</td>
<td>3½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alekhine</td>
<td>2½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vidmar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spielmann</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>1½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(13) Alekhine – Capablanca
Queen’s Indian Defense [E15]

1.d4 \(\text{f}6\) 2.c4 \(\text{e}6\) 3.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{b}6\) 4.g3 \(\text{b}7\) 5.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}5\) 6.d5

I made this move, without further consideration, to avoid a draw. It’s also pretty good, but requires subsequently precise, purposeful play. Castling or 6.dxc5 would have undertaken less.

6...\(\text{e}5\) 7.\(\text{h}4\)

According to the method recommended by Rubinstein in Collijn’s handbook. Also the newer maneuver 7.\(\text{g}5\), introduced by V. Bürger, together with possibly \(\text{h}3\)-\(\text{f}4\) (or \(\text{f}2\)), is interesting and full of opportunities.

7...\(\text{g}6\) 8.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{g}7\) 9.0–0

Indeed, some have criticized this reasonable move, and instead advised 9.\(\text{b}5\). I can’t share this opinion, since after the simple 9...0–0 10.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{a}6\), White would find no use for the infiltrated knight. No, the actual omission or mistake comes only later.

9...0–0 10.\(\text{f}4\)

Not a happy thought, although White was able to get a decent game. The following opportunity-rich continuations came into consideration, however.

(1) 10.\(\text{c}x\!\!\text{d}5\) d6 11.e4 \(\text{bd}7\) 12.f4 \(\text{e}8\) 13.\(\text{e}1\) a6 14.a4, and the push e5 hangs in the air (Dr. Vajda-Monticelli, Budapest 1926); (2) 10.\(\text{g}5\) h6 11.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) (not 11...\(\text{xf}6\)?, List-Sämisch, Berlin 1927. whereupon 12.\(\text{xf}6\), etc., follows – with a winning position) 12.\(\text{c}x\!\!\text{d}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 13.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{c}6\) 14.\(\text{xd}7\) \(\text{ac}8\), with some positional compensation for Black for the lost pawn; and (3) 10.f4 d6 11.f5, with active piece play against weak points on both sides.

Indeed, this compilation of a number of not unfavorable continuations for
White shows well enough that the move 6. d5 is definitely not to be written off, as the general criticism wanted to convince the larger audience after the game.

10...d6 11.cxd5

More consistent than 11...xd5 xd5 12...xd5 xd5 13...xd5 a6!, etc., with a probable draw, since White wanted to avoid exactly this result.

11...h5 12...d2 d7 13.f4(?)

From here on begins too much artificiality: admittedly the text move dwells in the position, but much more important first was 13. e4 with the (positional) threat 14. f5!. After 13...h5-f6 14. f4 could quite possibly occur, when the opportunities in the center should not be underestimated. Why I neglected the double-step of the e-pawn is now quite inconceivable to me.

13...a6 14...f3

A totally weak move, after which the game is hard to save. Losing time, only to place one's own piece on a worse square in order to force an opponent's to a better one – I've done such teamwork only extremely rarely, even in the beginning of my chess career.

Certainly 14.e4 was no longer as good as on the previous move – for example, 14...b5 15...f5 b4! 16...a4 gx5 17...hx5 fxe4 18...xe4 f6 – but 14.a4 was completely in keeping; in the case of ...c4, White could then have gotten some counter-play through 15...e3, together with ...f3, and occupation of d4.

14...hf6 15.a4

15...c4!

White, through entirely illogical positioning, has eliminated any hope of occupying d4 with his knight in the event of Black's push, so this idea becomes the strategic plan. The first threat is 16...b5 17.axb5 axb5 18...xb5? b6+, etc.

16...e3 c7 17.g4

The explanation for this and the following pawn moves consists solely in the fact that, after the 15th move, I gave the game up as lost, and just dragged myself, not played, through the game. By the way, it's clear that here 17...d4 wouldn't have helped, because ...d7-c5-b3 would follow.

17...c5 18.g5 fd7 19.f5 fe8 20...f4 e5 21...g4

White's systematic distancing of his pieces from the protection of the center squares facilitates the work of his opponent. Attempting to bolster his position with 21...g2 could have put up more resistance.

21...b3 22...g6 hxg6 23...b1 xg3

The fate of d5 is sealed.
24.bxc3  
25.e3  
26.Qf3  
27.h1  
28.Qb3  
29.Qb1  
30.Qg2  
31.Qxf3  
32.Qg2  
33.e3  
24...c5+  
25.e3  
26.Qf3  
27.h1  
28.Qb3  
29.Qb1  
30.Qg2  
31.Qxf3  
32.Qg2  
33.Qf1  
34.Qxh4+  
35.Qe1  
36.Qe1  
37.Qd2  
38.Qc1  
39.Qb2  
40.Qf2  
41.Qb6  
42.Qa6  
43.Qe2+  
0-1

The beginning of the slaughter.

6.e3 (?)

This is a needlessly passive move, which robbed White of prospects for an opening advantage. After the obvious 6.Qc2!, together with e4, Qd3, etc., it would not have been at all easy for Black to come by a game.

6...d6

White's previous move was so ill-advised that the second player, before fianchettoing his queen's bishop, permits himself the luxury of flirting with the threat ...e5, and so induces his opponent to play the tamer Qe2 (instead of Qd3). In contrast, after 6.Qc2, the text move would be unsuccessful because of 7.a3 Qc3 8.Qxc3, etc.

7.Qe2  
8.0-0  
9.Qc2  
10.Qd1

If Black sets great store in the occupation of e4, then here he should have now played 9...Qxc3 10.Qxc3 Qe4. After the text move, the maneuver could be prevented.

(14) Vidmar – Nimzovich

Bogo-Indian Defense [E11]

1.d4  
2.Qf3  
3.c4  
4.Qd2  
5.Qc3

This natural move is, in my opinion, unjustly blamed by many commentators: it's definitely no worse than 5.g3, for example, perhaps even better with Black's chosen reply.

5...0-0

In order to control e4 (of course without playing 5...d5), 5...b6 was appropriate here. But then 6.g3 Qb7 7.Qg2 could have followed – and normally in such positions, the vis-à-vis white bishop proves itself somewhat superior.

Black's bishop check on the third move does not, however, yield equal play.

I feel ashamed of this game, but readily admit that my opponent took impeccable advantage of my errors.
Since sooner or later, the d-file will open, in general the occupation of that file by the rook is appropriate. But at this point there was another method of play for White, which would have made it possible for him to weaken the pressure on the central squares from the enemy's queen's bishop. This was 10...g5!. If after this, 10...h6 11.f3 d5, then the simple 12.h3, and if g5, then 13.c×d5!, e×d5 (13...g4 14.d6) 14.f5, etc. – with a fully equal game.

10...c3

Black is correct not to make further reinforcing moves, but rather to strike out immediately. In fact, in the current position, he can in no way decide which file his rooks should occupy – and there weren't other wait-and-see maneuvers.

11.c×c3 e4 12.e1

Considering Black's tangible superiority in the center, the bishop pair embodies White's future chances, although not particularly promising. After 12.d2 c×c3! 13.c×c3 e5, White would remain entirely without counter-play.

12.f5 13.b3

If immediately 13.d2, then 13...g5, which virtually forces the reply 14.f4. But apparently White wants to avoid this.

13.c5

Played in order to force a clearing in the center before he undertakes a flank attack. Certainly the process costs him the d-file, and considering this fact, many would have chosen a different preparation for e5, like 13...h8, for example, instead of the text move, which weakens d6. But... fortune favors the brave.

14.d2 d×d2 15.d×d2 e5 16.d×e5 d×e5 17.f3

Sooner or later this move is unavoidable. Played at this point, it offers a quite definite leveling tendency: namely, in the case of the reasonable 17...f6, White's move permits the pin of the knight with 18.h4. He can then exchange these minor pieces, and then already, without difficulty, force general simplification by the pressure on the open file. Nimzovich thwarts this plan in an intriguingly simple way.

17...g5!

An unprejudiced, beautiful move, which sets before the opponent the difficult problem of defending himself from now on against two equilateral break-through threats – ...e4 and ...g4. In addition, the knight is protected from an exchange now and later.

18.f2 f6 19.fd1 ae8!

With this, Black shows that he absolutely wants to win – and further developments give him that right. The endeavor is so much the more commendable because it's contingent upon the final relinquishing of the open file, a gamble against which many an experienced master would have bristled. My recent experiences with players of the very first class have shown me that in analogous situations, without thinking, they would place both rooks on the file for exchange and afterwards complain
that the art of chess approaches death from draws... I have to admit I could never get used to the thought of such a danger. If one would examine, for example, the games of Nimzovich or Bogoljubow – just to name the most successful – from the last few years, one easily becomes convinced that still many, many years will pass until fighters for a draw can feel fully safe!

20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}4}}

Black's reply brings home the futility of this sortie. Somewhat better here seems 20.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{g}3}, with which, first of all, the threat \textit{e4} is parried.

20...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{a}8}!

21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}7}, etc., was threatened.

21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}6}

An eviction notice for White's queen's bishop, on its way to c3; no indifferent plan – only White gives it up on the next move. Otherwise, 21.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{g}3} still came under consideration.

21...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{g}7}!

A sinister reinforcement of Black's breakthrough threats! Somewhat premature would be 21...\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}4}, on account of 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}4} – for example, 22...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{g}x}f4 23.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{h}4}! f3 24.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}f6} \textit{\textcolor{blue}{xf}6} 25.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}f6} fxe2 26.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e}1} ±.

22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}1}?

Inconsistent and weak. He absolutely had to consider the threat ...\textit{e4}, and with this in mind, play 22.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e}1}!. If ...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e}4}(?), then 23.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{c}3}, and White would have some play. Therefore Black probably would have favored 22...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{g}4}, but then the outcome would also not be entirely certain, in spite of his undeniable advantage – for example, 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}x}g4 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}4 24.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}4 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}4 25.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{c}2}, etc.

22...\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}4}

Of course.

23.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{e}1}

Bleak, like everything else. If 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}xe}4, then 23...\textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}e}4, together with \textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}b}2, etc.

23...\textit{\textcolor{red}{x}f}3 24.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{c}3} \textit{\textcolor{red}{e}7}!

Decisive, since mate would follow 25.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}f}6 in four moves (25...\textit{\textcolor{red}{x}e}3+ 26.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{h}1} \textit{\textcolor{red}{f}x}g2+, etc.).

25.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}6d}3

A sad retreat.

25...\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}x}g2 26.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}2 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}2 27.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}f}6

Sometimes even "in-between moves" don't help. Also, 27.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{e}4}+, etc., leads quickly to mate.

27...\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}4}! 28.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{b}1d}2 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{h}3} 29.\textit{\textcolor{blue}{c}3} \textit{\textcolor{red}{g}4}+ 0-1

It's mate in two moves.
(15) Spielmann – Marshall
Vienna Game [C29]

1.e4 e5 2.\texttt{\textit{c}3} \texttt{\textit{d}6} 3.f4 d5 4.f\texttt{x}5 \texttt{\textit{e}4} 5.f3 \texttt{\textit{c}5}

One of the good moves at Black’s disposal here. As is well known, sufficient for speedy equality is 5...\texttt{\textit{e}7}, together with ...0-0 and ...f6.

6.d4

Exactly what Black wanted to force with his bishop move. However, the less forthcoming 6.\texttt{\textit{e}2} should be considered; if 6...\texttt{\textit{f}5}, then 7.\texttt{\textit{d}1}, when f2 would be covered, and White is prepared to dislodge Black’s central knight by means of d3.

6...\texttt{\textit{b}4} 7.\texttt{\textit{d}3}

The queen stands awkwardly here – but after 7.\texttt{\textit{d}2} c5, etc. the complications in the center would likewise turn out quite in favor of Black.

7.c5 8.dxc5 \texttt{\textit{c}5}

The c-pawn wouldn’t run away, and Black could first quietly strengthen his position through further development (8...\texttt{\textit{c}6}). But Black’s game is already so favorable that his move does well.

9.\texttt{\textit{e}3} \texttt{\textit{c}6} 10.\texttt{\textit{b}5} \texttt{\textit{e}6}!

Prevents castling and renews the threat of a fork. One has to wonder that White still succeeds in emerging from this position unscathed.

11.a3 \texttt{\textit{a}5} 12.b4 \texttt{\textit{b}6} 13.\texttt{\textit{d}3} 0-0!

Of course it would be lamentable after 13...d4 14.\texttt{\textit{e}4}, etc., to allow the opponent to castle short without further ado. The pawn sacrifice is consequential and good.

14.\texttt{\textit{y}x}d5

Or 14.\texttt{\textit{x}d5} \texttt{\textit{e}5} 15.\texttt{\textit{e}5} \texttt{\textit{d}4} – to Black’s advantage; for example, 16.c3 \texttt{\textit{e}5} 17.0-0 a6 18.\texttt{\textit{c}4} b5 19.\texttt{\textit{b}3} \texttt{\textit{b}7}, etc.

14...\texttt{\textit{d}4}

It’s curious that the attacking player Marshall doesn’t feel the necessity of his queen’s cooperation in the calculated exploitation of the open white king’s position. Admittedly, 14...\texttt{\textit{c}7} (or ...\texttt{\textit{e}7}) would have been useless with this in mind because of 15.\texttt{\textit{d}6} – but after 14...\texttt{\textit{d}7}, White would get into an awkward situation; because if then 15.\texttt{\textit{d}3} or 15.\texttt{\textit{e}4} (Black’s main threat is 15...\texttt{\textit{c}7} 16.\texttt{\textit{e}4} \texttt{\textit{x}b}5, together with ...\texttt{\textit{x}b}4 or ...\texttt{\textit{x}e}5, etc.) – then 15...\texttt{\textit{d}4}!, with the idea of ...\texttt{\textit{f}5}, etc. In any case, the e5-pawn would be a condemned man, and after his disappearance, the king wouldn’t be able to find peace anywhere. After the text move, the black advantage totally evaporates, bit by bit.
After 17...d2 Qxe5 18.0-0-0, the reply 18...g4 would have in fact proven strong.

17...Qxe5 18.0-0-0 Qg4

Perhaps he overlooked the countermove, because any other developmental move of the bishop (18...e6 18...f5) would have hindered Black's work to level the game.

19.e2! Qxe2

19...cx3 20.Qx3 Qxe2 21.Qxd8+, together with Qxe5, etc., clearly leads to nothing.

20.Qxe2 Qxb2+ 21.Qxb2 Qc4+
22.Qb3 Qd2+ 23.Qb2 Qc4+
24.Qb3 Qe3

The play for a win is unfounded, since with his pawn superiority, White is ahead by a couple of tempi. Black should have repeated moves.

25.Qxd8+ Qxd8 26.Qf4(!) g5

After 26...Qd2, White saves himself with 27.Qc3! Qf2 28.Qe1, etc.

27.Qd3 Qc8 28.Qc1 f5 29.g3 Qf7
30.Qc4 Qd8(?)

Correct was 30...Qf6, and only after 31.c5, then 31...Qd8 32.Qc3 f4! 33.gxf4, Qd5+, etc. Now White gets an advantage.

Obviously there would be no boon from 33...Qh2, on account of 34.Qh1 together with Qh7, etc.

34.Qf1

Again, one of the many games in this tournament in which Spielmann, in spite of better endgame chances, declares himself in agreement with a draw! Instead of the text move, which is indeed synonymous with an offer of peace, the simple approach 34.c5 came strongly under consideration; for example, 34...h6 35.Qe2 Qf6 36.Qc4 and now – whether Black now swaps the rooks (36...Qe8), or whether he plays 36...Qe4 (whereupon a4-a5 follows) – winning chances would always be on the side of the first player. With such a good-natured disposition, one can’t hope for a reward, of course, in spite of a strong and prudent game.

34...Qf6 35.Qe1 Qf7 36.Qf1 Qf6 ½-½
Cycle II

Round 6

0 Marshall – Capablanca 1
1 Nimzovich – Alekhine 0
½ Spielmann – Vidmar ½

Standings after Round 6:

Capablanca 5
Nimzovich 4½
Alekhine 2½
Vidmar 2½
Spielmann 2
Marshall 1½

(16) Marshall – Capablanca
Torre Attack [A46]

1.d4 ½f6 2.½f3 e6 3.½g5

Perhaps the fashion for tomorrow. These days one still almost always plays 3.c4.

3...c5 4.c3

Allowing Black an easy equality. The conventional move is 4.e3 – but 4.e4 deserves more recognition, in my opinion, than it’s been given up to now.

4...½b6 5.½c2 cxd4 6.½xd4

More tolerable would be 6.cxd4, although Black would also stand excellently then after 6...½c6 7.e3 d5, together with ½d7, ½c8, etc. After the text move, Black gets a much clearer advantage – a mobile pawn superiority in the center.

6...½c6 7.e3 d5 8.½d2 ½d7

In the long run, a position cannot endure so many inferior moves. Advisable was 9.½c1 in order to take the queen back to b1 after 9...½c8, then to develop the king’s bishop and castle short.

9...½e4 10.½f4?

Relatively better was 10.½h4.

10...f6

11.½d3??

After all, White’s position wasn’t so bad that he had to “sacrifice” a piece in despair. Either 11.½e2, or first 11.½g3, was possible. What comes now is horrible.

11...e5 12.½xe4 dxe4 13.½xe4 0-0-0

Crucial.

14.½g3?

With 14.½x e5 or 14.0-0-0, he could have retained two pawns for the piece and – in case he still wanted to play on – achieved a longer resistance.

14...exd4 15.0-0
New York 1927

Or 15.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\), together with \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\), etc., or 15.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}4+\), with an easy win.

15...\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{e}3\) 16.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}4\)

Another "aggressive" move.

16...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textit{d}}\text{d}}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{xf}2+\) 18.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}1\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) 19.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}1\)

Since, for reasons difficult to understand, White doesn’t want to give up in spite of a piece minus, it becomes an amusing cat-and-mouse game.

19...\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}4\) 20.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}2\) \(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5\) 21.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}1\) \(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}3\) 22.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}2\) 23.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{gl}\) \(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}4!\)
24.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1\) \(\text{\textit{hx}}\text{g}3\) 25.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}x\text{e}2\) \(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}e2\)
26.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}x\text{g}3\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}6\) 27.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}1\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{he}8\)
28.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}5+\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}8\) 29.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5\)
30.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1+\) 31.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}1\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5!\) 32.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5\) 33.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}2\) \(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}1+\) 34.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}1\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}4!\)
0-1

Black had a threat that couldn’t be parried: 35...\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}1!\), etc.

It’s really unbelievable how self-consciously and weakly Marshall always played against Capablanca! He put up quite a different resistance opposite the other participants in New York – in spite of his apparently inferior shape. One could compare, for example, his games with Dr. Vidmar from the Cycles II and IV!

(17) Nimzovich – Alekhine
Réti Opening [A05]

1.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{f}6\) 2.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}3\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}6\)

This reply appears to be more logical to me than the usual 2...\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5\), with which the e5-square, whose occupation White apparently strives for with the flank development of his queen bishop, is ceded to the opponent without a struggle.

3.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}3\)

So, the purest “hypermodernry.” In the current game, it probably wouldn’t have brought the first player any laurels if his opponent hadn’t overestimated the position and imagined that such a formation could be finished off in any old way.

3...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5\) 4.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}4\)

Otherwise Black has even easier play, with the unimpeded thrust of his central pawns.

4...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}4\)

This move is therefore reasonable, because with it White is as good as forced into the following escapade; since after 5.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5!\) 6.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}x\text{d}5\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5\) 7.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5\), etc., his position would inspire anything but confidence.

5.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}4\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5\)

For the moment, quieter and also good is 5...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}7\). But the immediate clearing in the center is more logical.

6.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}x\text{d}5\)
Cycle II: Round 6

6...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}x\mathbf{d}5}}}

So Black hopes to bring about positions similar to the one mentioned above, but soon has to convince himself that the tempo White wins with \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}c3}} doesn't amount to an awfully lot. More correct was the natural 6...\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}d5}}, which, with simple means, shows the unsoundness of the opponent's situation. Because if next 7.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}c2}}, then simply 7...\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}e7!}} (the same also after 7.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}b2})} 8.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}xe4}} 0-0, with unpleasant threats — for example, 9.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}b2 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}e8}}} 10.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}g2 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}b4!}}, together perhaps with ...\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}f8!}}. Anyhow, there could be no talk in this case about a White initiative, and the "double-hole" development, proscribed with such reason, by the late opening artist Teichmann would be led again to its absurd conclusion.

7.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}c3}} \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}c6.}}

To 7...\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}e5}}, the reply 8.f4 was unpleasant for Black. The text move has, in any case, the advantage of as good as forcing the following white-square weakness in the enemy position.

8.e3

To 8.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}g2}}, Black intended 8...e3 — for example, 9.fxe3 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}h3}} 10.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}g1 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}g4.}}}

8...a6

In light of the exposure of the central pawns and the possibility of a later advance to f5 by White's knight on the edge, it was less advisable to allow the queen exchange by means of 8...\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}g4}} 9.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}xg4! \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}xg4}}} 10.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}b5}}, etc. Additionally, the pre-emptive move in the text, which bestows on the opponent a highly important developmental tempo, distinctly attests that the capture with the queen on the 6th move contained in it more dark sides than light.

9.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}b2 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}g4}}}

At least deflects the white king's bishop from the planned attack on e4; but now f5 is uncovered.

10.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}e2 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}xe2}}} 11.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}xe2!}}}

After 11.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}xg2}} 0-0, etc., Black would have had real chances to exploit the weakness of d3 and f3.

11...\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}bd7}} 12.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}c1 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}b6}}}

After this, Black gets a disadvantage and has to make great efforts in the following play to get chances for equality. On the other hand, after 12...\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}c5}} 13.0-0 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}d7!}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}xf6}} \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}xf6}}, etc., a struggle with mutually strong and weak squares would arise, whose outcome would hardly be foreseeable.

13.0-0 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}d6}} 14.f3

Also 14.d3 came under consideration. The sharp text move leads to difficult-to-assess imbroglios, from which Black finally emerges with a sufficient positional equivalent for the sacrificed material.

14...\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textblacksquare}e5}}

The introductory move to the following interesting sacrificial combination, whose value, by the way, was totally misunderstood by the critics (unfortunately adapting themselves only too often just to the end result of a game). In any case, less satisfactory was
14...\(\text{e}x\text{f}3\) \(15.\text{\textit{f}}x\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{g}}5\) 16.\(\text{\textit{f}}x\text{e}5\) \(\text{\textit{f}}x\text{e}5\) 17.d4 \(\text{\textit{d}}6\) 18.\(\text{a}3\)\(\text{c}3\), together with \(\text{e}4\pm\).

\(15.\text{\textit{a}}x\text{e}5\)

Not \(15.\text{\textit{a}}3\) \(\text{\textit{a}}5\)!, etc.

\(15...\text{\textit{d}}x\text{e}5\) \(16.\text{\textit{f}}x\text{e}4\) \(\text{\textit{d}}3\)

One of the necessary consequences of move 14; obviously deficient would be \(16...\text{\textit{d}}x\text{e}4\), on account of \(17.\text{\textit{c}}2\), etc.

\(17.\text{\textit{c}}3\) 0-0 0 \(18.\text{\textit{b}}1!\)

The only move: after \(18.\text{\textit{c}}2\) \(\text{\textit{b}}4\), the \(\text{d}2\)- and \(\text{e}4\)-squares would be unprotected at the same time, and after \(18.\text{\textit{d}}4\), of course the exchange sacrifice \(18...\text{\textit{e}}x\text{d}4\) would ensue, whose strength is apparent. Now, on the other hand, Black is forced to put still more into the deal.

\(18...\text{\textit{d}}x\text{e}4!\)

The other sacrificial combination possible in this position, \(18...\text{\textit{c}}5\) 19.d3 \(\text{\textit{a}}4\)!, would be unsuccessful in the event that White gives back the won material immediately. 20.b4 \(\text{\textit{e}}x\text{e}3+\) 21.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{\textit{e}}x\text{e}2\) 22.\(\text{\textit{f}}c1\) \(\text{\textit{d}}7\) 23.\(\text{\textit{b}}6\) \(\text{\textit{e}}8\) 24.\(\text{\textit{b}}1\) \(\text{\textit{d}}6\) 25.\(\text{a}7\), etc., with a winning attack.

\(19.\text{\textit{e}}x\text{d}3\) \(\text{\textit{d}}x\text{d}2\) 20.\(\text{\textit{f}}x\text{d}8+\) \(\text{\textit{d}}x\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{\textit{d}}f5+\) \(\text{\textit{b}}8\) 22.\(\text{e}1\)

Until the text, all counter moves by White were as good as forced; but now he had a choice again – and it's entirely unsure that he decided for the best. If the correctness of Black's positional sacrifice could be called into question at all, then it was now with 22.\(\text{\textit{c}}1\)

\(\text{\textit{e}}x\text{e}3+\) 23.\(\text{f}2\) – but even in this case, Black's position after 23...\(\text{\textit{e}}7!\) (not 23...\(\text{\textit{e}}4\), on account of 24...\(\text{\textit{f}}7!\), etc.) 24.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{\textit{e}}5\), etc., would offer chances.

After the move played, on the other hand, Black could have won yet a third pawn, and with that, at least establish a material balance.

\(22...\text{\textit{e}}x\text{e}3+\) 23.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{\textit{d}}3\) 24.\(\text{f}4\)

There wasn't anything better in view of the threat 24...\(g5\).

\(24...\text{\textit{c}3}\)

Only after this imprecise move does White get effective counter chances. In contrast, the second player could get an adequate game with the obvious threat to \(a2\) made with 24...\(\text{\textit{c}2}\). For example:

(1) 25.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{\textit{a}}2\) 26.\(\text{g}2\) \(g5\) 27.\(\text{f}3\) \(gxf4\) 28.\(\text{d}2\) \(fxg3\) 29.\(h\times g3\) \(\text{\textit{a}}5!\), and the queen comes with tempo to \(d5\), whereupon it will no longer be difficult for Black to force a favorable endgame;

(2) 25.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{f}3}+\) 26.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{a}2}\), likewise with full compensation for the sacrificed piece.

As one sees, the matter of the knight sacrifice was not so easy by far as the gentlemen critics fancied ...
25.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e3}}!

Black underestimated the effect of this good defensive move, and gets in a jam as a result.

25...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{c1+}}}

He may no longer take the pawn \textit{\textcolor{red}{a2}}:

25...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{a1+}} 26.\textit{g2} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xa2}} 27.\textit{f3}, 28.d3, etc.}

26.\textit{g2} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{c6+}} 27.f3 \textit{g5}

Through this weakening of the pawn position, the work becomes substantially easier for the opponent. The smaller evil was still 27...\textit{xf3 28.f3 \textit{d2+} 29.e2 \textit{c2}, etc.}

28.d3! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xf3}}

A sad necessity, because if 28...\textit{e4}, then 29.\textit{fe5! d5 30.xf3, etc.}

29.xf3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{c2+}} 30.f2 f5

In the long run, 30...\textit{xa2 31.xf3, etc.}, would not have been sustainable.

31.e2 \textit{c5 32.d3 \textit{d4 33.e5 f4!}}

With the last moves, Black did what there was still to do. The following pawn exchange obviously means a boost to his drawing prospects.

34.c4! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{fxg3}}} (?)

But here 34...\textit{f8} (threat: \textit{g4}) or 34...\textit{g8} first had to be tried, because each piece exchange is obviously pleasant only for White.

35.d2 \textit{h8}

Or 35...g4 36.e3! \textit{f6 37.xd8+ \textit{xd8 38.g3, etc.}}

36.xd8+ \textit{xd8 37.hgx3 \textit{d4}}

A queen exchange is probably not avoidable in the long run, since if the queen leaves the d-file (and Black doesn’t have many moves), then White can provoke a new weakness through \textit{g5}. Anyway, biding time would have prolonged the agony somewhat.

38.f8+ \textit{a7 39.f2 \textit{xf2+ 40.xf2 h5}

Here \textit{b5} still offered a last practical chance. But that was now the 40th move...

41.e3.

A nuance more precise was 41.\textit{f3}. In contrast the retreat expected by the majority of the onlookers, 41.d2, after 41...\textit{b6} – with the threat of conquering the pawns on the queenside – would have at least made victory very difficult.

41...c5

To 41...b5, White would have the following winning line: 42.d2 h4 43.g4 c5 44.e4! h3 45.xf3 c4 46.bxc4 bxc4 47.g3 b6 48.xh3 \textit{a5 49.g3 \textit{b4 50.f3 \textit{a3 51.e3 \textit{xa2 52.d4 \textit{b3 53.c5}, etc.}}}

42.a4 b5 43.a\textit{xb5 axb5 44.d2 \textit{b6 45.e4 h4 46.g4 h3 47.f3 b4}

Or 47...c4 48.b4, etc.
48. \( \text{Q} \times g5 \) c4 49. \( \text{Q} e4 \)

49. bxc4 also won.

49... \( c \times b3 \) 50. g5 b2 51. \( \text{Q} d2 \) \( \text{Q} c5 \)
52. g6 h2 53. \( \text{Q} g2 \) \( \text{Q} d4 \) 54. g7 \( \text{Q} d3 \)
55. g8\( \text{Q} \) \( \text{Q} \times d2 \) 56. \( \text{Q} a2 \) \( \text{Q} c2 \)
57. \( \text{Q} c4+ \) 1-0

(18) Spielmann – Vidmar
Four Knights Game [C47]

1.e4 e5 2. \( \text{Q} f3 \) \( \text{Q} c6 \) 3. \( \text{Q} c3 \) \( \text{Q} f6 \)
4.d4 exd4 5. \( \text{Q} x d4 \) \( \text{Q} b4 \) 6. \( \text{Q} x c6 \) \( b \times c6 \) 7. \( \text{Q} d3 \) d5 8. e\( \times d5 \) c\( \times d5 \)

According to the experience of recent years, Bogoljubow’s recommended 8...\( \text{Q} e7+ \) is here the easiest way to reach a draw; and Black can’t strive for more in this line, searched in all possible directions.

9.0-0 0-0 10. \( \text{Q} g5 \) c6

Again Black chooses, to his disadvantage, an entangled method of play instead of comfortably simplifying the position after Capablanca’s recipe by means of 10...\( \text{Q} x c3 \) 11.b\( \times c3 \) h6.

11. \( \text{Q} f3 \) \( \text{Q} e7 \) 12. \( \text{B} a1 \)

In recent years this proved more sustainable than the more obvious 12. \( \text{Q} f1 \), earlier used exclusively. The new idea allows White, after 12...\( \text{B} b8 \), to pull back his knight to \( d1 \), without interrupting the alliance of his rooks, even for a short while.

12...\( \text{Q} e6 \) 13. \( \text{Q} e2 \)

In a game Alekhine-Em. Lasker (Moscow 1914) a very similar position occurred – only the king’s rook was on e1 – and play continued 13.h3, with the sequel 13...h6 14.\( \text{Q} x h6 \) (retreat would also come under strong consideration, especially if, as in the current game, the bishop could distance himself to c1) 14...g\( \times h6 \) 15.\( \text{Q} x e6 \) f\( \times e6 \) 16.\( \text{Q} g3+ \) \( \text{Q} h8 \)
17.\( \text{Q} g6 \), etc., with an unavoidable draw.

But the text move has a lot to be said for it, especially since White only with difficulty could assume the opponent would voluntarily relinquish his bishop pair.

13...h6 14. \( \text{Q} c1(!!) \) \( \text{Q} g4 \) 15. \( \text{Q} g3 \) \( \text{Q} x e2 \)

One decides on such an exchange only under severe coercion. Actually, after 15...\( \text{Q} d6 \) 16. \( \text{Q} h4 \), for example, the possible threat of a sacrifice on h6 would have been rather unpleasant.

16. \( \text{Q} x e2 \) \( \text{Q} d6 \) 17. \( \text{Q} f3 \)

Here 17. \( \text{Q} h4 \) also came under consideration.

17...\( \text{Q} e8 \) 18. \( \text{Q} f1 \) \( \text{Q} a5 \) 19. \( \text{Q} x e8+ \) \( \text{Q} x e8 \)

Of course, more than questionable would be 19...\( \text{Q} x e8 \) 20. \( c3 \) \( \text{Q} x a2 \) 21. \( \text{Q} f5 \)
\( \text{Q} f6 \) (21...g6 22. \( \text{Q} d7 \) 22.\( \text{Q} x h6 \), etc.

20. \( \text{Q} x e8+ \) \( \text{Q} x e8 \) 21. \( \text{Q} e2 \) \( \text{Q} f6 \)
22. \( a3 \) \( \text{Q} c7 \) 23. \( g3 \)

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Here the game was given up as a draw – a decision to be rebuked on the part of White. With two bishops and the healthier pawn position, one should have tried to bring the game to a happy end. Both after the queen exchange, 23. ...\( e7 24.\&xe7 \&xe7 25.b4! \), etc., as well as without it, 23...c5 24.c3 together with \( \&f3 \) – Black would have a difficult game, defending for a considerable time.

**Round 7**

\( \frac{1}{2} \) Spielmann – Capablanca \( \frac{1}{2} \)

\( \frac{1}{2} \) Vidmar – Alekhine \( \frac{1}{2} \)

\( \frac{1}{2} \) Nimzovich – Marshall \( \frac{1}{2} \)

Standings after Round 7:

- Capablanca 5½
- Nimzovich 5
- Alekhine 3
- Vidmar 3
- Spielmann 2½
- Marshall 2

(19) Spielmann – Capablanca

Caro-Kann Defense [B15]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.\( \&c3 dxe4 \)
4.\( \&xe4 \&f6 5.\&g3 \&g4 \)

As the course of this game shows, a bishop sortie is not to be recommended, because with it the first player is given an easy opportunity to secure the advantage of the bishop pair. If 5...e5 should also fail in this position (see the game Alekhine-Capablanca from the fifteenth round) – which I definitely don’t think is impossible – then one would have to revert finally to the older move 4. ...\( \&f5 \) (instead of 4...\( \&f6 \)).

6.\( \&d3! \)

This was – in connection with the fianchettoing of the king’s bishop – already tried with success by Spielmann against Carls in Baden-Baden 1925. In any case, Black doesn’t have an easy game.

6...\( \&bd7 7.h3 \&h5 8.\&xh5 \&xh5 9.\&f3 e6 10.g3! \)

Apart from the future role of \( \&g2 \), not to be underestimated, it’s of special importance to secure the f4-square against a possible intrusion from the knight.

10...\( \&d6 \)

Both this, as well as the next developmental moves (up to the “liberating” e5), make a somewhat superficial, schematic impression and are in fact hardly the best. Here, for example, it came under strong consideration to complicate, through 10...\( \&a5+(! \) ), the possible fianchettoing of the white queen’s bishop – with 11.\( \&d2 \) or 11.c3. Exactly through the omission of such details can one all too often get into difficulty.

11.\( \&g2 0-0 12.0-0 \&c7 13.b3 \)

Very correct! Also the mentioned Spielmann-Carls game developed in this manner, by the way.

13...\( \&hf6 14.\&b2 e5 \)

After this obvious relief maneuver, White’s advantage becomes quite clear. Black already had to make up his mind to accept this, since otherwise White would further strengthen his position without difficulty: \( \&fe1, \&ad1, a3, c4, \) etc., with difficult-to-endure pressure.
15.\textit{dxe5} \textit{\textdagger}e5 16.\textit{\textdagger}f5!

Here and with the next moves, White averts the opposition of the enemy bishop on e5.

16...\textit{\textdagger}fe8 17.\textit{\textdagger}fe1 \textit{\textdagger}xf3+ 18.\textit{\textdagger}xf3 \textit{\textdagger}xe1+

In turn, there's nothing better than the double rook exchange.

19.\textit{\textdagger}xe1 \textit{\textdagger}e8 20.\textit{\textdagger}xe8+ \textit{\textdagger}xe8 21.\textit{\textdagger}g4!

Spielmann handles this game very nicely up to a certain moment. The text move, for example, contains the strong threat 22.\textit{\textdagger}c8\textit{\textdagger}, and forces the opponent into complex defensive maneuvers.

21...\textit{\textdagger}e7 22.\textit{\textdagger}f1

Not 22.\textit{\textdagger}c8, on account of 22...\textit{\textdagger}e1+, together with 23. ...\textit{\textdagger}c5, etc.

22...\textit{\textdagger}b4 23.\textit{\textdagger}c3

Also, 23.\textit{\textdagger}e5 was good, securing an endgame advantage.

23...\textit{\textdagger}d6 24.\textit{\textdagger}d3 \textit{\textdagger}a5 25.\textit{\textdagger}a3 (?)

But this diversion is certainly contrived. It was much more obvious, through 25.\textit{\textdagger}b4 \textit{\textdagger}c7 (or 25...\textit{\textdagger}b6 26.\textit{\textdagger}c4 \textit{\textdagger}c5 27.\textit{\textdagger}d5!, etc.) 26.\textit{\textdagger}c4, to re-open the nice diagonal for the bishop! If next 26.\textit{\textdagger}e4, then 27.\textit{\textdagger}xe4 \textit{\textdagger}xe4 28.\textit{\textdagger}e2, etc. – with more pleasant prospects than in the "ending position."

25...\textit{\textdagger}c7 26.\textit{\textdagger}c4 \textit{\textdagger}e5 27.\textit{\textdagger}e2 \textit{\textdagger}xe2+ 28.\textit{\textdagger}xe2 \textit{\textdagger}b6 ½-½

Here Spielmann made the decisive mistake of accepting the draw offered him. The position with the two bishops and centralized king was, without a doubt, worth playing out. Both 29.\textit{\textdagger}c5 (29...\textit{\textdagger}b5 30.\textit{\textdagger}cxb6, together with \textit{\textdagger}b2, or 29...\textit{\textdagger}e4 30.\textit{\textdagger}f3!, etc.), as well as 29.\textit{\textdagger}d3 \textit{\textdagger}c5 30.\textit{\textdagger}b4, etc., would have assured him an obvious endgame superiority, and Black would have to fight a long time for an uncertain draw.

Capablanca was therefore able to split the point without a fight in the text position due only to the halo of his title at the time.

(20) Vidmar – Alekhine
Bogo-Indian Defense [E 11]

1.d4 \textit{\textdagger}f6 2.\textit{\textdagger}f3 \textit{\textdagger}e6 3.\textit{\textdagger}c4 \textit{\textdagger}b4+ 4.\textit{\textdagger}d2

In accordance with recent experience, the avoidance of the bishop exchange through 4.\textit{\textdagger}bd2 leads to no satisfying result for White; for example, 4.0-0 5.g3 \textit{\textdagger}b6 6.\textit{\textdagger}g2 \textit{\textdagger}b7 7.0-0 \textit{\textdagger}d5 (also ...\textit{\textdagger}e8, together possibly with ...\textit{\textdagger}f8, etc., comes into consideration) 8.a3 \textit{\textdagger}e7 9.\textit{\textdagger}b4 \textit{\textdagger}c5!= (Rubinstein-Alekhine, Semmering 1926).
4...\textit{\textbf{Ne7}} 5.g3

Nimzovich's move, which isn't worse than the immediate exchange, since the queen in this line invariably has to be developed to e7.

5.g3

Dr. Vidmar played 5.\textit{\textbf{Cc3}} against Nimzovich (see game number 14), and then had to fight against enemy pressure on e4. As is generally known, through flank development, White gets a very secure game - but little initiative.

5...0-0

With that, Black, on his part, foregoes fianchettoing the bishop, which in such cases is actually the logical counter-play for him. Although his plan, using the queen bishop on the c8-h3 diagonal, proves partially successful in this game, it's still hardly to be recommended - because, as becomes evident from the following, White could have opposed him forcefully.

6.\textit{\textbf{Gg2}} \textit{\textbf{Dxd2+}} 7.\textit{\textbf{Dxd2}}

Here, for example, it would have been more advisable for him, when faced with the intended advance ...d6, together with ...e5, to capture with the queen and to develop his knight to c3, with which (1) d5 would be more effectively guarded; and (2), the possible opening of the d-file by means of dxe5 would have gained a lot of strength - but Black would, in this case, have played not ...e5, but rather ...c5, after appropriate preparation.

7...\textit{\textbf{Dd6}} 8.0-0 \textit{\textbf{Ec6}} 9.\textit{\textbf{Cc2}} \textit{\textbf{Cc6}} 10.e3 \textit{\textbf{Dd7}}

Played in order to develop the queen's rook to e8, and in this way to follow through with the move ...e4, which didn't work yet because of \textit{\textbf{g5}}. But this idea could have been carried out at least as well by means of 10...\textit{\textbf{h6}}, whereby, in addition, the important retreat square for the knight, h7, would be opened in preparation for f5.

11.a3 \textit{\textbf{Dae8}} 12.\textit{\textbf{Dd5}}

Played mainly in order to be able to move his knight to d4 in case of its attack by ...e4. Moreover, an admittedly rather harmless demonstration on the queenside is planned in order to divert the opponent from the methodical and quiet utilization of his attacking chances on the kingside.

12...\textit{\textbf{Dd8}} 13.\textit{\textbf{Bb4 e4}}

Although his pieces stood somewhat congested, Black's position was completely capable of development and, the main thing, currently displayed no weak points. Instead of the text maneuver - through which an outpost is indeed established, which is not exactly pleasant for White, but in return a weakness on d6 is accepted - the simple, further intensification of pressure on the kingside, by means of \textit{\textbf{h5}}, together with f5, came into consideration. Then the possible advance of the White queen to c7 wouldn't be feared. For example, 13...\textit{\textbf{h5}} 14.\textit{\textbf{Cc5}} f5 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\textit{\textbf{Cf6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{Cc4}} \textit{\textbf{Db5!}}, etc., with a favorable game.

14.\textit{\textbf{Dd4 c6}}

The quickest liberation of the d8-knight was indispensable. After the immediate 14...\textit{\textbf{Cc5}}, White would have been
able to force a very favorable file opening – for example, through 15...\textit{ae}1, together with f3, etc.

15.dxc6 \textit{xc}6 16.\textit{fe}1

Aimed at 16...\textit{d}x\textit{d}4; together with e3, etc.

16...\textit{e}e5 17.\textit{e}e2!

White wants to keep the key e4-square under fire as many times as possible, which significantly complicates the further development of the enemy attack plans.

17...\textit{f}f5 18.\textit{c}c3 \textit{e}e7!

A clearance move for the king's rook, which should be used on the open c-file.

19.h3

Preparation of the offense against the weakling d6.

19...h5 20.\textit{ad}1 \textit{c}8 21.\textit{b}3 \textit{d}8

With 21...\textit{e}6, White would have been able to get a draw more easily than in the game: 22.\textit{d}5 \textit{ee}8 23.\textit{f}4 \textit{e}7 (23...\textit{d}7 24.c5! =) 24.\textit{d}5, etc.

22.f4!

Through this ingenious coup, White escapes any serious danger. With other moves, by contrast, he gets a disadvantage slowly but surely – on the one hand, since the position of the unhappy knight on d2 would impede the formation of an effective attack against d6, but on the other hand, because Black's pressure on the c-file can be rather easily strengthened by means of ...a6, together with ...\textit{c}c7, and possibly ....\textit{e}6.

22...\textit{xf}3

For his part, Black also has nothing better than to accept the transitional pawn sacrifice, since 22...\textit{e}6 23.\textit{h}2, together with \textit{b}5 (or \textit{e}2) -d4 would look quite friendly for White.

23.\textit{xf}3 \textit{g}3 24.\textit{e}2 \textit{g}6 25.\textit{f}4 \textit{g}3 26.\textit{c}2 \textit{g}6 27.\textit{f}4

If instead of this quiet draw offer (after 27...\textit{g}3, the game would automatically be a draw because of the three-time repetition of the same position), White had let himself be tempted into 27.\textit{xd}6, then he would get a decisive disadvantage after 27...\textit{hx}3! 28.\textit{f}4 \textit{g}3 29.\textit{xd}8+ \textit{xd}8 30.\textit{hx}3 \textit{g}4, with the threats 31...\textit{e}e3 or 31...\textit{h}2! 32.\textit{hx}2 \textit{d}2, etc.

27...\textit{h}7

Black decides to play for a win – actually not incorrectly, since mutual chances at this moment can be regarded as approximately equal (prospects of a king attack for Black, balanced against White's pawn superiority queenside), and further development of the conflict
Cycle II: Round 7

anticipates many interesting complications to come.

28.\[\text{\textit{d6}}\] \[\text{\textit{e6}}\]
After 28...\[\text{\textit{e6}}\], a later 29.\[\text{\textit{d5}}\] would have been unpleasant.

29.\[\text{\textit{xe6}}\] \[\text{\textit{xe6}}\] 30.\[\text{\textit{g5}}\] \[\text{\textit{f5}}\]
With 30...\[\text{\textit{xc4}}\], White could reply with 31.\[\text{\textit{c1}}\], as well as with simply 31.\[\text{\textit{h7}}\] and \[\text{\textit{x6+}}\].

31.\[\text{\textit{xe6}}\] \[\text{\textit{xe6}}\] 32.\[\text{\textit{d4}}\]!
Better than obvious 32.\[\text{\textit{xe6}}\] \[\text{\textit{xe6}}\] 33.\[\text{\textit{xb7}}\], whereupon Black would have had the choice, either to force perpetual check through 33...\[\text{\textit{h3}}\] 34.\[\text{\textit{xc8}}\] \[\text{\textit{g3+}}\], etc., or to play for further complications with 33...\[\text{\textit{xc4}}\].

32...\[\text{\textit{ce8}}\] 33.\[\text{\textit{d3}}\] \[\text{\textit{e4}}\] 34.\[\text{\textit{f1}}\] \[\text{\textit{g6}}\] (?)  
Black absolutely had to prevent the following exchange, which makes his enemy’s defense easier, with 34...\[\text{\textit{g5}}\], after which nothing better would remain for White than to play for a draw with 35.\[\text{\textit{d5}}\] \[\text{\textit{h4}}\] 36.\[\text{\textit{f4}}\] \[\text{\textit{e1+}}\] 37.\[\text{\textit{f1}}\], etc. But after the text move, he gets the upper-hand, and Black will have to fight hard to come to reconciliation.

35.\[\text{\textit{d8}}\] \[\text{\textit{xd8}}\] 36.\[\text{\textit{xd8+}}\] \[\text{\textit{h7}}\] 37.\[\text{\textit{d5}}!\]
Finally, with this important move he’s secure. Far weaker would be 37.\[\text{\textit{d7}}\], because of 37...\[\text{\textit{g5}}!\] (also threatening \[\text{\textit{g6}}\] 38.\[\text{\textit{d3}}\] \[\text{\textit{f5}}\], etc.

37...\[\text{\textit{g3}}\] 38.\[\text{\textit{f3}}\] \[\text{\textit{h4}}\]
Mainly in the hope that White will take the b7-pawn immediately: 39.\[\text{\textit{xb7}}\] \[\text{\textit{e2+}}\] 40.\[\text{\textit{h2}}\] (40.\[\text{\textit{f2}}\] \[\text{\textit{c2}}\] etc.) 40...\[\text{\textit{exe3}}!!\], etc., would assure Black of an offense leading at least to a draw. But Dr. Vidmar played more accurately:

39.\[\text{\textit{h2}}!\]
– whereupon nothing better remained for Black than a pawn sacrifice leading to a difficult endgame:

39...\[\text{\textit{d6}}!\] 40.\[\text{\textit{xf7}}\]
Again, not 40.\[\text{\textit{xb7}}\], because of 40...\[\text{\textit{e2}}\] 41.\[\text{\textit{f4}}\] \[\text{\textit{h5+}}\].

40...\[\text{\textit{d2}}\] 41.\[\text{\textit{g6+}}\]
Interesting here would be 41.\[\text{\textit{e2}}\], for after 41...\[\text{\textit{xe2}}\] 42.\[\text{\textit{xf2}}\], together with \[\text{\textit{xf4}}\], etc., White would plainly stand superior. It’s questionable, however, whether he would also retain real winning chances after the queen exchange – for example, 41...\[\text{\textit{f1+}}\] 42.\[\text{\textit{g1}}\] \[\text{\textit{xf7}}\] 43.\[\text{\textit{xf7}}\] \[\text{\textit{xe3}}\] 44.\[\text{\textit{e4+}}\] \[\text{\textit{h6}}\] 45.\[\text{\textit{xb7}}\] \[\text{\textit{xc4}}\] 46.\[\text{\textit{xa7}}\] \[\text{\textit{b2}}!!\]. With this last move, Black prevents the White passed pawn from advancing, and Black, with ...\[\text{\textit{b3}}\], as well as with the king’s march ...\[\text{\textit{g5-f4}}\], etc. (possibly along with the pawn advance g5 and g4), threatens to get sufficient counter-chances. After all, the immediate queen exchange in the text would definitely put before him a less-than-easy defense, or differently put, a counter-attack problem.

41...\[\text{\textit{g6}}\] 42.\[\text{\textit{c5}}!\] \[\text{\textit{a2}}\] 43.\[\text{\textit{e4}}\]
With this conciliatory counter-sacrifice, White hopes to bring the knight to side paths, which would allow him to assert
his queenside superiority. The results of the other winning attempt, 43.\( \text{f4} \), would have been very interesting. With that, the plausible \( \text{...g5} \) would have been highly precarious; for example, 44.\( \text{g4!} \) \( \text{h1+} \) 45.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{xh1}+ \) 46.\( \text{xh1} \) (the instructive pawn endgame after 46.\( \text{xh1} \) \( \text{xe3}+ \) 47.\( \text{h2} \) \( \text{xh2} \) 48.\( \text{xg2} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 49.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{a6} \) would, one could be convinced, even be won for Black), 46.\( \text{xe3} \) 47.\( \text{d3}+ \) \( \text{f6} \) (47...\( \text{g5} \) 48.\( \text{e4} \), etc.) 48.\( \text{f2} \) (stronger than 48.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d5} \), together with \( \text{...c2} \), etc.), 48...\( \text{d5} \) 49.\( \text{f3} \), and Black would hardly be able to successfully oppose the enemy’s penetration on both flanks (especially dangerous could be the seemingly harmless pawn \( \text{h3} \), supported by the bishop).

Therefore, to 43.\( \text{f4} \), he should not play 43...\( \text{g5} \), but rather 43...\( \text{g5} \)! – with consequences something like: (1) 44.\( \text{g4+} \) \( \text{h5} \) 45.\( \text{g1} \) (if 45.\( \text{xb7} \), then ...\( \text{xe3} \) 46.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 47.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{h6} \) 48.\( \text{g8} \) \( \text{h7} \) 49.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{h6} \), etc., draw) 45...\( \text{e2}+ \) 46.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{d4}+ \) ! 47.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{c2}+ \) 48.\( \text{d2} \) (48.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{xb4} \) 49.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{d3} \)) 48...\( \text{xb4}+ \) 49.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{a6}+ \) !; and (2) 44.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{f5} \) 45.\( \text{g1} \) (or 45.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{d3} \), etc. – similar to 1) 45...\( \text{a1+} \) 46.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{a2}+ \) 47.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{a3} \) 48.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{g6} \) 49.\( \text{xh7} \) \( \text{f6} \), and Black draws easily, since 50.\( \text{c6} \) doesn’t work, on account of 50...\( \text{xe3}+ \) 51.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{e5}+ \), together with \( \text{d6}+ \) and \( \text{b7} \), etc. – All difficult and at times quite interesting lines!

Therefore, to 43.\( \text{f4} \), he should not play 43...\( \text{g5} \), but rather 43...\( \text{g5} \)! – with consequences something like: (1) 44.\( \text{g4+} \) \( \text{h5} \) 45.\( \text{g1} \) (if 45.\( \text{xb7} \), then ...\( \text{xe3} \) 46.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 47.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{h6} \) 48.\( \text{g8} \) \( \text{h7} \) 49.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{h6} \), etc., draw) 45...\( \text{e2}+ \) 46.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{d4}+ \) ! 47.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{c2}+ \) 48.\( \text{d2} \) (48.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{xb4} \) 49.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{d3} \)) 48...\( \text{xb4}+ \) 49.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{a6}+ \) !; and (2) 44.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{f5} \) 45.\( \text{g1} \) (or 45.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{d3} \), etc. – similar to 1) 45...\( \text{a1+} \) 46.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{a2}+ \) 47.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{a3} \) 48.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{g6} \) 49.\( \text{xh7} \) \( \text{f6} \), and Black draws easily, since 50.\( \text{c6} \) doesn’t work, on account of 50...\( \text{xe3}+ \) 51.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{e5}+ \), together with \( \text{d6}+ \) and \( \text{b7} \), etc. – All difficult and at times quite interesting lines!

43...\( \text{e4} \) 44.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{g5} \) 45.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{e6} \)!

Through this recent pawn sacrifice, Black secures the f4-square for his knight, which permits him the complete use of the enemy’s pinned position. The final image is quite piquant.

46.\( \text{xh4} \) \( \text{f5} \) 47.\( \text{g4} \)

Or 47.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{xa4} \) 48.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{g5} \) 49.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{a5} \), etc. – draw.

47...\( \text{g5} \) 48.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{f4}! \)

The most stringent.

49.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{a3}+ \) 50.\( \text{f3} \)

After 50.\( \text{h2} \) \( \text{h3}+ \) 51.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{g4} \) 52.\( \text{c8}+ \) \( \text{g3} \) 53.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{xh3} \) \( \text{h3} \), together with \( \text{...d5} \), etc., Black would of course win.

50...\( \text{a2}! \) \( \text{h2-} \)

Black threatens 51...\( \text{h5} \) checkmate! Perpetual check with the knight follows 51.\( \text{h4} \), and perpetual with the rook follows a bishop move to c6, b7, a8. But if 51.\( \text{d1} \) (in order after 51...\( \text{a3}+ \), to be able to play 52.\( \text{f2} \)), then 51...\( \text{d2}! \), with which Black’s winning chances would obviously be in the past. Therefore ... draw.

(21) Nimzovich – Marshall
Réti Opening [A06]

1.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 2.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{d5} \)

Since with his second move White has foregone, \textit{de facto}, the fianchettoing of
Cycle II: Round 7

his king’s bishop, 2...b7, etc., certainly wouldn’t be a bad thing here.

3.b3 \( \text{\textit{Q}}g4 \)

The move is good, since it solves the problem of the queen’s bishop and at the same time permits White the occupation of e5 only after some effort. On the other hand, the older 3...c5 (Nimzovich-Spielmann, Cycle I) is at least very doubtful, because it virtually forces the pinning move \( \text{\textit{Q}}b5 \), so advantageous in the struggle for e5.

4.\( \text{\textit{Q}}b2 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}}d7 \) 5.h3

Temporarily not necessary, and – as became apparent, especially in the Nimzovich-Dr. Vidmar game in the tenth round, begun in this way – definitely not harmless. Instead, 5.\( \text{\textit{Q}}e2 \) commits to little, together with \( d3, \text{Q}bd2, \text{Q}h4 \), with the further idea of \( f4 \), etc.

5...\( \text{\textit{Q}}h5 \) 6.d3 \( \text{h}6 \)

Probably in order to retain the bishop threatened with exchange through 7.g4 \( \text{\textit{Q}}g6 \) 8.\( \text{\textit{Q}}h4 \), but which was hardly worth the effort. The immediate, and more obvious, 6.e6 appears better.

7.\( \text{\textit{Q}}bd2 \) e6 8.\( \text{\textit{Q}}e2 \)

Contrived, and hardly worthy of imitation. The proceeding had only partial success because Marshall – as opposed to his usual habit – in the following played merely for simplifications. Instead of this, 8.\( \text{\textit{Q}}e2 \) would have lead to an equal position – very well known, by the way, with colors reversed.

8...\( \text{\textit{Q}}b4 \) 9.g4

With the apparent intention of castling long. The dark queenside squares are very weak however, and this circumstance could have had unpleasant consequences for him.

9...\( \text{\textit{Q}}g6 \) 10.\( \text{\textit{Q}}e5 \)

The temporary control of e5 is only faint consolation here.

10...\( \text{\textit{Q}}\times e5 \) 11.\( \text{\textit{Q}}\times e5 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}}d6 \)

Why lose so much time? Immediately consequent was 11...\( \text{\textit{Q}}e7 \), together with 12...0-0-0, etc.

12.\( \text{\textit{Q}}e3 \) \( \text{\textit{Q}}e7 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{Q}}g2 \) 0-0-0 14.0-0-0

14...\( \text{\textit{Q}}\times e5 (? \)

So the white knight comes unexpectedly to the longed-for square, and will have to be removed by further exchange – and finally a balanced game results with mutual weaknesses. But instead of this, Black could, with 14...\( \text{\textit{Q}}a3+ \) 15.\( \text{\textit{Q}}b1 \) (15.\( \text{\textit{Q}}b2 \) e5 ?) 15...\( \text{\textit{Q}}e8 \) and a follow-up ...\( f6 \), finally take the e5-square from the opponent, which also would have resulted in the exchange of White's dark-square bishop (if not, then its blocking: 17.\( \text{\textit{Q}}g3 \) e5, etc.) – but with
a tremendous difference, compared to the text continuation. A much greater future would have beckoned to both the black knight (from d6) and his g6-bishop (on account of possible respective use on f7 and on the e8-a4 diagonal). After this omission, the play degenerates noticeably and consists for considerable time of small, easily clear tactical points. Not until the rook endgame does it become interesting again.

15.\( \square \times e5 \) \( \triangle h7 \) 16.c4!

The central knight covers d3. Besides, this move makes possible the queen’s involvement on the queenside and converts the weakness of the dark squares into a strength (definitely not a rare instance).

16...\( \triangle d7 \)

Otherwise, White would really get an advantage.

17.\( \square \times d7 \) \( \triangle \times d7 \) 18.c\( \times d5 \)

Removes the frontal pressure against d3.

18...e\( \times d5 \) 19.\( \$b2! \)

Here the queen stands resplendent – and it’s in no way surprising that her pressure on the center squares completely counterbalances the small weakness of the loosened kingside.

19...f5

Of course!

20.\( \$d2 \) \( \$f8 \)

Looks likewise very reasonable. But upon further consideration, the pressure on f2 proves harmless. Perhaps, therefore, the effects of 20...\( \$h8 \) (intending d4) would have been more long-lasting.

21.g\( \times f5 \)

Otherwise Black plays ...f4.

21...\( \$ \times f5 \) 22.\( \$h d1 \)

The infamous “over-protection” – this time bound with some tactical conditional ideas – for example, 23.e4 d\( \times e4 \) 24.d\( \times e4 \) \( \$ \times d2 \) 25.\( \$ \times d2 \) \( \triangle \times e4? \) 26.\( \$d7+, \) together with checkmate in two moves. Therefore, it would have been expedient for Black on the next move to play 22...a6 to open an outlet for himself. Then he probably would have stood still a nuance better.

22...\( \$g5 \) (?)

This failure, however, leads finally to a simplification that is in no way favorable. But even now, with halfway careful play, he wouldn’t need to worry about a draw.

23.f4 \( \$g3 \) 24.\( \$e5! \)

24.Qd4 (if ...c5 25.\( \$c2 \), etc.) worked too. But the text move is more compelling.

24...\( \$ \times h3 \)

If 24...c6 25.\( \$c2 \), with the renewed threat 26.\( \$ \times d5. \)

25.\( \$ \times d5 \)
The white pieces in the center now threaten many squares, and Black has to seek his salvation in simplification. The exchange of d5 against h3 was certainly not good business.

25...\text{g}6

With the threat 26...\text{f}5.

26.\text{e}4 \text{f}6 27.\text{x}f6 \text{x}f6 28.\text{g}1

Introduces a small threat to play on the g-file, but which should not have meaningful consequences, given the unavoidable bishop exchange.

28...\text{f}5 29.\text{dg}2 (!) \text{e}4

Here 29...g5! was simpler; for example, 30.fxg5 h\times g5 31.\text{x}g5 \text{e}4 32.\text{x}e4 \text{f}2! – and whether White exchanges a rook pair or not, Black would be able without difficulty to hold a draw.

30.\text{x}e4 \text{d}3

An effective and sufficient counterplay, much more purposeful than the passive behavior by means of 30...\text{f}f7, etc.

31.\text{x}g7 \text{e}3 32.\text{g}8+ \text{d}7 33.\text{g}1+ \text{c}6 34.\text{g}6

The position is a clear draw after the exchange brought about by this. But also 34.\text{c}8 wouldn’t have been sufficient – for example, 34...\text{x}f4 35.\text{c}xc7+ \text{d}6 36.\text{xb}7 \text{f}2! 37.\text{b}d7+ \text{c}6 38.\text{c}7+ \text{d}6, etc. – draw.

34...\text{d}6!

The simplest – the white king is driven to the edge.

35.e5 \text{e}1+ 36.\text{b}2 \text{e}2+ 37.\text{a}3 \text{x}g6 38.\text{x}g6+ \text{d}5 39.\text{h}6 a5 40.\text{h}7 \text{c}2

But now Marshall begins to contrive and thereby endangers his play. Simple was 40...\text{c}6, because if 41.\text{e}7, then 41...\text{f}2, and the White pawns wouldn’t advance. But the text move spoils nothing for now.

41.\text{e}7 b5 42.b4

If immediately 42.f5, then 42...b4+ 43.\text{a}4 \text{a}2+ 44.\text{b}5 \text{c}6+!, together with ...\text{a}4, etc. – draw.

42...a4?

The continuation of an unrealizable dream of mate. Correct was 42...\text{x}b4+ 43.\text{b}4 \text{c}4+ 44.\text{x}b5 \text{c}6+, together with ...\text{x}f4, etc. – draw.

43.f5 c5

Actually contains no threat (44...\text{c}4? 45.\text{c}7, etc.).

44.f6?

A mistake, but a rather excusable one. In hindsight it was noticed that White
was able to win with 44.e6!. Before the text, this move had the important advantage that it made possible the banishment of the king from d5 with \( \text{Qd7} + \), and thereby would have ensured the advance of the passed pawn. The logical further development of play would then be (44.e6!) 44...\( \text{Ec3} + \) 45.\( \text{Qb2} \) c\( \times b4 \) 46.\( \text{Qd7} + \) \( \text{Qc6} \) 47.\( \text{Qd}8 \) a3+ 48.\( \text{Qb1} \) \( \text{Ee3} \) 49.\( \text{f6} \) b3 50.\( \text{a\times b3} \) \( \text{Ee1} + \) 51.\( \text{Qa2} \) b4 52.\( \text{e7} \) \( \text{Ee2} + \) 53.\( \text{Qb1} \) \( \text{Ee1} + \) 54.\( \text{Qc2} \) a2 55.\( \text{Qa8} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 56.f7 (not 56.\( \text{Qx a2} ? \) \( \text{Qe2} + \), and a draw through perpetual check!), and wins. As one sees, this was in no way an easy line, and therefore one can hardly blame Nimzovich, at the board, for underestimating its strength.

44...\( \text{Ec3} + \) 45.\( \text{Qb2} \) c\( \times b4 \) \( \frac{1}{2} \)-\( \frac{1}{2} \)

After that, nothing better remains for White – since 46.\( \text{Qd7} + \) doesn't work – other than 46.f7, with the result 46...a3+ 47.\( \text{Qb1} \) \( \text{Ef3} \) 48.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{Ef1} + \) 49.\( \text{Qc2} \) \( \text{Ef2} + \) 50.\( \text{Qd3} \) b3 51.\( \text{a\times b3} \) a2=, etc. Therefore, draw.

Round 8

\( \frac{1}{2} \) Capablanca – Nimzovich \( \frac{1}{2} \)
\( \frac{1}{2} \) Alekhine – Spielmann \( \frac{1}{2} \)
0 Vidmar – Marshall 1

Standings after Round 8:

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<tr>
<th>Player</th>
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<td>Capablanca</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nimzovich</td>
<td>5 ( \frac{1}{2} )</td>
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<td>Alekhine</td>
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<td>Spielmann</td>
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(22) Capablanca – Nimzowitsch
Torre Attack [A46]

1.d4 \( \text{Qf6} \) 2.\( \text{Qf3} \) e6 3.\( \text{Qg5} \) h6

More usual and undoubtedly good is 3...c5 (compare Marshall – Capablanca from the fourth round). But in case Black absolutely wants to develop the queen's bishop to b7, then the text move has to happen exactly at this time, so that White either immediately exchanges on f6 (after which Black can choose the pawn configuration corresponding to the piece material reduced in this way), or gets around to e4, but only after some effort.

4.\( \text{Qh4} \) b6 5.\( \text{Qbd2} \) \( \text{Qb7} \) 6.e3 \( \text{Qe7} \) 7.\( \text{Qd3} \) d6 8.c3 0-0

Before he informs the opponent of his king's address, he would have done better, by means of 8...c5, to initiate play in the center immediately. The bishop check on b5 then wouldn't have been at all disturbing, because after 9...\( \text{Qc6} \), he could have guarded the pinned knight three or four times in case of need. Of course, Black's somewhat early castling could be exploited only with a fairly energetic, reckless approach – and Capablanca was accustomed to playing like that only in the rarest of cases.
9.h3

At this point hardly suitable, since a possible g4 before safeguarding the king’s position would be a strike at nothing – for example, (after 9...c5) 10.c×d4 ♞d5 11.♗g3 ♘b4+. In contrast, far more unpleasant for Black would have been the quiet – but still directed at a kingside attack – further mobilization of the white fighting force; for example, 9.♗e2 c5 10.0-0-0 ♗c6 11.♗b1 – and only then (even as a possible pawn sacrifice) g4, etc., with a promising fight. Instead the game degenerates completely after a few moves.

9...c5 10.0-0 ♘c6 11.♗e2 ♘h5

Seeking to keep the queen’s bishop with 11...♗b8 or 11...♗c8 would probably have little purpose, since in his solid, safe position, White would find opportunities for exchanges similar to the following. It’s indeed a difficult and thankless task to want to fight the unbending Capablancan will to draw.

12.♕xe7 ♗xe7 13.♗a6

Naturally!

13...♗f6 14.♗fd1 ♗fd8 15.e4

Played not in the hope of getting an initiative – he has no more chance of that – but rather merely in an attempt to force the opening of the file in order to trade the difficult pieces.

15...♗xa6 16.♗xa6 ♗c7

Prevents e5.

17.♗ac1 ♗d7 (!)

A preventive maneuver against possible d(or b)×c5.

18.b4 ♘ad8

Of course not 18...cxb4 19.cxb4 Nxb4? 20.Qa4, etc.

19.♗e2 ♘e7

Black distances the knight and queen from the c-file in order to be able to offer quick opposition to the rooks – a drawn game deeply thought through.

20.♗e1

Not 20.e5, because of 20...d×e5 21.♘xe5 ♗d5=.

20...♕g6 21.g3 ♗c8 22.b×c5 d×c5!

After 22...b×c5 23.♗b1, etc., the Black queenside could become weak.

23.♗b3 c×d4 24.c×d4 ♗b7

Finally, an exchange!

25.♗×c8+ ♗×c8 26.♗c1 ♗c7 27.♗×c7 ♗×c7 28.♗fd2 ♗c3 29.♗a6 (!) ♗c7

Rather more favorable for White would be 29...♗xe4 30.♗xe4 ♗e1+ 31.♗h2 ♗xe4 32.♗a7, etc.

30.♗e2 ♗c3 31.♗a6 ♗c7 ½-½

(23) Alekhine – Spielmann
Queen’s Pawn Game [D02]

1.♗f3 d5 2.d4 e6 3.♗f4

This continuation, especially favored by Rubinstein back in his day, is doubt-
lessly entirely solid, but has the disadvantage of being pointed only in a small measure toward pressure on the center, and so gives the opponent a larger choice between different types of development.

3...c5 4.e3 5.b6 5.c1

White’s leader made this passive move only because he wanted to try an improvement of the usual line; otherwise he would have chosen perhaps the vigorous developmental move 5.d3, which leads to peculiar play; for example: (1) 5...xb2 6.e5 a6 7.b1 xa2 8.a1 b2 9.a6, etc.; (2) 5...c4 6.e4! xb2 7.d2+. After other moves follows 8.b1, and White will develop unfettered.

5...c6 6.c3 d7 7.e2!

This is the mentioned improvement: if White plays 7.d3, then he will not be able to prevent the exchange of his valuable king’s bishop after 7...f6 8.h3 (otherwise, of course, ...h5, etc.) 8...c8 9.0-0 cxd4 10.exd4 b4, and after 11.e2 b5 12.d2 e2 13.xe2 d6, has to content himself with a position that is still solid, but offers little promise beyond that. With the game move, White’s thought is to first finish his development undisturbed, and only then position the bishop on the important b1-h7 diagonal. As we will see, the plan in this game was partly successful.

7...f6 8.h3 cxd4

This exchange certainly wasn’t necessary yet; but after 8...d2 9.b1, together with d3 and 0-0, White would have as good as forced the pawn trade on account of the positional threat dxc5: together with e4.

9.exd4 e7 10.0-0 0-0 11.b2 e8 12.b1 a5 13.e1!

This prevents the bishop exchange, since with 13...b5, simply 14.d1 would follow. It becomes more and more clear that Black is biting on a granite queenside.

13...f8 14.e5 e8 15.d3

 Threatens 16.g5 (16...g6 17.g4) to force 16...h6, probably a decisive weakness.

15...g6!

Thanks to this appropriate defense plan, the black position soon gets a hold. Indeed, however, it probably would have been different if White had continued resolutely.

16.g5

A stereotypical thought that cheats White out of the fruits of his rational opening approach. After Black had unavoidably weakened his kingside, White was able, and had first and fore-
most, to free his boxed-in queen on b1 (and thus also the queen’s rook) with b4!, (immediately or after e3, for example). He must accept the weakness c3, which would be quite easy to defend.

After 16.b4 c6, he could have continued promisingly with 17.a4 (17...e5 18.dxe5, together with e3-d4, etc.) or 17.b3 or 17.e3, together with f4, etc. After the text move, on the other hand, Black succeeds without effort in consolidating.

16...g7 17.c1

The threat connected with 18.g4 g8 19.xe7 xe7 20.c4, together with h6+ and f6 mate, is parried sufficiently through the next retraction.

17...g8 18.xe7 xe7 19.df3 f6

Through which the main hole is sealed and the actual danger therefore is eliminated, because the weakness on e6 is readily guarded by a number of pieces.

20.g4 g8 21.e2 f7 22.d2

After 22.c2, 22...c6, would follow, with a gain of tempo (...b4).

22...c4 23.c2 d6

Threatens with the not-to-be-underestimated counterattack b5-b4 (or first a5), etc.

24.xc4

White uses the last moment to get rid of the troublesome knight, without opening the b-file to the enemy.

24...xc4 25.e1 (!)

With a double intention – f4 and (if ...b5?), c5.

25...c7 26.d3 e7 27.d2 f5 28.ae1 e8 29.f4 (?)

But this is surely played too weakly; in better shape I would have made the doubtless risk-free attempt to conquer the e5-square by means of g4-h2-f3, together with g4-g5.

29.xf4 30.xf4 xe7 31.e3 xe3 32.xe3 e5 33.dxe5

The try 33.f3(!) was a last attempt at a win. But after 33...f8, not much would come of it.

33.fx e5 34.d3 f6 35.f3+ g7 36.fxe3 f6 37.f3+ ½—½

(24) Vidmar – Marshall
Bogo-Indian [E 11]

1.d4 d6 2.d3 e6 3.c4 b4+ 4.d2 x d2+ 5.b x d2 d5

As already noticed (compare the game Capablanca-Marshall from the first Cycle), in this variation lufi can be made for the black queen’s bishop either with ...b6 or ...d6, together possibly with ...e5 – without weakening the dark squares. The text move provides the first player in all cases a certain, if also not entirely convertible, positional advantage.

6.e3

The Capablancan 6.g2-g3 is also good.

6...0–0 7.c2 bd7 8.d3 h6 (?)
New York 1927

Rudolf Spielmann

José Raúl Capablanca

Aron Nimzovich
Alexander Alekhine

Frank Marshall

Milan Vidmar, Sr.
This weakening of the kingside is not harmless. After this a move, a more temperamental opponent probably would have tried to orchestrate an immediate offense by means of, for example, $g1-g4$, $g4-g5$, and castling long. But Dr. Vidmar apparently hopes to hold onto his advantage also through quite simple developmental moves.

9.0-0

He could also first play 9.$c1$, in order to make ...$c5$ still more difficult. But this wasn’t necessary, since after the disintegration in the center that now ensues, he gets a position promising victory.

9...$c5$

So it was foreseen with the previous move: The knight was freed from guarding $h7$, in order to be able finally to attack the white $c5$-pawn from $a6$(!) after a curious zigzag movement ... But such a plan with a half-developed position had to be unsound, and in fact, finds its rebuttal. But Black’s strategic situation was inferior at this moment, and the game of defense introduced by the *pater peccavi*-move ...$c6$ looked likewise uninviting.

10.$cxd5$ $\text{Qxd5}$ 11.$dxc5$ $\text{Qb4}$
12.$\text{h7+1}$ $\text{h8}$ 13.$\text{c4}$ $\text{a6}$
14.$\text{c2}$ $\text{dxc5}$ 15.$\text{b4}$ $\text{d7}$

After these six forced moves, it turns out that Black made no progress in the solution of the queen’s bishop problem, but opened up files for the action of the opponent’s rooks. White uses this circumstance very skillfully.

16.$\text{fd1}$ $\text{b6}$ 17.$\text{b3}$ $\text{d5}$

Looks daring, since the queen in the center, where she can be attacked too easily, has only a few squares at her disposal. But on the move 17...$e7$, at first glance more natural, White would force a new, probably decisive weakening of the enemy kingside: 18.$\text{d3}$ $f5$ 19.$\text{e5}$, etc.

18.$\text{b2}$ $\text{d7}$

What else?

19.$\text{e4}$

From here on, a vexing position arises, in which apparently several paths lead to Rome, but in fact, more often than not, there’s barely one single salvation for Black. At this moment, for example, the moves 19.$a4$ and 19.$\text{e4}$ appear enormously strong. But in the first case, Black would have pulled himself completely out of a fix with 19...$\text{d6!}$ – and halfway in the second with 19...$\text{b5}$ 20.$\text{xb7}$ $\text{a4}$ (20...$\text{ab8}$), with a pawn sacrifice. The text move is stronger.

19...$\text{b5}$ 20.$\text{a3}$

With the main threat 21.$\text{e5!}$, together with $\text{d6}$, and wins.

20...$\text{c6!}$

A bold defensive move, which gives him the most prospects for enemy carelessness.
21. \(\Delta d4\) (?)

Apparently tired from the struggle against the allure of various will-o'-the-wisps of the previous moves, Dr. Vidmar goes astray at this moment, when things weren't so hard. He relinquishes his whole positional advantage. The precarious position of Black's small heaps of pieces queenside, and above all of his queen, could have been taken advantage of here in two ways.

(1) 21.\(\Delta e5\) \(\Delta x e4\) (if [a] 21...\(\Delta a4\)? 22.\(\Delta x a4\) \(\Delta x a4\) 23.\(\Delta c5\); [b] 21...\(\Delta c4\) 22.\(\Delta x c4\) \(\Delta x c4\) 23.\(\Delta d3\) \(\Delta d5\) 24.\(b5\), with a winning advantage in both cases) 22.\(\Delta x e4\) \(\Delta c5\) (or \(\Delta la4\) 22.\(\Delta d4\) \(+\)) 23.\(\Delta f3\), and now for Black, neither 23...\(\Delta ca4\) 24.\(\Delta d4\), nor 23.\(\Delta ba4\) 24.\(\Delta c2\), etc., is satisfactory). In this line, Black would in the long run hardly be able to avoid the loss of a pawn; and (2) 21.\(\Delta d3!\) (not 21.\(\Delta d6\), on account of 21...\(\Delta c4\)! 22.\(\Delta x c4\) \(\Delta x f3\)!, etc.) 21...\(\Delta c4\) (or [a] 21...\(\Delta a4\) 22.\(\Delta x b5\) \(\Delta x b2\) 23.\(\Delta x c6\) \(bxc6\)! 24.\(\Delta c1\) \(\Delta c8\) 25.\(e5\) \(+\), etc.; [b] 21...\(\Delta h5\) 22.\(\Delta g3\), together with 23.\(h3\) or 23.\(\Delta a6\), and wins) 22.\(\Delta e2\) \(\Delta x e4\) 23.\(\Delta x e4\), and Black wouldn't have a sufficient defense against the threats 24.\(\Delta d4\) or 24.\(\Delta d3\), together with \(\Delta ac1\), etc. The weak text move – followed, by the way, by a still weaker one – permits Marshall the only time in the tournament to demonstrate his otherwise so feared tactical proficiency.

21...\(\Delta e5\) 22.\(f4?\)

Usually one makes such moves, weakening the entire center position, only if they are connected to a desirable change. So did White spot such a thing here in the driving back of the opponent's king's knight to the original place? He could have maintained a small advantage with the simple 22.\(\Delta b1\) (unpins and protects!).

22...\(\Delta c7\) 23.\(\Delta x c6\) \(bxc6\) 24.\(\Delta d3\) \(\Delta b8\)!

Indeed the only move (or else 25.\(\Delta d6\), etc.), but fine, since the knight can very soon get to better squares. Chances now score approximately equal.

25.\(\Delta ac1\) \(\Delta d5\)

The beginning of the counter-play in the center, enabled by White's careless 22nd move.

26.\(\Delta f2\) a5 27.\(b5\) \(\Delta b6\)

Threatens two pawns, neither of which is good to sacrifice. Therefore, it was now White's turn to make unpleasant forced moves.

28.\(bxc6\) \(\Delta x c6\) 29.\(\Delta c5\) \(\Delta ad8\) 30.\(g4?\)

A "risk-everything" play, which is unlike the leader of the white pieces. With 30.\(h3\) (preparing the move \(\Delta e4\), which doesn't work immediately because of 30. ...\(\Delta c3!\), etc.), he could have kept a balanced game.

30...\(\Delta de7\) 31.\(h4\)

Everything in the same style. The second player will determine that White will perish only because of his weak points in the center and kingside, arising from the many pawn moves.

31...\(\Delta d5!\)
The beginning of a long, calculated maneuver, which aims at the conquest of the black center squares.

32.e4

To 32.a4, ...b3 would be unpleasant, as would 32.e4 ffd8.

32...d4!

This move signifies the actual crisis of the game – for if Black were compelled here to draw back his rook, then White would get an advantage with the occupation of the b-file. But now he goes downhill rather quickly.

33.f5

To his misfortune, White has to convince himself that the instant win of the exchange with 33.d7 would ultimately change into a loss of a piece – for example, 33...d8 34.xf8 xfd3 35.xd3 xd3 36.f5 exf5 37.f5 g6! 38.f6 gxf6, etc.

33...exf5 34.gxf5 e5!

For the knights, which in the first part of the game had to wait so grimly for better days on a6 or b6 – bright new horizons are opening up; and in the end it will be their lot to deal the enemy the deathblow. The end phase makes quite a pleasing impression as an illustration on the subject of “Crime and Punishment.”

35.e2 xfd1+ 36.xd1 d8 37.xd8+ xfd8 38.f6

The tendency to simplify is probably understandable with the overall relaxed position. But it brings only slight relief, since there are still enough pawns remaining on the board to render a decision.

38...c6 39.f7+ g7 40.g2

The attempt 40.d3 would also prove insufficient after 40...d3 41.g3+ h7 42.xd3 d4+ 43.f1 e5, etc. The tragedy for White lies in the fact that the endgame is equally as hopeless for him as the middle game.

40...g6 41.h3

Also 41.h5 g5+, together with ...d4, etc., would be unpleasant.

41...d6!

Threatens to win a piece with ...d4+, etc.

42.g2 d4 43.b7

Forced, since after 43.d3, Black wins a piece with 43...e2 44.e2 xfd3!.

43.e5 44.f1

He already begins to hope for a “miracle”: 44...e4? 45.f7+!, together with 46.d6+, etc., draw!

44.f4

The bishop will soon be compelled to keep company with the knight in exile.
Cycle II: Round 9

(see White’s 47th move). The position, which represents the complete triumph of the strategy on the black central squares, deserves a diagram.

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{To } 57. \text{xf}4 \text{ comes } 57. \text{d5}. \text{ Mate in three.}
\end{array} \]

\[ 57...f5 \text{ 0–1} \]

Round 9

\[ \frac{1}{2} \text{ Vidmar – Capablanca } \frac{1}{2} \]

1 Alekhine – Marshall 0

0 Spielmann – Nimzovich 1

Standings after Round 9:

Capablanca 6\frac{1}{2}

Nimzovich 6\frac{1}{2}

Alekhine 4\frac{1}{2}

Vidmar 3\frac{1}{2}

Spielmann 3

Marshall 3

(25) Vidmar – Capablanca

Queen’s Gambit Declined [D30]

1.d4 \text{f6} 2.e3 \text{e6} 3.c4 \text{d5} 4.e3

With the voluntary confinement of his queen’s bishop, in my opinion White abandons the hope of getting an advantage in the opening. Oddly enough, in New York against Capablanca (see also Nimzovich-Capablanca, Round II), the best opening moves (4.\text{g}5 or 4.\text{c}3) were missed for mysterious reasons.

4...\text{bd7}

Against Nimzovich, Capablanca played 4...\text{e}7, together with ...0-0, which I also like better, because with that, Black reserves for himself the developmental possibility ...c5, together with ...\text{c}6.

5.\text{d}3

But the Merano line isn’t so strong for Black that White has to waive the nor-
mal move 5.Nc3 just to avoid it! To the text move, Capablanca tries a new, noteworthy developmental maneuver.

5...dxc4 6.Qc4 c5 7.0-0 Qb6 (!)

Enables a quick queenside mobilization. Inexpedient with this system would be the *zwischenzug* 7...a6, since after 8.a4 Qb6 9.Qd3, Black would always have to take into account a5.

8.Qd3 Qd7 9.Qc3 Qc8 10.Qe2

Here 10.Qxc5 Qxc5 11.e4 looks more natural. After the queen move, Black probably would have been able to make the push of the enemy e-pawn somewhat more difficult.

10...cxd4 11.Qxd4

The isolation of the central pawn through 11.e×d4 didn’t come under consideration, since in conjunction with it, White couldn’t expect a halfway serious attacking game.

11...Qb4

As the answer reveals, the developmental square for the bishop isn’t selected very happily. It was appropriate to look at the d4-knight with 11...Qc5, in order possibly to lead him astray; for example, 12.Qb3 Qe7 13.e4 e5 14.f4 0-0! 15.fxe5 Qg4 16.Qf4 Qg5 17.Qg3 Qe8! – and with good play, Black would take back the e5-square.

12.e4 e5

Not 12...Qxc3 13.bxc3 e5 (otherwise 14.e5 ±) 14.Qf3, together with Qc1-a3, with excellent play for White, thanks to the might of his black-square bishop.

13.Qc2 (?)

But here either 13.Qf3! or 13.Qb3 is preferable. If in this last case, 13...Qxc3 14.bxc3 0-0, then 15.Qa3 Qe8 16.Qc5 – rather in favor of White. But otherwise he would avoid the weakness on c3 (Qd2 or also possibly Qd5) and keep a small developmental advantage.

13...Qxc3 14.bxc3 0-0

Now Black is again at the helm.

15.Qe3 Qa4!

It’s true that this permits White to change his weakling c3 into a passed pawn that’s sound at the core – but at the cost of further weakening the entire area on the left side of the board. Only a few players probably would have conceived this idea.

16.c4 Qc5 17.Qd5 Qxd5 18.cxd5 Qa5

Threatens to win an exchange (19...Q×d3, etc.).

19.Qd1
19...\text{c}xd3 (?)

Strangely, Capablanca foregoes the obvious move 19...\text{c}a4, which would have assured him leading the game either after 20.\text{c}d2 \text{x}d2 21.\text{x}d2 \text{c}x3 22.\text{x}d3 \text{c}c4 (c2), together with doubling the rooks and moving the king to d7 – or also after 20.\text{d}2 \text{x}d3 21.\text{x}d3 \text{c}c3. On the other hand, following the hasty exchange, he can count only on a draw.

20.\text{c}x3 \text{c}c3

If now 20...\text{a}4 or 20...\text{c}3, then 21.\text{d}2!.

21.\text{c}e3 \text{c}x3 22.\text{c}x3 \text{a}5 23.\text{a}4 \text{c}c4 24.f3 \text{f}3 \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}

Now suddenly White stands better, since after 24. ...\text{a}4 25.\text{b}6. he wins back the pawn, whereupon White’s guarded d-pawn would have greater value than the Black pawn on b7. But the game, of course, was not to be won against proper defense.

(26) Alekhine – Marshall
Queen’s Gambit Declined [D30]

1.d4 \text{f}6 2.\text{f}3 \text{e}6 3.\text{c}4 \text{d}5 4.\text{g}5 \text{h}6

The praxis of the last tournament seems to suggest that White will have no trouble securing a lasting initiative after this move. Usually Black plays the move only out of “fear” of White’s later plans of development recommended by Capablanca – according to which the knight on d2 must be developed in order to take again on c4, in case Black plays ...\text{x}c4. It’s very questionable, however, whether this system can secure White a significant advantage, if Black, instead of the passive move ...\text{c}7-c6 (necessary if White develops his knight on c3), at the right moment liberates the play in the center with ...\text{c}7-c5!. In any case, this line still has been examined too little to be dismissed.

5.\text{x}f6 \text{x}f6 6.\text{c}3 \text{b}4

Relatively the best. If Black tries to thwart the exchange of the bishop with 6...\text{c}6, then 7. \text{b}3!, together with e4, etc., with superior play for White (Bürger-Sir Thomas, Hastings 1927).

7.\text{b}3 \text{c}5

If this counterattack were correct, then we would be forced to regard as insufficient the White maneuver from 4.\text{g}5 on. But in reality, the double step of the c-pawn gives some counter chances only in case of imprecise play on the part of the first to move, as was the case, for example, in the game Bogoljubow-Marshall, Moscow 1925. On the other hand, the simple liquidation of the tension in the center ensures White a real advantage – either positional or material.

8.cxd5

This move, also used by Bogoljubow in the mentioned game, is probably not the strongest. More correct is 8.\text{c}x5! \text{c}6 9.c5 \text{e}d5 10.a3! \text{x}c3! (or 10...\text{x}c5 11.e3, etc.) 11.b3\text{x}c3, and Black will have great difficulty winning back the gambit-pawn.

8...\text{c}xd4

An interesting idea, which promises Black more than 8...\text{e}d5 anyway
(Marshall-Bogoljubow), whereupon White would have replied not 9.a3 (Bogoljubow), but rather simply 9.dxc5, etc., as in the previous comment.

9...\( \textit{\#x2601}\)x\( \textit{\#x2601} \)

And not 9.dxe6 ?c6! 10.e+f7+ ?f8+, etc.

9...dxc3 10.dxe6

The only possibility to play for a win, since after 10.?c1 exd5 11.?x\( \textit{\#x2601} \)c3 ?x\( \textit{\#x2601} \)c3+ 12.?xc3 ?c6, etc., White would have only a quite insignificant advantage.

10...?xe6

11...?c6

This move – a kind of trap – is illogical, since Black has to swap queens anyway. A little better was 11...?xc3+ 12.bxc3 ?d7!, so that this knight could participate in the attack on the White c-pawn (via b6 or f6-d5 or a4, etc.).

12.e3!

The simplest, and better than 12.?xf6 gxf6 13.a3, (preventing ?b4) 13...0-0-0!, when Black’s pressure on the open files (d- and g-) could become unpleasant.

12...?xc3+

Or 12...0-0 13.?xf6 gxf6 14.a3±, etc.

13.bxc3 ?c8 14.?d3

In order to be able to play ?d4, which now, because of 14...?xd4 15.cxd4 ?c2, etc., would be premature.

14...0-0 15.?d4 ?d5 16.f3

Of course not 16.0-0, because ?e5, etc.

16...?e5 17.?d2 ?c5 18.e4

Black’s pressure on the c-pawn has become rather unpleasant – above all, since White, for now, has no real counter chances. White tries with the text move to bring about a simplifica-
tion, which will allow him to occupy the d-file just in time to neutralize the opponent's impact on the c-file.

18...\( \text{c}4 \) 19.\( \text{c} \times \text{c}4 \)

If 19.\( \text{c} \times \text{c}2 \), then 19...\( \text{c} \text{c}8 \), with the threat \( \text{a}6 \text{!} \), etc.

19...\( \text{c} \times \text{c}4 \text{!} \) 20.\( \text{e} \text{e}2 \text{a}3 \text{!} \) 21.\( \text{a} \text{c}1 \text{f} \text{c}8 \)

The previous move of the knight was excellent, since it impeded a possible counterattack on the b-file, and so limited the possibilities for White to come to the defense of his c-pawn. But here Black doesn't pay attention and permits the enemy to keep his material advantage through a concealed maneuver. The correct move was 21...\( \text{g}6 \)!, preventing the penetration of the knight via f5, after which White would still have great tactical difficulties asserting his advantage.

22.\( \text{f}5 \text{!} \text{h}8 \text{c}7 \)

After 22...\( \text{f}8 \), White's next move would be stronger yet.

23.\( \text{h} \text{d}1 \text{!} \text{b}5 \)

Or 23...\( \text{x} \text{c}3 \) 24.\( \text{x} \text{c}3 \) 25.\( \text{d}8+ \text{h}7 \) 26.\( \text{d}7 \text{c}2+ \) 27.\( \text{d}3 \text{g}2 \) 28.\( \text{x} \text{f}7 \), and White's passed e-pawn would obviously be superior. With the text move, Black hopes finally to capture the c-pawn, without ceding the seventh rank to White.

24.\( \text{c}4 \text{a}3 \)

25.\( \text{e}3 \text{!} \)

The point of the maneuver begun with the 22nd move: the c-pawn, which cannot be taken now because of the reply 26.\( \text{d}5 \text{!} \) (winning the exchange), will turn out to be a terrible weapon after some moves, against which Black will have no defense whatsoever. The final phase doesn't lack a certain piquancy.

25...\( \text{h}7 \)

Practically forced.

26.\( \text{d}5 \text{f}5 \text{c}6 \) 27.\( \text{d}3 \text{b}5 \)

White threatened 28.\( \text{a}5 \), et al.

28.\( \text{c}5 \text{b}4 \)

In order to steer the knight to c3 – via b5.

29.\( \text{f}5 \text{g}6 \) 30.\( \text{d}4 \text{!} \)

Prevents the plan mentioned above and prepares the triumphant pawn march.

30...\( \text{x} \text{g}2 \) 31.\( \text{c}6 \text{a}2 \) 32.\( \text{d}7 \text{c}8 \) 33.\( \text{x} \text{a}7 \text{!} \)
And not 33.c7 immediately, because of 33...b3! 34.\textit{b}x\textit{b}3 \textit{b}b5, etc., with some prospects.

33...b3

Despair!

34.\textit{c}x\textit{b}3 \textit{c}c2

Or 34...\textit{d}d8+ 35.\textit{d}d7!+ (not 35.\textit{d}d4+ because of 35...\textit{x}d4+, etc.).

35.\textit{c}x\textit{a}2 \textit{b}b4+ 36.\textit{d}d4 \textit{c}x\textit{a}2 37.\textit{c}c4 \textit{g}g6 38.\textit{c}c5 \textit{f}f6 39.\textit{d}d4

Or immediately 39.\textit{b}b6, etc. On the other hand, 39.\textit{c}c2 would be mistaken because of ...\textit{x}c6+!

39...\textit{c}c3 40.\textit{c}c4 \textit{e}e2 41.\textit{b}b6 \textit{b}b8+ 42.\textit{a}a7 \textit{b}x\textit{b}3 43.\textit{c}c7 \textit{a}a3+ 44.\textit{b}b7 \textit{b}b3+ 45.\textit{c}c6 1-0

(27) Spielmann – Nimzowitsch

Nimzovich Defense [C02]

1.e4 \textit{c}c6 2.\textit{f}f3 \textit{e}6 3.d4 d5 4.e5

If Black can’t devise something good after 1. ...\textit{c}c6 in order to avoid the current position, then certainly this move has no future. In fact, the black pieces are allocated to desperately few squares, and a demolition of the debilitating white pawn complex lies far in the future. Nimzovich’s next queenside operations are admittedly debonair and original, but remain without success, because his opponent attacks on the other side.

4...b6

Since without ...c5, this idea isn’t possible, I would try 4...\textit{a}a5? here – and only with 5.c3, then ...b6, etc. At the next move, 5...\textit{a}a5 therefore also came under consideration.

5.c3 \textit{c}c7 (?)

One can only waste time speculating about the occupation of “outposts” when the occupying pieces can actually be driven from such squares by enemy pawn moves. In the present case, for example, f5 will serve White merely as an attack-point, and therefore it offers absolutely no strategic value to waste time occupying. If Black didn’t want to cast his lot in with 5...\textit{a}a5, then 5...a5, with the aim ...\textit{a}a6, came under consideration.

6.\textit{d}d3 a5

The move has no success because of the obvious reply, and so could have been better replaced with the immediate 6...c5. But Black’s position was not satisfactory anyway.

7.\textit{e}e2 \textit{f}f5 8.h4

Threatening 9.g4 and forces the counter move, which further immobilizes Black’s kingside.

8...h5 9.\textit{g}g5
Cycle II: Round 9

9...g6?

Until now, the position could perhaps still have withstood the eccentricities, because they caused no irreparable weaknesses in their own camp. (The light squares queenside are certainly easy to "fill," like a bad tooth). But such a nasty weakening of f6 (and as a consequence, of its neighbors: since the squares of the same color have a common inner life – the fate of one most often exerts a corresponding influence upon the others), together with the absence of stable and effective squares for the black pieces, transforms Black's situation into a hopeless one. The way Spielmann resolves the situation, up to the unruffled winning position he obtained, is instructive.

Instead, with 9...gxe7. together with ...g6, ...e7, etc., the position could be given a face, although White's chances in this case would also be decidedly more favorable.

10.d2! gxe7

10...hxh4 is prohibited because of 11.b5+.

11.f1

With the irrefutable plan to oust f5 through f3, together with g4.

11.c5 12.f3 c4 13.c2 b5

The last three pawn moves form only a pseudo-demonstration, since the fate of the combat must be decided on the other flank. But even a halfway satisfactory defense set-up wasn't to be found there.

14.g4! g7

After 14...hxg4, 15.fxg4 hxh4 16.f2, etc., rupturing f7.

15.g3 c6 16.g2!

Very nice: after the opening of the g-file, unavoidable for Black, the queen will unfurl a deadly operation from here.

16...e7?

With this, Black makes the team play of the defending pieces still more difficult. But also after the relatively better 16...a7, favorable combinations would have stood at White's disposal; for example, 17.gxh5 hxh5 (or 17...gxh5 18.Nh7!±) 18.h5 19...xf7! xf7 20.xg6 xh4 21.xf7+ xf7 22.g1 ±, etc.

17.gxh5 gxh5

Forced, of course, since after 17...hxh5?, the exchange on h5, together with xf7, would immediately decide for White.

18.g1

From here on, different paths lead to Rome – and it's really Spielmann's bad luck that he thought of almost the only line that brought him, instead of to the eternal city, directly to hell ... Instead of the reasonable amplification of pressure on the g-file, the immediate sacrifice on f7, as well as the simpler h7-f6+, came under strong consideration.

18...a7
Although this sacrifice – as proved under later examination at some length – also should lead to a win, in my opinion it in no way deserves an exclamation mark, because it certainly isn’t the simplest way to a win. From the standpoint of economical reasoning, 19. \( \text{e}2! \) is certainly preferable here, which would leave the opponent completely without a halfway satisfactory countermove, and whereby all the sacrificial twists lying in wait in the text position would be maintained – but in decidedly intensified form. After 19...

The relative weakness of the previous moves was precisely that they connected with many enticements and side lines, and so placed unnecessary, heavy demands on White. Certainly the text move actually didn’t come under consideration at all, because it is based on quite a gross oversight. In contrast, it wasn’t at all easy to assess which of the four reasonable attacking continuations is the best: (1) 20. \( \text{g}6+ \); (2) 20. \( \text{e}4 \); (3) 20. \( \text{f}5 \); or (4) 20. \( \text{e}2 \).

The palm branch falls to the last method of play – with the rationale (20. \( \text{e}2! \)) 20... \( \text{h}4+ \) 21. \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 22. \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{f}7 \) 23. \( \text{g}6 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 24. \( \text{h}8 \) \( \text{x}h8 \) 25. \( \text{g}6! \), together with mate in some moves. It may be that White also could win with any of the other above moves in a complicated way. But in my opinion, this assessment wouldn’t have had any significance for the aesthetic value of the sacrificial combination.

A tad better was 21. \( \text{d}1 \) (compare Black’s 25th move); but this probably wouldn’t have had any effect on the outcome of the game.

Strange that Spielmann overlooked this actually natural, indeed sole, escape move. In the following, Black had quite an easy task and could have played differently in various places.

Still simpler was immediately 31...b4.

The return of the piece is actually the quickest way to checkmate.
37. \( \text{bxc8} \) \( \text{Ah4+} \) 38. \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{g7} \) 39. \( \text{hxh4} \) \( \text{c2} \) 40. \( \text{d8}+ \) \( \text{xh8} \) 41. \( \text{b8}+ \) \( \text{b7} \) 0–1

Round 10

\( \frac{1}{2} \) Capablanca – Alekhine \( \frac{1}{2} \)
0 Nimzovich – Vidmar 1
\( \frac{1}{2} \) Marshall – Spielmann \( \frac{1}{2} \)

Standings after Round 10:

- Capablanca 7
- Nimzovich 6\( \frac{1}{2} \)
- Alekhine 5
- Vidmar 4\( \frac{1}{2} \)
- Spielmann 3\( \frac{1}{2} \)
- Marshall 3\( \frac{1}{2} \)

(28) Capablanca – Alekhine
Semi-Slav Defense [D47]

1. \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 2. \( \text{f3} \) d5 3. c4 c6 4. e3

Hasn’t the move 4. \( \text{c3} \), used almost exclusively earlier, been placed into the archives somewhat too early? After 4...dxc4 5. a4 \( \text{f5} \) 6. \( \text{e5} \) e6 7. \( \text{f3}! \), together with e4, etc., White appears to get a game full of opportunity.

4...e6

Safer than 4...\( \text{f5} \) 5. cxd5! cxd5 (or 5...\( \text{xd5} \) 6. \( \text{bd2} \)) 6. \( \text{b3} \), with initiative for White on the queenside.

5. \( \text{c3} \)

This leads to the equalizing Meran variation. (I don’t believe in the supposed strengthening for White found in the very nick of time in this method of play.) Probably 5. \( \text{d3} \) promises somewhat more, in order possibly to develop the queen knight to d2.

5...\( \text{bd7} \) 6. \( \text{d3} \) d4 7. \( \text{xc4} \) b5! 8. \( \text{e2} \)

In case White wants to pass on the double-edged 9.e4 (after 8. \( \text{d3} \) a6), then it’s certainly most expedient for him not to interfere on the d-file with his bishop. Rubinstein also pulled his bishop back to e2 against Lasker (Moscow 1925).

8...a6 9.0–0 \( \text{b7} \) 10. a3

In the game mentioned, 10.b3 occurred instead of this, whereupon Black preferred to first mobilize his kingside, and only after 10...\( \text{e7} \), to play 11. \( \text{b2} \) 0–0 12. \( \text{e5} \) c5. On the other hand, after the text move, the immediate advance of the c-pawn is most advisable – since White, having prevented the possibility of ...b4, threatens 11.e4.

10...c5 11. \( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) (?)

Fearful fumbling for a draw as a result of inferior shape and unfavorable tournament standing! Full-value was only to be had in 11...\( \text{x5} \) 12. b4 \( \text{e7} \) 13. \( \text{b2} \) 0–0 – and Black, who would have more chances than White to make the most of c4 with the corresponding c5-square, would stand with more promise. The position would, by the way, have similarities to the 21st match game in Buenos Aires, where the pressure on the c-file soon provided the Black with a superior position.

After the illogical moves which occurred, White wins a couple of tempi and, as a result, gets greater freedom of space.

12. b4 \( \text{xd1} \) 13. \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{ce4} \)
14. \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{c3} \) 15. \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{e7} \)
16. \texttt{eac1 0-0 17. \texttt{d}e5 \texttt{fd8 18. \texttt{x}d8+ \texttt{x}d8 19. \texttt{d}4!}}

Capablanca doesn’t seem content yet with a draw – and justifiably, since Black still has to play carefully in order to equalize completely. After the exchange of the second rook, for example, White would certainly stand better (19...\texttt{c}8 20. \texttt{x}c8+ \texttt{x}c8 21. \texttt{c}6!, together with 22. \texttt{f}3 ±).

19...\texttt{d}6 20. \texttt{f}3

20...\texttt{d}5!

As a result, c6 is sufficiently defended (21. \texttt{c}6? \texttt{c}8 and wins), and consequently the winning chances of the opponent are neutralized. More amusing than this position, and even the whole game, is the fact, however, that – apparently as a result of an error in the telegraphic transmission of the game – the South American and European chess newspapers and columns described the text move as 20...\texttt{e}4?? And all – but all – assumed it as quite a matter of course that Black, in doing so, didn’t anticipate the quite obvious decisive countermove 21. \texttt{c}6, and that White likewise didn’t notice it ...

21. \texttt{d}3

It’s not hard to see that this move, which after [the erroneously reported, ed.] 20...\texttt{e}4 would have been a blatant error of omission, is here the most reasonable.

21...\texttt{f}8 22. \texttt{c}5 \texttt{x}c5 23. \texttt{x}c5+

Also 23.bxc5 \texttt{c}6, etc., would have been hopeless for the purpose of a win.

23...\texttt{e}8

If the knight had stood on e4 after White’s 23rd move [as in the false reports, ed.], then 23...\texttt{e}5 24.bxc5 (or 24.\texttt{x}c5 \texttt{f}3 25.\texttt{g}f3 \texttt{d}1+ 26.\texttt{g}2 \texttt{a}1 27. \texttt{c}3 \texttt{e}7+) 24...\texttt{x}f3 25.\texttt{g}f3 \texttt{e}7, etc., provides Black a superior rook endgame. But also this consideration awakened in the gentlemen commentators no doubt about the correctness of the text of the game.

24. \texttt{e}1 \texttt{c}8 25. \texttt{e}1 \texttt{c}7 26. \texttt{x}d5

In the European chess columns – and also in the Russian tournament book – the moves appear as 26. \texttt{x}e4 \texttt{x}e4 and in the next move – 27....\texttt{d}3. So all is in beautiful order!

26...\texttt{d}5 27.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{c}4 28.\texttt{d}1 \texttt{d}7 ½-½

(29) Nimzovich – Vidmar
Réti Opening [A06]

1.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{d}5 2.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{f}6 3.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{g}4 4.\texttt{b}2 \texttt{bd}7 5.\texttt{h}3

Nimzovich played like this against Marshall in the seventh round. But if in the following play \texttt{e}2 was deliberate, then \texttt{h}3 could calmly be omitted, and
Cycle II: Round 10

the bishop move take place immediately. Because after 5.\( \text{e}2 \text{xf3?} \) 6.\( \text{xf3 e5 7.d3} \), together with \( \text{d2} \), etc., White could have put a lot of faith in his white-square bishop.

5...\( \text{h5} \) 6.\( \text{e2} \)

In the game mentioned, 6.d3 occurred here, which in my opinion absolutely belongs to the system and must come sooner or later. White gets a disadvantage in this game only because he completely omits the move.

6...e6 7.\( \text{e5 (?)} \)

In connection with the following, this serves the development of the opponent. Still appropriate was 7.d3, together with \( \text{bd2} \).

7...\( \text{x}\text{e2} \) 8.\( \text{x}\text{e2} \text{d6} \) 9.\( \text{xd7} \)

A sad necessity, since 9.f4 is prohibited because of 9...\( \text{xe5} \) 10.\( \text{xe5} \text{e4=} \), etc.

9...\( \text{xd7} \) 10.\( \text{c4} \text{c6} \) 11.0-0 (?)

It isn't serious that the castled-short position is weakly defended right now - because Black isn't quite ready for attack. But what's really bad is that, in the future, there's no sensible way apparent for the white minor pieces to play across to the other flank in order to help their king. Therefore White would do much better to wait and see where the opponent castled - and with this idea, first play 11.\( \text{c3} \).

11...0-0-0!

12.\( \text{c3?} \)

This actually rather reasonable move is branded by the opponent in a very convincing way as a positional error of serious consequence. After the previous small omission, White's position no longer looks very good, but after 12.d3!, it would perhaps still get a face. Namely, if 12.\( \text{c7} \), then 13.\( \text{d1} \text{d6} \) 14.f4, with a center in need of protection, it's true, but flexible, and - which is the main thing here - with the real hope of co-operation from the bishop and knight.

Dr. Vidmar leads the following attack - as, by the way, the whole game - with great panache and precision.

12...\( \text{c7!} \) 13.d4

Rather forced, for if 13.d3 (or 13.\( \text{ad1} \)), then 13...\( \text{d6} \) 14.f4 (14.g3 \( \text{h5} \) 14...d4, etc., with a clear advantage.

13...\( \text{h5} \) 14.\( \text{c5?} \)

But now his best chance is in a pawn sacrifice: 14.e4! \( \text{dxc4} \) (after 14...\( \text{xe4} \) 15.\( \text{xe4} \text{xe4} \) 16.\( \text{xe4} \text{d6} \) 17.f4, etc., White has defenses) 15.\( \text{fd1!} \) (not 15.e5, since after ...\( \text{d5} \), exchanging
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and winning back a pawn, d4 remains miserably weak) 15...cxb3 16.a×b3, with a pawn center, open files and frolicking pieces. Instead of this, the bishop is demoted to a sleeping extra, and the knight will be scouting around in vain for useful squares. So the game is no more to be saved.

14...g5 15.b4 h4

Also 15...g4 16.h4 g3 17.f×g3 h×g4, etc., was strong. But the text move seems more aesthetic because of its inner consistency.

16.b5 Edg8!

Threatens ...g4 and, at the same time, allows the king the invulnerable d8-square. A powerful move!

17.b×c6 b×c6 18.f3

As a result, the threat ...g4 is deferred only a very few moves. But, anyway, the rest would be hopeless as well.

18...h5 19.e4 f5! 20.e×d5 e×d5 21.Eae1

Black no longer has to consider even this threat to swap queens.

21...g4! 22.h×g4 f×g4 23.f×g4

If 23.Ee6, now or on the next move, ...h3! decides.

23...E×g4

24.E×d5

Ingenious, but not hard to refute. Black was even able to take the sacrificial animal – for example, 24...c×d5 25.c6! Eg7 26.Ee6+ Eb8 27.E×d5, and now 27...h3!, etc. – but his reply is more compelling, since it wins the queen.

24...h3! 25.Ee7+ Eb7 26.Ef3

Black threatened 26...h2+, etc.

26...E×g2+ 27.E×g2 h×g2 28.d5 Eg4! 29.Eb3+ Ea8 30.E×h8 Eh4 31.d6

Otherwise, mate.

31...E×e1+ 32.E×g2 Ad8 33.Ed4

The last trump, and a very little one (33...Ee4+ 34.Eh2 E×d4? 35.Eb8+! etc.

33...E×e7! 34.d×e7 E×e7 35.Ef2 Ee4+ 0-1

A truly flawlessly implemented bout by Black.
Cycle II: Round 10

(30) Marshall – Spielmann
Sicilian Defense [B80]

1.d4 e6 2.Qf3 c5 3.e4

Also 3.c4 comes under strong consideration here.

3...cxd4 4.Qxd4 Qf6 5.£ic3

To 5.£d3, 5 ..A)c6 is good (see Spielmann-Alekhine, Cycle I). The so-called “Scheveningen” position, originating after Black’s next move, contains a series of interdependent, and therefore not easy to fathom, strategic problems.

5 ... d6 6 .£d3 £e7 7.0-0 0-0 8.£e3 £bd7 9.£e2 (?)

Marshall doesn’t belong to those who, in the space of 64 squares, seeks to solve riddles. He “develops” his pieces gradually in their own camp — apparently without worrying in which exact sequence these should be moved. Therefore, as preparation for f4 — which obviously is intended after £d3 — 8.£h1 comes much more under consideration according to Maróczy’s recipe, because on e3, the bishop can possibly serve the opponent as an object of attack, and after all, stands in the way of White’s own pieces. So instead of the text move, 9.f4 has to happen immediately in order to then lead the queen — via f3 or e1 — in two tempi to g3. As the outcome shows, this loss of time will be bitterly avenged.

9...a6 10.f4 £c7 11.Qf3 b5 12.£ae1

White had time for this later. More pressing was the strategic yet necessary 12.a3. It’s clear, by the way, that 12.e5 would be unfavorable because of 12...£b7.

12...£b7

An adventure as a consequence of White’s discontent with what he has achieved so far in this game. In fact, after 13.a3 £c5, Black would gradually have assumed control of the game — as he mostly succeeds, by the way, in the Sicilian in the case of a fortunately survived opening battle. But there was really no cause for White to grab at such desperate means. And Spielmann was completely correct in accepting the only apparently poisoned gift.

13.£g3 (?)

The point — but a harmless one.

14...£d5

As the outcome teaches, even this is sufficient to secure a positional advantage for Black. But why not simply 14...£d5 (of course not 14...exd5 15.£f5 ±) 15.exd5 £x£5, whereupon 16.£h3 would be easily and readily parried by 16...£7f6 and 16.f5 by 16...£e3, etc.
Much worse things occur in the following, by the way.

15.\textit{e}\textsubscript{x}d5 \textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{x}d5 16.f5!

This must now be answered exactly, because 17.\textit{\textalpha}h6 and 17.\textit{\textgamma}h3 are threatening -- and if 16...e5, for example, then 17.f6! \textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{x}f6 18.\textit{\textalpha}h6 could have followed, with disconcerting threats.

16...\textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{f}6

Precisely and well calculated.

17.\textit{\textalpha}h6 \textit{\textalpha}h5 18.\textit{\textgamma}g4 \textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{f}6!

An important tempo.

19.\textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{f}3 \textit{\textgamma}h8 20.\textit{\textgamma}\textsubscript{x}h5

Or 20.\textit{\textalpha}c1 g6 ±.

20.\textit{\textgamma}\textsubscript{x}h6 21.\textit{\textgamma}\textsubscript{x}h6 \textit{\textgamma}e7

White did win back the pawn, but meanwhile Black's positional advantage -- central pawns and the strong king's bishop -- emerged critically. Unfortunately, Black soon stumbles into a position technically easy for White.

22.\textit{\textgamma}e4 \textit{\textgamma}\textsubscript{x}e4 23.\textit{\textgamma}\textsubscript{x}e4 a5 (!)

Not 23...d5, because after 24.\textit{\textgamma}e3 (e2), he would not get around to the advance of the e-pawn (24...e5? 25.\textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{x}e5 \textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{x}e5 26.f6 ±, etc.).

24.\textit{\textalpha}fe1 e5

Now, of course, ...d5 is threatened, together with ...e4; and after the defensive move 25.\textit{\textgamma}e2, Black would find comfortable play on the c- and g-files. Black stands brilliantly.

25.\textit{c}c4 \textit{b}\textsubscript{x}c3 26.\textit{b}\textsubscript{x}c3 d5

Good, but also necessary, because otherwise, 27.c4.

27.\textit{\textgamma}e3

27...\textit{\textgamma}g8?

A regrettable oversight, thanks to which the advantage acquired through excellent play gets lost without a trace. Instead of this, 27...e4 was necessary and strong. If 28.c4 (what else?), then 28...\textit{\textgamma}d8! 29.\textit{\textalpha}e5? \textit{\textalpha}g5! (29...\textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{x}e5? 30.\textit{\textgamma}h3) 30.\textit{\textgamma}h5 \textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{x}e3+ 31.\textit{\textgamma}xe3 \textit{\textalpha}b6, and wins easily. Other lines would hardly be better -- White was already on the wrong track with his sacrificial attack, and only by this accident gets away with a black-eye-draw.

28.\textit{\textalpha}\textsubscript{x}e5!

Spielmann must have calculated imprecisely the results of this obvious reply, because otherwise he certainly would have chosen 27...e4.

28...\textit{\textgamma}g5 29.\textit{\textgamma}\textsubscript{x}g5!
(31) Capablanca – Marshall
Modern Benoni Defense [A62]

1.d4 ♗f6 2.♗f3 c5 3.d5

Hardly the best, because with this stiffening of the pawn position in the center, an all-too-great a choice between different plausible plans of development is left to the opponent. More flexible is 3.c4 with good prospects of getting sovereignty over the center squares.

3...e6

I would prefer 3...d6 with subsequent development of the bishop to f5 or g4.

4.c4 d6

The intended mobilization plan is not to be condemned off-hand; it has, after all, the advantage of bringing the black king’s bishop to a gleaming diagonal. The disadvantage of the line is in the ceding to the opponent the important strategic square c4 – a circumstance, which would be energetically taken advantage of especially by Nimzovich against Marshall (Round XVII). On the other hand, the manner of development chosen here by Capablanca lacks any particular sting.

5.♗c3 e×d5 6.c×d5 g6 7.g3

In the game mentioned, Nimzovich played 7.♗d2.

7...♗g7 8.♗g2 0–0 9.0–0 ♖e8 10.♗d2

Now the maneuver is not at all so effective, since the knight – even with the defense chosen by Marshall, in my
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opinion definitely not best – ultimately can’t hold his ground on c4. But White has no other reasonable plan.

10...\( \text{bd}7 \) 11.h3

A “psychologically” preventive move: In case of ...\( \text{e}5 \), White can now play \( f4 \), without the reply ...\( g4 \), and wants to suggest to Black that the knight move to \( e5 \) doesn’t work anyway ...

11...\( \text{b}6 (?) \)

Marshall actually lets himself be influenced! But on impartial reflection, he would have easily been able to recognize that it was decidedly in his favor to provoke the move \( f4 \), because as a result, the White center position would be weakened without proper compensation. Without \( f4 \), however, after ...\( e5 \), White would not have been able either to occupy the c4-square, or to complete his development well at all. Therefore, 11...\( e5 \) 12.\( f4 \) \( \text{d}7 \) was the right path for Black.

12.a4 \( \text{d}7 \)

The move 12...\( a5 \) would have had purpose only if the knight were still on b8 and had, via a6, an easy way to b4.

13.a5 \( \text{c}8 \) 14.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 15.e4

Apparently White convinced himself that he can’t effectively prevent the liberating move ...\( b5 \) (15.\( \text{b}3 \) b5! 16.\( \text{xb}5? \) \( \text{b}8 \), etc.) – and now tries to engage the opponent in the center. In any case, the game doesn’t make a unified impression.

\[ \begin{align*}
15...\text{b}5! \quad 16.\text{a}×\text{b}6 \quad \text{a}×\text{b}6 \quad 17.\text{a}×\text{a}3 \quad \text{a} \quad 18.\text{e}1 \\
\text{With the threat 19.e5, etc.} \\
18...\text{ab}8 \quad 19.\text{h}2 \]

[Diagram]

19...\( \text{c}8 (?) \)

Marshall, who up until now had acquitted himself quite well after a dubious opening, begins now to play in an affected manner, allowing his opponent ultimately to get a material advantage in a purely tactical way. Correct here was 19...\( \text{c}8!! \) with the double intention: (1) to keep a6 covered; and (2) to open the way to e5 (possibly c5) via d7 for the knight. If 20.\( f4 \), then 20...\( \text{f}d7 \), and Black can, after 21.e5, accept the pawn sacrifice and also first answer with 21...\( \text{b}7 \). In any case, it was inconsistent for him to cede the c4-square again to White without a fight.

20.\( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 21.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{a}8 \) 22.\( \text{f}3! \)

Threatens 23.\( \text{g}5 \), etc. – certainly a surprising turn, but one which bears only the smallest intrinsic relationship with the course of the struggle up to now.

22...h6
Since after 23.\texttt{Axh6 Axh6} 24.\texttt{Wxf6 Ag7}, etc., \texttt{b2} would remain unsecured. But \textit{White} has – everything a result of 19...\texttt{c8(?)} – strengthening moves.

\textbf{23.\texttt{Dc4 Db5}}

With 23...\texttt{h7}, the \texttt{h7}-pawn would be held for the moment. But in this case, \textit{White} would stand decidedly better. (Weaknesses on \texttt{a6} and \texttt{d6} because of the unhappy positions of the black knights!)

\textbf{24.\texttt{Da5 Dd7} 25.\texttt{Dxh6 Dxh6} 26.\texttt{Dxf6 Dg7} 27.\texttt{Wf3 Db6} 28.\texttt{Dg2 Da4}?}

In spite of the loss of the pawn, the Black position was definitely not yet hopeless, if here he had played, for example, 28...\texttt{c4}. After the incomprehensible text move, on the other hand, a second pawn is lost, and with that, the game actually should have been over.

\textbf{29.\texttt{Dxa4 Dxa4} 30.\texttt{Cc4}}

With the simultaneous, indefensible threats 30.\texttt{Db6} and 30.\texttt{Dxd6}.

\textbf{30...\texttt{Ab8} 31.\texttt{Dx6} Dxd6 32.\texttt{Dxa4 Dxb2} 33.\texttt{Dxa6 De5}}

\textbf{34.\texttt{De2}?}

This oversight (compare also Capablanca-Vidmar, Round IV) substantiates, among other things, that his mistake in my twelfth match game in Buenos Aires with Capablanca was absolutely not such a rare exception, as many wanted to suggest.

After the loss of one of the extra pawns and the queen exchange, the endgame here is most likely a draw, thanks to the opposite-color bishops. However, no special immersion in the diagrammed position is needed in order to be convinced that \textit{White} is headed for a win, and that more than one road leads to Rome for him: both 34.\texttt{Da4} and 34.\texttt{Dd6} were good enough, but most forceful was 34.\texttt{Dxa7!!} – for example, 34...\texttt{f5} (or 34...\texttt{e7} 35.\texttt{Dxe7 Dxe7} 36.\texttt{Dc4}, together with \texttt{Dxe2}, etc.) 35.\texttt{Dd6}! \texttt{Dxd6} (or 35...\texttt{fxe4} 36.\texttt{Df7+}, \texttt{Dh7} 37.\texttt{Dxe7}, etc.) 36.e5 \texttt{Dxe5} (or 36...\texttt{Dxe5} 37.\texttt{Dxg7}+ \texttt{Dxg7} 38.\texttt{Dc3}, etc.) 37.\texttt{Dc4+}, \texttt{Dh8} 38.\texttt{Df7}, etc. Black could play differently, but in all cases \textit{White} would maintain, besides the material advantage, an attacking position promising a win.

\textbf{34...\texttt{Dxe2} 35.\texttt{Dxe2} Dxe4+ 36.\texttt{Dxe4 Dxe4} 37.\texttt{Da8+ Df8} 38.\texttt{Df3 Dd4}.}

Now the white passed pawn is never allowed to go further, and \textit{White}'s kingside superiority can’t be made tangible without additional, leveling pawn exchanges. The following attempts at a win are therefore nearly hopeless.

\textbf{39.\texttt{Dd8 Dg7} 40.\texttt{De3 f5}}
Absolutely appropriate, since sooner or later, on account of the eventual threat of ...f4+ (together with ...h6), he forces the fixing of the pawn position with f4.

41.d3 e7 42.d7 f8 43.f4 e8 44.b5 f8 45.h4

After 45.g4, 45...b4, etc., suffices for a draw.

45...e4+ 46.f3 d4 47.e3 e4+ 48.d3 d4+ 49.c2 b4 50.d6

The last attempt.

50...h4! 51.gxh4 b5 52.e7 b4 53.h5 g5 54.e5 d4 55.f5+ g7 56.h5 d6 57.c5 d4 58.f5 g6 59.f8 g7 60.c3 a4 ½-½

(32) Alekhine - Nimzovich
Nimzo-Indian Defense [E32]

1.d4 f6 2.c4 e6 3.c3 b4 4.c2 d6

In this position, various moves stand at Black’s disposal, but none seems to lead to an entirely satisfactory result. (1) 4...b6 5.e4 b7 6.d3 c3+ 7.bxc3 d6 8.d4, together with 9.d3±; (2) 4...c5 5.dxc5! c6 5...d6 6.g3! d6 7.d3 c5 7...g5±, together with – as the case may be – e4 or e3, etc.; and (3) 4...d5 5.d3 c5 6.cxd5 exd5 7.d3 g5±, etc. The text move is not much better, as the continuation shows.

5.g5 bd7 6.e3

The “occupation of the center” by means of 6.e4 would obviously have only limited the effectiveness of his own pieces.

6.b6 7.d3 b7 8.f3!

In any case, less clichéd than 8.d3, with which a position, occurring rather often in recent years and notably against my opponent, was brought about. In fact, with the current flexibility of the enemy pawn position in the center, it’s not easy for Black to work out a further plan of development that promises success.

8...xc3+

And already from this moment on, his play begins to suffer from a certain vacillation; for example, he in no way needed to surrender readily his bishop pair to the opponent. Probably 8...c5 9.ge2 c8, together possibly with ...cxd4 and ...d5, etc., would have been a continuation full of opportunity.

9.xc3 c5 10.h3!

Surprising at first glance – but the only correct thing; to the more reasonable 10.e2 (or 10.d1), Black would have been able to force a simplification with a likely drawn conclusion by means of ...d5!.

10...h6 11.f4

And not 11.h4, because of the possibility of the tactical sortie ...g5-g4, etc.

11.e7
Threatening 12...e5 13.dxe5 dxe5 14.Qg3 e4!, etc.

12.Qg3!

But with this simple retreat, White retains his positional advantage.

12...e5 (?)

The lesser of two evils was still castling short (but not 12...Ec8 13.Ea3!), whereupon it wouldn’t yet be easy for White to intensify his pressure decidedly on the enemy dark squares.

13.dxe5! dxe5 14.0-0-0

On the other hand, now Black will not be able to withstand the enemy pressure on the central file in the long run, since in addition, his pieces are committed to guarding the pawn, which has become weak.

14...g6

Not immediately 14...0-0-0, because of 15.Qf5 g6 16.Qxe5! Qxf5 17.£xd7, together with 18.Qxf6 (or £xh8), etc.±. It’s evident, by the way, that castling short would be at least as questionable as the chosen continuation, with which the king can function not merely as attack object, but also as a defensive piece (eventual guarding of the d6-d8 squares).

15.Qc2

The bishop must obviously move to the a4-e8 diagonal, where he can accomplish a lot.

15...0-0-0 16.Qa4 £he8 17.Qf2 £e6

The bishop should be opposed on c6. To Black’s misfortune, this can’t happen without longer preparation, and White calmly uses this time to intensify his pressure on the d-file. Likewise unsatisfactory would be 17...Qh5 18.£d2, etc.

18.Qd3 £e7

Or 18...Qh5, 19.£d2, £xg3 20.£xg3 h5 21.£hd1, etc., eventually winning a pawn.

19.£d2 £de8 20.£hd1 Qc6

Finally, this unpinning move can be played, since e5 is sufficiently guarded. But after the following retreat, another, still more serious evil comes into being – d6 has become incurably weak in the meantime, and with the impossibility of finding protection for it, Black is put at a difficult material disadvantage.

21.Qc2! £h5

Also with other moves, a knight-discovery, together with £d6, would have followed.
22. $\Box x c 5$

With this, the fight is actually decided, because White wins the queen and a pawn for a rook and knight. Why the game still lasts so long is explained by the fact that this type of endgame usually requires very many moves – and especially if, as here, the stronger party possesses no passed pawns, and the opponent initially has no assailable squares.

22... $\Box x c 5$ 23. $\Box d 6$ $\Box x g 3$ 24. $h x g 3$ $\Box x d 6$ 25. $\Box x d 6$ $\Box c 7$ 26. $b 4$

In order to bring about a further simplification, since the retention of the current piece-material would only concede chances to the opponent.

26... $\Box b 7$ 27. $\Box x c 6$ $\Box x c 6$ 28. $a 4$ $\Box e e 6$ 29. $\Box x c 6$ $\Box x c 6$ 30. $\Box x e 5$

This pawn exchange is clearly favorable, since it crucially simplifies the later penetration of the king.

30... $\Box x c 4+$ 31. $\Box d 2$ $h 5$

32. $h 8+$, $\Box x h 6$ was threatened. But now everything is protected, and White will have to aspire to somehow assert his pawn superiority on the kingside. But this process is very laborious, since this superiority exists only in the form of a doubled pawn.

32. $a 3$

Or also immediately 32. $e 4$, etc.

32... $\Box c 7$ 33. $e 8+$ $\Box d 8$ 34. $e 4$ $\Box d 7+$ 35. $\Box e 3$ $\Box c 7$ 36. $\Box f 4$

Also good was 36. $\Box f 2$, together with $g 1-h 2$, etc., (see below). But Black pursues another plan, which likewise certainly leads to a win.

36... $\Box c 3$ 37. $a 4$ $\Box c 2$ 38. $e 7$ $\Box c 7$ 39. $f 6$

Temporizing.

39... $\Box c 2$ 40. $e 7$ $\Box c 7$ 41. $d 6$

That's the correct way – the queen should be put on d5, whereby Black is doomed to total passivity on account of the threat $d 5-a 8+$, etc.

41... $\Box e 6+$ 42. $e 5$

The winning procedure could also go: $f 4-e 3-f 2-g 1-h 2$, together with $f 3-f 4-f 5$, ... $g 6-f 5$, $e 4-f 5$, capturing the h-pawn with the queen, and finally advancing both g-pawns. White's plan to win is essentially the same. But the king immediately plays an active role – which, however, permits the opponent some harmless counter threats.

42... $\Box d 8$ 43. $d 5$! $c 6$

The continuation 43... $a 5$ 44. $a 8+$, together with ... $b 5$, would have led to similar positions as the one reached by White after the 52nd move.

44. $f 4$

Not immediately 44. $f 4$, on account of 44... $a 5 $, which in this case would really be unpleasant.
Cycle III: Round 11

44...e6+ 45.\eb3 c3+ 46.\eb2 c7 47.f4 d8 48.\eb3 c3+ 49.\ed4 c7 50.\ed5! a5

Practically forced, because after 50...\ec6 51.f5! a5, the queen sacrifice already prevails: 52.bxa5 \ec5 53.fxg6 fxg6 54.a\xb6 \xd5+ 55.exd5 \xb7 56.a5 \xa6 57.\xd6! \xb7+ 58.\xc7 \xa5 59.d6 \xb7 60.d7 g5 61.d8\xf8 \xd8 62.\xf8, etc. – with a winning pawn endgame.

51.\xa8+ \xb7 52.b5 \xe7

The current confinement of the queen by means of 52...\xb7 would clearly have proved futile after 53.\xf6!.

53.f5!

This advance finally occurs, which forces the winning of a second pawn. By the way, an awful trap here would be 53.\xb8? \xe6!, with mate or the win of the queen!

53...f6+ 54.\xd4 \xd7+ 55.\xe3 \xf5 56.e\xf5 \xf7 57.\f3! \xe5

This good knight position offers only temporary solace for the additional loss of material.

58.\xb1h5 \xd3+ 59.\xf2 \d2+ 60.\f1 \d4 61.\h7+ \d6

Or 61...\f7 62.\g8 \xa4 63.\b8, etc.

62.\b7 \d7 63.\c6+ \f7 64.\e6+ \d8 65.\b3 \b4 66.\d1

Temporizing.

66...\e7 67.\e2+ \d8 68.\a2 \e7 69.\e2! \e4+

After 69...\d8 would follow 70.\g8+, g4, etc.

70.\f3 \b4 71.\e3 \c5 72.\g8 \d7 73.g4!

Decisive!

73... \xa4 74.\g5 \xg5 75.\xg5+ \d6 76.\g6+ \c7 77.\c6+ \d8 78.f6 \a1 79.\g4 \f1 80.\g5 \f5 81.\a8+ 1-0

This check was sealed by White at adjournment, since he saw a forced repetition of moves and didn’t feel like further contemplation after the strenuous, five-hour game. However, on resumption, Nimzovich resigned the game immediately – because further details are already quite clear: 81...\c7 82.\c6+ \d8 83.g6!: (1) 83...\xf6: 84.g7, etc.; or (2) 83...\x6 84.\d6+, \d7 85.g7 \g5 86.\f8+ \f8; 87 gxf8\xb1, together with winning a rook in another three moves.

(33) Vidmar – Spielmann
Semi-Slav Defense [D46]

1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.\f3 \d7 4.e3
The move ...\( \text{d7} \) is probably not so strong that it demanded self-restraint. As it became convincingly apparent in other games in this tournament, the natural move \( 4.\text{c3} \) is quite favorable for White.

\[ \text{4...g6f6 5.d3 c6} \]

Black appears to want to bring about by all means a difficult line of the Slav Defense, not unjustly unpopular in general. Easier means of equalizing were offered by \( 5...c5 \).

\[ \text{6.bd2 d6} \]

Even now – after White waived early pressure against d5 by means of the development of the knight to d2 – ...c5 still came under consideration.

\[ \text{7.0-0 0-0 8.e4! dxe4 9.xe4 xe4 10.xe4} \]

With this, a well-known position is reached, in which White’s space advantage is brought to bear only with exact play.

\[ \text{10...c7 11.c2} \]

This withdrawal would occur also on \( 10...c5 \) or \( 10...f6 \). It has the dual purpose of not only preventing Black’s possible win of a later tempo (...f6, ...f5), but also especially preparing an attack against h7, which should force a change in the pawn position disadvantageous to Black.

\[ \text{11.h6} \]

Black is clearly determined, in the case of \( \text{d3} \), to accept the weakening of e6. The idea is more active, and therefore probably more promising, than the moves attempted by Bogoljubow in this position: \( 11...c5 \) or \( 11...d8 \) (together with ...f8).

\[ \text{12.b3} \]

Owing to this restrained method of development, Black gets time to eliminate the main disadvantage of his position – the unemployment of the queen’s bishop – and to reap sufficient counterplay in the center. And \( 12.d3 \) would be inexpedient, since it would force a move (...f5) that Black wants to make anyway. More logical would be, on the other hand, \( 12.e1! \) (with the intention of \( \text{d3} \)), which would probably have caused a change in the opponent’s plans – for example, \( 12.d8 \), in order to protect h7 with the aid of ...f8. But just after that, White would have been able to position his queen more effectively than in the game on the a1-h8 diagonal – for example, \( 13.d2 c5 14.dxc5 e5 15.e2 \), together with possible \( 16.c3 \).
In the following, White makes only small difficulties for the enemy.

12...b6 13.\(\texttt{\textbf{a}}\b2 \texttt{\textbf{a}}\b7 14.\(\texttt{\textbf{d}}\d3 \texttt{f}5 15.\texttt{\textbf{f}}\e1 \texttt{\textbf{e}}\ae8 16.\(\texttt{\textbf{e}}\e5 (?)

With that, the opening advantage is definitely given away. Correct was 16.\(\texttt{\textbf{a}}\d1, which would have prevented both 16...c5 and 16...e5 (17.c5!, etc.). But if 16...\(\texttt{\textbf{f}}\f6, then 17.c5, bxc5 18.\(\texttt{\textbf{c}}\c4!, etc. with complications favorable to White.

16...c5!

A small combination, the only one in this dry game, by the way. If namely 17.\(\texttt{\textbf{d}}\x7 \texttt{\textbf{d}}\x7 18. dxc5, then, to begin with, 18...\(\texttt{\textbf{c}}\c6!, together with ...\(\texttt{\textbf{d}}\d6\x7(+)\, etc.

17.\(\texttt{\textbf{d}}\ad1 \texttt{\textbf{f}}\f6

After 17...\(\texttt{\textbf{e}}\e4, White would probably sacrifice the exchange: 18.\(\texttt{\textbf{e}}\xe4 fxe4 19.\(\texttt{\textbf{e}}\xe4 \texttt{\textbf{f}}\f6 20.\(\texttt{\textbf{g}}\g6 cxd4 21.\(\texttt{\textbf{g}}\g4, with an attack guaranteeing a draw.

18.\(\texttt{\textbf{e}}\e2 cxd4 19.\(\texttt{\textbf{d}}\d4 \texttt{\textbf{e}}\e4 20.f4

With this, e5 is finally secured – but at the price of e4. The mutual strong knight positions now prevent (as often occurs with Stonewall formations) the development of a halfway promising fight. Considering this, the decision to draw appears justified after a half dozen moves.

20...\(\texttt{\textbf{d}}\d8 21.\(\texttt{\textbf{h}}\h1 \texttt{\textbf{h}}\h7 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{d}}\d3 \texttt{\textbf{e}}\e7 23.\texttt{\textbf{f}}\f1 \texttt{\textbf{f}}\f6 24.\(\texttt{\textbf{f}}\f3 \texttt{\textbf{f}}ff8 25.\(\texttt{\textbf{e}}\e5 \texttt{\textbf{f}}\f6 26.\(\texttt{\textbf{f}}\f3 \texttt{\textbf{f}}ff8 \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}

**Round 12**

1 Capablanca – Vidmar 0

Marshall – Alekhine ½

Nimzovich – Spielmann ½

**Standings after Round 12:**

Capablanca 8½

Nimzovich 7

Alekhine 6½

Vidmar 5

Spielmann 4½

Marshall 4½

(34) Capablanca – Vidmar

Ruy Lopez [C98]

1.e4 e5 2.\(\texttt{\textbf{f}}\f3 \texttt{\textbf{c}}\c6 3.\(\texttt{\textbf{b}}\b5 a6 4.\(\texttt{\textbf{a}}\a4 \texttt{\textbf{f}}\f6 5.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{e}}\e7 6.\texttt{\textbf{e}}\e1 b5 7.\(\texttt{\textbf{b}}\b3 d6 8.c3 \(\texttt{\textbf{a}}\a5

Lately 8...0-0 has become more usual, whereupon, as is generally known, White’s best is 9.h3.

9.\(\texttt{\textbf{c}}\c2 c5 10.d4 \texttt{\textbf{c}}\c7 11.\(\texttt{\textbf{d}}\bd2 0-0

Since White omits 11.h3, here 11...\(\texttt{\textbf{g}}\g4 came under consideration first. As Black plays, we come to a position (with transposition of moves) from the match Lasker-Tarrasch, long since known and analyzed.

12.h3 \(\texttt{\textbf{c}}\c6 13.d5

Certainly more solid than Lasker’s pawn sacrifice 13.\(\texttt{\textbf{f}}\f1 cxd4 14.cxd4 \texttt{\textbf{e}}\x7(!, etc. (Leonhardt-Rubinstein, San Sebastian 1912). On the other hand, 13.dxc5 dxc5 14.\(\texttt{\textbf{f}}\f1 – which was tried initially by Bogoljubow and then by Wagner – is absolutely not as harmless as it appears at first sight.
New York 1927

13...\(\text{d}8\) 14.a4!

A timely move, which should bring about at least one critical queenside position; for example, 14...\(\text{b}8\) 15.a\(\times\)b5 a\(\times\)b5 16.c4!, or 14...\(\text{a}7\) 15.\(\text{e}2\), etc. – but Black chooses a greater evil.

14...b4 (?)

Relinquishes the highly important square \(c4\) to the opponent without compensation. Of course, Capablanca doesn’t leave the favorable opportunity unused.

15.\(\text{c}4\) a5

Otherwise 16.a5, among others, would be unpleasant. The text move is relatively the best, since Black actually doesn’t need to fear the following tactical diversion.

16.\(\text{f}xe5\)

This much-admired exchange combination leads to a certainly somewhat more favorable, but not absolutely won endgame, which Black finally loses only by imprecise play. More sustainable was 16.\(\text{e}3\) (16...\(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{fd}2\)), in order first to temporize until the dominating knight position on \(c4\) forces the opponent into unfavorable operations.

16...\(\text{a}6\)

The \textit{zwischenzug} is not a bad thing. Only Black doesn’t use his tactical consequences properly in the following.

17.\(\text{b}3\) dxe5 18.d6 \(\text{xd}6\) 19.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 20.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{b}7\)?

Why voluntarily surrender the weapon of the bishop pair to the opponent?

Obvious was 20...\(\text{b}8\), and if 21.\(\text{c}4\), then 21...\(\text{x}c4\) 22.\(\text{x}c4\) \(\text{c}6\), etc. – with a definitely defensible game.

21.\(\text{b}7\) \(\text{b}7\) 22.c\(\times\)b4 c\(\times\)b4?

A further omission. Good was 22...a\(\times\)b4 23.f3 \(\text{a}6\), together possibly with ...\(\text{c}4\), with sufficient counter-play.

23.f3 \(\text{fd}8(?)\)

Black’s position has become unsure because of the weakening of the dark squares. But it simplifies victory for the opponent by a quite haphazard defense. A better defense opportunity was offered here, for example, by 23...\(\text{d}7\) 24.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{fc}8\) 25.\(\text{ac}1\) (25.\(\text{ed}1\) \(\text{c}7\)) 25...\(\text{f}8\), etc.

24.\(\text{e}3\) h6

To what end?

25.\(\text{e}d1\) \(\text{c}6\) 26.\(\text{ac}1\) \(\text{e}8\) 27.\(\text{e}2\)

Also, 27.\(\text{b}6\) could also occur. But White doesn’t need to hurry, since \(\text{a}5\) can’t evade him any longer.
27...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\textbf{x}}}}}d1 28.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}d1} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c}}}8} 29.g4

Not yet 29.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b}}}6}, on account of 29...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}7} 30.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}a5} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c}}}5}, etc.

29...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}7}?

A last mistake, which has as a result an immediate loss in material. After 29...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}8}, for example, the agony probably would have lasted longer.

30.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b}}}6} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e}}}6}

Or 30...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a}}}8}, then 31.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c}}}7}, etc.

31.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}e6} fxe6

If 31...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c}}}2+} 32.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e}}}3} fxe6, then of course 33.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}2}, etc.

32.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}d8}+ \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}d8} 33.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}d8} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}7} 34.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}a5} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c}}}5} 35.b3!

In distinctly winning positions, Capablanca plays always most accurately. Of course, 35.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}b4} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}a4} 36.b3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b}}}6} 37.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}6} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}7} 38.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}3}, etc., also wins easily.

35...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}b3} 36.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}b4} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}4} 37.a5 1-0

A generally clear and consistent game by Capablanca – on the other hand, quite weakly played by Dr. Vidmar.

(35) Marshall – Alekhine
French Defense [C01]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c}}}3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b}}}4} 4.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}d5}

Interesting but not recommended here is 4.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}3} c5 5.exd5 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}d5} 6.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}1} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c}}}3} 7.bxc3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c}}}6} 8.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}6} – and White is hardly likely to find a successful use for his bishop pair.

4...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{x}}}d5} 5.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e}}}7} 6.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g}}}e2}

More solid than 6.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}3}, recommended here by various commentators, whereupon Black could very well play 6...c5! 7.dxc5 d4 8.a3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a}}}5}, etc. But, on the other hand, 6.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h}}}5} came under strong consideration.

6...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{bc}}}6} 7.0-0 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g}}}4}

In the attempt to fashion more involved play where possible. Simpler – but drier still – is the usual 7...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}5}.

8.a3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a}}}5}

Again, the bishop retreat to d6 was simpler and healthier, and would certainly allow the trade for the enemy knight (9.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b}}}5}). With the text move, Black succeeds in making his own imprint on the game, but hardly in his favor.

9.h3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e}}}6}

Also after 9...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h}}}5} 10.f4!, White’s game would be favored a bit.

10.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a}}}4}!

With that, the opponent’s king’s bishop is condemned sooner or later to disappear from the battlefield.

10...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b}}}6} 11.c3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d}}}7} 12.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e}}}1} 0-0 13.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}4} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}5}

So Black is forced into this exchange of bishops, with which it is once again demonstrated that in this dreary line, neither of the opponents can allow him-
self escapades from the theoretical path to a draw, if he doesn’t want to risk being put at a disadvantage.

14.b4

With the threat 15.b5, together with $\text{ex}e7$, etc.

14...$\text{c}e8$ 15.$\text{a}2$

Actually, the quickest way to unite the rooks.

15...$\text{g}6$ 16.$\text{ae}2$ $\text{ex}e2$ 17.$\text{xe}2$

Forced. If 17.$\text{ex}e2$, then 17...$\text{xf}4$ 18.$\text{xf}4$ $\text{xd}3$ 19.$\text{xd}3$ $\text{xd}4$!, etc., winning a pawn.

17...$\text{e}8$

It would be more exact to exchange the knights initially, thus preventing the next sortie. But in the end this also works.

18.$\text{h}5$!

Threatens to win immediately with 19.$\text{h}6$!, etc., and there’s nothing else for Black to do than the following withdrawal, in which he frees the opponent’s queen from the little worry over the knight on the rim. With more initiative on the part of White, the game could have now become quite interesting. But an inglorious deforestation followed.

18...$\text{d}8!$ 19.$\text{f}3$ $\text{e}1+$ 20.$\text{x}e1$

Why not at least 22.$\text{f}4$ $\text{f}4$ 23.$\text{xf}4$

$\text{g}6$ 24.$\text{g}3$ (24...$\text{h}4$ 25.$\text{g}4$?), in order possibly to keep the bishop pair?

22...$\text{h}6$ 23.$\text{xe}7$ $\text{xe}7$ 24.$\text{e}3$

$\text{g}5$ 25.$\text{g}xg5$ $\text{hxg5}$ 26.$\text{g}4$ $\text{e}7$

27.$\text{e}2$ $\text{f}8$

Preparation for a possible ...$g6$.

28.$\text{b}6$

Finally! Certainly he still could have temporized until Black played ...$\text{d}7$, for example. But, of course, nothing really would have changed.

28...$\text{a}x\text{b}6$ 29.$\text{d}3$ $\text{c}8$ 30.$\text{g}3$

The knight must go to e2 in order to make f4 possible.

30...$\text{d}6$ 31.$\text{e}2$ $\text{e}7$ 32.$\text{f}4$ $\text{g}xf4$

33.$\text{xf}4$ $\text{g}5$ 34.$\text{xe}6$

Otherwise, Black would get somewhat of an advantage with 34...$\text{f}5$, etc.

34...$\text{xe}6$ 35.$\text{f}2$ $\text{b}5$ 36.$\text{f}3$ $\text{c}6$

37.$\text{e}3$ $\text{f}6$ 38.$\text{f}3$ $\text{c}8$ 39.$\text{e}2$

$\text{b}6$ 40.$\text{d}2$ $\text{e}7$ 41.$\text{e}2$ ½-½

(36) Nimzovich – Spielmann
Four Knights Game [C48]
Cycle III: Round 12

dxc3 7.exf6 \textit{xf}6 8.dxc3 \textit{e}7

Since the very popular 8...\textit{e}5+ (see Vidmar-Capablanca, Cycle IV), actually doesn't force the queen exchange (9.\textit{e}2), the text move appears simpler and more logical. In fact Black achieves complete equality very soon.

9.0-0 0-0 10.\textit{d}3 \textit{d}6 11.\textit{e}2

A let-down, of course, would be 11.\textit{h}5 \textit{h}6, etc.

11...\textit{e}8 12.\textit{e}4

Forces ...\textit{g}6, but which here has no great significance, since the queen stands too exposed to elude the exchange (and consequently killing any chance of offense).

12...\textit{g}6 13.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}6 14.\textit{f}3 \textit{g}4(!)

With that, the game actually could have already been given up as a draw. Curiously, Black subsequently still gets small chances, but only because Spielmann, who apparently is all too confident, treats the position somewhat carelessly.

15.\textit{g}xg4 \textit{g}xg4 16.h3 \textit{e}6 17.\textit{c}4 \textit{d}5?

He wants to immediately resolve the position and underestimates the reply. The idea of ...\textit{d}5 was adequate, but only after 17...\textit{c}5! 18.\textit{ad}1 \textit{ad}8, etc.

18.\textit{c}5!

Secures d4 for the bishop and at the same time gets a real chance at a pawn storm on the queenside. Whether this chance could suffice for a win, of course, couldn't be foreseen at this point - but in any case, from here the game again gains some content and interest.

18...\textit{c}5! \textit{f}6 19.\textit{c}3 \textit{ad}8 20.\textit{fd}1 \textit{c}6

A mistake would be 20...\textit{d}4 21.\textit{c}xd4 \textit{x}d4 22.\textit{b}5!, winning a pawn.

21.\textit{d}4 \textit{g}7 22.\textit{f}3 \textit{x}d4+ 23.\textit{c}xd4

The first consequence of the omission on the 17th move: after the undoubling of the White c-pawns, the pawn complex \textit{c}6, \textit{d}5 finally is fixed, and White needs only to follow the plan that the position itself dictates: a pawn attack against \textit{c}6 (therefore b4-b5, and sometimes a4-a5-a6), bound with the threat of opening the file and the infiltration of the rook. On the other hand, Black has to invent something.

23...\textit{f}5 (!) 24.\textit{f}1

If 24.\textit{xf}5 \textit{g}xf5 25.\textit{e}1, then 25...\textit{f}4, etc., with quite easy play to draw.

24...\textit{h}5 25.\textit{h}4

The threat of ...\textit{h}4 was not so dangerous as to lose a tempo and in addition
give the opponent the chance at a welcome pawn exchange. Therefore, correct here appears to be 25...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1\) (not immediately 25.b4, on account of 25...\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{c}2\), together with ...\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}4\) and ...\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}6\)), together with b4, a4, etc.

25...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{6}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{5}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{h}}\times\text{\textit{g}}\text{5}\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\times\text{\textit{g}}\text{5}\) 28.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{4}\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}7\) 29.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}2\) \(\text{\textit{h}}\text{4}\) 30.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{5}\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{7}\) 31.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{4}\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1\) 32.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) 33.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) (?)

It really wasn't worth playing on so long after the drawish opening phase for this! If something was to be gotten from the position, it was of course not through the rook exchange, but rather through the systematic continuation of the suggested plan. After 33.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{1}\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{4}\) 34.\(\text{\textit{f}}\times\text{\textit{g}}\text{4}\) \(\text{\textit{a}}\times\text{\textit{g}}\text{4}\) (34...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}4\)) 35.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{5}!\), Black would still have to exert himself in order to force a draw. The further moves are reasonable.

33...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) 34.\(\text{\textit{b}}\times\text{\textit{c}}\text{6}\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\times\text{\textit{c}}\text{6}\) 35.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{3}\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{7}\) 36.\(\text{\textit{g}}\times\text{\textit{h}}\text{4}\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\times\text{\textit{h}}\text{4}\) 37.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{5}!\) (?) 38.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}6\) 39.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{6}\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{5}\) 40.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{7}\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{7}\) 41.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{6}\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{5}\) 42.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{7}\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{7}\) \(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}\)

**Round 13**

1 Capablanca – Spielmann 0
\(\frac{1}{2}\) Alekhine – Vidmar \(\frac{1}{2}\)
\(\frac{1}{2}\) Marshall – Nimzovich \(\frac{1}{2}\)

Standings after Round 13:

- Capablanca 9\(\frac{1}{2}\)
- Nimzovich 7\(\frac{1}{2}\)
- Alekhine 5\(\frac{1}{2}\)
- Vidmar 5\(\frac{1}{2}\)
- Marshall 5
- Spielmann 4\(\frac{1}{2}\)

(37) Capablanca – Spielmann
Queen's Gambit Declined [D38]

1.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{4} \text{d}5\) 2.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{3} \text{e}6\) 3.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{4} \text{\textit{d}}\text{7}\) 4.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{3}\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{f}6\) 5.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{5} \text{\textit{b}}\text{4}\) 6.\(\text{\textit{c}}\times\text{\textit{d}}\text{5} \text{e}\times\text{\textit{d}}\text{5}\) 7.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}4!(?)

In any case, stronger than 7.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{3}\), which occurred in game 1. But whether the queen sortie is more compelling than the simple 7.e3 wasn't yet established by this game, in my opinion, since Spielmann offers inadequate resistance.

7...\(\text{\textit{a}}\times\text{\textit{c}}\text{3}+(?)

Already this exchange is very questionable. Why not 7...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{7}\), with the idea of leading the game along the track of a well-known variation of the Orthodox Defense – for example, 8.e3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{6}\) 9.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{3}\) \(\text{\textit{h}}\text{6}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{4}\) 0–0 11.0–0 \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) 12.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{e}1\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{8}\), etc. – with only minor difficulties. After the text move and the following advance of the c-pawn as far as c4, the dark squares in his position become pitifully weak.

8.\(\text{\textit{b}}\times\text{\textit{c}}\text{3} 0–0 9.\text{\textit{e}}\text{3} \text{c}5(?)

Weakens d5 without apparent benefit, and occurs evidently only in the attempt to somehow justify the maneuver ...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{8}\)-\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{4}\)\(\textit{c}3\). But with other continuations as well, the pin of \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{6}\) remains uncomfortable. For example, 9...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) came under deliberation, to answer 10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{3}\) with 10...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{5}!\); but White would have first played 10.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}2\).

10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{3} \text{c}4\) 11.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{2}\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{e}7(?)

This unpinning process costs too much time, and, in addition, the queen will have to suffer as an object of attack.
Instead of this, the odd maneuver 11...\(\text{g}6\) 12.0-0 \(\text{e}6\)!, together with ...\(\text{a}6\)-\(\text{b}6\), etc., aimed at ousting the troublesome white queen, could have been tried.

12.0-0 \(\text{a}6\) 13.\(\text{fe}1\) \(\text{e}6\) 14.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}5\) 15.\(\text{a}5\)

15...\(\text{e}4\)?

An awful move, after which White easily succeeds in busting up the enemy pawn chain and deciding the game by means of an obvious sacrificial combination. After the downright self-evident development 15...\(\text{b}7\) (16.\(\text{a}7\) \(\text{c}6\) or 16...\(\text{c}6\)), this wouldn't have been so simple, in spite of White's positional superiority.

16.\(\text{x}e4\) \(dxe4\) 17.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{d}5\)

Otherwise, the many threatened squares were no longer able to be protected – for example, 17...\(\text{b}8\) 18.\(\text{eb}1\) \(\text{d}5\) 19.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 20.\(\text{a}xb5\) \(\text{x}b5\) 21.\(\text{x}b5\) \(\text{a}xb5\) 22.\(\text{a}4\), etc.

18.\(\text{a}xb5!\) \(\text{g}5\)

Likewise, 18...\(\text{b}7\) 19.\(\text{b}xa6\), etc., was hopeless.

19.\(\text{a}xe4\) \(\text{b}8\)

Please note the line 19...\(\text{a}7\) 20.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{a}5\) 21.\(\text{b}a7\), and White remains with 21...\(\text{b}7\) 22.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{d}4\) 23.\(\text{a}6\), as well as after 21...\(\text{a}1\) 22.\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{b}6\) 23.\(\text{a}8\) \(\text{a}8\) 24.\(\text{a}8\), etc., with a material advantage.

20.\(\text{b}xa6!\) \(\text{b}5\)

After the queen exchange, the \(a\)-pawn would immediately cost him a piece. But the text move is also hopeless.

21.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{b}6\) 22.\(\text{a}7\) \(\text{h}3\) 23.\(\text{eb}1!\)

The most exact.

23...\(\text{a}b1+\) 24.\(\text{a}b1\) \(f5\) 25.\(\text{f}3\) \(f4\) 26.\(\text{exf}4\) 1-0

For this game, impeccably carried out by Capablanca, he receives the first special award for the best played game – when the judge specifically declared at the concluding banquet that, if the award had been a brilliancy prize, he would have chosen a different game.

(38) Alekhine – Vidmar
Queen’s Gambit Declined [D35]

1.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}5\) 2.\(\text{f}3\) \(e6\) 3.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 4.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{gf}6\) 5.\(\text{xd}5\)

The best move is probably 5.\(\text{g}5\), since White has no reason to avoid the line arising after 5...\(\text{b}4\).

5...\(\text{exd}5\) 6.\(\text{f}4\)

The move introduced by Sämisch. In my opinion, it leads to a game with about equal chances.
New York 1927

6...c6 7.e3 \(\text{\$e7}\)

Simpler and better than 7...\(\text{\$h5}\) (played in the game Alekhine-Lasker, New York 1924), when White can continue advantageously with 8.\(\text{\$e5}\) f6 9.\(\text{\$g3}\), etc.

8.\(\text{\$d3}\) 0-0 9.h3

Sooner or later necessary, after all, because of the possible threat \(\text{\$h5}\).

9...\(\text{\$e8}\) 10.0-0 \(\text{\$f8}\) 11.\(\text{\$e5}\)

As the outcome shows, a daring plan of assault. But to any other move, Black would continue his development without difficulty with 11...\(\text{\$g6}\), together with ...\(\text{\$d6}\).

11...\(\text{\$d6}\) 12.\(\text{\$h2}\)

When White decided on this move, he had to calculate in the end the following sacrificial combinations. Instead of this, with the retreat of the bishop to g3, he was able to prevent Black's next move (if 12...\(\text{\$6d7}\), then 13.\(\text{\$f7}\), etc.), but in any case, after 12.\(\text{\$g3}\) the reply 12...c5 – which immediately introduces a counterattack in the center – appears unpleasant to him, because he would then no longer command (as in the game) a direct kingside attack that includes the advance of his g-pawn.

12...\(\text{\$6d7}\)

Dr. Vidmar wants to be rid of the unpleasant knight immediately! As the consequence shows, this maneuver leads to a forced draw. It’s very questionable whether more was to be gotten from the position with 12...c5.

13.f4 f6 14.\(\text{\$g4}\) h5

Otherwise, White would quietly further strengthen his position with 15.\(\text{\$f3}\), 16.\(\text{\$ae1}\), etc.

15.\(\text{\$e5}\)!

A positional sacrifice; after 15...\(\text{\$xe5}\) 16.\(\text{\$xe5}\), and the retreat of the bishop on d6, 17.\(\text{\$h5}\), etc., White would have no direct threats, but it’s clear that in this case, two pawns and a continuous attacking position would offer him far more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece.

15...\(\text{\$xe5}\) 16.\(\text{\$xe5}\) \(\text{\$xe5}\)!

And not 16...\(\text{\$xe5}\) 17.\(\text{\$xe5}\) \(\text{\$xe5}\) 18.\(\text{\$h5}\) and wins.

17.\(\text{\$xe5}\) \(\text{\$xe5}\) 18.\(\text{\$f8+}\)!

The point of the first sacrifice, whereby an immediate draw is reached.

18...\(\text{\$xf8}\) 19.\(\text{\$h5}\) \(\text{\$d3}\) 20.\(\text{\$f1+}\)

Unfortunately there’s nothing better, because both 20.\(\text{\$h8+}\) \(\text{\$f7}\) 21.\(\text{\$f1+}\) \(\text{\$g6}\) and 20.\(\text{\$h7}\) \(\text{\$g5}\) are insufficient.
20...\(\text{g}8\) 21.\(\text{f}7+\) \(\text{h}8\) 22.\(\text{h}5+\) \(\text{g}8\) 23.\(\text{f}7+\) \(\text{h}8\) \(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}\)

(39) Marshall – Nimzovich
French Defense [C01]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{b}4\) 4.exd5 exd5 5.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 6.\(\text{g}e2\)

As is well known, here 6.\(\text{h}5\) is not very comfortable for Black. Therefore, 5...\(\text{c}6\) is preferable to the move chosen.

6...\(\text{f}5\) 7.0–0 0–0

After 7...\(\text{b}c6\), the position from my first match game with Capablanca would arise, in which White, instead of 8.\(\text{f}5(?)\), would probably play 8.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{g}6\) 9.\(\text{c}e2\), etc., with similar results as in the game.

8.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{g}6\) 9.\(\text{c}e2\)

Obviously influenced by the loss in the first cycle to the same opponent, at the first opportunity Marshall withdraws his knight from the exchange on \(c3\). But in an enterprising mood, he would perhaps have tried 9.\(\text{g}5\), in order to get out of the way as quickly as possible of the bleak, symmetrical piece-formations.

9...\(\text{d}6\) 10.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{b}c6\) 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 12.\(\text{ae1}\) \(\text{ae8}\) 13.\(\text{c}3\)

A position has arisen which, for purpose of a win, is hopeless for both sides, since each can nearly force the exchange of both rooks on the only open file. But to his misfortune, Marshall allows himself the luxury for a moment of affecting a plan, and thereby incurs a clear, if not necessary decisive, disadvantage.

13...\(\text{c}8\)

From \(d6\), the knight would like to be able to have an effect on \(e4\) and \(c4\), respectively. The idea is good, but of a harmless nature – especially if White, instead of unnecessarily pulling back his bishop, would have chosen the “symmetrical” move 14.\(\text{c}1\) (or perhaps first \(h3\), in order to prevent possible ...\(\text{g}4\)). It would have come very quickly to a peace settlement.

14.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 15.\(\text{f}4\)

But this also had to go rather painlessly...

15...\(\text{x}f4\) 16.\(\text{x}f4\) \(\text{x}d3\) 17.\(\text{x}d3\) \(\text{g}6\) 18.\(\text{f}3\) (?)

...if only White hadn’t lost this important tempo and thereby allowed ...\(f5\). Correct was immediate 18.\(\text{d}2\), for example, 18...\(\text{d}6\) 19.\(\text{xe}8\) \(\text{xe}8\) 20.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{xe}1\) + 21.\(\text{xe}1\) \(\text{a}4\) 22.\(\text{b}1!\), and in spite of the momentary awkwardness of his bishop, White would have nothing serious to fear.

18...\(f5\)!

Since the invasion points on the e-file (\(e5\)-\(e8\)) are sufficiently protected, this aggressive move has only bright sides here.

19.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xe}1\) 20.\(\text{xe}1\) \(f4\)

The additional restriction stands to reason and is apparently also forced. But White defends himself quite imagi-
tively in the following. Perhaps considering the subsequent surprising windup, the more cold-blooded 20...\( \text{b6} \) would offer somewhat better chances; but to anticipate – let alone calculate in advance – this was really not easy.

21.\( \text{\textit{c2}} \) \( \text{\textit{f5}} \)

There is no more time for 21...\( \text{\textit{b6}} \) (21...c6), because White threatens 22.\( \text{\textit{x4}} \) \( \text{\textit{x4}} \) 23.\( \text{\textit{x4}} \) g5 24.\( \text{\textit{g3}} \), etc. – also 21...\( \text{\textit{h4}} \) would have been unsuccessful because of 22.\( \text{\textit{h5}} \), etc.

22.\( \text{\textit{c}} \)

Strange, but true – in spite of the obvious flaws that come about in the White camp as a result of this move (d4, the half-dead bishop on c3), it forms White’s only, and perhaps sufficient counter-chances. It was un-commonly important for him, exactly at this moment (Black threatened ...\( \text{\textit{c2}} \), as well as possibly ...\( \text{\textit{h4}} \)) to free the e4-square for his queen, and, if possible, also to exchange the idle knight. If ...c6 had occurred at an earlier moment, then the White game would stand completely at a loss. But here, 22...dxc4 23.\( \text{\textit{xb7}} \), etc., would merely weaken Black’s pawn position, without compensation.

22...\( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 23.\( \text{\textit{cxd5}} \) \( \text{\textit{xd5}} \)
39.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}4 \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}5, together with ...\textit{\textbf{f}6+}}}}}}}}}}}} and positioning the king toward \textit{\textbf{d}5, it would have come to an interesting, and for Black, unassailable, endgame. That Nimzovich avoided it so persistently can probably be explained only by time trouble.

\textbf{34.f3 \textit{\textbf{g}5?}}

He should have pulled the queen back to \textit{\textbf{f}5 or \textit{\textbf{d}7}}.

\textbf{35.\textit{\textbf{d}}2!}

An embarrassing surprise for Black.

\textbf{35...\textit{\textbf{f}6 36.\textit{\textbf{xf}4 \textit{\textbf{x}d}4 37.\textit{\textbf{c}2}}}}

Threatens \textit{\textbf{38.e}5. Instead of the next move by Black, the immediate \textit{\textbf{37...d}8 would have made the crossing over of the bishop to the \textit{\textbf{a}1-h8 diagonal somewhat difficult.}}

\textbf{37...\textit{\textbf{d}5 (?) 38.\textit{\textbf{d}2! \textit{\textbf{d}8 39.\textit{\textbf{c}3}}}}}

White's advantage is now clear: a wonderfully lively bishop, the pinning of the knight, otherwise powerless on open board; finally the possibility to force the queen exchange at any time. And yet, all this appears not to suffice for a win with correct counter-play! Truly one must at times make very many mistakes in order to completely ruin a position.

\textbf{39...\textit{\textbf{d}3 40.\textit{\textbf{e}4 \textit{\textbf{d}5 41.\textit{\textbf{e}2 \textit{\textbf{d}7!}}}}}}

White threatened \textit{\textbf{42.b}4, which would have forced a fateful weakening of the Black pawn position.}

\textbf{42.h4}

This reasonable pawn move makes Black’s later draw combination possible. But so does its omission: \textit{\textbf{42.e}8, \textit{\textbf{d}1 43.a}8 a6 44.\textit{\textbf{b}8, and if Black simply replies 44...\textit{\textbf{d}5, a win for White would not be evident either in the middle game or in the endgame.}}}

\textbf{42...h5 43.\textit{\textbf{e}8 \textit{\textbf{d}1!}}}

The introductory move to the following handsome twist.

\textbf{44.\textit{\textbf{a}8 a6 45.\textit{\textbf{b}8 (?)}}}

Black was lying in wait just for this. With \textit{\textbf{45.e}4, White would still be able to play a while for a win, but hardly with success: Black would most simply reply \textit{\textbf{45.d}5 and further merely make rook moves on the fifth rank (d5-f5-d5). In case of the queen exchange on e8, the rook would come to d7 on the other hand, and then the knight to d5 via e7. The conclusion in the text is more fun.

\textbf{45...\textit{\textbf{h}1!}}

A nice final effect, which surprised Marshall in such a way that he thought an hour before it became clear to him that the game was now an unavoidable draw. In fact, his next move is forced, as emerges from the following varia-
New York 1927

A game with small jokes, small mistakes, small commotions. Indeed the boring opening variation gives very little room for unfettered flights of imagination ...

Round 14

½ Alekhine – Capablanca ½
1 Vidmar – Nimzovich 0
1 Spielmann – Marshall 0

Standings after Round 14:

Capablanca 10
Alekhine 7½
Nimzovich 7½
Vidmar 6½
Spielmann 5½
Marshall 5

(40) Alekhine – Capablanca
Caro-Kann Defense [B15]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.±c3 dxe4 4.±xe4 ±f6

Black usually has fewer difficulties with the development of his queen’s bishop with 4...±f5.

5.±g3 e5

Not quite risk-free, because d6 becomes somewhat weakened by the following exchange. The whole line needs a further practical inspection, however.

6.±f3 e×d4 7.±×d4

On account of the weakness mentioned, especially noticeable in the endgame, White was not wrong to seek simplification. The more involved 7.±×d4 probably would only be strong if Black answered with 7...±c5. Then 8.±e2+! could quite well follow – as happened in my Kecskemét game with Dr. Tartakover – with the idea of at least nailing down the advantage of the bishop pair after 8...±e7 9.±×e7+ ±xe7 10.±df5, etc. But if 7.±×d4, Black continues quietly with 7...±e7, then on the other hand, middlegame chances are likely to be estimated as mutually balanced.

7...±×d4 8.±×d4 ±c5 9.±df5

Of course not immediately 9.±e3, because of 9...±g4 or 9...±d5, etc.

9...0-0 10.±e3 ±×e3 11.±×e3 ±e6 12.0-0-0 ±bd7 13.±c4 ±c5

This knight maneuver appears affected and, in fact, puts Black at something of a disadvantage. In any case, simpler was 13...±e8, together with ...±b6, etc.

14.±×e6 ±×e6 15.±gf5 ±e4

Other defensive moves against the infiltration of the knight to d6 also have their downsides.

16.±hf1

To 16.±d7, Black would have had a comfortable defense in 16.±c5 17.±e7 ±fe8, etc.
Cycle III: Round 14

16...g6

17.\(\text{\text{d}}6\)?

Superficial, weak play! With 17.f3!, White was able to maintain a clear positional advantage, since after 17...gxf5 18.fxe4 fxe4 (18...f4 19.\(\text{\text{d}}5\), etc. wouldn't be better) 19.\(\text{\text{d}}5\), he would have quite easily won back the pawn and Black would be left with a seriously disrupted kingside. Therefore, on 17.f3!, it still would have been best for him to decide on 17...\(\text{\text{c}}5\) 18.\(\text{\text{d}}6\) a5 19.\(\text{\text{e}}c4\), etc. In Buenos Aires, as a rule, I didn’t miss such opportunities ...

17...\(\text{\text{d}}x\text{\text{d}}6\) 18.\(\text{\text{e}}x\text{\text{d}}6\) \(\text{\text{f}}d8\) 19.\(\text{\text{fd}}1\) \(\text{\text{e}}x\text{\text{d}}6\) 20.\(\text{\text{e}}x\text{\text{d}}6\) \(\text{\text{e}}x\text{\text{d}}8\) 21.\(\text{\text{e}}x\text{\text{d}}8\) \(\text{\text{e}}x\text{\text{d}}8\) 22.\(\text{\text{e}}\text{\text{e}}2\) \(\text{\text{f}}8\) 23.\(\text{\text{e}}\text{\text{d}}3\) \(\text{\text{e}}\text{\text{e}}7\) 24.\(\text{\text{e}}\text{\text{d}}4\) \(\text{\text{e}}6+\) 25.\(\text{\text{e}}\text{\text{e}}4\) f6 26.f4

This move was transmitted telegraphically to Europe as 26.c4 – which certainly made little difference here. But in general one should arrange in future American tournaments more precise wired information to the foreign press. Already in 1924, for example, a similar error lead to quite a false assessment of Marshall’s interesting won game against Réti. And regarding this tournament, it suffices to point out the quid pro quo in game 28.

26...\(\text{\text{c}}5+\) 27.\(\text{\text{d}}d4\) \(\text{\text{e}}6+\) 28.\(\text{\text{e}}4\) \(\text{\text{c}}5+\) ½–½

(41) Vidmar – Nimzovich
Catalan Opening [E01]

1.d4 \(\text{\text{f}}6\) 2.\(\text{\text{f}}3\) e6 3.g3

Even though this move isn’t entirely worthless, even so it causes the opponent no problems in development anyway. Generally, in my point of view, the moves 1.d4 2.\(\text{\text{f}}3\) and 3.g3 go together badly, since altogether they don’t accomplish anything at all either for pressure on the central squares (such as 3.c4) or for defense of the same (e4 unprotected!)

It’s even stranger that Nimzovich gets a decisive disadvantage so quickly in the game at hand.

3...d5

Other than this somewhat old-fashioned-seeming reply, a series of other manners of development – such as 3...c5 (4.c4!) 3...b6 or even 3...b5 – came under consideration, but they were hardly better than the one chosen. Already at the next move, Black had to look for compensation for the weakening (whether momentary or lasting can’t be determined here) of e5 in aggressive conduct in the center – either in the next moves by means of ...c5 or somewhat later by ...e5. But since he intends to go without both, the move ...d5 loses any internal substance.

4.\(\text{\text{g}}2\) \(\text{\text{bd}}7\)

4...c5 5.c3 \(\text{\text{c}}6\) 6.0-0\(\text{\text{d}}6\), etc., was good.

5.0-0\(\text{\text{d}}6\)
Also, 5...c5 was playable here.

6.b3

6...c6 (?)

Can one as Black really hope through such half-development moves – which even for purposes of defense don’t have absolute value (...c6 strengthens d5, but weakens d6, a circumstance which can be of greater importance in the opening of lines) – to get an advantage, and because of them to forego simple equalizing (not drawing) continuations? Such a move existed here in 6...e5; if thereupon 7...b2, then 7...e4 8...e5 ...e7; but if 7.dxe5 ...xe5 8...b2, then 8...f3+, together with – depending on how White takes back, 9...0-0 or 9...c6 – with a full-value game. But if Black wants to play more complicatedly, then this is also possible: 6...e4 7.c4 c6, together with ...f5 – a kind of Dutch Stonewall – certainly not to everyone’s taste, but probably playable.

7...b2

With that, a line of the Réti Opening is just about reached (it lacks only c4, following in the near future) – but on what detours and thanks to what bizarre (because clichéd ideas, if they are managed \emph{ad absurdum}, do make the same impression as eccentric ones) counter-play by Black!

8...e7 9.c4

After that, 9...a3 10...c1 ...b2 11...b2 would lead to a distressing weakening of the dark squares in Black’s camp – and 9...e5 to the ultimate isolation of d5. But all this would be more tolerable for Black than the move he found:

9...b5?

Considering the bishop on g2, to weaken the squares in such a way on the long diagonal certainly takes courage – but also momentary blindness.

10...e5!

The rebuttal.

10...x e5?

With that he already gets into a lost position. More bearable – although very unpleasant at any rate – was 10...b7 11.e4!, etc.

11.dxe5 g4 12.e4!

From here on and up to the conclusion, Dr. Vidmar plays always the most accurate move.
12...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{	extnumero gxe5}}} 13.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d5}}} e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d5}}}

If here or in the next move \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{...d3}}}, then simply 14.d\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xc6}}}! \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet b2}}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet c2}}}, etc.

14.c\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xd5}}} c\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d5}}} 15...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet d5}}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet b8}}} 
16.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e1}}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet d6}}}

Again, forced.

17...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet f3}}}!

Through its simplicity, an amazing decision: Black has to trade the central knight, and his remaining pieces stand undeveloped or committed. The end is very near.

17...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet f3}}}+ 18.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xf3}}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet h8}}}

Among others, the move 19.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e8}}}, etc., was threatened.

19.a\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{ac1}}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet b6}}}

The agony would have lasted a couple of moves more with 19...f6.

20.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xc8}}}!

Beautiful, even though obvious.

20...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet xc8}}} 21.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xf7}}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet g6}}}

Or 21...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet f6}}} 22.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xf6}}} g\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xf6}}} 23.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e7}}}, etc.

22.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xd7}}} 1-0

Upon 22...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet f8}}}, 23.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f7}}}, etc., now wins most easily.

A horrible debacle!

(42) Spielmann – Marshall
Scotch Game [C47]

1.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{4}}} e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{5}}} 2.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f3}}} c\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c6}}} 3...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet c3}}} f\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f6}}} 
4.d\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{4}}} e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{4}}} 5.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xd4}}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet h4}}} 6.x\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c6}}} b\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{bxc6}}} 7.d\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d3}}} 0-0

Occasionally one first plays 7...d5. But Black can still defer this a tempo, since White can obviously undertake nothing real before he castles.

8.0-0 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet e8}}}

Already playing with fire!

The known 8...d5 9.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{xd5}}} (or 9.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{5}}} g\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g4}}}) 10.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f4}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet e8}}} ±) 9...c\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d5}}}, together with x\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c3}}}, etc. would have led to equalizing lines. The tendency to organize a piece attack against e4 contradicts, on the other hand, the spirit of the position and is punished accordingly.

9.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f3}}} h\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{6}}}

Now already upon 9...d5 could follow 10.g\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{5}}}, keeping the tension in the center.

10.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f4}}}

In order to be able to answer the present 10...d5 with 11.e\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{5}}}.

10...d6 11.h\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{3}}}

Should serve among other things as preparation for the following knight maneuver.
11...\texttt{\textup{c}b7}(?)

Consistent, but – mainly in light of the position of \texttt{\textup{b}b4} – played rather carelessly. Black still had the opportunity, by means of 11...\texttt{\textup{x}c3}; 12. \texttt{\textup{b}xc3} \texttt{\textup{d}d7}(!), etc., to bring about an approximately balanced game.

12.\texttt{\textup{e}e2}!

With this move, the inadequacy of the following enemy maneuvers must have already been recognized.

12...\texttt{\textup{c}c5} 13.\texttt{\textup{g}g3}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

13...\texttt{\textup{c}c4}?

Apparently Marshall overlooks the second move of his opponent’s response. As a result, Black loses the exchange without any compensation. He was still able even here, in spite of the inferiority of his position, to defend himself tenaciously and, indeed, most simply, with 13...\texttt{\textup{d}d7}, together possibly with ...\texttt{\textup{f}f6}, etc. On the other hand, riskier would be 13...\texttt{\textup{b}b8}, because of 14.\texttt{\textup{c}c3} \texttt{\textup{a}a5} 15.\texttt{\textup{f}f5}!, with various sacrificial turns for White.

I believe, by the way, that even against best defense, Spielmann would have won the position in the diagram; but even so, it would have been interesting to see how he’d have executed the attack victoriously – so within his style of play.

14.\texttt{\textup{x}x}c4 \texttt{\textup{x}e}4 15.\texttt{\textup{b}b}3!

Thereupon, Black could have actually given up confidently, since the realization of the advantage of material in open positions – where one can so easily get rid of dispensable wood – has become child’s play with present-day technique.

15...\texttt{\textup{d}d5} 16.\texttt{\textup{b}b}5 \texttt{\textup{d}d}6 17.\texttt{\textup{x}x}d6 \texttt{\textup{b}b}8 18.\texttt{\textup{a}a}4!

As one sees, White had to foresee his the results of his 12th and 13th moves far and exactly. But to his bad luck, the combination can’t make much of an impression on the reader, because it is based on an adversarial blunder.

18... \texttt{\textup{x}x}b5 19.\texttt{\textup{y}y}x\texttt{\textup{b}b}5 \texttt{\textup{x}x}d6 20.\texttt{\textup{x}e}4 \texttt{\textup{x}e}4 21.\texttt{\textup{b}b}8+ \texttt{\textup{h}h}7 22.\texttt{\textup{x}x}a7 \texttt{\textup{e}e}5 23.\texttt{\textup{a}a}5

In order possibly to offer opposition to e1.

23...\texttt{\textup{y}y}x\texttt{\textup{b}b}2 24.\texttt{\textup{y}y}x\texttt{\textup{c}c}7 \texttt{\textup{c}c}4 25.\texttt{\textup{y}y}x\texttt{\textup{f}f}7

A real slaughter!

25...\texttt{\textup{x}x}c2 26.\texttt{\textup{a}a}1 \texttt{\textup{e}e}5 27.\texttt{\textup{b}b}7\texttt{\textup{g}g}5

Upon 27...\texttt{\textup{h}h}5, 28.\texttt{\textup{e}e}7 \texttt{\textup{g}g}5 29.\texttt{h}h4 \texttt{\textup{g}g}3 30.\texttt{\textup{x}x}d5, etc., clinches things.

28.\texttt{\textup{h}h}4

Forced queen exchange or win of the knight – which mean the same thing here.

28...\texttt{\textup{g}g}4 29.\texttt{\textup{x}f}6 1-0
Cycle III: Round 15

Round 15

0 Nimzovich – Capablanca 1
½ Spielmann – Alekhine ½
0 Marshall – Vidmar 1

Standings after Round 15:

Capablanca 11
Alekhine 8
Nimzovich 7½
Vidmar 7½
Spielmann 6
Marshall 5

(43) Nimzovich – Capablanca
Caro-Kann Defense [B12]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.e5 {f5 4.d3 {x d5 5.e xd5 e6 6.c3

Most often played here is 6.e2, whereupon Black, through ...{a5+ ...{a6 (or ...

b5), trades or displaces the enemy queen. The text move, which aims at quick piece development in the midst of mutually eliminated tension in the center by means of dxc5, should lead, with the correct continuation, to a game with equal chances – but probably not any more. The move 3.e5 simply obligates White too much, and Black will always find the necessary time to adapt himself to the rigid position in the center.

6...{b6 7.ge2 c5 8.dxc5 {xc5 9.0-0

Upon 9...{g3 could have likewise followed 9...{e7! (10...{g7 8.g8 11...{h7

...g2=).

9...{e7 10.a4

This obvious exchange is indeed sufficient for equality, but 10.a3(!) came into consideration, whereupon Black had nothing better than first to occupy the knight c6-square with the queen (10...{c7 11...b5, etc.). Anyhow, the alternative move would have introduced some disturbance in Black’s mobilization plans. On the other hand, the attempt to take by surprise, 10.b4, leads to nothing good: 10...{b7 11...b5 12...a3 ...a5 13..c5 ...c5 14...d6+ ...d7! (14...f8

15...f3= ) 15...g3 {hg8 16.d7 {f5, etc., with advantage for Black.

10...{c6 11...c5 {xc5 12.e3

A necessary reinforcing move, but which weakens still further the light squares in the central region. Ultimately, White loses only because he doesn’t recognize this curse in his position in time and doesn’t seek to remedy it by immediately opening files.

13...{f5 14.c3 (?)

This and the next move are based in my opinion on a total misjudgment of the situation, which absolutely had to be treated dynamically because of its weak points. Therefore, 14.ac1! {c6 15.f2 h5 16.c4 dxc4 17...c4 0-0 18.fd1, with {c3-e4, when White in no way should lose.

14...{c6 15.ad1 (?)

What’s the rook looking for on the d-file? White could still play 15...f2 h5

16.ac1, etc., as preparation for the above, outlined plan.
15...g6

A new weakening, but one which Black is always easily able to force.

16.g4??

An unbelievable maneuver for a player of Nimzovich's class. White deprives himself of any prospect on the kingside, frees the enemy from a possible concern about his dark squares – and gives him a completely free hand on the queenside as a result, where he ultimately must break through on the c-file! From here on White's game is to be regarded as strategically lost, although it still requires good technique on the part of Black in order to establish the win. By the way, the correct thing for White in this somewhat disadvantageous position was 16.Af2 h5 17.Ed2 (unfortunately not 17.c4, because of 17...b4, etc. – a result of the imprecise 14th and 15th moves), together with 18.c1, with the intent c4, etc.

16...xe3 17.xe3 h5

Almost taken for granted.

18.g5

Or 18.h3 hxg4 19.hxg4 0-0-0 (or immediately 19...g5), with the threats 20...g5 and ...h4=.

18...0-0 19.d4 b6 20.f2 fc8 21.a3

Contrary to his habit, Capablanca here tries to solve the problem of playing for the win in a combinative way, and only loses time. The correct procedure was – as happened also in the following – 22.e7, and, if White should take up the best defense position Ed2, Ed3, f2 – Black would proceed with ...ac8, ...a6, ...b5, ...b6 ...a5; then the threat of the breakthrough ...b4, in connection with the possibility of ...f5, etc., which was carried out in the game, would ultimately decide the day.

22...e5

23.e2 e8

Apparently Black convinced himself that the winning a pawn with 23...c4 24.f2 x3?, on which he had based his moves, would not be absolutely safe because of the reply 25.f5!. Therefore the preventive moves in the text.

24.g2 c6 25.ed2
A far better practical chance at a draw was offered here by the continuation 25.\( \text{\texttt{d}xc6} \text{\texttt{b}xc6}! \) 26.\( \text{\texttt{d}d4} \) (not 26.\( \text{\texttt{d}xa7?} \) \( \text{\texttt{b}6} \) 27.\( \text{\texttt{a}6} \text{\texttt{a}8} \), etc.), when the opponent would be punished to a certain degree for his imprecision on the 22nd move. In this case also, he would certainly have had to win with best play.

25...\( \text{\texttt{g}ec8} \) 26.\( \text{\texttt{g}e2} \)

The opportunity for a facilitating exchange was still there.

26...\( \text{\texttt{g}e7}! \)

Now begins the final phase, which is finished by Capablanca without misstep. For students, the game has considerable didactical value.

27.\( \text{\texttt{f}ed2} \text{\texttt{c}c4} \) 28.\( \text{\texttt{h}h3} (?) \)

As already said, 28.\( \text{\texttt{f}f2} \) was appropriate here; the queen has nothing to look on for \( \text{\texttt{h}3} \).

28...\( \text{\texttt{g}g7} \) 29.\( \text{\texttt{f}f2} \text{\texttt{a}5} \) 30.\( \text{\texttt{e}e2} \text{\texttt{f}f5}! \)

31.\( \text{\texttt{x}xf5}+ \)

The game would have lasted somewhat longer after 31.\( \text{\texttt{ed2} \text{\texttt{x}dx4} \) 32.\( \text{\texttt{xd}d4} \text{\texttt{c}xd4} \) 33.\( \text{\texttt{c}x}c4 \text{\texttt{e}e3} \text{\texttt{a}4} \), etc.

31...\( \text{\texttt{g}xf5} \) 32.\( \text{\texttt{f}f3} \)

If 32.\( \text{\texttt{c}xh5} \), then 32...\( \text{\texttt{c}h8} \) 33.\( \text{\texttt{f}f3} \text{\texttt{h}4} \), with a winning position.

32...\( \text{\texttt{c}c6} \) 33.\( \text{\texttt{c}c2} \) 34.\( \text{\texttt{d}d4} \)

Here 36.\( \text{\texttt{c}c4} \text{\texttt{c}c4} \) 37.\( \text{\texttt{d}d4} \) could still to be tried, which Black probably would have answered with 37...\( \text{\texttt{b}b3}+ \).

36...\( \text{\texttt{c}x}d4 \) 37.\( \text{\texttt{c}x}d4 \)

Obviously forced (37.\( \text{\texttt{c}x}d4 \text{\texttt{e}2} \), etc.)

37...\( \text{\texttt{c}c4} \) 38.\( \text{\texttt{g}g2} \text{\texttt{b}5} \)

The pawn moves occur in order first to eliminate the superfluous elements for the victory. A typical train of thought for the Cuban grandmaster.

39.\( \text{\texttt{g}g1} \text{\texttt{b}4} \) 40.\( \text{\texttt{a}xa4} \text{\texttt{a}b4} \) 41.\( \text{\texttt{g}g2} \)

It's clear that with other moves also, White would finally perish of zugzwang.

42...\( \text{\texttt{h}h1}! \) 43.\( \text{\texttt{d}d3} \text{\texttt{e}e1} \) 44.\( \text{\texttt{f}f3} \)

46...\( \text{\texttt{f}f1} \) 0-1

(44) Spielmann – Alekhine
French Defense [C09]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.\( \text{\texttt{c}c3} \)

Apparently Spielmann wants to avoid the dull line 3.\( \text{\texttt{c}c3} \) \( \text{\texttt{b}4} \), proven successful in this tournament. But as is generally known, Black can also easily obtain equality with the text move, with some caution.

3...\( \text{\texttt{c}c5}! \) 4.\( \text{\texttt{d}x}c5 \) \( \text{\texttt{x}c5} \) 5.\( \text{\texttt{d}d3} \)

If 5.\( \text{\texttt{c}c3} \text{\texttt{b}b6} \) 6.\( \text{\texttt{e}x}d5 \), then 6...\( \text{\texttt{f}f6} \), etc.

5...\( \text{\texttt{c}c6} \)

Probably easier than 5...\( \text{\texttt{f}f6} \) (Spielmann-Nimzovich, Cycle IV),
which not only allows the constricting e5, but even provokes it. Besides the text move, certainly 5...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}_7\) comes under deliberation, in order to take again with this piece in the case of \(6.\text{\texttt{exd}}5\). Anyway, Black doesn’t have a difficult opening game here.

\textbf{6.\texttt{exd}5 \texttt{exd}5}

In contrast, this isolation of the central pawn is neither necessary nor pleasant. With the simple \(6...\text{\texttt{xd}}5\), Black would have emphasized not only the inexperience of the knight development to d2 (the impossibility for this knight to bother the queen from c3), but also provide himself a flexible pawn position in the center (...e5!) for the coming middlegame. Then neither \(7.\text{\texttt{e}}_4 \text{\texttt{b}}_6\) \(8.\text{\texttt{c}}_4 \text{\texttt{d}}_8!\), nor \(7.\text{\texttt{g}}_4 \text{\texttt{e}}_5!\) \(8.\text{\texttt{g}}_7 \text{\texttt{d}}_4\) \(9.\text{\texttt{g}}_3 \text{\texttt{f}}_6\), etc. would have led to worthwhile complexities for White.

\textbf{7.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{b}6 8.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{ge}7}

Again artificial. The usual development of the knight to f6 in such positions is also the most suitable, since the pinning move \(\texttt{g}5\) would have led at the most to an early exchange of this bishop for the knight, and as a consequence to the intensification of the pressure of the b6-bishop on the respective squares. In addition, as we will presently see, the knight position on e7 makes the rational development of the queen’s bishop difficult for a purely tactical reason.

\textbf{9.0–0 0–0}

If \(9...\texttt{g}4\), then after \(10.\texttt{\texttt{e}}1\), for example, castling would not be feasible because of \(11.\texttt{\texttt{xh}}7+.\) On the other hand, for the same reason, the move \(11...\texttt{g}4\) would be impossible. So Black had to choose between two – albeit minor – evils.

\textbf{10.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{d}6 11.\texttt{e}1 \texttt{g}6 12.\texttt{e}3}

It stands to reason that any exchange can be desirable only for White, since only after the disappearance of the enemy opportunities for a kingside attack will White be able to proceed to play against the weakling d5 (whether through direct threat or, as in the game, indirectly).

\textbf{12...\texttt{xe}3 13.\texttt{xe}3 \texttt{g}4}

For the reasons discussed, Black had to take pains whenever possible to complicate the game – and to this aim, \(13...\texttt{f}4\) was undoubtedly more advisable here, since the knight could be ousted from this square only at the price of weakening the white kingside, and this would have had a disturbing effect.

\textbf{14.\texttt{g}6}

At the precise moment.

\textbf{14...\texttt{g}6!}

This truly difficult decision (on account of the weakening of e6-square and thereby indirectly the entire e-file, which soon turns into a mighty base of operations for the white rooks) is justified because the apparently secure \(14...\texttt{h}6\) would have left absolutely no chance of even halfway promising counter-play for Black. And the weakness on d5 would ultimately have been ruinous to him. On the other hand, as he plays, a small consolation remains for him in the open f-file.
15. h3 g5

As becomes immediately apparent, the attempt to keep both rooks for a while involves a great deal of danger. But further simplification, by means of 15...xf3, etc., already appeared all too emasculating.

16. Qbd4 Rad8

Even less worthwhile were the consequences of 16...e4 – for example, 17.Qxc6 Qxf3 (17...Qxc6 18.Qd4, together with 19.f3 =) 18.e7+ Qxe7 19.Qxe7 Qxd1 20.Qxd1, etc.

17. Qxf5 Qxf5 18. e2!

With that begins the pressure on the open file. Of course both here and in the next move, ...d4 would be unsatisfactory because of 19.Qd3, etc.

18...Qdf8 19. Qe1 Qc5

Black’s position has become very difficult. At this point, the queen has to depart d6 without fail, in order to make possible ...h6, which here would be bad obviously, because of Qe6, etc.; and it wasn’t easy to decide which of the two queen moves – to c5 or f4 – is the correct one. Finally, Black decides on the text move, because in so doing, he has in mind the hidden defense square in the seemingly most dangerous line.

20. Qe8 h6 21. Qe6+ Qh7 22. c8!

With that he threatens 23.Qxb7, and 22...b6 loses immediately because of 23.b4, etc.

22...d4!

By this surprising double sacrifice (pawn plus tempo), Black obtains excellent chances at a draw. The point of the pawn move lies in the fact that it enables the queen move to d6, which at this point would be insufficient because of simple 23.Qxb7, threatening Qe6.

23. cxd4 Qd6!

Not 23...Qb4, 24.a3, etc. But now everything is in order, since neither 24. Qe6 Qf4, etc. nor 24.Qxh7 Qd4, etc., would lead to anything tangible for White. In addition, 24...Qe7 is threatened, which causes White to decide on the following windup.

24. Qxf8 Qxf8 25. Qe6 Qb4!

Again the most promising, since White, if he now wanted to avoid the queen exchange, would have to decide on the unclear sacrifice 26.Qe4. The result would be then 26...Qxb2 27.b1 Qa2 28.Qxb7 Qc4! 29.b7 Qf6, etc., with sufficient defense, since 30.Qe5 would be answered with 30...Qxd4.

26. Qb3
But now in the following endgame, Black has sufficient counter chances for a draw in White’s weakened pawn position.

26...\(\texttt{\textbackslash b3}\) 27.a\(\times b3\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash d8}\) 28.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e4}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash d5}\) 29.\(\texttt{\textbackslash f1}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash b5}\) 30.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e3}\) a5!

Preventing 31.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e2}\) – whereupon obviously 31...a4! would follow – and in this way compelling the opponent to the following rook move, which allows the black king to cross over the center.

31.\(\texttt{\textbackslash d3}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash g8}\) 32.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e2}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash f7}\) 33.\(\texttt{\textbackslash d2}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash e6}\) 34.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c3}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash e7}\) (I)

More exact than 34...\(\texttt{\textbackslash d6}\) (it was reported thus by mistake in the European chess press – with the result 35.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e3}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash e7}\), etc.), because of the possible reply 35.\(\texttt{\textbackslash d2}\),

35.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e3}\)

Of course not 35.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c4}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash b4}\) + 36.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c5}\) b6#.

35...\(\texttt{\textbackslash d6}\) 36.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c2}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash d5}\) 37.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e4}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash b4}\) + 38.\(\texttt{\textbackslash d2}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash d5}\) 39.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c2}\)

The winning attempt 39.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e5}\) would remain without success because of 39...\(\texttt{\textbackslash x b3}\) 40.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c4}\) + \(\texttt{\textbackslash c7}\) 41.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e5}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash b6}\), etc.

39...\(\texttt{\textbackslash b4}\) + 40.\(\texttt{\textbackslash d2}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash d5}\) 41.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c2}\)

\(1/2-1/2\)

(45) Marshall – Vidmar
Slav Defense [D13]

1.\(\texttt{\textbackslash d4}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash f6}\) 2.\(\texttt{\textbackslash f3}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash d5}\) 3.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c4}\) c\(\texttt{\textbackslash e4}\) 4.\(\texttt{\textbackslash cxd5}\) c\(\texttt{\textbackslash x d5}\) 5.\(\texttt{\textbackslash c3}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash c6}\)

The “Slav Four Knights Game” is hardly appropriate for securing White a noteworthy advantage; since with it, although Black is nearly forced to leave his queen bishop at home in contrast to the enemy’s, his position remains unweakened, and prospects for development are therefore quite favorable.

6.\(\texttt{\textbackslash f4}\) e\(\texttt{\textbackslash e}\) 7.\(\texttt{\textbackslash e3}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash d6}\)

In New York 1924, Dr. Lasker twice played here 7...\(\texttt{\textbackslash e7}\), but without success. With the text move (which, by the way, Spielmann originated versus A. Nilson), the advance of the e-pawn, which totally changes the overall picture of the position, had to be planned – because with other continuations, the drawbacks of the exchange gradually emerge more and more clearly. (The king’s bishop is actually destined with this pawn constellation to guard against the possible penetrating of the White knight – to e5 and especially c5.)

8.\(\texttt{\textbackslash x d6}\) \(\texttt{\textbackslash x d6}\) 9.\(\texttt{\textbackslash d3}\) 0-0 10.0-0 e\(\texttt{\textbackslash e}\)!

Although this move, like Black’s whole game layout, is definitely not to my taste, Black can count on a draw (but no more) with counter-play halfway agreeable with the position. Despite the isolated pawn and the absence of a bishop to protect the neighboring squares, I have to admit, that the text position promises Black a wood-exchanging draw in the easiest way. The occupation of the central squares, in connection with the open c-file, normally forces White to exchange the most pieces he can, soon.

11.\(\texttt{\textbackslash b5}\)
Now something really odd occurs: up to the 18th move, Marshall follows the (uncertain) train of thought of Nilson in the previously mentioned game, and just like him, very quickly gets into a lost position! Instead of the – not directly bad, but affected – text move, the simple \( \text{dxe5  } fxe5  \text{ c2, etc. came under primary consideration.} \)

\[ 11... \text{c7 12.dxe5 } \text{xe5 13.c1(?)} \]

White is playing with fire; since \( \text{e2} \) was after all positionally unavoidable, it should have occurred immediately.

\[ 13... \text{g4} \]

A good move – but actually self-evident.

\[ 14.c7? \]

A sickly idea, which doesn’t at all resemble Marshall. The now necessary defensive move – \( \text{e2} \) – would still secure him a comfortable equality.

\[ 14... \text{d8} \]

Thereupon White is already without a good reply, since \( ...a6 \) is threatened, winning a piece, as well as \( ...\text{xf3+}, \) followed by \( ...\text{h3}, \) with a mating attack.

\[ 15.xb7 \text{xf3+ 16.gxf3 } \text{h3 17.e1} \]

Always in the same suicidal style. The exchange sacrifice \( 17.h1(!!) \) would pose Black a somewhat more difficult problem.

\[ 17...\text{e4!} \]

With the threat of mate in two. The reply is forced.

\[ 18.f4 \text{h4 (?)} \]

Less convincing anyway than the move chosen by Spielmann against Nilson, \( 18...\text{c5, for example, 19.ea7! } \text{a7 20.xa7 } \text{d3 21.xd3 } c5 22.b4! \text{a7 23.e4 } \text{d7! 24.e5 c6, and White, in spite of the pawn material, must perish because of his disrupted king position.} \)

\[ 19.xe4 \]

Forced, since \( 19.f3 c5 \) would now win quite easily.

\[ 19...\text{dxe4 20.xd4 } \text{ac8} \]

\[ 21.b5?? \]

Obviously on this day, Marshall was struck with chess blindness. Instead of
using the imprecise 18th move of his opponent to persistently defend now with 21.\textit{c2}, he falls victim to a transparent, one-move trap!

After the queen move, Black would have had to slave away before he would have strengthened his attacking position: if 21...\textit{c5}, then 22.f3!; and if 21...f5, then 22.\textit{e6!} \textit{f6} 23.\textit{g5!}, when ...\textit{h6} or ...\textit{g6} would be a decisive mistake – 24.\textit{c4+}. So Black would have had to devise more complicated attacks, for example, 21...\textit{fd8} 22.f3 \textit{d6}, whose irresistibility White absolutely should have made Black prove. Now it’s over, of course.

21...\textit{c1} 22.\textit{g5} \textit{\times d1} 23.\textit{\times d1} \textit{g4} 24.\textit{c1} \textit{h6} 0-1

\textbf{Cycle IV}

\textbf{Round 16}

0 Marshall – Capablanca 1
½ Nimzovich – Alekhine ½
½ Spielmann – Vidmar ½

Standings after Round 16:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Points</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Capablanca</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alekhine</td>
<td>8½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimzovich</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Vidmar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spielmann</td>
<td>6½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(46) Marshall – Capablanca

Caro-Kann Defense [B18]

1.\textit{e4} \textit{c6} 2.\textit{d4} \textit{d5} 3.\textit{\textit{c3}} \textit{d\times e4} 4.\textit{\textit{e4}} \textit{\textit{f5}} 5.\textit{\textit{g3}} \textit{\textit{g6}} 6.\textit{f4} (?)

Through the advance of the f-pawn, a number of central squares are critically weakened. Therefore it can then be good only if it serves attacking purposes which are concrete, clearly definable, and mostly connected with file openings. That’s absolutely not the case here, and the move – curiously enough no more inferior than that recommended by the classicist Maróczy – in my opinion, didn’t come under consideration at all. But it requires the refined opening technique of a Capablanca to reduce it to absurdity.

6...\textit{e6} 7.\textit{f3} \textit{d6} (!)

With the correct idea of developing the knight to \textit{e7} and consequently making still more difficult the possible advance of the f-pawn.

8.\textit{d3} \textit{d7} 9.0-0 \textit{d7} 10.\textit{h1} (?)

A “preventive move” (against what?), which here means a loss of tempo. Instead of this, White should have abandoned the idea of \textit{f5} and first centralize the king’s knight again (10.\textit{e4}). After 10...\textit{c7} 11.\textit{c3}, together with \textit{\textit{e2}}, \textit{\textit{d2}}, \textit{\textit{ae1}}, and possibly \textit{\textit{e5}}, White’s position would still possibly develop validity – sufficient, anyway, to face any danger of loss.

10...\textit{\textit{c7}} 11.\textit{\textit{e5}} \textit{\textit{d8}}!

Serves, among other things, as preparation to the following exchange, which should displace \textit{\textit{e5}}. White has to acquiesce, since the opening of the h-file after \textit{\textit{xg6}} or \textit{\textit{xg6}} would obviously be still worse business for him.

12.\textit{\textit{e2}} \textit{\textit{d3}}

Not 12...\textit{\textit{e5}} 13.f\times e5 \textit{\textit{d3}} 14.c\times d3!, with a splendid attacking game for White.
Cycle IV: Round 16

13.\( \Delta \times d3 \) 0-0

The results of the "pseudo-classical" line are quite unsavory for White. Without any prospect of initiative, he stands, moreover, with awkwardly covered central squares, before the threatening specter of a fairly catastrophic endgame, in which the enemy would seize the only open file and perhaps the shining knight square f5! Under such conditions, one has to decide on heroic means, for better or for worse – and I catch sight of such a one in the certainly unaesthetic-looking move 14.b4!, which, in that it directly would have prevented ...c5, would initiate play on the left side of the board. This play perhaps would have led to some pawn exchanges and consequently the threat of file openings, which would have increased White's chances. That Marshall does not take this and other possibilities into account (in the following) - shows me that he was not at all aware of the latent danger he was already in.

14.\( \Delta \, d2 \)

And now this crude snare, which rightfully turns against him! Advisable was simply 15.d\times c5 \( \Delta \times c5 \) 16.\( \Delta \times c5 \) \( \Delta \times c5 \) 17.\( \Delta \)ad1(!), etc., with a tenable game.

15...\( \Delta f5! \)

So comes the knight to this key square, from which he has a powerful effect on the whole board. Of course, 15...c\times d4 didn't work because of 16.\( \Delta \times d6 \), together with 17.\( \Delta b4 \). But now, on the other hand, White must not play 16.\( \Delta \times d6 \), on account of 16...\( \Delta \times d4 \), with the win of a pawn. Therefore White has to cast his lot with a repeated exchange under deteriorated circumstances.

16.d\times c5 \( \Delta \times c5 \) 17.\( \Delta \times d5 \) \( \Delta \times c5 \) 18.\( \Delta \, c3 \)

Flirts with the "threat" 19.\( \Delta f6 + \), which, by the way – if it would come to that – would be quietly answered by Black with 19...\( \Delta h8 \). However, 18.c3 (whereupon Black would simply double his rooks on the d-file) would have its downsides as well.

18...\( \Delta d4! \)

Everything simple and forced.

19.\( \Delta d1 \) \( \Delta \times c3 \) 20.\( \Delta \times c3 \) \( \Delta \times d1 \) 21.\( \Delta \times d1 \) \( \Delta d8 \)

Not yet 21...\( \Delta d4 \) because of 22.\( \Delta e4! \) (22...\( \Delta c2 \) 23.\( \Delta c3 \) \( \Delta a3 \) 24.\( \Delta c1 \) \( \Delta c4 \) 25.\( \Delta b5 \) ); but now Black threatens the knight move.

22.\( \Delta c3 \)
Until now, Black has handled the game quite flawlessly; but here, in my opinion, he commits a hasty move that should substantially simplify the defense. Why not first 22...h6, which would once and for all prevent the opposition of the enemy rook? Thereupon a viable defensive plan would not be entirely obvious.

23.\textit{d}d1! \textit{xd}1+ 24.\textit{x}d1 \textit{b}4 25.\textit{f}2?

Permits the following strengthening of Black’s position and gives his king \textit{h}ufi, along with the fortification of the knight. And it meanwhile places his own queen on a bad square! No wonder that after this, a pawn and consequently the game are lost under duress. Necessary was 25.g3 (25...\textit{d}d4 26.\textit{d}d3!), since the opening of the h1-a8 diagonal – which before the rook exchange would probably evoke a decisive attack – was, with the two remaining pieces, connected here with no real danger. Probably the game would be a draw after 25.g3, whereby Black’s omission on the 27th move would have found its just retribution. But in New York, Capablanca fought under an especially lucky star ...

25...h5! 26.a3

Here everything is already bad: if, for example, 26.g3, then 26...\textit{d}d6! 27.\textit{c}3 b5! 28.a3 a5! =, etc.

26...\textit{d}6 27.\textit{c}3 \textit{d}4!

Decisive, since White, in order not to die of asphyxiation, (for example,

28.\textit{g}1 \textit{e}3! 29.\textit{h}1 – otherwise ...\textit{c}2 – 29...a6 30.\textit{h}3 \textit{g}6 31.\textit{f}3 \textit{d}2 32.\textit{h}2 \textit{h}4!, etc.) gets himself into an endgame, which is hopeless in the long run.

28.\textit{xd}4 \textit{x}d4 29.\textit{e}4 \textit{xc}2 30.\textit{d}6 \textit{e}3

With this Black definitely secures for himself the material plus (31.\textit{xb}7 \textit{c}4, etc.).

31.a4 \textit{d}5 32.\textit{x}b7

Despair, since it was clear that the black king can be played to the queenside sooner than its colleague. But also 32.g3 b6 33.\textit{g}2 \textit{f}8 34.\textit{f}3 a6 35.\textit{e}4 \textit{g}6! 36.\textit{e}5 \textit{e}7, etc., was grim.

32...\textit{f}4 33.\textit{b}4 \textit{d}5 34.\textit{b}5 \textit{c}3

35.\textit{a}5 \textit{xa}4 36.\textit{c}6 \textit{f}8 37.\textit{xa}7 \textit{e}7 38.\textit{c}6+ \textit{d}6 39.\textit{g}1 \textit{f}6 40.\textit{f}2 \textit{e}5 41.\textit{d}8 \textit{d}7 42.\textit{b}7 \textit{c}7 43.\textit{a}5 \textit{c}3 44.\textit{f}3 \textit{xb}5

Marshall probably could have saved himself the rest.

45.\textit{e}4 \textit{d}6+ 46.\textit{d}5 \textit{d}7 47.\textit{c}6 \textit{c}8 48.\textit{b}8+ \textit{e}7 49.\textit{c}6+ \textit{f}7 50.\textit{d}8+ \textit{e}8 0-1

Here the game was adjourned and – after he had convinced himself that his pieces can be forced back quite easily – White resigned.

(47) Nimzovich – Alekhine
Alekhine’s Defense [B02]

1.e4 \textit{f}6 2.d3 e5
Cycle IV: Round 16

In the Dresden tournament game between the same opponents occurred here 2...c5 3.c4  c6 4.c3 (4.f4 immediately is probably more consistent) 4...e6 5.f4  d5 6.e5  d4 7.e4  x4 8.dxe4  g5!, etc., to Black's advantage. The text move was applied (among others) in the game Maróczy-Dr. Alekhine (New York 1924).

3.f4  c6

This interesting move was examined thoroughly by Oscar Tenner, the Berlin master living in New York and, on his advice, successfully tried in a correspondence game played in 1923 between the Capital Chess Club in Washington (White) and Manhattan Chess Club in New York (Black). Whether it is the best in this position certainly remains anyone's guess. Under strong consideration comes, for example, 3...d5 4.fxe5  g4!, winning back the pawn with excellent development.

4.fx e5

Besides this obvious capture, only 4.f3 comes under deliberation, which was also played in the mentioned original game of this line. There followed 4...d5 5.e×d5  cxd5 6.f×e5  g4 7.e2  c5 (also good is 7...xf3 8.xf3  h4+, which occurred in the game Maróczy-Alekhine: for example 9.g3!  d7 10.e2  e5 12.0-0 8xe2 13.e2  f6= or 13...e7=, etc.) 8.g5? (a move unfavorable to the position, which spoils everything; correct was 8.c3  f3 9.f3  e5 10.d4  f3  + 11.e5  d6! 12.0-0 0-0, whereupon Black likewise would stand quite well – for example, 13.d2  c5!, etc. – White's game would be kept alive) 8...d7 9.c3 (now 9.c3 would have been able to be answered with the decisive file opening 9...f6, etc.), 9...e4 10.xe3  x3 11.e4 0-0 12.f2  f3 13.xf3  x2+ 14.xf2  d4+. White resigned, because after 15...xe5, his game collapses like a house of cards. As will be seen, the text move poses Black more difficult problems.

4...x e5 5.f3!

After 5.d4  g6 6.e5  e4, etc., things would obviously be going very well for Black.

5...xf3+

The results of 5...g6 6.e2 (also 6.c4 would come under consideration), 6...d5 (otherwise the pawn position in the center remains too strong) 7.e5  d7 8.d4 f6 9.0-0! fxe5 10.g5  f6 11.h5, etc., seem unsavory for the second to move.

6.xf3

Better than 6.gxf3  h5, etc.

6...d5!

This counterthrust, which works only in connection with the following queen move, is already the only chance for Black to come to the game to some extent; because after 6...d6 7.e2  g4 8.f2  e2 9.xe2, together with 0-0, etc., White's position soon becomes overpowering, thanks to the open f-file.

7.e5  e7! 8.d4

With his previous move, Black had been concerned mostly with 8.f4, which at
first glance looked unpleasant for him. But ultimately he relied on the following line: 8...\(\text{b4+}\) 9.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{g4}\) 10.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{h5}\) 11.\(\text{xg4}\) \(\text{xf4}\) – with comfortable equality because of the threat 12...\(\text{d3}\), etc. Following the text move, the black knight even comes to e4, which for Black is certainly pleasant.

8...\(\text{e4}\) 9.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{h4+}\)

So he forces an approximately equal endgame. But possibly there was still more to obtain with 9...f5 10.0-0 \(\text{e6}\) (11.\(\text{x}\) 12.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{d7}\), together with ...0-0-0, etc. The quieter text continuation is explained by Black's striving at the end of the tournament to further risk, under no circumstances, the loss of the initiative he fought so hard for opposite his main competitor.

10.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{g4}\) 11:\(\text{d2}\)

To avoid the queen exchange would be inadvisable – for example, 11.\(\text{g2}\) (11.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{e7}\), etc.), 11...\(\text{g5}\) 12.\(\text{x}\) 13...\(\text{b5}\), etc., together with 14...\(\text{f3!}\) and ...\(\text{x}\) 15.\(\text{d4}\), etc.

11...\(\text{xf3}\) 12.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{e7}\)

Now, in case of 13.\(\text{x}\) 14.\(\text{g5}\), Black can force a definitely favorable endgame, in spite of the bishops of opposite color, with ...\(\text{g5}\), together with ...\(\text{g4}\) and ...\(\text{f3}\), etc.

13.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{h3}\) 14.\(\text{xe4}\)

With that, a double-edged position is again brought about: Black keeps the bishop pair, besides the chance of success-promising pressure on the weak light squares in the opponent's camp. In turn, White will try repeatedly to attack the exposed black e-pawn. On the other hand, 14.\(\text{d2}\), together with a knight exchange, would presumably lead speedily to a drawn ending.

14...\(\text{xe4}\) 15.\(\text{d2}\) 16.0-0-0 f6

Played in the knowledge that the e-pawn still needs head-on protection. The attempt to play on the d-file by doubling the rooks, together possibly with ...\(\text{c5}\), would probably be unsuccessful. For example, 16...\(\text{d7}\) 17.\(\text{hg1}\) \(\text{f5}\) 18.\(\text{de1}\) \(\text{hd8}\) 19.\(\text{h4}\) (threatens \(\text{g4}\), etc.), 19...\(\text{h5}\) 20.\(\text{c3}\), together with 21.\(\text{f2}\), etc.

17.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 18.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{he8}\) 19.\(\text{de1}\) \(\text{e6}\)

Black hopes to be able to activate the rook on the sixth rank, but it doesn't come to that. More cautious therefore was 19...\(\text{e7}\), in order not to allow the opponent to gain a tempo with d5.

20.\(\text{e2}\) h5 21.\(\text{he1}\) \(\text{de8}\) 22.\(\text{f4}\)

In order to provoke where possible ...\(\text{g5}\), to weaken squares on the f-file in Black's camp.

22...\(\text{f5}\)

And yet the pawn move would have been more logical, because after 22...\(\text{g5}\) 23.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{c5}\), White would have been able to execute the redeployment maneuver \(\text{f1(c4)-e3}\) only under unfavorable circumstances. If, for example, 24.\(\text{g1}\) \(\text{f5}\) 25.\(\text{c4}\) (\(\text{f1}\)) and Black continues with ...\(\text{g4-...f3}, etc. A$
ter the text move, White should actually get something of an advantage.

23.d5!

At the right moment, since the rook must now leave the sixth rank:

23...cxd6 24...e4 25...e4 26...e4 27...c4 28.d6!, together with 29.d6, and wins.

23...6e7 24.h4

The immediate 24.d6 would have shown itself to be a let-down after 24...6e6! 25.dxc7 g5. together with 6xc7, etc. But now Black undertakes something against this threat.

24...b5!

The rescue-move: upon 25.a4 now follows simply 25...a6 and upon 25.c4(!), then 25...6d8! suffices (not 25...bxc4 26.d6! cxd6 27...xc4 6c7 28...c2!+) 26...e4 bxc4! 27...d6+ (or 27...xf6 6xe2, etc.), 27...cxd6 28...xe7 6xe7 29...xe7 6d7, etc., suffices – just barely – for a draw.

25.d6

This tempting advance, in fact, opens some files to Black’s advantage. Correct was 25...f1 (6e3), in order at least to block the passed pawn, which apparently isn’t to be won. Only after this maneuver would White have been able to try to gain the initiative on the queenside – for example, through 6c2, a4, together with the occupation of the a-file. On the other hand, the text move brings him into danger.

25...cxd6 26...xd6 6e6 27...c5

Also, after 27...f4 b4! 28.c4 6c6, etc, White would get into difficulties.

27...a6

Now it’s Black who misses a favorable opportunity: after 27...a5!, he would have held on to some winning chances, because upon 28...f1, then 28...c6! 29...f2 b4, etc., could have followed. And after 28...b3, the following combination would have been possible: 28...g4 29...e3 (otherwise ...e3), 29...g5 30...d4 g×h4! 31...xe6, when 31...xe6 now wins upon 32...xe4 6g5+, together with ...6f5, etc., and after 32.g×h4 6h4, Black recaptures the exchange with ease and keeps with his two passed pawns and splendid chances for a win. After the tame text move, White succeeds in evading the danger.

28...f1! 6g4

If now 28...c6, then 29...b4!, etc.

29...d2 g5 30.h×g5 6g5

The interesting move 30...e3 doesn’t work because of 31...d5!
With that, the knight has reached the correct position, and a draw is unavoidable for Black.

33...\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe3} \)

Otherwise the knight comes to d5 or (with ...\( \text{\( \mathcal{f} \)f3} \)) to f5.

34.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe3} \) \( \frac{1}{2} \)–\( \frac{1}{2} \)

(48) Spielmann – Vidmar
Ruy Lopez \[C65\]

1.e4 e5 2.\( \text{\( \mathcal{f} \)f3} \) c6 3.d4 b5 4.\( \text{\( \mathcal{f} \)f6} \) d6 5.e5 \( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)e4} \) 6.0-0 \( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)e7} \) 7.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xd4} \) 0-0 8.\( \text{\( \mathcal{f} \)f5} \) d5

Until now, everything as in the first match game (Dr. Lasker-Marshall), where the American innovator continued here with 9.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe7} \) bxc6 10.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe7+} \), etc., and was soon at a disadvantage. Dr Tarrasch, who annotated the games of this competition, was of the opinion that the white game, after 9.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe7+} \) \( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe7} \) 10.\( \text{\( \mathcal{d} \)d3} \), would have had a valid face because of the two bishops and the pawn on e5. (Collijns’ textbook recommends, on the other hand, 10.f3 \( \text{\( \mathcal{c} \)c5} \) 11.f4, etc., with double-edged play.) But, as the present game seems to establish, this face can be called anything but beautiful. The downsides of the Barry line consist precisely in the certainly exaggerated hopping around of the king’s knight during the neglected development.

9.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe7+} \) \( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe7} \) 10.\( \text{\( \mathcal{d} \)d3} \)

The developmental move 10.\( \text{\( \mathcal{d} \)d2} \) offered better chances of equality.

10...\( \text{\( \mathcal{c} \)c5} \) 11.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)e2} \)

And now the third move with this bishop! No wonder that Black soon gets a meaningful positional advantage without effort.

11...c6 12.c3 (?)

White treated the opening rather uneconomically, and now, instead of becoming aware of the danger in his position and thinking about the protection of his advanced central pawn, with the text move he makes a direct tactical error. Here or in the next move, \( f4 \) should occur \textit{nolens volens}.

12...\( \text{\( \mathcal{c} \)c7} \) 13.b4?

Very weak, as the reply shows.

13...\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)e4} \) 14.\( \text{\( \mathcal{d} \)d3} \)

Clearly White overlooked that upon 14.f3?, Black would win with 14...\( \text{\( \mathcal{b} \)b6+} \) 15.\( \text{\( \mathcal{d} \)d4} \) \( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)c3} \). Now he has to be happy that he doesn’t lose a pawn ... but the helplessly weakened queenside!

14...\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe5} \) 15.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)e1} \) \( \text{\( \mathcal{f} \)f6} \)

The simplest, since the opponent, in order to establish the material balance, has to exchange his “Spanish” bishop and remains behind in the development.

16.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)xe4} \) dxe4 17.\( \text{\( \mathcal{e} \)e4} \) \( \text{\( \mathcal{f} \)f5} \) 18.\( \text{\( \mathcal{d} \)d4} \) \( \text{\( \mathcal{d} \)d5} \)

Threatens 19...\( \text{\( \mathcal{b} \)xb1} \), and thereby compels the white bishop to a very unobtrusive post.

19.\( \text{\( \mathcal{b} \)b2} \) \( \text{\( \mathcal{a} \)ad8} \) 20.\( \text{\( \mathcal{d} \)d2} \)?
Another oversight, after which Black should have quite an easy game; for better or worse, probably 20.\( \text{a}3 \) had to happen here.

20...\( \text{b}6? \)

So everything vanishes into thin air; on the other hand, entirely natural and instinctual was 20...\( \text{c}3 \) 21.\( \text{xd}8 \) 22.\( \text{b}3 \) 23.\( \text{e}6+ \) 24.\( \text{h}1 \) 25.\( \text{e}6! \), etc., with a sound pawn majority in the endgame. It's really remarkable that Dr. Vidmar did not take into account this simple opportunity.

21.\( \text{b}3 \) 22.\( \text{c}4 \) 23.\( \text{e}1 \) ½-½

Discontinued as a draw at Black's suggestion. Actually, in the last couple of moves, Black spoiled his prospects to such an extent that one can regard the game as balanced.

Round 17

(49) Spielmann – Capablanca
Caro-Kann Defense [B19]

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.\( \text{c}3 \) dxe4 4.\( \text{x}e4 \) 5.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 6.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 7.\( \text{h}4 \)

\( \frac{1}{2} \) Spielmann – Capablanca \( \frac{1}{2} \)

\( \frac{1}{2} \) Vidmar – Alekhine \( \frac{1}{2} \)

1 Nimzovich – Marshall 0

Standings after Round 17:

Capablanca 12½
Alekhine 9
Nimzovich 9
Vidmar 8½
Spielmann 7
Marshall 5

This pawn move, in connection with castling long, is probably one of the oldest systems for White in the Caro-Kann. Chigorin, Pillsbury (for example, against Caro, Vienna 1898) and others played in this way – and not without success. But later it was proven that Black can easily free himself by a timely counter-thrust in the center (...c5), and the whole line gradually went out of style. Strangely, in this game Capablanca doesn’t use the mentioned possibility for exoneration, and consequently gets a clear disadvantage. By the way, I would play in lieu of 7.\( \text{h}4 (?) \), 7.\( \text{d}3 \), with the further plan of development 0-0, \( \text{e}2 \), c4, together with d2-c3, etc.

7...\( \text{h}6 \) 8.\( \text{d}3 \) 9.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 10.\( \text{d}2 \)

If 10.\( \text{f}4 \), Black could develop the queen with tempo to a5.

10...e6 11.0-0-0 \( \text{d}6 \)

With this and the next moves, Black aspires now to an exchange – an inclination that is in no way in harmony with the given position. Obvious and good was 11...\( \text{c}7 \), together with ...0-0-0 and possibly ...c5, with initiative in the center.
12. \( \text{\textit{a}} \text{e}4 \ \text{\textit{a}} \times\text{\textit{e}}4 \) 13. \( \text{\textit{b}} \times \text{\textit{e}}4 \ \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}7 \) 14. \( \text{\textit{h}} \text{\textit{e}}1 \ \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}6 \)

What's more, immediate 14...0-0-0 was still simpler and better here.

15. \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}2 \ \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4 (?) \)

What did the harmless bishop d2 do to him? On the other hand, the black bishop guarded, among other things, e5, from which the white knight otherwise can be driven only with effort.

16. \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5! \ \text{\textit{d}}\times\text{\textit{d}}2+ \) 17. \( \text{\textit{d}}\times\text{\textit{d}}2 \) 0-0-0 18. \( \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3! \)

As a result of the imprecise enemy treatment of the opening, now White exercises a bothersome pressure against f7, and all of his pieces have more room in general than the black ones.

18... \( \text{\textit{h}}\text{\textit{f}}8 \)

With the intent of 19... \( \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7 \) (20. \( \text{\textit{f}}\times\text{\textit{f}}7 \) \( \text{\textit{b}}\text{b}6 \)), but he doesn't have time for it.

19. \( \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}3 \) \( \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}6? \)

One commits tactical errors more easily in inferior positions than in good ones. The pawn move, which at first glance looks so unprejudiced and there-fore impressive, is believed to have been based on some oversight. Instead of this, there was nothing better than 19... \( \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}8 \).

20. \( \text{\textit{a}}\text{a}3? \)

If Spielmann had been a little less hypnotized by the idea of Capablanca's invincibility, then he probably would have decided on obvious 20 \( \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4 \). If then 20... \( \text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5 \) 21. \( \text{\textit{h}}\times\text{\textit{h}}6 \) \( \text{\textit{a}}\text{a}5 \), then simply 22. \( \text{\textit{b}}\text{b}1 \), with the follow-up \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3 \), etc.; but if 20... \( \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}8 \), then 21. \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3! \) (intending 22. \( \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3 \)) 21... \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}7 \) 22. \( \text{\textit{a}}\text{a}3 \), whereupon both black corner pawns would be attacked. After the inconsistent text move, White's advantage rightfully evaporates completely, and Black ultimately even comes to a counter-attack.

20... \( \text{\textit{b}}\text{b}8 \) 21. \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3 \)

Here this move has little power. Capablanca immediately utilizes the first opportunity given him for risk-free counter-play.

21... \( \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5 \) 22. \( \text{\textit{h}}\times\text{\textit{g}}5 \) \( \text{\textit{h}}\times\text{\textit{g}}5 \) 23. \( \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3 \) \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}4 \) 24. \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}2 \) \( \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}6 \)

Capablanca is especially great with knight maneuvers. From d6, the horse covers f7 and, at the same time, threatens d4 (... \( \text{\textit{b}}\text{b}5 \)).

25. \( \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3 \)

With that, the white queen is questionably cut from the main battlefield. After his unhappy 20th move, White appears to have lost the thread altogether.

25... \( \text{\textit{h}}\text{h}8 \) 26. \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1 \) \( \text{\textit{h}}\text{h}2 \) 27. \( \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}3 \)

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Capablanca settles for a draw through move-repetition just at the moment when excellent chances of victory were waving at him with 27...\text{\textit{g}}h8 (reserving all threats for himself). Indeed, even with this half point, it became mathematically certain that the first prize was his ($3\frac{1}{2}$ points advantage with three remaining rounds).

28.\text{\textit{g}}4 \text{\textit{d}}6 29.\text{\textit{g}}3 \text{\textit{f}}5 $\frac{1}{2}$–$\frac{1}{2}$

(50) Vidmar – Alekhine
Queen’s Indian Defense[E16]

1.d4 \text{\textit{f}}6 2.\text{\textit{f}}f3 \text{\textit{e}}6 3.c4 \text{\textit{b}}6 4.\text{\textit{g}}3 \text{\textit{b}}7 5.\text{\textit{g}}2 \text{\textit{b}}4+ 6.\text{\textit{d}}2 \text{\textit{x}}d2+ 7.\text{\textit{f}}x\text{\textit{d}}2 0–0 8.0–0 \text{\textit{d}}6 9.\text{\textit{c}}3

Until this, everything has already been seen before. Instead of the text move, 9.\text{\textit{c}}c2 was tried (9...\text{\textit{e}}4? 10.\text{\textit{f}}d2!, etc.), which at best is answered with 9...\text{\textit{e}}4. White already lost the opening fight concerning the e4-square, and afterward has to aspire to at least making up for the failure in the next phase of the game.

9...\text{\textit{e}}4! 10.\text{\textit{c}}c2

Capablanca plays in a similar position against Nimzovich (19th round) 10.\text{\textit{x}}e4 \text{\textit{x}}e4 11.\text{\textit{e}}1, and finally got an advantage, but only thanks to the imprecise play of his opponent. Better than the text move, which throws away a tempo, is probably the immediate exchange.

10...\text{\textit{x}}c3 11.\text{\textit{x}}c3

Of course not 11.\text{\textit{g}}5, on account of 11...\text{\textit{x}}e2+.

11...\text{\textit{d}}7 12.\text{\textit{ad}}1 \text{\textit{e}}7 13.\text{\textit{fe}}1 \text{\textit{f}}5!

With that, Black threatens, by means of ...\text{\textit{e}}5 or possibly ...\text{\textit{f}}4, to gather a dangerous attack; therefore White strives for the most immediate simplification.

14.\text{\textit{h}}4! \text{\textit{x}}g2 15.\text{\textit{x}}g2 \text{\textit{f}}6 16.\text{\textit{f}}3 \text{\textit{ae}}8

Prepares the advance of the e-pawn, which White can’t prevent in the long run.

17.\text{\textit{c}}2 \text{\textit{g}}6

Here the game was given a draw at White’s suggestion. That the players in the approximately balanced position at the end of the strenuous tournament
were peacefully disposed is not inconceivable. But it was much more astonishing that the tournament management (or more correctly, a reputable member of the tournament committee, Mr. Walter Shipley, to whom Dr. Vidmar appealed on this occasion against the decision by master Maróczy) — although according to plan, they had the complete right to force a master to play until the 40th move — permitted a premature conclusion in this way with a crowded board...

As far as the position itself is concerned, the chances are approximately equal. It's true that in the diagrammed position, White could hardly play 18.e4 on account of 18...fxe4 19.fxe4 e5 20.d5 Qg4 21.Qf1 Qg5+. But, for example, after 18.a3 e5 19.e3 e4 20.f4, together with b4, etc., he would have secured himself an initiative of sorts on the left side of the board as compensation for the unhappy knight position.

(51) Nimzovich — Marshall
Modern Benoni Defense [A61]

1.c4 Qf6 2.d4

Otherwise, Nimzovich almost never makes this move at such an early stage. But just against Marshall, who in this tournament defended insecurely against the Queen’s Gambit and Queen’s Pawn Game respectively, the choice of this old form of development was deliberate.

2...e6 3.Qf3 c5

Whether the move is a chess mistake remains undecided — but it is a psychological one, surely enough. Marshall had to have known that his opponent as good as never played a proper Queen’s Gambit (that is, with Qg5 and pressure on d5), and as a result in this opening hardly can feel especially at home (compare also the game Nimzovich-Capablanca, Round 2). Therefore 3...d5 is here the “correct” move — that’s something that the older masters of our chess generation (Dr. Lasker excepted), the current forty-year-olds (approximately) – have to profess.

It's not guile, which only too often is evidence of character weakness, but rather the conviction acquired through experience that in chess, in chess battles, insight into human nature and penetration into the opponent's psyche is necessary above all. Earlier one played only with pieces — we play however (or aspire at least) with the opponent, the enemy — with his will, his nerves, his special propensities, outlandishness, and — not in the least— with his vanity. Marshall had to lose the game at hand because he sought only to bring disorder to the enemy pieces; his opponent, however, in addition sought to rattle the psyche of the black army’s commander and not in a small way. And that’s how it happened.

4.d5 d6 5.Qc3 e×d5 6.c×d5 g6 7.Qd2!

This appears more logical to me than the Capablancan 7.g3, because with it, in the midst of marking the weakness d6, the battle is immediately initiated around the center-point c4. Certainly, however, Black’s opening is hardly refuted with the move.
7...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}bd7}\)

In order to sour the c4-knight right away.

8.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}c4\)

Wasn't first 8.e4 more expedient here? If 8...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}b6\), then 9.a4, and White expels the knight or (after 9.a4) conquers the b5-square. Otherwise, White has time for the maneuver \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}c4-e3\), which in the game — but \textit{per nefas} — brought him an advantage.

8...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}b6\) 9.e4 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}g7\)?

He had to take the knight, with a game with mutual chances. (Black would have the nice a1-h8 diagonal, but d6 would remain weak.)

10.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}e3\)!

The result of purely strategic, impeccable reasoning; at the appropriate time, a4 will happen, whereupon one of two things occur: (1) either Black allows a5, when the knight on b6 is repulsed to d7 (possible c8) and his white colleague gets c4 again; or (2) Black plays ...a5, thereby surrendering b5, andweakens the knight position on b6, which, through \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}b3\), in this case, could be attacked forcibly.

White's whole set-up is logical and thereby aesthetic. Only too bad that with the imprecision of the 8th move, the overall picture became somewhat distorted.

10...0-0 11.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}d3 \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}h5\)

The occupation at the moment of the dark squares brings no blessings upon him, since the main disadvantages of the position — the weakness of d6 and above all, the unhealthy development of \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}c8\) — are in no way eliminated by that. Instead of this, the leading concern should be first quite a modest one — namely just to secure the connection of the rooks; for example, 11...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}d7\) 12.0-0 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}c7\) 13. a4 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}ae8\) 14.a5 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}c8\), with a constrained, but still rather solid position.

12.0-0 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}e5\)

To expose the bishop in this way was careless; because if it comes to exchanging it, the kingside loses any stability ... more consistent therefore is the immediate 12...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}f4\).

13.a4 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}f4\) 14.a5 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}d7\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}c4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}x d3\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}x d3\) f5

Much resembles an act of despair.

17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}x f5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}x f5\) 18.f4!

Also good was the move 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}e4\), given by Nimzovich. But he has to go all out, absolutely right psychologically, even sacrificing material. With an undeveloped queenside and compromised king position, Black's position has to collapse quite quickly after a simple file opening.

18...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdollar}}}d4+\)

The white bishop has to be provoked to e3, where he blocks the main file and takes an important square from the knight. Quite shrewd — if it weren't already too late to play subtly ...
New York 1927

19. \( \text{\textalpha}e3 \text{\textalpha}x c3 \) 20. \( \text{\textalpha}x c3 \text{\textalpha}f6 \)

Very strong also was the immediate 20...\( \text{\textalpha}x d5 \): among others, 21.f5! \( gxf5 \) 22.\( \text{\textalpha}f3 \), etc.

21. \( \text{\textalpha}b3! \)

A well considered positional move, which is connected superfluously with some tactical ideas. Therefore, relatively best for Black is 21...g4, in order to ensure a retreat for the rook; but he would always stand awkwardly.

21...\( \text{\textalpha}x d5? \)

This move is refuted neatly. Upon 21...\( \text{\textalpha}x d5 \), which looks somewhat better, Nimzovich indicates the strong file occupation 21.\( \text{\textalpha}ae1! \) as sufficient for a win.

22.f5!

This move all of a sudden makes the rook and bishop vital. If Black takes the pawn with the bishop, then he remains likewise without defense after 23.\( \text{\textalpha}g5 \).

22...\( gxf5 \) 23.\( \text{\textalpha}g5 \text{\textalpha}d4 \)

Or 23...\( \text{\textalpha}e6 \) 24.\( \text{\textalpha}x b7 \text{\textalpha}c8 \) 25.\( \text{\textalpha}ae1! \), and wins.

24. \( \text{\textalpha}b6+ \) c4 25. \( \text{\textalpha}c3 \) a\( \text{x} b6 \) 26. \( \text{\textalpha}x d4 \text{\textalpha}g7 \) 27. \( \text{\textalpha}ae1! \)

With ideas of mate.

27...\( \text{\textalpha}x a5 \) 28.\( \text{\textalpha}e8! \) \( \text{\textalpha}x e8 \) 29.\( \text{\textalpha}f6+ \) \( \text{\textalpha}g8 \) 30.\( \text{\textalpha}h6 \) 1–0

The game received the third special award.

**Round 18**

½ Vidmar – Capablanca ½
1 Alekhine – Marshall 0
½ Spielmann – Nimzovich ½

**Standings after Round 18:**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Player</th>
<th>Points</th>
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<tr>
<td>Capablanca</td>
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<td>Nimzovich</td>
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<td>Vidmar</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spielmann</td>
<td>7½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(52) Vidmar – Capablanca

Four Knights Game [C48]

1.e4 e5 2. \( \text{\textalpha}f3 \) \( \text{\textalpha}c6 \) 3. \( \text{\textalpha}c3 \) \( \text{\textalpha}f6 \) 4.\( \text{\textalpha}b5 \) \( \text{\textalpha}d4 \) 5. \( \text{\textalpha}x d4 \) e\( \text{x} d4 \) 6.e5 d\( \text{x} c3 \) 7.\( \text{\textalpha}x f6 \) \( \text{\textalpha}x f6 \) 8.d\( \text{x} c3 \) \( \text{\textalpha}e5+ \)

The entire line was played for the first time by Capablanca against me in St. Petersburg in 1914. It leads to an easy draw for Black, if White immediately exchanges queens – but this is definitely unnecessary. Under consideration comes instead 9.\( \text{\textalpha}e2 \) \( \text{\textalpha}c5 \) 10.0–0 0–0 11.\( \text{\textalpha}f3 \) – with the idea of causing, in contrast to the text game, the exchange of the black-square bishops, whereupon the mutual pawn set-up would be rather favorable to White.
Cycle IV: Round 18

9. \( \text{e2} \text{x}\text{e2+} \) 10. \( \text{xe2} \text{d5} \) 11.0–0

More cautious probably was first
11.\( \text{d3} \), in order to prevent the following move by Black, which nearly forces
the bishop exchange.

11...\( \text{f5} \) 12.\( \text{b5+} \)

Was it really worth the effort, to spoil
the opponent’s castling? He was assured
of a simple draw with 12.\( \text{f4!} \) 0–0–0
13.\( \text{d3} \), etc.

12...\( \text{c6} \) 13.\( \text{e1+} \) \( \text{d7} \) 14.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 15.\( \text{cxd3} \) \( \text{d6} \)

Black kept the correct bishop, that is,
the one that can possibly attack the fixed
pawns on the white queenside. This
means only a very small advantage here,
but is better than nothing.

16.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{e8} \) 17.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f5} \) 18.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{g6} \)

The logical reply, whereby the oppo-
nent is forced either to give up the fight
for e4 immediately, or to decide upon
the “Stonewall” setup, which will seri-
ously weaken his dark squares.

4.\( \text{fd2!} \)

A move that stands in contrast to all
principles – both with the older formula
(“don’t make different moves with the
same piece in the opening”) as well as
the modern notion (“pressure on the
central squares is generally more effec-
tive than their occupation”). In addition,
Black has the disadvantage of unneces-
sary voluntary agreement, which allows
the opponent already to elaborate the en-
tire further battle plan with the next
moves. In short: it forms a characteristic
opening mistake, which I label as “illeg-
itimate disturbances of the balance.”

4...\( \text{b4} \)

A typical Marshall trap: if now \(5.\text{a3} \),
then 5...\( \text{f6} \) and wins!

5.\( \text{c2!} \) \( \text{d5} \)

If 5...\( \text{f5} \), then 6.\( \text{a3} \), forcing the exchange
of the developed black pieces.

6.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f5} \) 7.\( \text{dxe4} \)

White’s further operations are pre-
scribed clearly through the situation
which has arisen: first e4 should be
eliminated by means of f3, then a pos-
sible e4 forces a file opening, and fi-
nally, follow up with the utilization of the weakness e6, exposed in this way. In fact, Black loses in something of a different way— but only because he tries to face the plan with forcing, combinational means.

7...f×e4 8.f×f4

This bishop development destroys all Black’s hopes of a kingside attack, of which he otherwise could dream, based on the open f-file.

8...0-0 9.e3 c6

Otherwise White would have forced the exchange of  b4 through 10.a3 (10...d6? 11.xd6, together with c×d5 exd5 ×d5!, etc.).

10.e2 d7

Or 10...d6 11.xd6 ×d6 12.0-0, together with f3, etc. Also, the attempt to take advantage, in a tactical way, of the somewhat exposed position of the bishop on f4 would have ultimately proved insufficient— for example, 10...c5 11.a3 a5 12.d×c5 d4 13.b4 d×c3 14.b×a5 ×a5 15.e6, together with 0-0±.

11.a3

This seemed to me to be easier than the line 11.0-0 ×f6 12.f3 ×h5 13.e×e4 (13.e5 ×g5) 13...×f4 14.e×f4 ×f4 15.e×f4 d×c4, etc.

11...e7

Following the exchange, the dark squares would be left quite unprotected, and White, without difficulty, would have achieved a strong attack on the king by means of castling long, together with opening the g-file with f3, ...e×f3, g×f3.

12.0-0 g5

There probably isn’t anything better.

13.f3! ×f4 14.e×f4 ×f4

To be sure, Black’s position was unenviable also without this— but with 14...e×f3 15.e×f3 d6, together with queenside development, he would still have been able to carry out extended resistance. Obviously, the text move already prepares the following forcible liberation attempt in the center.

15.e×e4 + 16.e×f1 e5

Leads to dramatic complexities. After 16...d×c4 17.e×c4 ×b6, White would get an advantage with 18.f2.

17.e2!

The beginning of the decisive combination. It’s clear that both 17.d×e5 d4 and 17.c×d5 (or exd5) 17...e×d4 would not yet directly contribute.

17...c5
Cycle IV: Round 18

There was actually no choice for him, since any exchange in the center clearly would be only grist for the opponent's mill, and against 17...b6, I had prepared the following winning line: 18.c5 a5 19.exd5 e4 20.b4! dxc3 21.g5 c7 22.d6, etc.

18.dxe5! d4 19.gf4!

Doubtless the quickest and surest path to a win. On the other hand, questionable on move 18 was 18.f4xd5 cxd4 19.b4, on account of 19...f6!, and on move 19 - 19.d5, because of 19...c5, together with ...d6, etc.

19...dxc3

Forced.

20.gf7+ h8 21.bxc3!

This "quiet" move is the actual point of the whole combination. With the natural 21.e6, the following defense would be at Black's disposal: 21...f6 22.e7 g8! 23.f6 g4! 24.xg8+ xg8 25.d6 e8=, etc.

21...g8 22.e7 h6

This protects him at least from one of the threats (23.e6 f6 24.e5 h7!).

23.h5!

The death blow.

23.a5

Or 23...c4 24.f7; or 23...h7 24.e6 b6 (24...f6 25.f6) 25.f8 and wins.

24.e6 g6 25.exd7 xxd7 26.f7 1-0

The arbiter, Mr. L. Mayer, declared this game the most beautiful in the tournament, but it nevertheless received only the second special award, because the quality of the Capablanca-Spielmann game was said to be supposedly higher.

(54) Spielmann – Nimzovich
French Defense [C07]

1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.f3 c5 4.dxc5 xxc5 5.d3 c6

An active move, which just as 5...c6 (see Spielmann-Alekhine, Cycle III), is pretty playable. Only Black mustn't lose a single tempo during the center battle in the opening phase, which in the current game - as will become convincingly clear - absolutely isn't the case.

6.e5 df7 7.gf3 c6 8.f2

There we have it! Instead of capturing the central point e5 with 8...f6! - even at the cost of some more superficial weaknesses (given by Nimzovich himself after the game) - Black loses time to eliminate the seemingly innocent white king's bishop. At the same time,
a valuable protection of the d4-square (\textit{\&c6}) disappears. After 8...f6 9.exf6 \textit{\&xf6} 10.\textit{\&b3} h6 (simplest) 11.\textit{\&xc5} \textit{\&xc5}, the Black position would even be favored because of the central pawns' flexibility. Against correct counter-play, White's knight move to d2 can't be advantageous!

9.0-0 \textit{\&xd3} 10.\textit{\&xd3} 0-0 11.\textit{\&b3} \textit{\&e7}

Otherwise \textit{\&g5}, etc.

12.\textit{\&e1} \textit{\&b6} 13.\textit{\&bd4}

In the good old, pre-war times (San Sebastian 1911 to St. Petersburg 1914), where many of his opponents didn't yet grasp well that this — \textit{ceteris paribus} — already meant half the victory, Nimzovich himself had invested enough games with such a central position for the knight and won most of them. No wonder that, here a defender, he doesn't feel comfortable and gets more and more into a jam. In contrast, Spielmann's following positional play appears very aesthetic.

13...\textit{\&d7} 14.b3 \textit{\&c8} 15.\textit{\&d2} \textit{\&a8}

The knight seeks in vain for halfway reasonable squares. Black's move confines him in such a way that he can in no way secure his dark-square bishop from the exchange, and so has to abandon the hope of the bishop pair.

16.a3 \textit{\&c7} 17.\textit{\&b4} \textit{\&a6} 18.\textit{\&xe7} \textit{\&xe7} 19.b4 \textit{\&c7} (?)

Permits a further strengthening of the white position on the queenside: namely, Black can never profit from the open c-file, since his own pieces stand in the way of each other. For defensive purposes, first 19....\textit{\&a4} would have been more useful.

20.a4! \textit{\&e8}

After 20...\textit{\&xb4}, White would get a clear advantage with \textit{\&e1-b1-b7}, etc.

21.c3 f6

No heroic resolve, but rather an avowal that there's no other way to conduct business. In fact, if Black permits the opponent a couple of tempi — for example, in order to double the rooks on the e-file for the purpose of preventing the text move — then he would soon fall victim to a direct attack on the king. Certainly, the wonderful animals on d4 and e5 look formidable now, but a direct path to a win is more difficult to find.

22.exf6 \textit{\&xf6} 23.\textit{\&e3} \textit{\&f4}!

Again the lesser evil, since after 24.\textit{\&xf4} \textit{\&xf4} 25.\textit{\&xe6} \textit{\&xe6} 26.\textit{\&xe6}, he would get more than sufficient compensation with 26...\textit{\&c4}, etc., for the loss of a pawn.

24.\textit{\&e5} \textit{\&e3} 25.\textit{\&xe3} \textit{\&f6}

The threat was ....\textit{\&d3-c5}, etc.

26.g3

With the apparent purpose of finally making the weakness on e6 permanent by means of f4. As the reply shows, the way chosen was not correct, and the preparatory move 26.h4(!) was recommendable. If after that, 26...h6, then 27.g3, when 27...g5 wouldn't work because of 28.\textit{\&g4}, etc. Small omissions
of that kind usually suffice to transform a totally superior position gradually into an equal one.

26...g5! 27.b5 ♖f8 28.♗b1 b6 29.♗be1

In spite of the imprecision of the 26th move, White still has a position that promises a win, since three to four pieces of the opponent are in stalemate. Instead of the text move, which threatens to win a pawn (30.♗g4), also 29.♗b4 comes under consideration here – albeit with a different plan – if after that 29...♗d8 (in order to prevent c4), then first ♖g2, together with ♖e1-a1 and finally, if Black still conducts himself passively (and what else can he do?), a5, opening a file.

29...a6

Quick-witted and bold, yet in the case of a proper answer, inadequate. Since 29...♖e7 still works in the short term, for example, (1) 30.♗g4 ♖g6 31.♗f5+ ♖f8 32.♗d6 ♖d8, etc.; or (2) 30.♗dc6+ ♖xc6 31.♗xc6+ ♖d6 32.♗xa7 ♖a8, etc. He should have chosen this move, for better or worse, to cover e6.

30.♗xa6?

With that, in my opinion, Spielmann misses out on a win. Correct was 30.a5!, with the following lines: (1) 30...♖b8 31.♗dc6! ♖b7 (after 31...♕xc6 32.♗xc6! wins the exchange) 32.♗xa6 ♕xa6 33.♗d8 ♖b8 34.♗g4 ♖g6 35.♗xe6+ ♖g8 36.♗d4 ♖d7 37.♖e5 ♖d6 38.♖d7 ♖xd7 39.♖c6 ♖bb7 40.♖e5, etc., with an easy win; and (2) 30...♖b5 31.a×b6 h5 (otherwise, ♖g4) 32.♖a1 ♖xd4 33.c×d4 ♖b5 34.♖b3, with a winning position, since he threatens, among other things, ♖×b5, together with ♖b7 and ♖a8. After the text move, Nimzovich, with his desperate ...a6, is proved right.

30...♖a8! 31.♗b5 ♖xa6 32.♗g4

Now quite harmless, since after 32...♖g6, the pawn can’t be taken: 33.♗xe6?, ♖xe6 34.♖e6 ♖d7 35.♖f6+ ♖g7, and wins.

32...♖g6 33.♗e5 ♖f6 34.♗g4

Otherwise Black generates counter-play with ...♕c5, etc. Too bad for the game, which up to achieving a winning position, was implemented so well by Spielmann!

34.♖g6 ½-½

Round 19

½ Capablanca – Nimzovich ½
1 Alekhine – Spielmann 0
½ Vidmar – Marshall ½

Standings after Round 19:

Capablanca 13½
Alekhine 11
Nimzovich 10
Vidmar 9½
Spielmann 7½
Marshall 5½
(55) Capablanca – Nimzovich
French Defense [E16]

1.d4 ♘f6 2.♘f3 e6 3.c4 b6 4.g3 ♘b7 5.♗g2 ♘b4+ 6.♗d2 ♘xd2+ 7.♔xd2 0-0 8.♗c3

Up until now, everything is identical with the game Vidmar-Alekhine from the 17th round, in which White played 8. 0-0 here. The text move permits the following exchange, facilitating it for Black.

8...♗e4 9.♗xe4 ♘xe4 10.0-0 d6 11.♗e1

A simplifying initiative, necessary sooner or later, which has the advantage of pledging the knight on g2 interesting evolutionary possibilities (e3, f4). And yet here I would have preferred first 11.♗fd1, in order to hamper, if possible, the strategic counterattack ...c5.

11...♗xg2 12.♗xg2 ♘d7

An imprecise developing move, which reveals an inadequate assimilation of the details of the position – certainly a rare case with Nimzovich! Correct was 12...♗e7, in order to answer 13.e4 with 13...c5! and 14.♗fd1 with ...f5!, which in both cases would have secured full counter-play for Black.

13.e4 e5?

A move entirely contrary to position which weakens d5 and f5 without compensation – 13...c5! is still possible; for example, 14.d5 ♘e5!, or 14.♗ad1 ♘c8 15.♗e3 ♘c7 16.dxc5 ♘xc5, etc.

14.♗e3 ♘f6

Probably 14...e4d4 15.♗xd4 ♘f6 16.♗xf6 ♘xf6 17.f3, etc., offers a better chance at a draw – with only a small positional advantage for White.

15.f3 c5?

With that, he hurls the game at the opponent. For better or worse, 15...g6, together with ...♗e7, etc. should be played.

16.dxe5 dxe5 17.♗ad1 ♘d2

Or 17...c7 18.♗f5 ±.

18.♗xd2

Control of the only open file, in connection with the penetration point for the knight, should now decide the conflict in White’s favor without considerable difficulties.

18...♗fd8 19.♗fd1 ♘xd2

It would be useless to play 19...♗d4 20.♗f5, etc.

20.♗xd2 g6
20...\textit{f8} doesn’t help because of 21.\textit{d6}!, etc.

21.\textit{f2}?

With this move, we see most clearly that Capablanca had absolutely no interest in the outcome of this game. Otherwise he wouldn’t have possibly overlooked the entirely obvious invading move 21.\textit{d6} (not 21.\textit{d5} because of 21...\textit{g7}!). Now against 21...\textit{g7}, Capablanca would have the choice of either first bringing the king to the center – or by means of 22.\textit{d5} \textit{\times d5} 23.\textit{e\times d5} (23...\textit{e8} 24.\textit{d7} \textit{e4} 25.\textit{f2}!, etc.), bringing about an endgame not technically difficult to win.

21...\textit{f8} 22.\textit{d5}

On the other hand, White gets nothing more now from 22.\textit{d6}, on account of 22...\textit{e7}, since then 23.\textit{c6} would be a direct mistake because of 23...\textit{e8}!, together with ...\textit{d7}.

22...\textit{d8} 23.\textit{e3} \textit{\times d5}+ \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}

Actually, after 24.\textit{d5} \textit{d5} 25.\textit{e\times d5} (or 25.\textit{c\times d5} \textit{b5}!, etc.) 25...\textit{f5} 26.\textit{g4} \textit{e7} 27.\textit{g\times f5} \textit{g\times f5} 28.\textit{f2} \textit{d6} 29.\textit{g3} \textit{e7} 30.\textit{h4} \textit{h6}! 31.\textit{h5} \textit{d6}, etc., White can’t win the pawn endgame, since his king can’t move forward because of ...\textit{e4}. But that could have been shown to the New York public.

\textit{\textbf{(56) Alekhine – Spielmann}}

French Defense \textit{[C13]}

1.e4 \textit{e6} 2.d4 \textit{d5} 3.\textit{c3} \textit{f6} 4.\textit{g5} \textit{e7} 5.\textit{e\times d5} A quite harmless variation. Whether Black recaptures with the knight or with the pawn, he can always achieve equality without effort.

5...\textit{d5} 6.\textit{e7} \textit{d7} 7.\textit{d2} \textit{b4}

This move, which has already been made here occasionally, forces an approximately equivalent endgame – but only just approximately. And by the way, why should Black be in such a hurry for simplification? Playing first 7...0-0, and, for example, not until 8.0-0-0, playing 8...\textit{b4}, etc., would have spared him the following unpleasantness.

8.\textit{\times d5} \textit{\times d2}+ 9.\textit{\times d2} \textit{e5} 10.\textit{e1}+ \textit{e6}?

In the games Schlechter-Maróczy and Schlechter-Spielmann (San Sebastian, 1911) 10...\textit{f8} occurred, and in both cases Black reached a draw, although not without a certain effort. It’s hard to comprehend why Spielmann – who therefore was not unfamiliar with this position – decided on the self-pinning of the bishop.

11.\textit{h3}!

Very strong, since the knight will be able to develop versatile activity from \textit{f4}: (1) pressure on \textit{d5} and \textit{e6}; (2) impact on \textit{c5} or \textit{e5} respectively via \textit{d3}; and (3) possibility of the flank attack, \textit{f4-h5}.

11...\textit{c6}

Gradually Black gets a decided disadvantage. But also 11...0-0 12.\textit{f4} \textit{c6}
13.c3 a6 (otherwise \( \text{b5} \)), \( \text{e2-f3} \), etc., was of little benefit to him.

12.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 13.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{ae8} \) 14.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{d6} \)

All this is as good as forced.

15.\( \text{c5+} \) \( \text{d7} \) 16.\( \text{e5} \)

Another likewise more promising continuation was 16.\( \text{e3} \), when Black couldn’t very well play 16...a6 – for example, 17.\( \text{xc6+} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 18.\( \text{he1} \) \( \text{d7} \) (after 18...\( \text{d7} \), White wins by means of 19.\( \text{e8} \), together with \( \text{h5} \), etc.) 19.\( \text{h5} \) \( \text{hg8} \) (or 19...\( \text{eg8} \) 20.\( \text{g3} \), etc.; but after 16...f6 17.\( \text{xc6+} \) \( \text{bxc6} \) 18.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{b8} \) 19.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 20.\( \text{e1+} \), etc., it would ultimately have come to similar positions as in the game.

16...f6 17.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 18.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 19.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{bxc6} \)

White brings about a rook endgame, which indeed must be winning, but still requires quite precise handling.

20.\( \text{e1+} \)

In almost every endgame, it’s important to drive the enemy king out from a central position; but especially here, where the rook can be lead to both flanks, according to need, to attack the enemy pawns.

20...\( \text{d7} \)

Relatively better than 20...\( \text{f7} \), whereupon White would have won by implementing the following plan: 21.\( \text{c3}! \) \( \text{b8} \) 22.\( \text{e3} \). Now the black rook has to watch the b-file, and Black cannot prevent the following moves: a3!, \( \text{c2} \), \( \text{f3}! \), \( \text{b3} \), after which the rook would penetrate the enemy position following ...\( \text{e8} \), \( \text{d2} \), etc. It’s also interesting to find out that even with the white king’s position on c2, Black can’t oppose the rook, because then the pawn endgame also would be lost.

For example, ...\( \text{e8} \); \( \text{xe8} \), ...\( \text{xe8} \); \( \text{b3} \), ...\( \text{d7} \); \( \text{b4} \), ...\( \text{c8} \); \( \text{a5} \), ...\( \text{b7} \); \( \text{f3} \) (or, in the case the pawn is already on \( \text{f3} – \text{b4}! \)). Now, after the exhaustion of the kingside pawn moves on both sides (for example, ...h5; f4!, etc.), Black will have to move ...a6 (after ...\( \text{b8} \); \( \text{a6} \), etc., the White win is easier still), whereupon b3!, ...\( \text{a7} \); b4, ...\( \text{b7} \); a4, ...\( \text{a7} \); b5, ...\( \text{b5} \); a\( x \)b5; a\( x \)b5, ...\( \text{cxb} \); \( \text{b5} \), ...\( \text{d7} \); c6+, etc. follows, with a clear win for White. An instructive pawn endgame!

21.\( \text{c3} \)

Corresponding to the foregoing implementation, 21.\( \text{e3} \) could also be played immediately, because after that 21...\( \text{e8} \) doesn’t work. But 21...\( \text{b8} \), etc., would just amount to a transposition of moves.

21...\( \text{b8} \) 22.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{f8} \) 23.\( \text{g3!} \) \( \text{f7} \) 24.\( \text{b4} \)
From here on, White starts to become somewhat indecisive; the correct way is – as also happens further on – $24.\text{h}3$.

24...$\text{e}7$ 25.$\text{c}3$

After 25.$\text{a}5$, the counterattack 25...$\text{e}2!$ 26.$\times\text{g}7+\text{c}8$, etc., would probably lead to a draw.

25...$\text{f}7$ 26.$\text{h}3$ h6 27.$\text{d}2!$

Threatens 28.$\text{a}3$, against which Black actually has no defense, since upon ...$\text{c}8\text{b}7$, the rook infiltrates to e8 via e3; and after 27...$\text{f}8$ 28.$\text{a}3$ $\text{b}8$ (or 28...$\text{a}8$ 29.$\text{a}6$) 29.$\text{c}3$ $\text{b}7$ 30.$\text{a}6$, Black would finally perish by zugzwang.

27...$\text{e}7$

An attempt.

28.$\text{a}3$

With the logical move 28. $\text{e}3$ (intended with the previous maneuver), White could have compelled a victory-promising pawn endgame. Because after 28.$\text{e}3!\text{xe}3$ 29.$\text{xe}3\text{e}6$ 30.$\text{f}4$ $\text{g}6$ (30...$\text{g}5+$? 31.$\text{g}4$, etc.) 31.$\text{g}4$, Black obviously will not be able to prevent the total barraging of the kingside, and White penetrates finally on the queenside. For example, 31...$\text{g}5+$ 32.$\text{e}3\text{d}7$ (32...$\text{f}5$ 33.$\text{f}3$) 33.$\text{d}3\text{c}8$ 34.$\text{c}3\text{d}7$ 35.$\text{b}4\text{a}6$ 36.$\text{a}4\text{b}7$ 37.$\text{a}5\text{a}6$ (in case of $\text{c}$-any, then White plays $\text{a}6$, together with $\text{b}4$-$\text{b}5$, and after ...$\text{c}6$-$\text{b}5$, $\text{a}$-$\text{b}5$ and $\text{b}6$, with an easy win) 38.$\text{a}4\text{a}7$ 39.$\text{b}3!\text{b}7$ 40.$\text{b}4\text{a}7$ 41.$\text{b}5\text{a}5$ 42.$\text{a}5\text{b}7!$ 43.$\text{b}6!$ (White had not sufficiently appreciated exactly this point in his calculations; after 43.$\text{b}x\text{c}6+$? $\text{b}7\text{b}8\text{a}8$, etc., the game is already a draw) 43...$\text{c}6\text{b}6+$ 44.$\text{c}b6\text{b}8$ 45.$\text{a}6!$ $\text{c}5$ 46.$\text{d}x\text{c}5\text{d}4$ 47.$\text{b}7$ 48.$\text{b}6$ 49.$\text{c}6\text{d}1\#$ 50.$\text{c}7\#$.

Not a very easy variation – but in better shape, the leader of the White pieces doubtlessly could have and should have figured it out. Now comes an endgame on quite a different track.

28...$\text{e}4$ 29.$\text{a}4\text{c}8$ 30.$\text{f}3\text{h}4$

With the corner position of the enemy rook, White promised himself something too much with his 28th move.

31.$\text{h}3\text{b}7$ 32.$\text{e}3\text{f}5!$

The correct way to free the rook, since White can’t really prevent ...$\text{f}4+$, together with ...$\text{h}4$-$\text{h}5$-$\text{f}5$, etc.

33.$\text{b}4+$ $\text{c}8$ 34.$\text{a}4$

With other moves as well, for example, $\text{b}3$, nothing much more might result after 34...$\text{f}4+$, etc.

34...$\text{g}5$ (?)
New York 1927

From here on, Black, for his part, starts to take great pains. Simplest, of course, was 34...f4+ 35.\textit{f}2 \textit{h}5 – for example, 36.\textit{b}3 (36.a5 a6) 36...\textit{f}5 37.\textit{d}3 \textit{f}7 38.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}7 39.\textit{e}2 \textit{e}2+, together with ...a5!, with a dead draw.

35.a5 g4

After the previous mistake, probably still the best practical chance. Because after 35...a6 36.\textit{f}2!, Black's rook would remain perpetually closed off after White, through the threat \textit{g}3-h2, together with g3, etc., would force Black to play ...f4, and finally the playing of the rook on the e-file, together with its unavoidable infiltration, would bring White a decisive advantage.

36.\textit{h}xg4 f\times g4 37.a6! gxf3

Upon 37...g3 38.f4, etc., wins.

38.gxf3 \textit{h}1 39.\textit{b}7 \textit{e}1+

With his 38th move, Black probably overlooked that 39...\textit{a}1 would now be baneful because of 40.\textit{a}a7 \textit{b}8 41.\textit{b}7+ \textit{c}8 42.\textit{b}3! \textit{a}a6 43.\textit{a}3 \textit{b}7 44.f4!, etc.

The counterattack on the d-pawn forms therefore his only chance of salvation.

40.\textit{f}4!

Through 40.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}7! 41.\textit{a}a7 \textit{b}8 42.\textit{b}7+ \textit{a}8!, etc., it's true, a pawn was to be won, but not the game.

40...\textit{d}1 41.\textit{e}5 \textit{e}1+ 42.\textit{f}5 \textit{d}1 43.\textit{a}7!

This pawn exchange occurs in the correct knowledge that the white king will succeed in rendering both enemy passed pawns harmless, as well as effectively supporting his own f-pawn. The final phase is instructive in technical respects.

43...\textit{x}d4 44.\textit{a}8+ \textit{d}7 45.f4 \textit{a}4 46.a7! \textit{h}5

Or 46...d4 47.\textit{e}4 \textit{h}5 48.b3 \textit{a}1 49.f5 \textit{e}7 50.\textit{x}d4 \textit{h}4 51.\textit{e}5, and wins.

47.b3!

The winning move; since it's clear that White's main task consists in standing sentinel with the king over the dangerous d-pawn – the h-pawn can be stopped in a pinch with the rook by sacrifice of the a-pawn. And b3 allows the king to move to e5, which would be obviously pointless at the moment because of 47...\textit{e}4+.

47...\textit{a}1 48.\textit{e}5 \textit{e}1+ 49.\textit{f}6

Gaining time on the clock.

49...\textit{a}1 50.\textit{e}5 \textit{e}1+ 51.\textit{d}4! \textit{d}1+ 52.\textit{c}3 \textit{a}1 53.f5! \textit{e}7

Forced, because of the deadly threat f6, etc.
54.\texttt{d4} \texttt{h4} 55.\texttt{e5} \texttt{a1}+ 56.\texttt{f4} \\
\texttt{a1} 57.\texttt{g5} \texttt{g1}+

A difficult decision. But upon 57...\texttt{h3} comes 58.\texttt{h8} \texttt{a7} 59.\texttt{h3} \texttt{a1} 60.\texttt{f6}+! \texttt{f7} 61.\texttt{h7}+ \texttt{f8} 62.\texttt{c7}, with an easy win.

58.\texttt{xh4} \texttt{a1} 59.\texttt{g5} \texttt{g1}+ 60.\texttt{f4} \texttt{a1} 61.\texttt{e5} \texttt{e1}+ 62.\texttt{d4} \\
\texttt{a1} 63.\texttt{c3} \texttt{a3} 64.\texttt{b2} \texttt{a6} 65.\texttt{b4}

Now the approach of this pawn immediately decides.

65...\texttt{f7} 66.\texttt{b3} \texttt{a1} 67.\texttt{f6}! \texttt{a6} \\
68.\texttt{b5} c\texttt{x}b5 69.\texttt{b4} 1-0

(57) Vidmar – Marshall
Queen’s Pawn Game [A46]

1.\texttt{d4} \texttt{f6} 2.\texttt{f3} \texttt{e6} 3.\texttt{c4} \texttt{e4} \\
4.\texttt{c2}

A good move, but which can’t be regarded as a strengthening compared to 4.\texttt{f2} (Alekhine-Marshall), since it’s clear that the e4-outpost must be attacked at least by the knight. It’s less clear, on the other hand, that \texttt{c2} belongs in all variations.

4...\texttt{d5}

More precise seems first ...\texttt{f5}, and provided 5.\texttt{c3}, then 5...\texttt{b4}, with the eventual threat of causing for the weak white pawn complex \texttt{c3}, \texttt{c4}, \texttt{d4} so typical of the Dutch game. It’s strange how little importance Marshall places on the nuances of the opening phase!

5.\texttt{c3} \texttt{f5} 6.\texttt{f4} \texttt{d6} 7.e3

A well known idea with the Stonewall, which supposedly originated with Pillsbury. Following the exchange on f4, White should press against e6. But as a rule, Black doesn’t need to swap at all, and in the text game he could also avoid this easily.

7...\texttt{c6} 8.\texttt{e2} 0-0 9.0-0 \texttt{e7} (?)

When one takes a back seat in the development, one can’t miss the opportunity to lead new fighting forces into the battle. Here for example, 9...\texttt{d7} is tactically possible (10.\texttt{xe4} \texttt{xf4}), and ought to happen immediately. Then, upon 10.c5, the bishop would have had a comfortable retro move ...\texttt{b8}. After the text move, White gets an advantage.

10.c5! \texttt{xf4}

If 10...\texttt{c7}, then simply 11.b4 together with a4, b5, etc. – using the circumstance that Black in this case couldn’t develop his queenside further. But now White has a still easier play – ousting or encircling the knight on e4.

11.\texttt{e4} \texttt{d7} 12.\texttt{b4} \texttt{f6}

Black attempts not incorrectly to get some kingside counter-play, because with a simpler continuation, for example, 12...\texttt{df6} 13.\texttt{e5} \texttt{d7} 14.\texttt{f3} \texttt{x}c3 15.\texttt{xf3}, together with a4, b5, etc., he would have perished anyway, slowly but surely.

13.\texttt{d3}

A clearance move for the queen’s knight.

13...\texttt{h6} 14.\texttt{e2} \texttt{df6}
15.\text{c1}(?)

From here on, White starts to play hyper-fine chess. Indeed his position is strong enough to endure all kinds of artificiality – but gradually he lets the win get away from him. On the other hand, the crystal-clear plan to drive away knight on e4 with f3 would strengthen his positional advantage without greater effort. We examine 15.\text{c5}: (1) 15...g5 16.f3 gxf4 17.fxe4 fxe4 18.gxf4 exd3 19.gxd3 xd7 20.\text{f1}, with a technically easy win thanks to White's complete control of the dark squares; (2) 15...\text{h5} 16.\text{d2}!, with the unstoppable threat, without drawbacks, of 18.g4.

15...\text{h5} 16.a4 a6 17.\text{a3} (?)

And now still 17.\text{c5}, together with f3, was tremendously strong.

17...\text{ef6} 18.\text{b1}

Now 18.\text{c5} could have been met with 18...\text{d7}. In this way Black survived the worst.

18...\text{g4}!

In order to take h3-square away from the white rook.

19.h3

Not 19.\text{e5}? \text{g3}, and wins.

19...\text{gf6} 20.\text{e5} \text{d7} 21.\text{d3} \text{hf6}

Now Black's fighting forces (up to the a-pawn) stand exactly as if he had on the 14th move played ...\text{e4-f6}. But what's strange is that White, during this whole time, not only took no step forward, but, to the contrary, rather worsened both his piece positions (\text{c3} instead of \text{b3}, \text{b1} instead of \text{d3}), and his pawn configuration (h3 instead of h2)! – Dr. Vidmar didn't have a good day.

22.\text{e3} \text{h8}

The most economical protection of e6.

23.\text{e1} \text{g8} 24.\text{e5} \text{xe5} 25.\text{dxe5}?

Already White's previous move was somewhat premature (since ...g5, to liberate the f4-square, wasn't to be feared by the White knight anyhow), and could have been better prepared, for example, by the maneuver \text{f1}, together with \text{g1-f3}. But the repositioning of the d-pawn, grounded in the clear overestimation of the worth of the d4-square, robs White of his high trump – the frontal pressure against e6, and the use of the e5-square. Therefore, decidedly preferable would have been 25.\text{xe5}, together with \text{c1-d3}, and the occupation of e5 by the knight – or, in the case of ...\text{e4}, White has \text{xe4}, together with f3 ±.

25...\text{e8} 26.\text{d4} \text{d7} 27.g4
The white pieces have too little coordination to be able to support effectively this pawn attack; it must lead at best to a further obstruction of the position. But White’s advantage disappeared some time ago – he remains with merely a somewhat greater freedom of space, which can only inspire elusive hopes, given the lack of attack targets.

27...g6 28.g5 ♖f8 29.a5

Black, on the one hand, can quite easily prevent the breakthrough b5 (...c7, ...e8), and can even ogle the counter threat ...a5 – therefore, this obstruction is justified. But it’s curious that this game, which already here begins to make such a bleakly drawish impression, still has to last more than 60 more moves!

29...c7 30.g3 b5 31.b2 h5! 32.g×h6

The only possibility to play on. But now h3 is at least as weak as g6.

32...h×h6 33.h2 g7 34.♗e1 ♖g8 35.d3 ♖f7 36.♗×b5 c×b5!

With that he gets the prospect, sometime or another, of bringing the bishop in the open with the pawn sacrifice ...d4.

37.♗d2 ♙c6 38.♗d4 ♖h8 39.♗e3 ♖e7 40.♗g5 ♖f7 41.♗g3

One plan for White would be to bring his king to d4 and then, with the help of the knight watching the squares h4 and g5 from f3, to force a favorable liquidation by means of h4-h5. Regrettably for him, the opponent has the complete possibility of organizing counter-play on the h-file during this long-winded maneuver.

41...♖g8 42.♖g1 ♖f8! 43.♖f3 ♖h6 44.♖g2 ♖g7 45.♖f1 ♖h7 46.♖e1 ♖h8 47.h4

As one sees, he is very far from his ideal – king position on d4 – and must unavoidably dissolve the tension on the kingside. The endgame that follows contains a couple of tactical finesses, to be sure, but Black easily holds the draw. In any case, it wasn’t worth struggling along to the 93rd move.

47...♖g8 48.h5 ♖×h5 49.♖h5 g×h5

Naturally not 49...♖h5 50.h3 ♖g4 51.♖h2 g5 52.♖h7+ ♖g7 53.♖g7+ ♖×g7 54.♖e6+, together with ♖×g5, with a winning position.

50.♖g8 ♖g8 51.♖g8+ ♖g8 52.♖e6 ♖f7 53.♖d4 ♖g6 54.♖f3 ♖f7 55.♖e2 ♖d7 56.♖e3 ♙c6

This is the position where White can undertake the only, and as one will see, inadequate, attempt at a win – beginning with ♖d4, etc. At first he doesn’t decide on it, and prefers to undertake a
new trip with the king. And only when this proves useless in the face of the always threatening advance of the Black central pawn, brings about the diagrammed position again (on the 87th move!). As a consequence, it's advised the less patient readers spare themselves the next 30 moves and play over only the final moves (from 88 on), starting with the diagrammed position.

57.\(d4\) \(g6\) 58.\(f3\) \(e8\) 59.\(g3\) \(c6\) 60.\(f3\) \(d7\) 61.\(h3\) \(c6\) 62.\(g3\) \(d7\) 63.\(h4+\) \(f7\) 64.\(f3\) \(e6\) 65.\(e3\) \(e8\) 66.\(f3\) \(e7\) 67.\(d4\) \(d7\) 68.\(f3\) \(f7\) 69.\(g3\) \(g6\) 70.\(g2\) \(f7\) 71.\(h2\) \(g6\) 72.\(g1\) \(f7\) 73.\(h1\) \(g6\) 74.\(h2\) \(f7\) 75.\(h3\) \(g6\) 76.\(h4\) \(c6\) 77.\(e2\) \(d7\) 78.\(h3\) \(c6\) 79.\(h2\) \(d7\) 80.\(g3\) \(c6\) 81.\(h4\) \(d7\) 82.\(g3\) \(c6\) 83.\(d4\) \(d7\) 84.\(f3\) \(f7\) 85.\(e2\) \(g6\) 86.\(f3\) \(f7\) 87.\(e3\) \(c6\)

(See previous diagram.)

88.\(d4\) \(e6\) 89.\(g5+\) \(e7\) 90.\(f3\) \(f8\) 91.\(e6\) \(g7\)

Simpler still was 91...\(e7\) with the same next move.

92.\(e5\) \(d4\)!

So it was nevertheless granted the bishop to take some fresh air, even if only a moment before the end of the game!

93.\(x d4\) \(f6\) \(1/2-1/2\)

**Round 20**

\(1/2\) Capablanca – Alekhine \(1/2\)

\(1/2\) Nimzovich – Vidmar \(1/2\)

\(1/2\) Marshall – Spielmann \(1/2\)

**Final Standings**

Capablanca 14

Alekhine 11\(1/2\)

Nimzovich 10\(1/2\)

Vidmar 10

Spielmann 8

Marshall 6

(58) Capablanca – Alekhine

French Defense [C13]

1.\(d4\) \(e6\) 2.\(c3\) \(d5\) 3.\(e4\) \(f6\) 4.\(g5\) \(dxe4\)

In connection with the next move, good and secure. Anyway, none of the opponents against whom I played this variation (these were Aurbach, Bogoljubow, Euwe, Yates and here Capablanca), succeeded in getting an advantage in the opening.

5.\(e4\) \(e7\)!

This and not 5...\(d7\)\(xf6\) – as was earlier mostly played – is correct in my opinion. On the contrary, meanwhile the black queen knight should remain on \(d7\), in order perhaps to be able to support the advance ...\(c5\) or ...\(e5\).

6.\(xf6+\)

Interesting is here 6.\(xf6\) \(xf6\) 7.\(e2\)?, analogous to the Wolf-Bogoljubow variation of the MacCutcheon.
Cycle IV: Round 20

6...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{f}6\) 7.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{f}6\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{f}6\) 8.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}f3\) 0-0

Better anyway than 9.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}d3\) c5 10.0-0 cxd4 11.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{d}4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{B}}}d8\)!, (Euwe-Alekhine, Amsterdam 1926), whereupon Black would even get some advantage.

9...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}d7\) 10.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e2\)

Since White can’t prevent the following emancipation of the opponent, nothing better remains for him than to bring his king quickly to safety.

10...e5 11.dxe5 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{e}5\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{e}5\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{B}}}x\text{e}5\) 13.0-0 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e6\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}f3\) c6

The play is dismally equal, and must sooner or later come to liquidation on the open central file.

15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}a4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{B}}}f8\)!

Not a trap, rather actually the invitation to a somewhat artish draw-dance. But Capablanca himself basically avoids the shade of unnecessary complications.

More amusing for the public would have been the following little intermezzo: 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}f1\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{f}1\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{e}1\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}b3\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{e}4\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{e}4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{a}2\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{B}}}b4\), winning back the pawn and ultimate equality - for example, 20...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e8\) 21.h4 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e7\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{c}6\), etc.; or 20...b6 21.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{c}6\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{B}}}d8\), together with 22.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e6=\).

16...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}c5\)

Avoids the unpleasant weakening of b6 (after 16...a6).

17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}f1\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}c4\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{c}4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{c}4\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{e}8+\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{e}8\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{B}}}h4\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}f8\)

Naturally not 20...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{a}2\), on account of 21.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}a1\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}c4\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{a}7\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}a6\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}x\text{c}6\)±.

21.b3 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e2\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}xe2\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}xe2\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}d7\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e7\) 24.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}d8+\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e8\) 25.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}d7\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e7\) 26.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}d8+\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e8\) \(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}\)

(59) Nimzovich – Vidmar
Sicilian Defense [B22]

1.e4 c5 2.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}f3\) e6 3.c3

With that Black easily gets a balanced game. But Nimzovich, who in accord with the tournament standing aspires only to a draw, probably wanted to reach a clarification of the pawn position in the center as quickly as possible.

3...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}f6\)

Otherwise, only 3.d5 4.e×d5 e×d5 5.d4, etc., comes under consideration, with quite easy strategic challenges.

4.e5 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}d5\) 5.d4 c×d4 6.c×d4 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{A}}}e7\)

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With such indifferent moves, there's no hoping to obtain winning chances! If Black didn’t want to decide on the fianchetto 6...b6 (or even ...b5) – which incidentally would not be very favorable for him on account of 7...c4 6.b7 8..c3, etc., then he could, and should, immediately bother the opponent in the center with 6...d6. Then he’d have the chance to make either the advanced e5-pawn or the d4-isolani an object of attack. At least that would have been more promising than drawing the enemy pawns to the center through exchange, as he does in the next move.

7...c3 6.xc3 8.bxc3 d6 (?)

In contrast, this move is all too provoking and hardly correct. How did Black want then to defend his kingside against the stereotypical attack 9..d3, h4, together with h5, 6.h3-g3, etc.? The course of action would have been strong even without his castling. More correct, in any case, is 8...d6.

9.exd6

Only explained by a decided tendency to draw.

9...d6 10..e2

The bishop doesn’t go to d3, in order not to hamper a frontal guard by d4 in case of c4.

10...0-0 11.0-0..d7

This move was decorated with an exclamation point by some annotators, in my opinion incorrectly. In any case, the natural move was 11...c6, which, after the possible c4, would have threatened to trouble White somewhat with the quadruple attack against d4 (following ...6f6 and ...e8d8).

12.a4 6.c7 13..b3 b6

The mighty thrust 13...e5 would have led ultimately only to the opening of the central files, which, with the undeveloped bishop on c8, wouldn’t be harmless to Black anyway. But the flank development entails the early pawn exchange on b6, which provides for a welcome object of attack for White as compensation for the pawns c4 and d4 in need of protection. The mutually strategic trains of thought are transparent and lack sharpness, right up to the conclusion (of peace).

14..b7 15.a5 6f6

It’s clear no boon would come from taking on a5. Then 16..f4 (if 16...b6 17..a4), as well as 16..d2, could have followed.

16.a×b6 a×b6 17..e3 h6 18.h3 6fc8 19..fc1!

With that he hopes to achieve a complete simplification at the cost of a temporary pawn sacrifice. The combination is long and correct, which is: 19...x a1 20..x a1 6.x f3! 6.x c4 22..c4 23..a8+ 6f8 24.d5! e×d5 25..d5 6.b4 26..b8 6.d4 27..b7! 6.e6 28..e6 f×e6, together with 29..d4 6.d4 and 30..b6=. But meanwhile, Black keeps up the excitement.

19..cb8 20..a8
The aim of this file sacrifice is not obvious, on the other hand, since ...\(\text{Qc}5\) would surely be a letdown because of \(\text{Qc}2\). Therefore, more reasonable was immediately \(20.\text{Qd}2\). Of course, the text also works.

\[
20...\text{Qxa8} 21.\text{Qd}2 \text{Qe}7 22.\text{Qf}3 \text{Qa}3 23.\text{Qb}2 \text{Qxf}3 24.\text{Qxf}3 \text{Qa}5 25.\text{Qd}2 \text{Qa}3 26.\text{Qc}2 \text{Qd}6 27.\text{Qc}1 \text{Qa}3
\]

A result of both time pressure and the impossibility of finding a winning idea against the rock-solid white position. It's all the more commendable that Dr. Vidmar finally finds a not decisive, yet correct and surprising, witty reply, which for a moment enlivens the otherwise very bland game.

\[
28.\text{c}2 \text{Qd}6 29.\text{c}1 \text{Qa}7 30.\text{Qd}3 \text{Qa}3
\]

If 30...\(\text{Qa}8\), then 31.\(\text{c}5\), etc. As a result, he therefore surrenders the \(h1-a8\) diagonal to the white queen.

\[
31.\text{Qe}4 \text{Qf}6 32.\text{Qc}6
\]

Next comes the previously mentioned wit. White could prevent it with 32.\(\text{Qc}2\) but didn't need to.

\[
32...\text{Qxe}3!
\]

The last chance at the prize!

\[
33.\text{Qxd}6! \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}
\]

After the acceptance of the exchange sacrifice, Black would actually still have chances, for example - 33.\(\text{Qxe}3\) \(\text{Qa}3\) 34.\(\text{Qe}1\) \(\text{Qg}3\) 35.\(\text{Qf}1\) \(\text{Qxe}3+\) 36.\(\text{Qh}1\) \(\text{Qe}4+\). He could continue playing some more (if he hadn't been in awful time pressure) after the text move as well - because he was not at a disadvantage after the refusal of the sacrifice either. That is to say, that after 33...\(\text{Qe}2!\), the apparently strong reply 34.\(\text{c}5\) would have found a fully sound defense in 34...\(\text{Qa}3!\), and 34.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{b}5!\), etc., and was not to be feared by Black either. According to this, after 33...\(\text{Qe}2\), a fight with approximately equal chances could still have developed, but which didn't have to end so certainly in a draw.

(60) Marshall – Spielmann
Scotch Game [C47]

\[
1.e4 e5 2.\text{Qf}3 \text{Qc}6 3.\text{Qc}3 \text{Qf}6 4.d4 exd4 5.\text{Qxd}4 \text{Qb}4 6.\text{Qxc}6 bxc6 7.\text{Qd}3 d5 8.exd5 cxd5 9.0-0 10.\text{Qg}5 c6
\]

We most often play like this, although statistics in recent years (thanks mainly to Spielmann's efforts) force a rather favorable verdict to be conceded to White. Simpler (though of course, bound only with thoughts of a draw) appears the Capablanca relief system: 10...\(\text{Qxc}3\) 11.bxc3 h6 12.\(\text{Qh}4\) (12.\(\text{Qe}3\) \(\text{Qg}4!\) – Spielmann-Alekhine, Baden-Baden 1925) 12...\(\text{Qe}8\), which would.
New York 1927

prevent 13.\textit{f}3, because of 13...g5, together with \ldots\textit{g}4.

11.\textit{f}3 h6

Through this strange move, Black expresses his peaceful intentions quite openly. He is after a drawn endgame, without costing himself a debasing of his pawn position. The move is supposed to stem from Rubinstein, albeit certainly an after-the-war-Rubinstein. Otherwise 11...\textit{e}7 (see game Spielmann-Vidmar, Cycle II) was the move.

12.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 13.\textit{xf}6 \textit{g}x\textit{f}6 14.\textit{e}2(!) \textit{b}8 15.a3 \textit{a}5

Beginning of artificial maneuvers, less appropriate because Black's position, given his many pawn weaknesses, can still in no way be regarded as secure. With 15...\textit{d}6 16.b4 \textit{c}5, etc., he would have spared a very important tempo here, and in addition, kept the knight on \textit{f}4 at bay. On the other hand, it will soon turn out that the bishop has little to do on \textit{b}6.

16.b4 \textit{b}6 17.c3

Prepares \textit{d}4, if need be.

17...\textit{c}5 18.\textit{f}4!

But after Black weakened \textit{d}5, this spot is systematically undermined. Up to the 27th move, the game is Marshall's best achievement in this tournament, in my opinion.

18...\textit{c}4 19.\textit{e}2 \textit{e}6 20.\textit{a}d1 \textit{bd}8 21.\textit{fe}1

Not yet 21.\textit{f}3, on account of 21...\textit{d}4. But now White threatens the move.

21...\textit{c}7

22.\textit{g}3!

The key move to the entire attack formation against \textit{d}5: it's clear that Black must not swap on \textit{f}4, because in this case, a rather easy path to a win, in a technical regard, would stand at White's disposal. He would namely – at first through multiple threats on \textit{d}5 (\textit{d}4, \textit{f}3; Black rooks on the d-file; in the case of ...\textit{e}6, White first plays \textit{a}4) – in connection with the possibility \textit{f}5, force the move ...\textit{f}5.; then bring the king to \textit{e}3, move \textit{d}4-d2, and finally occupy the central \textit{d}4-square with the king. The remainder would be the exchange of rooks under threat of penetration on one of the open files (e.g., or on the queenside) – and finally the utilization of the surplus pawn on the left side.

The way chosen by Spielmann is naturally less hopeless, because he secures himself bishops of opposite color, but not yet sufficient to produce a balance again.

22...\textit{e}5 23.\textit{f}3 \textit{xc}3

With 23...\textit{d}4 as well, he would have lost a pawn without compensation.
24. $\Box x e6$

24. $\Box x e6 f x e6$ 25. $\Box x e6 d4$, etc., would have been favorable for Black.

24... $f x e6$ 25. $\Box x e6 d4$ 26. $\Box c6$

One sees that the entire attack was calculated deeply and correctly. His main goal consisted much less in obtaining a material gain as in securing White the following positional advantages: (1) the spreading of his pawn surplus on both flanks, a circumstance which makes almost illusory Black's hope of a draw based particularly on the opposite colors of the bishops; (2) The isolation and need for protection of the remaining black pawns; and (3) the uncertainty of the black king's position, which can be successfully utilized through a potential doubling of the white rooks on the seventh rank. One would think, therefore, that after he had reached all this, according to plan, White would solve just as successfully the final phase of the problem of winning.

26... $d3$

Or 26... $\Box c8$ 27. $\Box x c4$, together with $\Box d5+e4$, etc.

27. $\Box x c4 \Box b2$

28. $\Box d2$?

It's really a shame from the standpoint of the art of chess that Marshall, after playing so well up until now, suddenly begins to see a ghost. The doubled — and unfounded — fear of (1) the opposite bishops, and (2) the passed pawn on d2, causes him to totally underestimate his chances on the queenside and to play for further simplification.

Correct, however, was the simple 28.a4! — with the threat simply to advance the a- and b-pawns — for example, 28...d2 29.b5 $\Box f e8$ (what else?) 30.a5 $\Box e1+$ 31.$\Box g2$ $\Box x d1$ 32.$\Box x d1$ $\Box e8$ 33.$\Box c2!$ $\Box c1$ 34.$\Box c7$ $\Box e1$ 35.b6! $a x b6$ 36.$a x b6$ $\Box x d1$ 37.$b7$ $\Box g1+$ 38.$\Box h3$, and wins. Black can also play differently after 28.a4!, but a satisfactory defense is not obvious for him. On the other hand, after the contrived text move, the win, if still possible at all, is in any case exceptionally difficult.

28... $\Box x a3$ 29.$\Box g2$ $\Box f 7!$

Could Marshall possibly have overlooked this only defensive move in his pre-calculations? With other continuations, after the bishop exchange, he would have captured the a-pawn and prevailed easily.

30.$\Box a2$ d2 31.$\Box x a3$ d1 $\Box g 32.$ $\Box x d1$ $\Box x d1$ 33.$\Box g 4+$ $\Box h 7$
34. $\text{a6}$ (?)

The rook has no business on the sixth rank, since f6 is quite easy to guard. On the contrary, he should occupy the fifth (34. $\text{a5}$!), with the idea of possibly using the king as an attack piece kingside (via h3 to h5). To prevent this, Black would have had to allow small weaknesses (...f5), and the outcome still would have been doubtful.

After the text move, a dead-drawn position arises very quickly.

34... $\text{d5}$!

Spielmann immediately exploits the neglect of his opponent.

35. $\text{h4}$ $\text{h5}$ 36. $\text{f4}$ $\text{g6}$ 37. $\text{c6}$ $\text{a5}$

Obviously a further relief for Black.

38. $\text{bxa5}$ $\text{xa5}$ 39. $\text{c8}$ $\text{b7}$ 40. $\text{g8+}$ $\text{g7}$ 41. $\text{h8}$ $\text{aa7}$ 42. $\text{b4}$ $\text{ab7}$ 43. $\text{xh7}$ $\text{xb7}$ 44. $\text{f3}$

What can one still hope for here?

44... $\text{b2+}$ 45. $\text{f1}$ $\text{b1+}$ 46. $\text{e2}$ $\text{b2+}$ 47. $\text{e3}$ $\text{b3+}$ 48. $\text{e4}$ $\text{b4+}$ 49. $\text{d5}$ $\text{b5+}$ 50. $\text{d4}$ $\text{b3}$ 51. $\text{e4}$ $\text{b4+}$ 52. $\text{d5}$ $\text{b3}$ 53. $\text{f4}$?

Finally, White loses his extra pawn. But perhaps he played on this far only because he wanted to show his opponent that in the position, he could afford a blunder.

53... $\text{g7}$! 54. $\text{c8}$ $\text{xg3}$ 55. $\text{e6}$ $\text{e3+}$ 56. $\text{f5}$ $\text{e7}$ 57. $\text{c6}$ $\text{a7}$ 58. $\text{e6}$ $\text{a5}$ 59. $\text{d6}$ $\text{g6}$ 60. $\text{b6}$ $\text{f5}$ 61. $\text{b4}$ $\text{a5}$ 62. $\text{b6}$ $\text{f5}$ $\frac{1}{2}$-$\frac{1}{2}$
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