# New York 1927 

## by Alexander Alekhine

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## Alekhine's Controversial Masterpiece Finally in English!

For decades, Alexander Alekhine's account of New York 1927 was at the top of the list of works that should have been rendered into English but unaccountably were not.

This is unlike any other tournament book ever written. Not only do you have one of the greatest annotators of all time rendering some brilliant analysis, but he melds it with an exceptional agenda, an anti-Capablanea agenda. And since he wrote it after defeating Capablanea in their marathon match, he sounds like a sore loser who became a sore winner.

So, this is just a mean-spirited book, right? Nothing of the sort. Alekhine goes beyond elaborate move analysis and offers deep positional insights and psychological observations. Nikolai Grigoriev, in his foreword to the 1930 Russian edition of this book, pointed out how Alekhine broke new ground by underlining the critical moments of each game.

Why Alekhine's work was published in German, in Berlin in 1928, and not in English, is unclear. But now, after more than 80 years, it's finally available to the largest audience of chessplayers. It's about time.


## New York 1927

# Alexander Alekhine 

Foreword by<br>Andy Soltis



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Russell Enterprises, Inc. Milford, CT USA

by Alexander Alekhine

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## Table of Contents

Foreword ..... 4
Editor's Note ..... 10
Crosstable ..... 12
The 1927 New York Tournament as Prologue to the
World Championship in Buenos Aires ..... 13
Cycle I
First Round ..... 26
Second Round ..... 34
Third Round ..... 43
Fourth Round ..... 48
Fifth Round ..... 58
Cycle II
Sixth Round ..... 65
Seventh Round ..... 71
Eighth Round ..... 80
Ninth Round ..... 89
Tenth Round ..... 97
Cycle III
Eleventh Round ..... 103
Twelfth Round ..... 111
Thirteenth Round ..... 116
Fourteenth Round ..... 122
Fifteenth Round ..... 127
Cycle IV
Sixteenth Round ..... 134
Seventeenth Round ..... 141
Eighteenth Round ..... 146
Nineteenth Round ..... 151
Twentieth Round ..... 160
Index of Players ..... 167
Index of Openings ..... 168

## Foreword

It's about time this book was published. For decades, Alexander Alekhine's account of New York 1927 was at the top of the list of works that should have been rendered into English but unaccountably were not.

There is no shortage of reasons for why this book was recognized as a classic when it first appeared. First, the toumament was one of the strongest ever held. The only previous events that came close to it in average strength were St. Petersburg 1895-96 and the finals of St. Petersburg 1914. The New York organizers further ensured their place in history by luring José Capablanca back into action. He had appeared in only four tournaments since becoming world champion in 1921.

The tournament also captured a pivotal moment in the evolution of chess thinking. New ideas normally gain acceptance slowly, almost glacially. But the games played at the Manhattan Square Hotel in the final days of the winter of 1927 showed how chess thinking had been transformed by the Hypermodern revolution. Even lapsed gambiteers like Frank Marshall and Rudolf Spielmann were experimenting with Indian openings at New York 1927. New theory was being written as early as games 1 and 2, which gave us the "Manhattan Variation" of the Queen's Gambit Declined. Put that into perspective: Can you recall a modern toumament that provided the name for an opening?

And yet... And yet the 1927 toumament and its magnificent book have garnered only a fraction of the attention that New York 1924 achieved. Why?

There are several explanations and none tells the whole story. One version is that the 1927 toumament never became what the contemporary fans hoped it would be: It was not a candidates toumament. It was not a battle royale among all the potential challengers to determine who would be Capablanca's next match opponent. There was no need for such an event because Capa's five-year-old "London Rules" had stipulated how challengers should be chosen, and it wasn't by a tournament. Alekhine had already challenged Capablanca according to those rules and he threatened to boycott the toumament if it would deprive him of his place at the head of the line of challengers.

Another explanation for why New York 1927 never reached the iconic status of 1924 is that there seemed to be something missing in the scoretable. Or rather, someone. It's always hard to identify the precise international pecking order of bygone, pre-Elo days in this case, the days of February 19-March 25, 1927. However, it's safe to say that several world-class players were absent, beginning with Akiba Rubinstein, Yefim Bogoljubow and Emanuel Lasker.

## Foreword

Bogo and Lasker were invited but failed to accept. Why that happened is significant because according to an alternative ratings universe, Chessmetrics, they and not Capa or Alekhine were the two strongest players in the world at the time. Bogoljubow had an amazing year in 1925, capped off by his stunning victory at the first intermational toumament of the Soviet Union, at Moscow. But success had clearly gone to his head by 1927. Bogoljubow replied to his invitation by asking for an enormous appearance fee of $\$ 1,500$, which is well over $\$ 20,000$ in today's dollars. If his attitude wasn't clear enough, he added that instead of this "mediocre" toumament - his word - the New Yorkers should spend their time, money and energy on a Bogoljubow-Capablanca world championship match.

Lasker, who was used to making his own huge fee demands, had a different reason for saying "Nein" to New York. He was still angry at Norbert Lederer, the organizer of both New York toumaments, because of an incident during his game with Capablanca in 1924. Lasker blamed his loss on a faulty clock and was upset that his protest wasn't treated properly. The former world champion did not reply to his invitation to New York 1927 and his place was taken by Spielmann.

In addition to the missing-in-action masters and the lack of "candidate" toumament status, there are other explanations of why New York 1927 doesn't match the caché of the 1924 toumament. One is the matter of age. The 1920s seemed to cherish everything that was new and young, at the expense of anything that predated the Great War that everyone wanted to forget.

New York 1924 may not have been a toumament filled with Magnus Carlsen-like kids but at least it had Richard Réti and his 1.5 f 3 idea. That was fresh enough. In contrast, the 1927 invitees seemed old. All of them had won their spurs at least a dozen years before. The youngest, Alekhine, was 34 . The players' average was just under 41 years. By comparison, Garry Kasparov was an ex-champion at 37 and retired at 41. It's easy, therefore, to write off this off as a toumament of hasbeens.

But that would be quite wrong. Capablanca was never stronger than he was at New York. Alekhine reached his peak three years later. Aron Nimzovich and Spielmann would have their best-ever results when they finished 1st-2nd at Carlsbad 1929. Even Marshall seemed to be getting stronger in the years before 1927. His historical rating was on the rise since his poor showing in the U.S. Championship match of 1923 against Edward Lasker. Yes, the New York invitees were ancient by today's standard. But in those days, super-GMs hit their apex later in life then than they do now.

Another stab at explaining why New York 1927 has been dimly remembered is the games. Alekhine included only two of the 20 he played (games 32 and 53) in his second best-games collection. This was significant because in those pre-Informant days, it was the GMs who established priorities and told the fans which
games were important. In contrast, Alekhine put five of his 20 games from BadenBaden 1925 and three of his 16 games from Kecskemet 1927 in that book. Marshall could only include one of his 27 games in My 50 Years of Chess because he only won one.

But this explanation, too, has flaws. Great chess was played in New York, a lot of it. Milan Vidmar's wonderful win over Nimzovich (game 29) and Nimzo's crush of Vidmar (game 14) and of Marshall (game 51) are among the finest games they ever played. Nimzovich felt that nine of his New York games deserved to be included with 100 others in his brilliant The Praxis of My System. And, of course, there were the games of the toumament winner. Capablanca never compiled his best games. But in the Harry Golombek's book of Capa's 100 best, you'll find wins over Nimzovich (games 4 and 43), Alekhine (game 13), Vidmar (game 34) and Spielmann (game 37). All of these games deserve the ovations they received at the time.

Perhaps the most compelling reason for why New York 27 is largely forgotten is its lack of drama: The heavy favorite won easily. Only one of the invitees, the hapless Marshall, had ever beaten Capablanca before, and Capa was in no danger of losing to his old rival this time. In fact, the world champion wasn't in real jeopardy in any of his 20 games. The densely annotated collection of Capablanca games by Alexander Khalifman and Leonid Yudasin indicates he had inferior positions only three times in the tournament. Although Alekhine claims he could have put Capa in a "difficult position" in game 13, Khalifman/Yudasin deny that. They say Capa was at risk only in game 40 . He held the sole lead after three rounds and never looked back. He was so far ahead in the final rounds that he telegraphed his intentions to the other players that he wouldn't try to beat them.

So, the toumament script may fail to stir a modern reader. But Alekhine's words should. This is unlike any other toumament book ever written.

Not only do you have one of the greatest annotators of all time rendering some brilliant analysis, but he melds it with an exceptional agenda, an anti-Capablanca agenda. The extraordinary bias is a rarity for toumament books, which were often written in cool, dispassionate and boring prose. One of the few exceptions was the book of Nuremberg 1896, in which Siegbert Tarrasch ridiculed the victory of his rival, world champion Emanuel Lasker. At the end of that book, Tarrasch compiled a "luck scoretable," that claimed that Lasker scored five "luck acquired points" from bad positions, and this was more than enough to turn what should have been a poor performance into an outstanding result.

Tarrasch was being a sore loser in that appendix. But Alekhine's bitterness runs throughout the 1927 book. And since he wrote it after defeating Capablanca in their marathon match, he sounds like a sore loser who became a sore winner.

## Foreword

Alekhine's theme is evident in the introduction where he derides Capa's third place at Moscow ("the biggest disappointment he had experienced up until then in his international career"). Moscow helped reveal the truth about "the halfmythic Capablanca Uberspieler." New York revealed more of Capablanca's weaknesses, Alekhine adds, and that showed him how to beat the world champion in the match in Buenos Aires six months later.

Alekhine's hostility is still raging near the very end of the book when this position arises.


Capablanca-Nimzovich
White to play

He criticizes Capa’s choice of 21.bf2?, "instead of the obvious 21. Sd6!." Like Bobby Fischer, Alekhine didn't think much of what was considered Capablanca's strong suit. "In the endgame," he sniffs, "he is not to be feared by a first-class master."

But Alekhine must have known that 21. Bf 2 was not just weak but deliberately weak. Capablanca felt that if he had won this game or added other victory-lap points, it would have unfairly altered the race for second place. According to Hans Kmoch, in a 1962 Chess Review article, Capa even wrote a note that read "Please make better moves. I don't know how to avoid a win" and passed it, through a tournament official, to Nimzovich, during the endgame.

Alekhine also took aim at Nimzovich, who, after Alekhine had won the world championship, seemed like the most likely challenger for his new title. It's worth noting that a 1932 poll of readers of Wiener Schachzeitung found that they considered the world's best players were Alekhine, Capablanca, and Nimozvich, followed by Bogoljubow and Spielmann, in that order.

Alekhine repeatedly trashed his rivals' play in the New York tournament book. Nimzovich's choice of $16 . g 4$ ?? in game 43 "is unworthy of even a mediocre amateur," he writes. "The fact is that Nimzovich, in a contest with an equal opponent
is probably always doomed to fall from the highest level into the abyss, and then work his way back upward," he says.

It becomes clear later in the introduction that Alekhine felt that the toumament should have been a two-man race between him and Capablanca because there was no one else worthy to compete. Once Alekhine lost his first game with the champion, he sought a draw in their subsequent games, he said, and the toumament drama disappeared.

Nevertheless Alekhine castigates his colleagues, over and over, for their pitiful play againstCapablanca. "It's really unbelievable how self-consciously and weakly Marshall always plays against Capablanca!" he writes in transparent frustration. Vidmar "played somewhat under his usual league" against the champion, and Spielmann was cowed by Capa's reputation, he said.

So, this is just a mean-spirited book, right? Nothing of the sort.
In contrast with his New York 1924 book, here Alekhine goes beyond elaborate move analysis and offers deep positional insights and psychological observations. Nikolai Grigoriev, in his foreword to the 1930 Russian edition of this book, pointed out how Alekhine broke new ground by underlining the critical moments of each game. We see this in Alekhine's comments to 56. ge 4 in game 11, to
 in game 27 , to $22 . c 4$ in game 39 , for just a few examples.

Alekhine also offers some valuable positional pointers. For instance, he shows the virtues of not contesting control of an open file in game 14 and the bankruptcy of an outpost-centric strategy in game 27. After Nimzovich castles in game 3 , with few of his pieces in the vicinity, Alekhine writes that a king's capacity for self-defense "has been strongly underestimated for a considerable time (after the desperate attempt by the aging Steinitz to use this piece to attack on a full board
 ending in game 32 and his analysis of the rook endings of games 5,56 and 60 are among the most insightful sections of a very instructive book.

Alekhine also tosses out some remarkable and original opening ideas. For example, after 1.d4 ©f6 $2 . \searrow \mathrm{ff} 3 \mathrm{e} 63 . \mathrm{g} 3$ in game 41 , he suggests 3 ...b5! more than 40 years before the world appreciated its strength. He also suggests 6 . e e2 in the Vienna Game, after 1.e4 e5 2.⿹c3 乌f6 3.f4 d5 4.fxe5 ©xe4 5. Df 15 , with the idea of $6 \ldots$... f5 7.0 d 1 ! and 8 .d3. Less promising but still intriguing is game 35, where, after 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.0c3 \%b4 he suggests 4. Dd3 c5 5.exd5


Alekhine also entertains us with his use of language. Or rather languages. He was a polyglot who, at a later toumament, Kemeri 1937, could speak English with

## Foreword

Reuben Fine, German with Kmoch, and French with everyone at the opening ceremony. In this book you'll find him coining terms such as "angst-moves" and "positional hari-kiri." In game 24 he pokes fun at Marshall's mishandling of the pawn structure by adding that he couldn't bring himself to try to correct it with a "pater peccavi-move." He suggests there was "a mot d'ordre to play only sec-ond- or third-best moves against" Capablanca.

Ironically, it was Capablanca who was supposed to write this book. He reached an agreement to edit it before play began. But on the eve of the Buenos Aires match, the American Chess Bulletin said that he was unable to write the notes and therefore the toumament committee had "ceded the rights for the English edition to Dr. Alekhine." Alekhine's notes to his own games were turning up in leading journals in Germany, Russia, Austria and Switzerland, among others, and a Russian toumament book, by Savielly Tartakower, soon appeared. Why Alekhine's work was published in German, in Berlin in 1928, and not in English, is unclear. But now, after more than 80 years, it's finally available to the largest audience of chessplayers. As I said, it's about time.

Andy Soltis
New York City
December 2010

## Editor's Note

When the publisher came to us with the toumament book of New York 1927, published in German, we saw a chance to correct a historical injustice. It just could not stand that the book of one of the most important chess events ever held in the U.S., written by the fourth world champion, Alexander Alekhine, was not available in English. (A 78-page pamphlet by Chess Digest [Alekhine, Alexander: International Chess Tournament New York 1927, Dallas, Chess Digest 1972] made no attempt at an extensive translation.)

The project seemed ideal for our husband-and-wife team. Mary, a former German teacher and Fulbright scholar at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, worked on the translation of the text, while Al , a chess editor and writer, helped sort out the colorful and intricate chess annotations Dr. Alekhine is famous for. We worked hard to maintain faithfully Alekhine's original thoughts, as well as his presentation of material. Along the way, we discovered the inevitable mistakes in the commonly used databases of these games, as well as challenging typos in the German source itself.

But more than anything, we found Alekhine's brilliance, humor, and deep insight. We hope you agree that the outcome is both an important piece of history and a series of chess lessons on the highest level.

In 1927 Alekhine obviously lacked the benefit of computers. And although Al ran "Deep Rybka 4" as he played through the games and variations, we made no changes to Alekhine's annotations and inserted no notes. What readers get is what Alekhine wrote. Many readers will, however, enjoy running such an engine and will find a few bloopers. But they will much more often find impressive instances in which Alekhine sees his way through to the truth of a confusing position. And greatly to the benefit of the serious student, Alekhine is able to explain the reasoning that leads him to that truth.

We found Alekhine's thoughts on his great rival, world champion José Raúl Capablanca, particularly interesting, revealing as much about Alekhine himself as the great Cuban. In this regard, we should understand the author's perspective. To maintain his undisputed position as challenger, Alekhine had to come from behind during the last stages of the 60 -game toumament, which ended in late March, to secure second place behind Capablanca, who had cruised through the 60 games of the marathon without a loss, racking up a plus score against every one of his opponents. But it's important to know that the tournament book was written only after Alekhine's subsequent victory over Capa in the Buenos Aires match for the world title, which took place from mid-September to the end of November of the same year. The result was a surprise to the general public, if not

## Editor's Note

to Alekhine, who analyzed the games of New York 1927 to prepare for Buenos Aires while sailing there on the steamer Massilia. He writes that "Only then did it finally become clear to me how exaggerated were the general shouts of praise with which the quality of his (Capablanca's) performance in New York was greeted."

Indeed, Alekhine repeatedly makes the point, beginning immediately with his preface, "The New York Tournament 1927 as Prologue to the World Championship in Buenos Aires." that the quality of Capablanca's play in New York, despite results, was hardly worthy of the widespread public opinion that Capa was an Überspieler, or "super player." Alekhine concedes Capa's wonderful instincts in the middlegame, but undercuts the tribute by saying that his "ability lies much more in intuition than in critical thinking."

On the negative side, Alekhine goes so far as to say, counter to both contemporary and modern assessments, that Capablanca was "definitely no remarkable endgame artist"! Then how did Alekhine explain Capa's fine result? Nearly everyone was cowed by his reputation, playing below his true strength when facing the Cuban legend.

Of course, there is undoubtedly a grain of truth to this last assertion - great champions sometimes benefit from their reputations. At any rate, Alekhine's premise affords him an ongoing context to work particularly hard throughout his book to find improvements in both Capablanca's play and that of Capa's opponents. Those readers who kibitz the games with an engine may, however, notice, as Al did, that the computer evaluations often agree with Capablanca's choices. Ironically, and whatever the ultimate value of the moves themselves, Alekhine's challenging suggestions, when brought forward to the era of chess-playing programs, may actually bolster the popular claim that Capa was the closest a human could come to being a "chess machine"!

The tournament book of New York 1927 is fascinating on many levels - as the history of one of the great chess toumaments, as a testament to the fourth world champion's analytical skills, as a personal history of Alekhine's preparation for his famous championship victory - and as a continuation of the great rivalry of the 1920s.

Al Lawrence
Walkill, New York
December 2010
New York 1927
February 19-March 22, 1927

|  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Capablanc | x | $1{ }^{1 / 2} 1 / 2^{1 / 2}$ | $11 / 21^{1 / 2}$ | $1 / 21 / 21^{1 / 2}$ | $1 / 21 / 21^{1 / 2}$ | $111 / 21$ | 141/2 |
| 2 | Alekhine | $0^{1 / 21 / 21 / 2}$ | x | $1 / 2011 / 2$ | 1/2 $1 / 21 / 21 / 2$ | $11 / 21 / 21$ | $1 / 211 / 21$ | 111/2 |
| 3 | Nimzowitsc | $0^{1 / 2} 0^{1 / 2}$ | $1 / 2101 / 2$ | x | $1001 / 2$ | $11^{1 / 21 / 2}$ | $11 / 21 / 21$ | 101/2 |
| 4 | Vidmar | $1 / 21 / 20^{1 / 2}$ | $1 / 21 / 2^{1 / 2} 2^{1 / 2}$ | $0111 / 2$ | x | $1 / 21 / 21 / 21 / 2$ | $1 / 2011 / 2$ | 10 |
| 5 | Spielmann | $1 / 21 / 20^{1 / 2}$ | $0^{1 / 2} 2^{1 / 2} 0$ | $00^{1 / 2} 1 / 2$ | $1 / 21 / 21 / 21 / 2$ | x | 1/2 $1 / 21^{1 / 2}$ | 8 |
| 6 | Marshall | $0011 / 20$ | $1 / 20^{1 / 2} 0$ | $0^{1 / 2} 1 / 20$ | $1 / 20^{1 / 2}$ | $1 / 21 / 201 / 2$ | x | 6 |

## The 1927 New York Tournament as Prologue to the World Championship in Buenos Aires

I. We know that the year 1925 brought Capablanca the biggest disappointment he had experienced up until then in his international toumament career: in the Moscow toumament, he took third only with great effort, lost two games to players of a relatively lesser class, and escaped defeat in some other games (as against Réti or Loewenfisch, for example), mainly thanks to the kindness or carelessness of the opponents. Already at this point, one could hear the voices of, in part, the specialty press, pointing out a number of not completely credible symptoms that characterized the achievements of the Cuban grandmaster in that tournament. These symptoms gave cause to not unwarranted assumptions along the lines that Capablanca's art was not nearly what it had promised to be during his activity in the period before the war. The blame lies in his tendency, manifest more and more over the years, toward the simpler - toward, whenever possible, the pure, technical forms of battle. This predilection gradually killed his "lively spirit," with which his performances in San Sebastian 1911 and St. Petersburg 1914, for example, were impressively imbued. And finally, that even his attempts to rouse his former self (caused by his realization that pure technique against modern competition wasn't enough anymore) were his undoing in the aforementioned losses (the unusually complicated - for him - game, with attacks on both wings, against Ilyin-Zhenevsky, the unprepared artifice in the opening against Verlinsky).

We may say without exaggeration that for Capablanca, the somewhat negative impression of his qualitative results during his Moscow performance cast a much more perceptible shadow over his reputation than his lost games - because even Lasker, the unsurpassed tournament fighter, was third in Hastings 1895 and shared second and third place with Janowski in Cambridge-Springs 1904, two clear places behind the victor Marshall! But during the entire, very long period of his world championship, Lasker was never so defeated as Capablanca was by Verlinsky. It was especially this impression on the part of the general public - that he, although extremely rarely, could play absolutely weakly - that Capablanca had to try to obliterate sometime soon.

And it must be admitted that this problem - the preparation and organization of a larger toumament in the interest of the complete rehabilitation of the current world champion - was solved in the most brilliant way. By whom - by people or ... fate, with Capablanca's help or without - is in my opinion irrelevant. So I will now draw upon facts, with the conviction that they speak clearly enough for themselves.

In the autumn of 1926, the then-champion received two challenges to a competition for the championship - one came from Aron Nimzovich, the other from me. It soon became apparent, however, that Nimzovich's attempt was of a "platonic" nature, since he lacked a small thing, namely the financial support to fulfill the
conditions coming out of London. Therefore his challenge probably had much more the purpose of informing the chess world unequivocally that he, grandmaster Nimzovich, wished this contest and consequently considered himself a world championship candidate. That he was entitled to have such a position owing to the rising curve of his tournament successes in recent years is beyond doubt; but its immediate practical value, the challenge, as I said, was nil.

The case was different with the telegram I sent Capablanca in September from Buenos Aires: Sufficiently instructed by the experience of my fruitless attempts of 1921 and 1923, I was determined to send a challenge only if I would have an absolute guarantee on the part of the interested organizations that, financially, nothing would stand in the way of the realization of the match. Therefore I imagined that it would hardly be possible for the world champion - after assurances were given him that his material conditions were wholeheartedly accepted - to drag out the acceptance of the challenge; by the way, the chess world appeared to believe that as well. But it in fact turned out differently: while the challenge was not rejected, it was also not accepted. And instead of a direct answer, I got (aside from a private letter from Capablanca, the exact meaning of which got lost in generalities, but still contained a clear idea - that I should come to New York) the official program of the New York "Six Master's Toumament." The conditions for the event appeared immediately to take many in the chess community aback. As Capablanca had demanded for future world championships, Dr. Lasker was not invited, and the number of hours of play and also the time controls were unusual. Finally, the point, the winner of this toumament (or the runner-up, if Capablanca was first) would be declared the official world championship candidate.

The reckoning of fate, which in everything concerning the toumament in 1927 so supported the world champion, was incontestable - although it was clear that the introduction of this last point would have, as a consequence, justifiable protests from the interested masters, especially from the present writer. But what might emerge from such a protest, what came out of that really? The committee gave in formally - but meanwhile, thanks to the corresponding handling of the entire press, the whole psychological atmosphere was irrevocably created: the toumament was viewed by "public opinion" as a test for the world championship candidate, from which he had to emerge at least in second place. As a result, from a sporting point of view, in this toumament it came to a rather paradoxical situation in which the only one who risked nothing was the titleholder, because for him, in case of relative failure, a competition with the fortunate rival was as good as certain. On the other hand, both for Nimzovich as well as for me, not achieving one of the first two places was virtually synonymous with abandonment of a match with Capablanca - if not forever, then at least for a very long time.

Precisely because of this psychological handicap, I had very serious concerns before I accepted the invitation of the committee. Finally I decided - mainly for the two following reasons: (1) Despite repeated requests, both on my part and on
the part of the Argentine Chess Club, Capablanca refused to give a clear and definitive answer to my challenge and, in his letters and telegrams, gave me to understand unequivocally that it was necessary for me to come to New York if I wanted to reach an understanding with him; (2) My refusal could have been interpreted incorrectly by the chess world - that is, as a testimony of "fear" of Capablanca, which ultimately would have made it easy for him (if desirable) to replace me with the first- or second-place finisher, and then let the whole project proposed from Buenos Aires drop into the water.

And so I decided out of necessity to put at stake my perhaps unrepeatable opportunity in New York for the fight for the world title - and this, even though I could have no illusions about my form at the moment. Actually, the ten practice games that I had played about six weeks previously with Dr. Euwe in Holland had clearly convinced me that, due to a number of circumstances, among which the physical excessive fatigue following the strenuous tour in South America didn't play the least role, I found myself in one of my periods - fortunately not occurring frequently, and not lasting long - in which my thinking about chess requires a dual strain on the nerves and incomparably more time than otherwise demanded. As a result, I became much more quickly exhausted, and only in the rarest cases able to produce consistently good play. Under those circumstances, achieving second place in New York required a very special unfolding of the forces of will - far greater than at the later match in Buenos Aires - that in general went quite as planned, according to my requirements.

In qualitative terms, my achievements in New York would have meant for me a clear step backward - especially compared with the year 1925 (Paris, BadenBaden) - if I'd known less precisely the reasons for this internal failure. It was significant to me, among other things, that I played particularly inaccurately, and sometimes downright poorly, only up to the moment (Cycle VI, in the game with Nimzovich), when I was still able to hope for the first prize. On the other hand, when I started playing, from the seventh round on, only for the second prize, I managed to get, despite the apparently inferior state, exactly the same score as Capablanca ( 9 out of 14). The reasons for my failure lay, as I said, mainly in the condition of my nerves at that time. And since I knew exactly how I could improve, I was quite calm with respect to the fight - it had to be a struggle from which I, if not necessarily winning, at least should emerge with honor.

The lineup of the tournament and its technical results can be seen from the adjacent tables and annotated games. But these tables don't speak of those who were missing. Therefore it's not superfluous to recall those names to the readers: they were (1) Dr. Lasker, who surpassed Capablanca in all the tournaments where he met him, and took away from him an historic match-up in St. Petersburg, 1914; (2) Bogoljubow, who, ahead of Capablanca (and by how much!), emerged as first in Moscow, 1925; (3) Rubinstein, who prior to Buenos Aires, was the only master who had a better result against Capablanca ( $+1,=2$ ); (4) Réti, who in New York

1924 won the only game against Capablanca that the world champion lost, and also put up bitter resistance at other encounters (for example, see the Moscow game); and (5) Dr. Tarrasch, who has an equal result against Capablanca (+1, -1; $=2$ ).

When you put together the successes of those absent with the fact that up until then, none of Capablanca's invited European competitors in New York had won even one game against him - you have to admit that "the fate" of the world champion at the time was especially favorable, in that it assured him of maximum psychological preconditions for final success.

As far as the organization and management of the tournament itself is concerned, it is a pleasant duty for me to acknowledge that those were in fact quite irreproachable. In my long toumament practice, I have very few cases in memory where the contests were taking place so harmoniously and in such a pleasant, quiet atmosphere. The principal credit for this goes without doubt to the tireless secretary of the toumament competition, Dr. Norbert Lederer, who must be referred to as the soul of the whole event, and without whose cooperation the foreign masters hardly can imagine a tournament in the United States. But also grandmaster Geza Maróczy, as toumament director, and the press department director Hermann Helms, contributed in no small measure to the full outward success of the tournament. I believe myself to be pronouncing the opinion of all my European colleagues who participated in the toumament when I express the hope that all future toumaments, in technical and social respects, be organized just as perfectly as the one just discussed.

It is hardly possible to speak of the New York toumament without mentioning at least in a sporting relationship - the sweeping role that Nimzovich was destined to play in the first half of the toumament. It's especially to be noted that his success in this period of the competition was very well deserved - just as deserved as his failure in the second half. The fact is that Nimzovich, in a contest with an equal opponent, is probably always doomed to fall from the highest level into the abyss, and then work his way back upward. For it is truly difficult to imagine that he should succeed suddenly, after a 25 -year chess career, in changing his temperament entirely - this temperament, which until now helped him at times to get very special results, both of a combinational as well as purely positional nature, but sometimes threw him into the abyss.

I see the main fault in Nimzovich's creativity in some uncertainty in the treatment of opening positions that are unknown to him. Perhaps this uncertainty comes from his placing, in my opinion, exaggerated value on the preparation of an "opening repertoire," and consequently he does not feel at home every time he is placed in front of a new strategic opening problem - not in terms of variations, for he possesses more than enough technique to solve such a problem. Anyway, the fact is - although we can find roughly no case where Capablanca lost as a direct result
of the opening (the game with Verlinsky forms the only exception, which confirms the rule) - that with Nimzowich, such cases happen fairly often (compare, for example, his third game with Vidmar from this toumament, the games with Lajos Steiner from Kecskemet and Berlin in 1928, some games from BadenBaden, 1925). Instead, he showed in New York as well the valuable work he can produce after a fortunately survived opening (see his games with Vidmar and Spielmann from the Cycle I, and with the author in Cycle II). As I said, I'm of the opinion that in New York he filled just the spot corresponding to his current strength. But it will not surprise me at all if, in the future, he does something greater, because his path seems to lead upward.

The play of the other three participants generally made a very lame impression: Dr. Vidmar played less enterprisingly than usual, Spielmann gave up most of the games as draws far too early and had some bad luck besides (in the games with Nimzovich in the Cycle II, and with the author in Cycles I and IV). Finally, Marshall lost courage after an unfortunate start and played the end of the tournament in a class lower than his real strength.

Despite the aforementioned shortcomings in the performance of individual participants, I'm of the opinion that this toumament produced a number of valuable games, most of which either were not yet published, or were accompanied by quite superficial comments. So I hope the following work of annotation, in which it seemed to me to be particularly valuable to emphasize the scientific aspects of interesting openings, will be of use to the chess community. In my view, some lines of the Queen's Indian, the Caro-Kann, and the Dutch systems deserve special attention for opening theoreticians.
II. It's well known that Capablanca's sporting success in New York was brilliant. But to what extent did the internal performance, the qualitative value of the games delivered, suit him? In order to come to an unbiased judgment about that, it's relevant to check his games against each individual opponent from an artistic point of view. Then one probably will have to come to the following conclusions.
(A) With me, really just one game was played, the first one, for in the others I played for a draw as a result of my vulnerable toumament standing and bad shape. And since such a result was quite welcome for Capablanca as a consequence of the absence of otherwise serious competition - these games actually never came to a struggle at all. So what can one say of the first game? First, the second player (Capablanca) chose a risky playing style, which with correct counter-play, as later analysis showed, would have put him in a difficult situation. But it turned out differently, because in contrast to my usual style (since at other times I play imprecisely now and then in worse opening positions, but almost never in better ones), White (me) played a number of inferior moves one after another, the refutation of which would have been easy even for an average master. Understandably, Capablanca took advantage of the opportunity accordingly and won quickly
and surely. Thanks to my bad play, the chess value of this game was equal to zero, the psychological value, on the other hand, enormous - not for the vanquished, but rather for the vast chess audience.

There was no doubt that right after this game, some $95 \%$ of the so-called expert critics endeavored to persuade the entire chess world (and succeeded in part) that in Buenos Aires, there would be no fight at all, but rather a massacre. If these gentlemen had taken the trouble to compare this referred-to game with any number of my average performances from toumaments of the last few years, they would have had to come to a somewhat different opinion. But it was clearly their lot to remain blind up to the end of the competition. Some - Nomina sunt odiosa (names are disagreeable) - remain so even now, probably because they don't want to see. On the other hand, you can't fight it, of course.
(B) With Nimzovich, the four games took the following course:
(1) Nimzovich (White) played the opening very inconsistently and quite weakly; also in the following play, he missed a series of game-saving possibilities. In the first half, Capablanca's play is by no means an example of accuracy. Admittedly the complex endgame was full of possibilities.
(2) With White, Capablanca dispenses with any kind of initiative and seeks merely continuous exchange - although the position certainly doesn't require such a trading. As a result - a short, bland draw.
(3) One of Capablanca's best games in the toumament - in so far that in it, he is guilty of no detectable failure. But what a helpless impression Nimzovich's positional play makes! Move 16. g4, for example, is unworthy of even a mediocre amateur. By the way, in this game Capablanca's play is not consistently flawless (22...〇a5[?]), and only the final part is impressive in its logical simplicity.
(4) A very bad game. Without compelling reason, Nimzovich lets his opponent have the open center file, through which a winning position is effortlessly achieved. But instead of the obvious 昌d6, Capablanca plays 21. Ef 2 ??, and the game is a draw!
(C) With Dr. Vidmar, the case was not so simple for the ex-world champion - he won only one game - but also in this case he had to deal with an opponent who played somewhat under his usual league:
(1) Through weak use of his middlegame opportunity on the d-file, Capablanca lets the opponent achieve an approximately balanced position, but then sets a positional trap for him (provocation to an only apparently "simplistic," but in fact fatal queen exchange, which could easily have been avoided) and gets a won
endgame after its success. But then he fails completely and, after adjoumment, allows his opponent a straightforward drawing simplification.
(2) Following fortunate opening play, Capablanca leaves unused a simple possibility to secure a positional advantage, and hurries instead through a series of exchanges to give way to a drawish endgame. In the final position, Vidmar even stands a tad better.
(3) As a result of the weak move $14 \ldots$...b4?, Capablanca gets positional domination as White. But instead of trying methodically to exploit this, he immediately brings about a simplification, which ensures him of an admittedly comfortable, though not won, endgame. Black loses this endgame as a result of remarkably imprecise play.
(4) In general, no game, rather deforestation.
(D) Spielmann was actually the only one who didn't play below his strength against Capablanca. His mistakes were generally not chess-related, but rather psychological in nature. That is to say, he couldn't conceive how one can conquer the "unconquerable," even with a better position.
(1) An unfortunate opening idea of the first player (Capablanca), in conjunction with tactically inferior implementation, whereby, as things developed, the result is a forced pawn sacrifice. Then Capablanca picks himself up and finds redemptive counter-play in a couple of the opponent's inaccuracies.
(2) A superficial handling of the not easy - for Black, anyway - 3 . $勹 c 3$ variation of the Caro-Kann, in which the inclination to clear the board proves to be an insufficient means of equalizing. The game remained without a proper finish, because Spielmann suddenly called it a draw after he had obtained a clear advantage. It's more than doubtful that he would have done this against any other opponent.
(3) In at-home analysis, Capablanca finds reinforcement for the variation used in Cycle I and, with Spielmann's indifferent countermoves, already obtains a winning position in the opening. The final combination is exactly calculated, but also very simple. The brilliancy game award is probably explained by the fact that Capablanca did indeed execute it so impeccably.
(4) In general, the same picture as in the second game - again the Caro-Kann, again the same tendency towards simplification in no way justified by the position. The difference is only that Spielmann forfeited his chances in an elementary way even before the "drawn ending," and as a result Capablanca probably could have played on for a win. The overall impression of the game is that both were playing without any strong interest.
(E) With Marshall, Capablanca had - as he has so often - a very easy match:
(1) In a Queen's Indian defended weakly by his opponent, Capablanca again overdoes the motif of simplification, and permits Marshall a chance to equalize. After this opportunity goes inexplicably unused (14...b5??), Capablanca plays the conclusion in good style.
(2) Marshall again plays the opening very badly, and drops a piece on the 12th move. The rest is silence.
(3) A less than satisfying game. Capablanca uses his opening chances imprecisely (especially the fight for c4 leaves a lot to be desired) and gives his opponent various opportunities to equalize chances. Finally Capablanca wins, thanks to some tactical errors by Black, first a pawn, then a second - whereupon one could think that the fight was over. But right afterward, he makes an elementary blunder and, at the sacrifice of one of the extra pawns, allows a drawn endgame with bishops of opposite color.
(4) The opening phase was handled by Capablanca, as Black, with great sophistication, and gradually he got a crushing positional domination (f5 together with the center file). But then follows a typical "simplification move" (permitting the rook exchange), which grants the possibility of a reprieve for White. Since Marshall blindly passes over this simple opportunity (32.g3), the subsequent endgame takes place as if by itself to win for Capablanca.

This was roughly the impression the Capablanca games in New York made on me as I (for the purpose of "preparation" for the match with him) reviewed them more precisely on the steamer Massilia, which brought me to Buenos Aires. Only then did it finally become clear to me how exaggerated were the general shouts of praise with which the quality of his performance in New York was greeted. That's supposed to be a chess machine? A "champion of all times?" What absurd pronouncements with respect to a player, whose overwhelming majority of games, while with no direct mistakes, exhibits about two to three omissions each, which either put the win in question or, countered with a suitable reply, seriously compromise his position.

But I have to state specifically that this "critique of the criticism" is directed solely toward the half-mythic Capablanca Überspieler (superplayer). For when one takes the trouble to rid his thinking of this anesthetizing legend, then one comes, of course, to the belief that Capablanca is entirely a first-class master, whose ability lies much more in intuition than in critical thinking. Before the match, it seemed only appropriate to determine objectively to what extent and in which form this, his primary quality, manifests in individual phases of the struggle. In the process, I came to the following insights, which in the most part were confirmed in Buenos Aires:
(A) The Opening. As Capablanca himself tells us in one of his books (I think in Chess Fundamentals), in each individual chess battle he participates in, he uses basically only one or two openings or variations of the same opening. So it was in his contests with Marshall (the Spanish, and the ...〇e4 variation of the Queen's Gambit Declined) and Lasker (again the Spanish, Steinitz Defense, and the orthodox variation of the Queen's Gambit), so it was also - with few exceptions, which only prove the rule - in New York 1927 (the King's Fianchetto against the Queen's Indian as White, and Caro-Kann as Black). This limited repertoire is studied closely and in particular detail.

His opening theory knowledge, if not particularly many-sided - is characterized always with imposing depth and, above all, expediency. This economy of approach to developing an opening repertoire is definitely not to be criticized, by the way. If anything, it is much more suitable in its limited share of opening knowledge, chosen to produce lasting value, than the comprehensive and eclectic, yet unmethodical scrutinizing of the so-called "moderm theoreticians." Let's not forget that also Lasker's opening repertoire, for example, was rather limited during his long-lasting brilliancy period - and yet probably no one can accuse him of superficiality or a lack of will to win...

The first seemingly logical conclusion which one can draw from the above observation would be that, in a match with Capablanca, it must be useful and advantageous, where possible, to vary the openings (or its branches), in order to bring him as quickly as possible out of the explored paths. But this observation would be correct only if, especially in the recent years of Capablanca's chess activity, a characteristic hadn't developed beyond all measure and hadn't traversed his entire creative work like a recurring theme. This is the instinct of self preservation to which he sacrificed so many beautiful, enticing trains of thought and placed such a number of rook pairs on the open file for exchange! This instinct, which at this stage his refined intuition serves almost exclusively, makes any attempt to gain the upper hand against Capablanca by a surprise in the opening ripe for failure from the beginning. Actually, no case is known, to me, at any rate, in which Capablanca was stumped by a complicated novelty; if anything, in such circumstances he unveils a maximum presence of mind and hits upon the only right thing (compare his familiar Spanish with Marshall, New York 1918); never has he gotten into a lost position as a result of a combinational surprise in the opening!

This extraordinary certainty in the disposal of any half-way real danger is explained by the fact that, exactly in the positions where such a thing could manifest, it was easiest for Capablanca to lead with his high trump - exactly that, which for so long secured him a predominance with regard to the other masters, even those of first class. It was this, his unmatched defensive technique, sharpened for simplification - a weapon, of which he availed himself with complete virtuosity, but only up to the unhappy moment where he (perhaps subconsciously)
began to regard it as an all-holy method in any random position. This tendency to exaggerate reveals itself in New York, of all places, thanks to which one of the main strengths of his style threatens to transform unequivocally into a serious weakness. Both in positions promising victory (in Cycle III, his game with Vidmar; in Cycle IV, with Marshall - just to name these), and in such positions where a chance to win already was eliminated for him (Cycle II and IV games with Spielmann), his use of the simplifying method was excessive by all means and, with better counter-play, could have had serious consequences. But since it was once again crowned with success, I was well able to assume that Capablanca would continue to use it (and in fact in the exaggerated way just described), particularly in the match - and from this assumption was able to profit in the following two ways:
(1) With White, to avoid none of the simplified opening problems familiar to him - in the assumption, that exactly their apparent simplicity will tempt him to want to solve it through any old system of exchange, a tendency which possibly can compromise his position. For a match, this tactic has the inestimable value that it decreases the possibility of a loss to the extreme (as is generally known, I lost no game as White) and, at the same time, not all too infrequently leads to positions that are not forced wins, but still contain within them the seed of a win. Of course, winning chances of this kind are mostly very difficult to accomplish - and therefore, of the four games in which they existed (the 8th, 22nd, 28th, 34th), I succeeded in happily finishing off only the last. But on the other hand, the tactic proved itself brilliant from a psychological point of view, in that it forced my opponent to defend himself arduously for hours in positions where he himself no longer could hope for a win - and so posed him thankless, from his point of view, unnecessary and disagreeable problems.
(2) With Black, I strove in general to use the same method of simplification as Capablanca himself does in the defense, but where possible, only without exaggeration, and always keeping in mind that positions occur only all too frequently in which the weaknesses of the defending party manifest most clearly after simplification. Since this problem was a rather new one for me, I wasn't able, of course, to bank on $100 \%$ success. Yet in the middle of the match (games 8-24) where on the one hand I was rid of the indisposition I suffered at the beginning of the competition, but on the other hand had not yet entered the tired period of the final phase - I found playing for a draw with Black absolutely no trouble.
(B) The Middlegame. From the moment of the competition, where detailed knowledge takes a step back from pure art, those characteristics of Capablanca's style, which had helped establish his half-legendary reputation, appeared most clearly; above all, an exceptional swiftness in understanding, then an almost infallible, intuitive view of the positional. Curiously enough, these particular two gifts, which with appropriate application would have brought their possessor perhaps to
unimagined heights as an artist, in effect led him to an opposite result - namely, to a dead point, to the belief that the art of chess is very near its wom-out end.

How was that able to happen? In order to answer this question correctly, it's necessary to penetrate into the psychological dangers, which the first of the abovenamed characteristics conceals. Actually, quickness in perception - the possibility of a nearly simultaneous overview of a series of tactical elements, which every complicated position holds within it - besides its obvious advantages (economy of thought and, as a result, self-confidence), contains the following temptation, which is difficult to avoid: all too easily, the player can lapse into the delusion that the good moves, which he sees immediately - or nearly so - by contemplation of the position, are absolutely the best, and as a result of this delusion, his creative work loses in depth what it gained in ease.

This gradual abandonment of seeking the absolute, the contentment with only good moves is unfortunately (for the art itself) characteristic of the current phase of Capablanca's chess career. Only two cases are exceptions for him: (1) In positions where the combinational element dominates in such a way that it literally forces him into exact reasoning (as for example, in the game with Dr. Tartakower, London 1922); (2) If he - mostly as a result of one or several clearly detectable enemy mistakes - has already gained sufficient domination for a win, then suddenly the true artist awakens in him, who finds pleasure in ending the fight in the quickest and thereby most elegant way. The most peculiar thing about it is that this tendency occasionally stands in no relation to the internal aggregate value of the game itself: thus he came to the idea, for example, of a forced queen sacrifice in the second game of the New York toumament with Marshall, after the latter, in a most unaesthetic fashion, already scrapped a whole piece in the opening.

It's clear that such cases of an awakening of the combinational spirit, caused by quite special positions, can be looked at only as exceptional occurrences. In contrast, as a rule one can observe in Capablanca's creative work over the years an ever-decreasing immersion in the details of a position, based on his unflappable (I'm speaking of the years before Buenos Aires) belief in the infallibility of his intuition. The saddest thing indeed was that this system - to work with the "sec-ond-best moves" - was enough for him almost without exception because, in the majority of cases, more or less helpless resistance, in a positional sense, opposed him. Through this "impunity" upon execution of the second-best moves he, on the one hand, gradually became weaned from steady concentration during a chess match, which alone can give an absolute guarantee against possible elementary blunders. On the other hand his self-confidence grew in the extreme, indeed turned into self-idolization. (Before the match, for example, he wrote in an Argentine newspaper that to become a world champion ranks among the miracles.)

No wonder that, in addition to mentally flawless strategic thought, his praxis of the last years displayed relatively more and more frequent cases of neglect of
winning, or simply of more favorable tactical opportunities. As examples from recent tournaments, it will probably suffice to allude to his games (as Black) with Yates and Marshall (New York 1924), with Dr. Lasker (Moscow 1925); the third game with Marshall and the fourth with Nimzovich (New York 1927). Also, rather severe blunders occur less rarely than in the beginning of his career; nevertheless, these are not at all always exploited by his opponents (compare the games with Sir Thomas, Hastings 1919; and Morrison, London 1922), but sometimes they lead to a loss (like the loss of the queen against Chajes, New York 1916, or missing the queen check on b2 against Réti in New York 1924).

As I said, such sporadic signs of intellectual weakness can in no way be regarded as rare exceptions - for the total number of toumament games delivered by Capablanca in recent years is very small compared to the quantitative performance of other grandmasters, and proportionately the number of his mistakes is therefore significant. Thanks to these observations, I came to the somewhat seemingly paradoxical conviction that the tactician Capablanca at present stands far behind the strategist; that as a result, it is necessary not to believe him in the middle game, that is, to check each of his tactical thoughts with the utmost meticulousness - for it is by no means impossible that a demonstrable "hole" will be found. This decision, which of course has nothing in common with a potential underestimation of the opponent, helped me in no small measure to make the most of Capablanca's omissions in a whole number of match games ( $1,11,21,34$ ).
(C). The Endgame. If possible, even larger tall tales were spread about Capablanca's performances in the last, semi-technical part of the game than about his handling of the opening and middlegame. All these exaggerations probably had root in the fact that Capablanca is the victor over Lasker, whose mastery, especially in the endgame - particularly in the complicated, not purely technical ones - over the course of at the very least two decades, stood at an unattainable height. Actually, one of the four decisive games of the Havana match (the 10th) was won by Capablanca in a splendidly implemented endgame. Certainly, one can find in his twenty-year chess career some other good endgame performances (for example, with Nimzovich, Riga 1913; Bogoljubow, London 1922; Réti and Dr. Tartakower, New York 1924). But about which of the present-day grandmasters can one not say the same thing? For that reason, it seems downright amazing the (proportionally) enormous number of endgame opportunities missed by him, which is far greater than the number of his mistakes or omissions in the middlegame.

In order to get a clear overall picture, I expect it's sufficient to review critically his games from (a) San Sebastian with Leonhardt (which he did win, but - as Dr. Tarrasch demonstrated - highly laboriously and thanks to the opponent's help), and Rubinstein (in which he plainly failed to notice the gleaming chance at a draw by means of a rook sacrifice); (b) Havana - with Marshall (in which he lost an endgame, after standing better, if not won, in the beginning); (c) New York

1924, with the author (this game among others was a turning point in my grasping Capablanca's chess individuality); (d) Moscow 1925 with Torre and Spielmann; and finally, (e) New York 1927, with Vidmar from Cycle I. Then one will have to come to the realization that Capablanca is definitely no remarkable endgame artist, that his proficiency in this phase of the game is decidedly of a more technical nature, and that there are other masters (like Rubinstein, for example, in rook endgames) who in some variations certainly are or were superior to him.

In order to pull the discussion together succinctly, I can formulate my overall impression of Capablanca's method of play before the match: in the opening, he is only great as defender; the middlegame is his strongest suit, in which he now and then reveals also an attacking spirit; in the endgame he is not to be feared by a first-class master, for here he succeeds only in exceptional cases to rise above the mediocre.

As prologue to the world championship match, the New York Toumament had then a double and very real meaning - but one which differed completely from the opinion of the entire chess world conceming this last event: it gave Lady Fortune the opportunity to gift the Cuban hero with an ambiguous smile in which, besides outward encouragement, also a faint waming was imbedded; and it is really not her fault that her darling this time couldn't decipher her smile. Moreover, the toumament allowed his future opponent, immediately before the Arnageddon, to verify observations of earlier years by a number of new examples, and so to come to the correct conclusions. May also the years to come bring us the greatest surprises - in any case, in the history of chess, the New York Toumament 1927 will be in the books as the starting point to that spectacle, which finally destroyed for our art the harnful legend of the human chess machine.

## Cycle I

## Round 1

$1 / 2$ Capablanca - Spielmann $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Alekhine - Vidmar $1 / 2$
0 Marshall - Nimzovich 1

Standings after Round 1 ：

Nimzovich 1
Alekhine $1 / 2$
Capablanca $1 / 2$
Spielmann $1 / 2$
Vidmar 1／2
Marshall 0
（1）Capablanca－Spielmann
Queen＇s Gambit Declined［D38］

## 1．d4 d5 2．〇f3 e6 3．c4 ©d7

Dr．Lasker＇s move，the idea of which－ as I understand it－consists much less in preparing the bishop sortie to b4 in connection with ．．．c5，which Spielmann and Dr．Vidmar delighted in using in New York，than in reserving the possi－ bility of the Cambridge Springs Defense for himself，and with that，preventing the opponent from choosing the fash－ ionable line 4.8 g 5 （after $3 \ldots . . \mathrm{ff} 6$ ），to－ gether possibly with $₫ \mathrm{~b} 1-\mathrm{d} 2$ ．With this in mind，I also used the text move in my seventh match game with Capablanca．

## 4．cxd5 exd5 5．乞c3 Øgf6

If White wanted to force this position， then he should have played first of all 4．0c3 and only upon $4 . . .0 g 8-\mathrm{f} 6,5$ ． g 5 （as in the following game Alekhine－ Vidmar）；because in the text position， Black could avoid the following pin
with 5 ．．．c6，completely without harm． Such small inaccuracies in handling the opening aren＇t rare with Capablanca．

## 6．2g5 2b4（？）

Spielmann wants to force the counter－ pin variation at all costs，questionable in any case，which he－according to his own report－had analyzed carefully with Dr．Vidmar on the way to New York．But in the available position，the idea appears illogical；indeed，usually one makes the bishop move with the intention of forcing a clarification in the center（ $\mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 5, \ldots \mathrm{exd} 5$ ）by means of tac－ tical threats．If，however，the opponent already decided voluntarily on this clari－ fication beforehand，then Black can bring about long－known positions，quite harm－ less to him，through ．．．c6，together with $\ldots$ ．．．e7，．．． $0-0, \ldots$ ．．．e8 and ．．．乞f8，etc．

## 7．씁b3

Not a very happy thought－although， of course，White didn＇t need to get an disadvantage because of this move alone．If he absolutely wanted to move the queen，then more appropriate was 7．…a4－which happened between the same players in Cycle III．I still believe that White doesn＇t need to get involved here with artifice，and can fortify his opening advantage rather through simple further development（e3，d3， $0-0$ ）．

## 7．．．c5！

Here completely correct，since it threat－
 etc．，and in the process，White lacks time to bring the king into safety by castling short．

## Cycle I: Round 1

## $8 . a 3$ 2 $\times \mathbf{c} 3+$

To 8.... ㅃㅂㅂ5, 9. d2! would be a sufficient reply.

## 9. 씁 $\times \mathbf{c} 3$

More in accord with the position was 9.b×c3, since against this formation, Black's queenside pawn supremacy would be much more difficult to mobilize than in the actual game.
9...c4!

The point of this good move is that now White can't play 10.e4, because of 10... Dxe $^{2}$, etc.

## 10. 씁e3+

Still relatively the best move.

## 10... 씁e7 11. 씁 $\times$ e $7+$ - $\times$ - 7



## 12.乞d2?

Only after these angst-moves does White find himself at a direct disadvantage, which could be avoided with the natural $12 . e 4$ - for example, with 12...dxe4 13.0 e5! h6 (13...b5 14.a4) 14. $8 \times 56+0 \times f 615.8 \times c 4$, etc., whereby chances and counter-chances would balance out.

## 12...h6 13.2h4

In case of $13.2 \times f 6+0 \times f 6$ 14.e4, Black would, following 14... $0 \times 4$ e $15.0 \times e 4$ dxe4 16. $0 \times \mathrm{c} 4$ 8d8 $17 . \mathrm{d} 5$ (or 17. . d 1 \&g4), block the passed pawn with $17 \ldots$... d 6 , and later show his pawn supremacy to advantage on the kingside.

## 13...b5 14.e4

Bitter necessity; otherwise the queenside pawn advance would win rather easily as a matter of technique.

## 14...g5 15. \& g3 ©xe4 16. Dxe4 dxe4 17.a4



The only possibility, of course, of avoiding the consolidation of the enemy pawn chain (with ...a6).

## 17...8a6?

Until this moment, Spielmann had played the game perfectly and was now able, with 17 ...f5!, to maintain his material advantage in a good position, and retain excellent chances of winning. Capablanca (and also Dr. Tartakower in the Russian tournament book) gives the following variation: 18. c A a6 19.h4 Ghc8 20. a g $421 . \mathrm{h} 5$ !, with prospects of a draw for White. I believe, however,
that only in absolute necessity would Black have to make the move ．．．g4，de－ valuing the pawn－chain，and in the case at hand，no such obligation existed．So instead of this，he should have played 20．．．©f6！in order to annul－in case of $\mathrm{h} \times \mathrm{g} 5, \ldots \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 5$－the effect of the white rook on the h－file with either ．．．${ }^{\text {bit }} 7-\mathrm{g} 7$ or possibly ．．．思h8．After the text moves， White achieves a longed－for draw through the coordination of his pieces， precisely carried out and intensified by a number of tactical threats．

## 

As can be seen，Black has no more time to play ．．．f5，after his failing on the 17 th move．

## 20．h4 96

Strangely enough，after 20．．．g4，White would have had sufficient counter re－ sources at his disposal－for example， 21．©e2 f5（or h5）22．${ }^{\text {ga5 }}$ ！a6 23．b×c4 alec4 24．${ }^{\text {B }} \mathrm{d} 2$ ！．

## $21 . b \times c 40 \times c 422 . h \times g 5 \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 5$ 23．${ }^{\text {En }} \mathrm{h}$ ！

With the awful threat 24.0 d6＋，etc．

## 23．．．Df6

Not 23．．．f6 because $24.8 \times c 48 \times c 4$ 25．马̈h $7+$ 由e6？26．d5＋，and wins．

## 24．日a5！

Threatening $25.8 \times 4$ ，together with Ee5＋，etc．The rook attacks on both flanks are interesting．

24．．．${ }^{\text {D } b 5 ~}$

Evidence that he＇s already happy with a draw．Actually，there was nothing more here to get out of this position．If，for ex－ ample， $24 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{~g} 4$ ，then 25 ． $\mathrm{Eb} 6 \mathrm{~m} \times \mathrm{f} 1$
 Ea8－c8 29．Eb2，and White would have had nothing more to fear，considering the many enemy weaknesses．

##  27．© d ${ }^{\text {日la2＋}}$

Insufficient is $27 . . . \mathrm{e} 3+$ after $28 . \mathrm{f} \times \mathrm{e} 3$ ！

 and $\Xi \times c 8$ ．Capablanca proved himself once again to be a splendid tactician and cleverly saved a game，which strategi－ cally was inadequately conceived．

## 28．${ }^{\text {th }}$ d1

## （2）Alekhine－Vidmar

 Queen＇s Gambit Declined［D38］1．d4d5 2．c4e6 3．⿹f3 ©d74． 2 c 3
 7．e3 0－0

Lately this variation has been played occasionally up to this move，especially by Spielmann．Here，however，only 7．．．c5 seems to be in harnony with the sharp－edged bishop sortie of the previ－ ous move，whereupon the first player would then be forced to play a proper gambit with all its advantages and downsides－in fact，8．d3 c4 9．ac2
 now either 12 ． mb b or 12. ． B b，both of which make Black＇s castling question－ able．For example，12．甾b1 0－013．e4！ dxe4 14．d2 Ma3 15．D m 4 当a6 16． $0 \times f 8$ exf3，and now－not as in the club tournament game Maróczy－

## Cycle I：Round 1

Tenner，New York 1926，17．\＆e7？留e6 －but，of course，rather 17． Qb 4 fxg 2 18．日e1，with the threat $\& \times h 7+$ ！，and White must win．After the imprecise text move，White in any case gets a good attack，without needing to sacri－ fice anything for it．

## 8．Qd3 c5 9．0－0 \＆xc3 10．bxc3 c4 11．\＆c2 Ma5

After this，White could try with 12．畄b1 to bring about variations similar to those mentioned in the previous note．But his next move is even more effective．

## 12．0．05！

The exchange of the c3－pawn for the h7－pawn，which this move intends， damages the position of the black king much more than is noticeable at first sight；therefore，it probably would have been more advisable for Black to be－ ware＂Greeks bearing gifts＂by reject－ ing c3 and play 12 ．．．${ }^{\text {E }}$ e 8 －for example， with a sequence similar to $13.0 \times \mathrm{d} 7$ Dxd7 14．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{d} 2$ b5 15．a4，when White would still have kept the better pros－ pects．

## 12．．．씁 $\times$ c3 13．$Q \times d 7$ ！$\triangleq \times d 7$

Quite bad，of course，would be $13 \ldots$ ．．． ed 7 14．$\times \times f 6$ ，together with $\Omega \mathrm{c} 1$ ，etc．

## 14．씁 b 1 ！

The point of the 12th move：because of the strong threat of 15 ． A e 7 ， B e8 16．b4，Black has no time to save his h－pawn．



In spite of opposing superior strength on the queenside，White＇s advantage is en－ tirely clear，and in spite of his proven re－ sourcefulness，Dr．Vidmar cannot devise a sufficient parry against the many－sided threats（i．e．，17．e4，17．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{d} 1,17 . \mathrm{e}$ a 4 ）．

16．．．Df8
If $16 \ldots . . \circlearrowright \mathrm{b} 6$ ，then simply $17 . \mathrm{a} 4$ ，etc．

## 17．2a4！

Leads to the win of a pawn plus a more powerful position．The remainder should have been simply a matter of technique．

## 17．．．昌e6

Forced．

## 18．씁b5

This，and not $18 .{ }^{\text {m．}} \mathrm{g} 5 \mathrm{f} 6!$ ，is correct．

## 18．．．${ }^{\text {g }} 66$ 19．씁 $\times d 5$

Should amply suffice，it＇s true．More economical first，however，was 19．2f4！， when it would have been quite difficult for Black to invent anything else at all．

## 19．．．씁 b4！

Quite shrewd subterfuge：Black defends squares b7 and f8，attacks a4 and ap－ parently threatens the other bishop with 20．．．eb，etc．And still White has an easy save．

## 20．\＆c2 De6 21．Me4

Of course not 21． $\begin{aligned} & \text { es } \\ & \text { e }, ~ f 6, ~ e t c . ~ B u t ~ n o w ~\end{aligned}$ the bishop is covered by the possible
queen check on h 4 ，and in the follow－ ing，White will have all to great a choice of various winning continuations．

## 21．．．f5 22．．．

Or 22．Mh4＋פh7 23．Qf4，etc．

## 22．．．〇h7 23．h4

This defense was planned with the pre－ vious move．But rather good also was


## 23．．．乌×95 24．h×g5 씁e7 25．씁h4＋

White wants to lead the rook still fur－ ther astray，and so allows his opponent some further swindles（see the remark to move 30 ）．Incomparably simpler，in
 threatening e4，etc．

## 25．．．思h6 26．Mg3 貃h5 $27 . f 4$

Hardly stronger was $27 .{ }^{\text {M．}}$ e5 昌d8！，etc．

## 27．．．씁a3

With that he still provides the opponent with the most practical difficulties．

## 28．씁f3g6 29．e4！

The simplest，because it forces a won endgame．Less clear by far would be 29．abl

## 29．．．씁b2 30．exf5

Absolutely not a mistake－as some crit－ ics believed－but rather the intended consequence of the maneuver intro－ duced by the previous move．Simpler， though，was 30. 尚 f 2 ，and after $30 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 7$
（intending ．．．日ah8），31．』d1！，with an easy win．

30．．．씹 $\times$ d4＋31．씁f2


With this move，the position is finally clarified．Black is forced into a queen exchange and very soon will have to hand over his two united passed pawns． To White＇s misfortune，however，with his next move he permits himself to be distracted from the originally calculated winning plan．

## 31．．．씁 $\times$ f $2+32$ ． $6 \times f 2$

With the rather worthless pawn－grabbing intention of this move，White misses the way to his hereto fore well－eamed victory． Black gains adequate counter chances in the pure rook ending．

After $32 . \Xi \times f 2$ a $\times$ f5（after $32 \ldots \mathrm{gxf}$ 33. Be1，etc．，Black would perish be－ cause of his unfortunate bishop posi－
 35．\＆ 4 Eb8 36．f5，etc．，Black would very soon have had to recognize the uselessness of further resistance．

## 32．．．$\times$ ff $33.0 \times f 5$ gxf 34.9 fd1

Winning a pawn with the threats 35.8 d 7 or 35 ．
to be insufficient，however，against de－ termined counter－play．Likewise un－ clear would be $34 . g 4 \mathrm{f} \times \mathrm{g} 435$ ． g g ， कg7！，etc．

## 34．．．Eh7 35．Ed5

On the other hand，atthis moment，there was a last winning attempt： $35 . \mathrm{g} 4$ ！，fg 4 36． B 3 ，since the opportunity to double rooks on the h －file would no longer be at the opponent＇s disposal．

##  <br>  

With that，White expresses his peace－ ful intentions，since the terrible passed pawn on the seventh rank would thwart any serious attempt to win．For ex－ ample，if $42 .{ }^{6} 4$ ，then simply 42．．．${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{c} 4+$ ，and now the rook exchange
 together with ．．．b4，etc．，would actually seriously endanger White＇s game．

## 42．．．${ }^{\text {Bl }}$ d 7

He also could have tried 42．．．日c3＋， when 43 ．马e 3 would be the simplest．

##  $1 / 2-1 / 2$

## （3）Marshall－Nimzovich

French Defense［C01］
1．e4 e6 2．d4d5 3．2c3 皿b44．exd5 exd5 5． 2 f 3

With his last，White foregoes even a shade of an opening advantage－and even more：now Black gets the chance， through a possible exchange on c 3 ，to
brand the resulting doubled pawn as a permanent weakness．More frequently， 5．${ }^{2}$ d3 occurs immediately．

## 5．．．〇e7 6．\＆d3 Dbc6 7．h3

Upon immediate castling，7．．． 84 isn＇t so pleasant．The difference in the de－ velopment of the king＇s knights be－ comes noticeable，to the disadvantage of White．

## 7．．．\＆e6

Encouraged by the unfortunate open－ ing tactic of the opponent，Nimzovich did without the more obvious exchange maneuver，7．．．f5，in favor of a more complicated，interesting，yet probably not－quite－correct，manner of play．

## 8．0－0 씁d79． 2 f 4

Simpler was 9.0 e 2 ，with roughly the same game．But the text move is also not to be dismissed－and even offers good，practical chances，in that it leads the opponent to a foolhardy experiment．

## 9．．． $2 \times \mathrm{c} 3$

In the last few years，the play against pawns in the center，weakened by dou－ bling，became one of Nimzovich＇s most preferred strategic motifs，and he dealt with such positions－which he knew how to bring about from the most di－ verse openings－with special virtuos－ ity．Here，however，he was mistaken， because the uncertainty of his king＇s position should have prevented him，in the following play，from benefiting from the weaknesses．With 9．．．dd6，he could，of course，have had a comfort－ able equality．

## 10．bxc3 f6

The necessary supplement for the pre－ vious move：After the disappearance of the king bishop，the dark squares must be protected with pawns where pos－ sible．But now e6 becomes weak．

## 11．${ }^{\text {g b }}$ b1 g5 12．Qg 0－0－0



The king takes on the defense of $b 7$ and c 7 ．The king＇s role of defense has been strongly underestimated for a consid－ erable time（after the desperate attempt by the aging Steinitz to use this piece to attack on a full board was a miser－ able fiasco）－and only the years after the war seemed to bring a gradual about－face in this respect．One can ex－ amine the games of the Buenos Aires match，for example，where the kings， already in the middle game，were used now and then to defend key squares－ that is，functioning as active pieces even before the endgame．

Black＇s last moves，with their original strategic approach，must make a pleas－ ing impression on anyone who believes in the evolution and depth of chess thought．Therefore it＇s almost too bad that upon closer examination of this position，it becomes clear that Black＇s plan was not only not the best，but in－
stead，with correct（and not at all abstruse） counter－play，must bring the second player a completely unenviable situation． So he would have done better to choose instead of $11 \ldots g 5$ ，the down－to－earth $11 . . .0 \mathrm{~d} 8$ ，together with $. . .0-0$ ，etc．

## 13．씁e2？

The opponent＇s temerity breaks Marshall＇s train of thought，and here and in the following play，he makes a couple of errors in precision that are hardly to be made up for．Instead of the queen move，for example，the less ste－ reotyped（since with Me2，White threat－ ens only quite clumsily 14 ． 46 ，which is deflected in the easiest way）attack formation beginning with $13 . \varrho \mathrm{d} 2$ ！is called for．If after that，for example， 13．．．$巳 \mathrm{~b} 8$ ，then 14.0 D 3 b 6 15．．．．e2－ this time with really unpleasant threats．

Therefore，Black could better answer 13.0 d 2 with 13 ．．． 0 a5，with the neces－ sary idea of exchanging the enemy knight on the way to c5．But－apart from the fact that this exchange would put a better face again on the White pawn queenside position，and conse－ quently show the inadequacy of the plan introduced with $9 \ldots \times \times 3$－in this case White wouldn＇t at all have had to play 14．©b3 immediately．Instead of this，甾c1（or possibly 씁a3）would have been lasting and good－and only then the knight move．As one can easily be con－ vinced，White would have kept a last－ ing initiative with this method of play． Now he gets into a tight spot bit by bit．

## 13．．．等de8！

Defense（making an escape square， d 8 ， for the king）and counterattack at the same time．

## Cycle I：Round 1

## 14．${ }^{\text {g fe1 }}$

If 14.8 ma ，then $14 . . . \mathrm{b} \times \mathrm{a} 615$ ． $\mathrm{m} \times \mathrm{a} \times+$ ＊id8 16．日b7 ©f5！17．日xc7 筸×c7 $18.2 \times \mathrm{C} 7+$ 甼 $\times \mathrm{c} 7$ ，etc．，with an easily winning game．

## 14．．．2f5 15． $0 \times f 5$

After the disappearance of this bishop， the queenside pawn complex becomes quite weak，and the prospects in the endgame become so much the grimmer． In spite of the apparent danger， 15 ．\＆h2 would have offered him more chances．

## 

The decisive mistake，because now the second player can occupy the correct queenside defense formation with gain
 18．c4！，with some chances in the com－ plications），this would have been avoided．

## 17．．．b6 18．씁a3 웁b7 19．씁b3

Beginning of the tragedy－otherwise c2 was hard to guard．

## 19．．．ちc6 20．ちd2

What on the 13th move would have meant the beginning of a very promis－ ing attack is now merely a shy defen－ sive move against the penetration of the black knight to c4．It gets ever more gloomy．

## 留 8

Apart from the fact that Black doesn＇t need these pieces for the exploitation
of his positional advantage，a purely tactical idea also forms the basis of the double－rook exchange．Black gets rid of the threat，floating in the air，of 0 b3－ $\mathrm{c} 5+$（after $9 \mathrm{~d} 2-\mathrm{b} 3$ ），and with that avoids the otherwise inevitable knight exchange．

## 

Whatelse？With 24． f f1，for example， $24 . .$. 岶 4 would already be very strong．

## 24．．．훕c8（？）

Probably time pressure，since otherwise the omission of 24 ．．．．eme2！－which af－ ter 25 ． 甾c1 puts White at a standstill，
 27.0 d 3 〇d2！，forces material gain with a continuous attack－is inexplicable．

## 25．씁d1 씁e6

Also 26．．．．．．．c6 was strong．

## 26．ひb3 ŋc4 27．乞d2 Əa3 28．ŋf1 D×c2

The loss of this pawn perhaps would have still been bearable for White with the bish－ ops of opposite color，if he wouldn＇t have to suffer from the remaining－and incur－ able－weaknesses of his queenside．But as it is，he has only to wait until the oppo－ nent gives the coup de grace．

## 29．쓱5 S D3 30．M M1 Me4 31．乞d2 씁e2！32．씁×e2

After 32．甾c1 ©e1！，etc．，he would gradually suffocate．

## 32．．．\＆$\times$ e2 $33 . f 4$ 气a3 34．f $\times \mathrm{g} 5 \mathrm{f} \times \mathrm{g} 5$ 35．${ }^{6}$ f2

Otherwise 35．．．〇b5，together with ．．．${ }^{\text {d }} \mathrm{d} 3$ ，etc．

## 35．．．2h5 36．De5 g4 37．h×g4

Kingside pawn exchanges are benefi－ cial only to Black，who，on the other side，possesses completely sufficient material to win．Therefore， $37 . \mathrm{h} 4$ was certainly more advisable from a practi－ cal point of view．

## 



## 39．．．皿e6！

Threatens to win a pawn with 40 ．．． 0 b 5 ， etc．，which at this moment，on account of the response c3－c4，would still be premature．White，apparently under time pressure（the 40th move！）misses the threat，whereupon the endgame causes no more difficulties at all．It was also won，however，after 40．©d3！，for example：40．．．${ }^{\text {d }} \mathrm{d} 7$ 41．f8 $8 \mathrm{f} 5+$
 อе3 7 ．

## 40．\＆f8？乌b5 41．2b1 a5

Also fine was $41 \ldots$ af ，since after $42 . a 4$ \＆$\times$ b1 $43 . a \times b 5$ ，Black plays the simplest， $43 \ldots .$. did 7 ，together with（in the case of e3－f4－e5）．．．c6 and，after the
pawn exchange，forces his way to c4 with the king．

##  

Marshall could easily have spared him－ self the next fifteen moves．


 cxd4 54．8×d4 b5 55．8b6 a4 56．Da5d4！57．cxd4 b458．©b6a3＋


## Round 2

0 Nimzovich－Capablanca 1
0 Spielmann－Alekhine 1 $1 / 2$ Marshall－Vidmar $1 / 2$

Standings after Round 2：
Alekhine 1 1⁄2
Capablanca 1 1／2
Nimzovich 1
Vidmar 1
Marshall $1 / 2$
Spielmann $1 / 2$
（4）Nimzovich－Capablanca
Queen＇s Gambit Declined［D30］

## 1．c4 勺f6 2．ضf3 e6 3．d4 d5 4．e3

As is well known，4．0g5 and 4．0c3 are more vigorous here，and at the same time quite credible developmental moves．But that is the way it is－in New York one played against Capablanca usually in such a way，as if there were a mot d＇ordre to play only the second－or third－best moves against him．

## Cycle I：Round 2

## 4．．．©e75． 0 bd2

Why this artifice？Other moves（5．c3， 5．（d3）were more sound，that is，more in keeping with the demands of the problem of the center．

## 5．．．0－0 6．D d3

More in harmony with the previous move was the flank development of the queen bishop（6．b3）or first，6． e 2．

## $6 . . . c 57 . d \times c 5$

Once again， $7 . \mathrm{b} 3$ ，together with 8．b2， would have lead to a full game with chances on both sides．The text move should result in a rapid simplification of the position．

## 7．．．乞a6



A good move，but one that should lead only to equality．

## 8．0－0？

That is the actual mistake，which relin－ quishes control of the whole board to Black．Virtually taken for granted here was $8 . \doteq \mathrm{b} 3 \mathrm{~d} \mathrm{\times c} 4$（if $8 \ldots . .0 \times \mathrm{c} 59.0 \times \mathrm{c} 5$
 rather to White＇s advantage） $9.0 \times \mathrm{Cc} 4$
 12． B －2 $=$

## 

This systematic and uninterrupted de－ velopment of the opponent in the midst of sacrificing time and space is tanta－ mount to a positional hara－kiri．White should still play 10．b3．He refrains too long from this possibility，until he in－ curs a lost position just on account of the encapsulated queen bishop．

## 10．．．乞×d5 11．乞b3 Db7 12． $0 \times c 5$ Oxc5 13．씁a4

And now he seeks to trade the already developed bishop，and leaves the other one quietly sleeping．Indeed，in this game，Nimzovich is not to be recog－ nized．Preferable was 13．d2 留f6 14．${ }^{\text {eb }} \mathrm{b} 3$（e5）15． 0 c3，etc．

## 13．．．씁 6 ！

Justifiably，Black doesn＇t bother in the least about further losses in tempo planned by the opponent（the exchange on a6 was otherwise surely easy to pre－ vent with ．．．a6）and plays only to take advantage of the cl－bishop＇s lack of development．A sounder，more appro－ priate plan，but one，which，for a change，Capablanca doesn＇t implement with the necessary precision．

## 

This knight maneuver in particular ap－ pears to be somewhat superficially cal－ culated and merely leads to a facilitated exchange for the opponent．Simple and strong here was $15 \ldots . .5 \mathrm{fd} 8$ ，together with possibly ．．．e5－e4，against which

White would hardly have found a suf－ ficient defense in the long run．

## 16．씁e2 ${ }^{\text {g fid }} 17 . a 3$

Better than 17．0e1，whereupon the simple doubling of rooks（17．．．gd7） would be very strong．

## 17．．．乞d3 18．乞e1 Øxe1 19．日xe1 

This so－much admired queen move should have just as little success as ev－ erything else：Black just threw away the substance of his advantage with his unfortunate knight maneuver．Certainly White may not now successfully play 21．b4，on account of 21．．．ed6 22．g2－ g3 甾e5－e4，with the subsequent pen－ etration of the rooks．But he had sim－ pler ways out in the following play．

### 21.93



This new，highly precarious debilitation of the light squares was hard to avoid， since with the plausible move $21 . \mathrm{d} 2$ ， Black would get the advantage in the following way：21．．．d6 22．g3 घc2



[^0]The right move，because with it，a fur－ ther weakness is forced．On the other hand，Capablanca＇s assertion（in his written commentary to this game for the English toumament book）that 21．．．甾e4 would have won a pawn is based on an error：that is to say，after 22．d2，Black couldn＇t have played $22 . . . \times$ a3？，be－ cause then the missing Luft would have become disastrous for him；for example， 23．b×a3 日c2 24．日bc1！घb2 25．马ed1甾d5 26．e4！Md7 27．b4！，and wins．

## 22．b4 Df8 23．Db2 Ma2！

With the unpleasant threat 24．．．a5．

## 24．日a1？

A weak palliative．To save the game，he should play $24 . \Xi \mathrm{gbd} 1$－－for example，（1）

甾xb2（or $28 . . . \Xi \times b 229.9 \times f 8+$ ，etc．，with perpetual check）29．．．． G d6；or（2） $24 . . . \mathrm{a} 5$ 25．${ }^{\circ} \times \mathrm{d} 8 \mathrm{\Xi} \times \mathrm{d} 826$ ．d4！，etc．，with suffi－ cient counter threats．

## 24．．．．씁b3 25．Dd4？

Even now 25 ．巴ac1 could still occur， with variations similar to those men－ tioned above．The d4－square is not se－ cure for the bishop，since ．．．es hovers continuously in the air．

## 25．．．望c2 26．씁a6？



With this，the game is finally lost．（It＇s strange，by the way，how many weak moves White had to make in order to get to this result！）To be sure，it looked bad anyway－but after 26 ．Mff or 26 ． Md1（intending ${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{e} 2$ ），there were still some hopes of rescue．

## 26．．．e5！

The beginning of a forceful endgame， which in a way compensated for the mutual omissions of the previous phase．

## 

Nice is the＂main variation，＂28．gf1留 $\times$ e3！（as in so many problems and studies，there＇s also a sideline cook here，by the way： $28 . .$. m m 5 ，together with ．．．． m f3）29． $8 \mathrm{f} 4 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{f} 2$ ！，with early mate．And 28 ．．mf1 would not have saved the game－for example，28．．．．Md5 29. Qd4，甾h5！（indicated by Capablanca， and much better than 29 ．．．．．．．f3，which could be answered with 30．घac1） $30 . \mathrm{h} 4$ （otherwise， $30 \ldots . .5 \times f 2$ ，etc．，with a suf－ ficient pawn preponderance） $30 \ldots$ ．．． $\mathrm{m} f 3$ ， with annihilation．

## 28．．．g×f2 29．g4 Me6 30．2g3 

A second nice twist：if 31 ．$\times \mathrm{h} 2$ ，then $31 \ldots$ 甾 $\times \mathrm{g} 4+32$ ． ． G 1 m 崮 3 ！，together with mate．Weaker in contrast would be $30 \ldots$ ．．．$\times \mathrm{g} \times \mathrm{g} 4$ on account of 31 ．gf1，etc．

##  33. 흡 $\times \mathrm{g} 2$ 筸 $\times \mathrm{g} 4$

The rest is already quite easy．


 tob7 0－1
（5）Spielmann－Alek hine
Sicilian Defense［B40］

## 1．e4 c5 $2 . \searrow f 3$ e6 $3 . \mathrm{d4}$ cxd4 4．2×d4 Df6 5．Dd

With this move，in my opinion，Black gets easy equality．More promising－ but also more double－edged，on account of Black＇s possible pressure on the c－ file－is 5 ． 0 c 3 ．

5．．．Dc6 6．$\triangle \times c 6$
To 6．\＆e3，6．．．d5 7．0d2 e5！，etc．，suf－ fices for equality．

## 6．．．dxc6

After $6 \ldots . . \mathrm{b} \times 6$ ，the mobilization plan of 7．${ }^{\mu}$ e2，together with 8．0－0and 9．c4！， etc．，would have been unpleasant for Black．

## 7．乞d2

The knight，for whom no fine future beckons from c3，is steered to more promising squares．It＇s plain，though， that this procedure can cause Black no great difficulties．

## 7．．．e5 8．乞c4 日c5！9．昷e3

Not 9．0xe5？M $\begin{gathered}\text { d } 4, ~ e t c . ~\end{gathered}$

## 9．．．皿xe3 10．乞xe3 县e6 11．0－00－0

Black stands a tad better，mainly on account of the blockage on e4，which somewhat limits the freedom of move－ ment of the white pieces．Still，an early
draw is anticipated following the hard－ to－avoid rook exchange on the only open line．

##  Mc5

Unfortunately，White can＇t so easily get around to doubling the rooks on the d － file，since after $14 \ldots . . . d 7$ ，there follows 15．©c4！，rather to White＇s advantage．

## 15．昌ac1 a5

Otherwise 16．b2－b4．

## 16．© b1 g6

If immediately $16 \ldots$ a 4 ，then $17 .{ }^{[5 x d} 8$
 19．．．当b6？，then 20．甾×a4，threatening省a8＋，etc．Therefore luft was necessary．

## 

Although at the moment White influ－ ences the open file somewhat more than his opponent，White can＇t strengthen Black＇s position so easily－after 19．h3， for example，19．．．$勹$ h5 could well enough follow．The text move，how－ ever，which also should serve as prepa－ ration for a possible f4，allows the fol－ lowing simplifying maneuver．

## 19．．． $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{g}} \times \mathrm{d} 220$ ． $\mathrm{m}_{\boldsymbol{g}} \times \mathrm{d} 2$

If $20 .{ }^{\Xi} \times \mathrm{d} 2$ ，then of course， 20 ．．． Ed 8 ，etc．

## 20．．．〇g4！

With this，Black apparently gets the advantage－but only just apparently． Certainly 21.0 f 1 c g 7 ，with the threat ．．． $5 f 8-\mathrm{d} 8$ ，etc．，as well as $21.0 \times \mathrm{g} 4$

M $\times$ g4，together with 8 d 8 ，etc．，looks rather uncomfortable for White，but he has a face－saver in ．．．

## 21．2f5！

－which at least eliminates the unpleas－ ant enemy bishop．

## 21．．． $0 \times f 5$

There was no choice，since the varia－ tion 21．．．gxf5 22．exf5 ${ }^{\mu} \times f 2+23$ ． 省xf2
 etc．，would obviously be very favorable for White．

## 22．exf5 $\boldsymbol{\text { Df } 6 ~}$

Or first of all 22 ．．．${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{g} 7$ 7．

## 23．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{d}$ d 6



##  h×g6 26．씁 b 4

Because of the threatened thrust of the e－pawn，White has hardly anything bet－ ter than this offer to exchange，which， however，should suffice．

## 26．．．${ }^{\mu} \times b 4$

If Black wanted to play for a win，then he could have pulled the queen back to a7 without risk．After the queen ex－ change，it would have been the most reasonable for him to accept the opponent＇s correctly offered draw．

## 27．cxb4



## 27．．．a3

To his regret，the author has to state that this，his brain child－although it looks quite aesthetic on the surface－in no way merits the exclamation mark awarded it by most all critics．To the contrary，this move should have led， with correct technique on the part of the first player，to a compromise of the black position，and after 27．．．©d5 $28 . a 3$ （or b5）f5，etc．，to an easy draw．

## 

As desired，although not yet jeopardiz－ ing Black＇s game；on the other hand， 30.8 b 3 ！would have put a rather diffi－ cult task in front of the opponent，be－ cause after $30 \ldots$ ．．． 8 d 8 ，then $31 . a 4$ ！would follow－with the threat of speedily us－ ing the queenside pawn preponderance by means of a5，a4，together with b5， etc．Admittedly，different counterattacks －like ．．．』d1 + ，together with ．．． 8 d 2 and ．．．$\circlearrowright g 4 ;$ or ．．．e3，together with ．．． gd2，etc． －were then at Black＇s disposal．Yet，even so，a draw would be Black＇s best result－ and this only after a tough battle．If，how－ ever， 30 ． gb 3 b 5 ，then 31．${ }^{\text {．}} \mathrm{f} 1$ ，and the Blackrook couldn＇t penetrate．Now Black forces a quite pleasant rook endgame．

##  

Black＇s position is not really strength－ ened，especially since White threatens to free up a corner pawn；if，for ex－ ample，34．．．巴a4 35．घc1 ©d5 36．b5！ c×b5 37． Bc c ，etc．

## 

Hardly had the rook endgame begun， when White already commits the deci－ sive error．As becomes immediately apparent，the idea to defend the b－pawn from the fourth rank is quite an unfor－ tunate one，and the intended cordoning off of the black king from the queenside is not executable．Correct was 36． Bb 3 ！， in connection with an immediate exploi－ tation of the kingside chances；for ex－ ample，36．．．e5 37．马e3＋©ig 5 38． 9 f 3
肖 $\times$ b4 42．g4，etc．Then a drawn ending could hardly fail to materialize．

## 

As a result，Black obtains a winning position，since after $\mathrm{g} 4 \mathrm{f}^{+}$，the pawn obviously still can＇t be taken．

## 38． 9 f4＋©

Although not in great time pressure， Black favors figuring out the not－so－ easy－to－calculate consequences of the king move to d 5 only after the time con－ trol at move 40．At this moment，he is certainly still able to allow himself this luxury．But his next，indifferent，move seriously imperils the win．

## 40．8f4＋© Cl （？ ）

The king had to move specifically to e6，in order to be able to go from there immediately to d 5 ，because he mustn＇t
go to f6 any more－since the position would repeat for the third time．After this omission，White again gets chances for a draw．

## 


 e7－f8，etc．－draw．

### 42.94

His only chance；insufficient would be
 $\mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{b} 4$ ！（not so clear by far are the conse－ quences of $44 \ldots . . \Xi \times b 445 . \Xi \times f 7$ ，etc．）

 $49.9 \times f 7$ b3 50.9 ff 6 a3！，etc．With his 40th move，Black gave up precisely this advantage out of convenience．

## 42．．．c×b4

Even after $42 \ldots$ ．．．$\times$ b4 43 ．$コ \times b 4$ cxb 4 44．©e2，Black would still have had some difficulties．Correct for him then would be the following： 44 ．．．${ }^{\text {e }} 6$


 $54 . \mathrm{h} 5 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{h} 555 . \mathrm{g} \times \mathrm{h} 5$ 臽 g 5 －draw．

Contrived；after the simpler 43 ．．．g×h5 $44 . \mathrm{g} \times \mathrm{h} 5$ b5，White would have a diffi－ cult game－for example， $45 . \mathrm{h} 6 \mathrm{~b} 3$
 gh47，etc．

But after $46.9 \times 24$（instead of 46.9 e 3 ） 46．．．b×a4 47．h7 b2 48．h8筲 b1甾＋ 49． e 2，the queen endgame would have been very difficult，if possible at all，for Black to win．

## $44 . \mathrm{h6}$ b3 45．日e3

The rook exchange would clearly be less favorable now than in the variation above． On the other hand，now the fourth rank is blocked at the moment by the white g－ pawn，so that White succeeds in captur－ ing the enemy passed pawn，without hav－ ing to surrender his own．

## 45．．．b2 46．${ }^{\text {y }} \mathrm{b} 3$ 宣c6

Of course not 46．．．9a1＋47．${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{g} 2 \mathrm{~b} 1$ 甾 48． $3 \times$ b1，together with h 7 ．

## 47．${ }^{1} \times \mathrm{b} 2($ ？$)$

This should also suffice；but 47．f3！ga3 （47．．．日a2 48． g g 1 ！） $48 . \mathrm{g} \times \mathrm{b} 2 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{f} 3+$
 much easier．

## 

Black has to let the enemy rook advance to the eighth rank－since $48 \ldots$ ．．． b 7 49．Ic5 b4？，would be a worse trap to fall into because of 50.3 g 5 ！．

## 电c7

## Cycle I：Round 2

Obviously，the king may not move for－ ward because of h7，and the last，weak chance of a win for Black now consists in his crossing over，where possible，to the kingside．

## 

If53．．．gf3，then 54．gf8！ $9 \times f 2+55 .{ }^{\text {enb }} 3$ छ゙h2 $56.9 \times f 7+$ ，together with ．．．h7－ draw．

## 54．be c1！




## 

The winning of the f2－pawn with 55 ．．．gh2 was still of no importance on account of a later g f8，etc．

## 56． $6 \times$ b3

Here White appears to have seen a ghost，since otherwise he would have chosen the quite simple path to a draw：

 White can allow himself some things in this position．

## 56．．．酉e5！57．家c4

After an inferior move－again quite a good one．His idea consists in answer－ ing the threatening advance of the black king in case of need with an analogous maneuver of his own－for example，
 60．©e7 f5 61．itf etc．，draw．What＇s more， 58 ．कd 3 looms，with a fully se－ cure position．

## 57．．．曽h3！

Black still tries everything possible，but should not have succeeded．

## 58．昌e8＋

In connection with the following，prob－ ably the simplest process．

## 安g461．日e4＋

With this，the next mistake is prepared． Safest was to reach a draw with 61 ．${ }^{\text {en }}$ e2！


## 61．．．क्ष日3



## 62． 9 f4？

With this instructive mistake，White al－ lows the decisive encircling of his re－ maining pawn． 62 ． e ，etc．，would still have sufficed for a draw．

## 62．．．f5 63． 9 ．f3＋

Loses quickly，but after 63．§a 4 ，as well as after 63. ．te2，Black would have ul－ timately won with $63 \ldots$ ．．． 2 2，etc．

63．．．Wh2！64．日f4 日h3＋0－1

There would follow 65 ．．．． e g2，where－ upon the white pawn obviously can＇t be saved．
（6）Marshall－Vidmar
Four Knights Game［C49］

## 1．e4 e5 2．Df 4．Db5 Db4 5．0－0 0－0 6．d3 \＆$\times \mathrm{c} 3$ 7．bxc3 d6 8．Lg 5 留e7

The well－known Metger Defense， which usually leads to difficult posi－ tional battles after 9.9 e 1 ©c6－d8－e6， and lately is preferred，especially by Rubinstein．It＇s not so dangerous for White，however，that he has to imme－ diately lay waste to the position by the following unimaginative exchange．

## 

If the first player let himself be misled into the exchange on c6 because of his ensuing occupation of the b－file，then he evidently overestimated the value of this pressure－because the penetration－ point b7 is protected for now，and even if the white rook succeeds in occupy－ ing it for a moment，this fact wouldn＇t have great meaning in most cases．

## 10．．．h6 11．$\times$ x 6

After 11．Wh 4, ．．．g5 could have occurred quite harmlessly．

## 11．．．留 $\times$ f6 12．算e2

More prudent first would be 12．c4，in order not to have to work with the du－ bious sacrificial offers that follow．

## 12．．．쌉e6！

Not only is ${ }^{\mu} \times 22$ threatened，but also f5 14．exf5 甾xf5，etc．，with a clear po－ sitional advantage．Therefore Marshall decides to go all out．

## 13．Dh4！？



## 13．．．씅f6？

This queen move，in connection with the following repetition，bears witness to a timidity in no way resembling the usual Dr．Vidmar．After 13．．．尚 $\times$ a2 ， what dangers hovered before him？Af－ ter $14 . c 4$（otherwise the queen heads back immediately），14．．．．부a5 $15 . f 4$（or 15．甾e3 c7）15．．．exf4（or first
 16．Rflxf4，Qa5－g5 17．Rbl－fl，a7－a5， etc．，White probably would have sought in vain for compensation for the dan－ gerous passed pawn．In any case，the position was worth playing out．

## 14． $2 f 3$ Me6 15．Oh4

Encouraged by the opponent＇s appar－ ent peacefulness，for the second time White lets the pawn hang．

Draw！

## Round 3

1 Capablanca－Marshall 0
$1 / 2$ Alekhine－Nimzovich $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Vidmar－Spielmann $1 / 2$
Standings after Round 3：
Capablanca $21 / 2$
Alekhine 2
Nimzovich $1 / 1 / 2$
Vidmar 11／2
Spielmann 1
Marshall $1 / 2$
（7）Capablanca－Marshall Bogo－Indian Defense［E11］

## 1．d4 〇f6 2． $2 f 3$ e6 $3 . c 4$ Db4＋ 4． $\mathrm{d}^{2} \mathrm{D} \times \mathrm{d} 2+5 . \varrho \mathrm{b} \times \mathrm{d} 2 \mathrm{~d}$ ？

Just after White had taken back with the knight，it was entirely out of place to introduce the prospect of a piece com－ ing to the c 4 －square by bringing about a balanced position in the center．In－ stead，now 5 ．．．d6，together with ．．．e5， is in accord with the bishop exchange on the fourth move－in order to occupy the dark squares，no longer guarded by the bishop－which disappeared so quickly－with pawns．

## 6．g3 0－07．Dg2 $\mathrm{D}^{2}$ bd7 8．0－0씁e7

Likewise，the immediate 8．．．b6 came under consideration here．But the text move is not as bad as the commenta－ tors have said．

## 9．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{g}$ c2 b6（！）

Looks like a kind of blunder，but in re－ ality exactly calculated．Neither could

White have obtained a tangible and strong advantage with continuations other than the one he chose－for example， $10 . \doteq$ e 5 ©xe5 11．dxe5 $0 g 4$ ！12．cxd5 exd5 $13.8 \times \mathrm{d} 5 \mathrm{gb} 8$ ，and e5 falls．

Or instead of the 11 th move played in the game（11．e4），11．a3，then 11．．．c5！，and Black，who would sometimes have the tempo－gainer 12．．． 8 a6 at his disposal， would apparently emerge unscathed．

## 

The point of the relief maneuver，intro－ duced with $9 \ldots . . \mathrm{b} 6$ ．On the other hand， unsatisfactory would be 11．．．〇5f6
 on account of 15.9 b3 or $15 . \mathrm{b} 3$ ，etc．

## 12．雍c3（！）

In this way，at least the troublesome knight is driven to the modest a6－ square．Wrong，of course，would be
 with gfc8，etc．

## 12．．．c5

Not 12．．．\＆a6？，because of $13 . a 3$ ！$\& \times f 1$ $14 . \mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{xf}}$ ，etc．

13．a3 乌46


Unfavorable would be 13．．．今c6，on ac－ count of 14．d5！，etc．

## $14 . \mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{c} 5$

Very characteristic of Capablanca＇s style， a resolution of tension that，admittedly， eliminates even the idea of the danger of a loss for him，but met with a correct－ and a very obvious－response，should lead to very little．A more complicated game－and in my opinion one in White＇s favor－would result from 14．gfe 1！\＄b7 15．d5，or the immediate 14．d5．

## 14．．．b×c5？

Unbelievable，since taking back with the queen appears to be a downright matter of course．After 14．．．M M x 5

 ©f6，together with gad8，etc．Black would have reached a draw without dif－ ficulty．Instead he gets an incurable pawn weakness on the queenside with－ out any offsetting counter－attack．A sad game！

## 15．2c4 \＄b7 16．Dfe5！

Again，a true Capablanca move，but this time，a flawless one．The idea，to keep just the＂good＂c4－knight against the ＂bad one＂on a6－while he eliminates the other two through exchange－is convincing．

## 

Threatens the unpleasant invasion of the knight to d6．

[^1]Also，the immediate $21.5 \times \mathrm{d} 8+$ ，to－ gether with 22 ．萷b3，was strong，al－ though not yet decisive．

## 21．．．〇b8

Apparently Capablanca had waited for this attempt to lead the knight back to lively regions，in order to take advan－ tage，where possible，of the momen－ tarily adjourned position of the black pieces on the b－file．With proper de－ fense，it shouldn＇t have been so easy for him to succeed．

##  24．Oh3



## 24．．． 0 c6？

It＇s clear at first sight that Black isn＇t exactly sitting pretty．But that he decides to give away the threatened pawn with－ out a fight can be explained only through a combinational miscalculation or an unreal notion of attack．In fact， after 24 ．．．${ }^{6} \mathrm{f} 7$－although this move ap－ pears risky enough－no direct benefit for White can be established；for ex－ ample， $25 . ⿹ \mathrm{e} 3$ 甾c8！－and now 26. ．〇f5甾c7，as well as $26.8 \times e 6+$ 畑 $\times$ e6
 to no avail．White would have to look for（but would he find？）subtler ways
to give the game a make－or－break twist after 24．．．兽f7．

## 

Any thought of attack by Black is nipped in the bud by the guarded cen－ tral position of the white bishop．

##  

Desperation，since White，among other things，threatens 30．b4．

## 30．e5！

Decisive．
30．．．f $\times 5$ 31．${ }^{\mu} \times \mathrm{c} 5 \mathrm{~h} 5$ 32． $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{f} 8+$ th77 33．Dig8＋© th6 34．씁d6＋g6 35．씁f8＋1－0
（8）Alekhine－Nimzovich
English Opening［A14］

## 1．Df 3 Df6 $2 . c 4$ e6 3．乌c3 b64．g3

Other than this system of development， which was very popular a few years ago mainly because of Réti＇s successes with it，White can very well use one of the following variations：（1） $4 . \mathrm{d} 4$ \＆ D b 7 5．\％ g 5 ，together with e3，7．\％d 3 ，etc．； （2） $4 . e 4$ \＆b7 5．d3（5．e5？©e4）－this last according to a stratagem intro－ duced，not without success，by Nimzovich in Dresden 1926.

##  （？）

After $7 . \mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{cxd} 48.0 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ 昷 $\times \mathrm{g} 2$ 9．${ }^{6} \times \mathrm{g} 2$ ， etc．，things would be good for White （see a similar position in the

Capablanca－Vidmar game from the fourth round）．But now the opponent succeeds in seizing the initiative．

## 7．．．d5！8．乞e5

Recognizing the inexpediency of his last move，White wants at any cost to complicate the game with a defensive position sufficient for a draw，instead of simply 8．cxd5 $0 \times \mathrm{d} 59.8 \mathrm{D} 2 \mathrm{dff}$ ，etc．

## 8．．．乌bd79．f4

The consequence of the previous move， since any exchange in the center would only further the enemy＇s development．

## 9．．．昷d6 10．cxd5



10．．．exd5
A testimony to momentary lack of cour－ age and resolve！As the conductor of the white pieces proved upon comple－ tion of the game，Black would be able to get a promising game here if he had decided on a－probably only tempo－ rarily－pawn sacrifice．For example，
 $13 . e \times f 7+$ 曾xf7 $14 .{ }^{6} \times g 2$ ge8！，with strong pressure on the center file－ mainly because of the weakened posi－ tion of the white king．After the text
move，White may get an advantage more easily．

## 11．©c4！

Black seems to have overlooked this simple response．

## 11．．．씁b8！

Still the only move，since a retreat of the bishop would have had an immediate dis－ advantage because of $12 . \emptyset e 3$ ！，etc．

## $12.2 \times d 6+12 . . . \mu \times d 613 . d 3$

White，dissatisfied with his handling of the opening，aspires only to a draw and frees the center．Instead of this，with the continuation 13．d4 0－0 14．\＆a3，etc．，he could still fashion a game quite inter－ esting and risk－free for himself since， in this case，the pressure from White＇s bishops on the c－and d－pawns would have been more than sufficient compen－ sation for any possible black counter－ play on the e－file．

## 13．．．0－0 14．e4 dxe4 15．dxe4 Mat

The only move，but sufficient．
 18．exd5 $\Delta f 6$ 19．\＆b2 $\theta^{\circ} \times d 5$


Black of course plays 21．．．．〇d5 and keeps the knight in this strong position．

## （9）Vidmar－Spielmann

Queen＇s Indian Defense［E14］

## 1．d4 亿f6 2．Øf3c5 3．e3

By all means，very tame．If White doesn＇t want to opt for $3 . \mathrm{d} 5$ ，which ac－
tually has a downside，then he can well enough try $3 . c 4$ ；if after that， $3 \ldots . . c x d 4$ $4.0 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ e6 5.0 c 3 ，which happened， among other games，in Przepiórka－ Spielmann，Munich 1926，then 6．甾b3 © $267.93!\pm$.

## 3．．．b6

But this response is artificial and in this respect illogical，as White will succeed， with d 5 ，in blocking the diagonal of the fianchettoed bishop．Instead of this，the simple 3．．．d5（4．Dd3 Dc6，or perhaps 4．．．．${ }^{\text {g }} 4$ ，etc．），as well as the tempo－ rizing $3 \ldots e 6$ ，could occur without dis－ advantage．

## 4．c4！

Naturally．

## $4 . . . c \times d 4$ 5．exd4 e6 6．Od3 皿b7 7．0－0 县 e 7 8．0c3 0－0（？）

After this imprecise move，Black could have gotten into an awkward defensive position．Correct was first of all 8．．．d6， in order to be able to answer $9 . \mathrm{d} 5$ with 9．．．e5．

## 9．d5！d6

Obviously disadvantageous would be 9．．．exd5 10．cxd5 $0 \times d 5$ 11． $0 \times d 5$ 昷xd5 12． $\mathrm{P} \times \mathrm{h} 7+$ ，together with $13 . \mathrm{m} \times \mathrm{m} 5 \pm$ ．

## $10 . d \times e 6$（？）

Playing on the apparent weaknesses， d 6 and e6，is obvious，and superficially tempting．But Black gets more than suf－ ficient counter－play in his reinvigorated queen＇s bishop and the open f－file．The logical consequence of the previous

## Cycle I：Round 3

move was 10．⿹d4！e5（10．．．．．́．c8 11．日e1）11．$\searrow \mathrm{ff} 5$ ，together with $12 . f 4$ ， etc．，with a positional advantage diffi－ cult to off set．

## 10．．．fxe6 11．乞d4

Offering better prospects is 11.0 g 5甾c8 12．ఏe1 e5 13．甾c2，for example， 13．．．h6（better is 13 ．．．…g4） 14 ．\＆\＆f 甾c6 15．©d5！，etc．The advance of the knight， intended with the text move，proved meaningless．

## 11．．．씁c8！12．씁e2

Also after 12． g e1，Black gradually would have gotten counter－play；for example，12．．．e5 13．\＆ff ©bd7 14．Re6＋©h8 15．⿹f5 Me8 16． $0 \times \mathrm{d} 6$


## 12．．．e5 13．©f5 Qbd7 14．ge6＋并h8 15．〇f 5 Me8 16．Dg 3

Disappointed over the failure of his imprecisely calculated expedition （16．$D \mathrm{~b} 5$ ？©c5！，etc．），Dr．Vidmar sounds the retreat rather than securing the weapon －although in this position rather harm－ less－of the bishop pair with $16.0 \times \mathrm{xe} 7$前xe7 17．\＆h3，etc．Now Black＇s counter－ play on the c－file begins．

## 16．．．Dc5 17．Oh3 Mc6 18．\＆e3 

The voluntary exchange of this bishop， which was so necessary for the defense of the dark squares，is inconceivable from a player of Dr．Vidmar＇s class．For example，19．gfd1（19．．．De6 20．0d 5 ， etc．）was possible，when White was not at all without chances．

19．．．씁 xc5 20．昌ac1
Still，20．gfd1 appears to be more logical．

## 20．．．2a6！21．Dce4 Dxe4 22．Dxe4 Mc6 23．씁e3？



Clearly，White overlooks that his c－ pawn can be taken；otherwise he would have deflected the threat，．．．d5－for example，with 23．${ }^{\text {Md }}$ 3！（ $23 \ldots$ ．．d5 24.甾×d5，甾×d5 25．cxd5 昷xf1 26. ＊$\times \mathrm{f} 1 \pm$ ），whereupon his position could without a doubt be held．After the text mistake，on the other hand，Black ob－ tains a decidedly winning position．

## 23．．． $8 \times 4$ ！

An unpleasant surprise for White．With 24．b3？，he would not only fail to win a piece after $24 \ldots$ ．．． 525.0 d 2 \＆\＆ m 5 or 25.0 g 5 甾g6，but would even suffer a material disadvantage．And as he plays， it＇s true he succeeds in momentarily avoiding the threatening pawn sacrifice， but only at the cost of further strength－ ening Black＇s pressure on both flanks．

## 24．2d2 d5 25． $0 \times \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 4$ 26．甾 $\times$ e5 是 $c 5$ ？

From this moment on，it is again Black who begins to play more and more
weakly，until he brings about a drawn position．More compelling than this threat on f 2 was strengthening the pres－ sure on the queenside by means of 26．．． $\mathrm{Mf} 6!$－for example，27． $\mathrm{m} f 4$ b5
 with threats that in the long run would be indefensible．

## 27．씁h5 씁f6

Putting the queen on the f－file and thereby leaving d 4 exposed is in any case clumsy preparation for $27 \ldots \times 2+$ ．Strong was 27．．．．．．．e4！（threatening 28．．．घxf2！，etc．） 28．©h $10 \times 52$ ，and White wouldn＇t get in the important defensive move g 3 ，as he did in the game．

The pitfall $29 . \mathrm{Exc}_{\mathrm{x}} \mathrm{qg} \mathrm{g}$ ！was already
 gether with $\left.{ }^{( } \mathrm{ff} 6-\mathrm{f} 1+\mathrm{xc} 4\right)$ ．

## 29．．．씁c6＋

Although the chances of winning had in large part evaporated during the last moves，there＇s a last attempt to make
 31．\％ 2 甾c5，etc．



## Round 4

（10）Capablanca－Vidmar
English Opening［A30］

## 1．d4 Df6 2. Df3 e6 3．c4 b6 $4 . g 3$皿 $b 7$ 5．日2 c5

$1 / 2$ Capablanca - Vidmar $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Marshall - Alekhine $1 / 2$
1 Nimzovich - Spielmann 0

Standings after Round 4：
Capablanca 3
Alekhine $21 / 2$
Nimzovich 2 $1 / 2$
Vidmar 2
Spielmann 1
Marshall 1

I still consider this move disadvanta－ geous because of the possibility of $6 . \mathrm{d} 5$ ， and prefer both $5 \ldots$ b4＋and $5 \ldots$ e7．

## 6．0－0

On the other hand，this answer，although sound，is quite harmless in nature，and allows Black various ways to reach equality．

## 皿7

But this is inconsequential，since Black absolutely had to aspire as quickly as possible to deal with the weakness on the d－file．Admittedly，with this in mind， the immediate $8 \ldots . . \mathrm{d} 5$ wouldn＇t yet go well because of 9．．． 4 4 4 ！（Capablanca－ Alekhine，third match game）－but 8．．．甾c8！would have been the proper preparation to this end；for example， 9．b3（9．留d3 气c6！）9．．．』e7 10．2b2甾b7＋11．f3 d5 12．cxd5 今xd5 13．M d2 0－0 $14 . e 4$ へf6，etc．

## 9．20c3 0－0（？）

Still，9．．．．．．．c8（10．b3 d5！，etc．）comes into keen consideration．After the text
move，the d－pawn remains perpetually underdeveloped．

## 10．e4！Mc8

A tempo too late！

##  

Dr．Vidmar played less than exactly the whole first part of the game．For ex－ ample，why did he need to develop the White queen here？Simpler was imme－ diately ．．．d6．

## 

And now this obvious loss of tempo！

## 16．씁d3 © ${ }^{\text {en }} 17$. gad1 d6

In spite of many inaccuracies，the Black position is still rather solid since，as is well known， d 6 in this variation in the middle game can be defended without difficulty．In the following play， Capablanca tries to implement his only seriouschance，a flank attack．Actually， this plan demands quite a rigorous de－ fense from his opponent，who certainly possesses substantially smaller freedom of terrain．

## 18．日e2 登d7 19．日ed2 昌ad8 20. 亿e2

The simplest way to prevent ．．．d5 once and for all（because of $8 \times f 6$ ，etc．）．

## 20．．．씁a8

In order to move the knight to e 8 ，which at this point one would hesitate to relo－ cate because of 21．e5！．

## 21．씁e3 h6 22．h4 M．${ }^{\mu}$ b7 $23 . a 4$

To prevent the liberating possibility ．．．bs for all time．

## 23．．．〇e8 24．⿹f4 Df6 25. Dxf勺×f6 26.94 亿h7

Therefore White＇s attack has only little chance of success，because the knight on f 4 is restricted in its movement since d 5 is guarded．If the knight abandons this square（for h5，for example），e5 could occur much sooner．Then interesting pos－ sibilities would open up for the Black knight to break into the position．So Capablanca soon starts to prepare him－ self for the transition to a rook endgame．

## 27．씁c3 $2 f 828 . g 5 \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 5$ 29．h $\times \mathrm{g} 5$ Dg6！

Hear，hear！If now $30 . \circlearrowright h 5$ ，then $30 \ldots$ e 5 31．tg3 崮c7，together with ．．．ef8 and ．．．씁d8，etc．White has nothing better than to exchange．

## 30．⿹\zh26灬 6 fxg6 31．씁d4 씁 6

The occupation of c5 establishes a sat－ isfactory counter－trump for Black．

##  35．${ }^{\text {gh }} 2$



## 35．．．$\mu \mathrm{M} \times \mathrm{d} 4$ ？

Since White（1）can＇t trade queens with－ out disadvantage（on account of ．．．bxc5， together with pressure on b3；or here even because of ．．． $\mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{c} 5$ ，together with advancing into the d－file）；and（2）like－ wise White couldn＇t very well avoid the queen exchange（ m c3 or b2）because of ．．．d5！，etc．－here a temporizing atti－ tude was the simplest way to a draw． Thus correct for Black was ${ }^{\text {big }} 8$－ $\mathrm{f} 7-\mathrm{g} 8$ ， etc．，until White himself decided to change the position．The fact that，in－ stead of this，Dr．Vidmar got himself into an at least dubious endgame，with－ out being forced，is probably explained only by time pressure．

## 

In my opinion，this strategic break ought better to occur after the next tempo；for example，38． 44 d 3 ！备e7（or e8）39．f5 gxf5＋（if39．．．．${ }^{6} 7740 . f \times e 6+$ ，together with 41．gd 5 ，followed by Bb 5 －or sometimes， e5 $\pm$ ）． $40 . e x f 5$ exf5 +41 ．${ }^{6} \times f 5$ 㒶f 7 $42 . \mathrm{g} 6+$ ，with a winning position．In other variations also，the positional advantage is transformed into tangible assets more easily than with the text move．

## 38．．．g×f5 $\mathbf{3 9 . e x f 5} 5 \times f 5+40$ ．${ }^{6} \times f 5$ 



The only－if temporary－save against the threat $\mathrm{g} \mathrm{f} 2+$ and g f 6 ，with a win－ ning position．If 41．．． 42．${ }^{\text {ghh}} 2$ ！，etc．（see below）．

## 42． $\mathbf{3}$ f2＋？

This leads only to a draw．The correct utilization of the painstakingly achieved advantage had to begin with a tempo move－for example，42． 44 d 3 ！．If next 42．．．${ }^{6}$ e8，then 43．日h 2 ！，and after the exchange of the rook pair，the remain－ ing White rook would advance either to f6 or b8：43．．．${ }^{\text {bf }} 8$（or 43．．．gf7
 （threatening 46．®h6） 45 ．．．gf8 46． Exf 8曾xf8 47．§h8 ${ }^{2}$－anywhere 48．⿷b8， etc．On the other hand，Capablanca forces the rook exchange with an unfa－ vorable change in the position of his pawns，so that Dr．Vidmar saves the game easily．

## 42．．．gf743． $\mathbf{g}$ f6

If $43 . \mathrm{Rfd} 2$ ，then $43 . . . \mathrm{Ke} 7=$ ．

##  

Much simpler than ．．．gf5,$+ \ldots$ ．． $\mathrm{g} \times f 6$ ．
48.8d5 deff

The gentlemen could have saved them－ selves the following．





## Cycle I：Round 4

## （11）Marshall－Alekhine

Torre Attack［A47］

## 1．d4 Df6 2． $2 f 3$ b6

It＇s more common recently to start with ．．．e6 and only then ．．．b6．The most played riposte， $3 . c 4$ ，admittedly results in a mere transposition，and only the move applied by Marshall in this game puts the contest on another track．

## 3．\＆g5 3．\＆ $\mathbf{~ b ~}$

If Black had played ．．．e6 on the second move，then $3 \ldots \mathrm{c} 5$ ，together with ．．．皆b8， etc．，would have been available，as is well known．On the other hand，here 3 ．．．c5 would be unfavorable because of the response 4．d5．Other than the move played，only the answer 3 ．．．©e 4 came into consideration for Black－for ex－ ample，with the continuance 4． h 4
 c5！，．．．g6，together with ．．．9g7，etc．）－ when the not－so－easily eliminated bishop pressure on e7 would create an Achilles＇Heel．

## 4． 2 bd2 e6

A dangerous experiment：only because of the pair of bishops does Black allow the opponent to occupy a strong cen－ tral position in good old style．Less ac－ commodating and also more in har－ mony with the second move here was 4．．．c5！．

##  8．씁e2 My

In order to develop the king＇s bishop， which would be questionable to do at this time because of $9 . e 5$ ．Black falls
behind in development and already has to grasp at such artificial，strained maneu－ vers just to keep afloat．Pernitting e4 without a struggle was just reprehensible．

## 9．0－0 Re7 10．$^{\text {Pad1 }}$

Until this，White had made the right moves．But here it was time，in light of his better development，to conceive a vigorous middlegame plan－for ex－ ample，to construct a mighty attack po－ sition with $10 . \mathrm{c} 3$ ，and on $10 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 7$ ， 11．$D \mathrm{e} 1$ ！，together with $12 . f 4,13 . \emptyset \mathrm{ef} 3$ ， 14．Đae1，etc．，without allowing the opponentany kind of a chance．The text move is certainly not bad，but has the small disadvantage of allowing the fol－ lowing counterblow in the center．

## 10．．． $2 d 711 . c 3$ c5（！）

Black had to，cost what it would，some－ how distract the opponent from his thoughts about mate，before he decides to castle．After 11．．．0－0 12．⿹e1！，fol－ lowed by $13 . f 4$ ，together possibly with ©e1－c2－乌e3，would be alarning．

## 12．d×c5

With this，he changes his plan and wants to profit from the d－file．His next move， however，already shows that he had not quite worked out the precise details of this plausible plan．

## 12．．．b×c5 13．Db5？

After this，Black succeeds in completely securing himself，and even gradually gets an advantage．White should try to rob his opponent of his only effective counter－weapon，the pair of bishops， and with this in mind，by all means play
 etc．，Black would admittedly avoid im－ mediate material disadvantage－but the weaknesses of his queenside light squares，together with the d6－square＇s need for protection，would doubtlessly give him serious concerns during the further course of the game．

## 13．．．a6

Not immediately $13 \ldots 0-0$ because of 14． 0 c 4 甾c7 15．皿xd7！筸xd7 16． $0 \times d 6$ alad6 $17 . e 5 \pm$ ，etc．

## 14．Qa4 0－0－0 15．© 2

The bishop actually has nothing better than to retreat ruefully，because if 15 ． ©c4，Black would have a satisfactory parry in 15 ．．． D 66 ．

##  ©f8 18． $\mathbf{g}$ fd1

All these efforts to take advantage of the supposed weakness on d6 remain unsuccessful and have，as a conse－ quence，only promoted further devel－ opment of the Black pieces．

## 18．．．a5

Perhaps more exact was 18 ．．．${ }^{\text {gab8，in }}$ order to relinquish b5 to the White pieces only in an emergency．But the text move proves to be good．

##  21．20b5 씁c6 22．씁e3

The knight has just advanced proudly to b 5 －now events prove that he could not be kept there without an offsetting positional disadvantage．Because if the
threat 22 ．．． 2 f 4 is warded off with $23 . \mathrm{g} 3$ ， then Black has the pleasant choice be－ tween 23．．．c4 24． $0 \times \mathrm{x} 4$ 甾xe4，etc．，or possibly ．．． d 5 ，exploiting the weakness of the hl －a8 diagonal．

## 22．．．c4 23．Dbd4 Mc5 24．昷b1



The second player succeeds not only in overcoming the opening difficulties，but also in getting a not－to－be－undervalued middlegame as well as an endgame tar－ get，in the form of the fixed pawn on b2．For the purpose of utilizing the op－ portunity， $24 \ldots$ ．．． 18 ，together with ${ }^{\text {gb6 }}$ ， Idb8，etc．，probably makes the most sense at this juncture．Also 24．．．${ }^{\text {bem }}$ f8，as preparation for the knight move to e5， has much to say for itself．Instead of this，a small，hasty slip occurs，which pernits the opponent to force an equal－ izing simplification of the game．

## 24．．．ضe5（？） $25.0 \times e 5 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{e} 5$

With 25 ．．．甾xe5，White would come by an attack with $26 . f 4$ ，together with doubled rooks on the f－file，and ulti－ mately e5．

## 26．Df5！

The only move，because if，for example， 26.0 c 2 ，then $26 \ldots . . \Xi \times \mathrm{d} 227 . \Xi \times \mathrm{d} 2$ 皿 c 6 ！， etc．，to Black＇s clear advantage．

## Cycle I：Round 4

## 26．．．日xd2 27． $0 \times$ e7＋甾×e7 28． $3 \times \mathrm{d} 2$ ！

After 28． $\mathrm{m} \times \mathrm{d} 2$ \＆ c 6 ！，together with ．．．． 4 ，Black would remain with the advantage．Now however，the some－ what passive position of the bishop on bl and the weakness on b 2 is compen－ sated for by the fact that White controls the only open file．The game could ac－ tually already have been a draw here． But Marshall imagines things look bet－ ter－obtaining，however，in the next dozen moves，only a worsening of his pawn position，whereby his kingside dark squares are weakened．

## 28．．．皿c6 29．h3 씁b7 30．쓸e2 씁b5 31．씁d1 कh7 32．씁f 3 且e8 33 ．씁e3 Qc634．a3

Hardly necessary at this point．This move，which condemned the b－pawn to immobility，should have occurred only in the case of ．．．a4．

## 34．．．씁b7 35．씁e2 且b5 36．씁e3 Qc6 37．f3 甾e7 38．Da2 D ${ }^{\text {D }} 5$ 

After White，without an obvious rea－ son，abandons the important diagonal $\mathrm{gl-a} 7$ ，Black＇s position is preferable．

## 

Obviously not 42． Exf f？苗g8，etc．

## 

From here on，with the＂threat＂of f4， White begins to speculate about the fol－ lowing discovered check．At any mo－ ment，Black was able to put an end to his opponent＇s hopes with ．．．g6，to－
gether with ．．． 87 ，etc．，butdidn＇t want to，because he himself was dreaming of winning chances after f 4 ．

## 43．．．贝a4 44．8a2 Db5 45．8b1国446．흡 1

So that after $f 4 \times 55$ ，the black queen re－ captures without check．

## 46．．．Eb6



If Black didn＇t want to decide on ．．．g6， then 46 ．．． 9 b 8 would be better here．If White then hadn＇t also been fooled into f4，he certainly would have slowly fallen into a disadvantage anyway．

## 47．f4

This strategically defective move is still playable here on account of a tactical trick．As will be seen，Black now could well－nigh force a drawn ending－but since White couldn＇t win without this move，the break through is not to be blamed．

47．．．db3
It＇s clear that 47 ．．．exf4 would be disad－ vantageous because of $48 . e 5+$ ，．．．g6 49. Md4，etc．But by the same token，the c4－pawn has to be covered somehow
because of the threat $48 . \mathrm{f} \times \mathrm{e} 5$ ，together with ${ }^{\mu} \times \mathrm{c} 4$ ．With this in mind，other than the text move，only $47 \ldots$ ．．． Q 5 and ．．．${ }^{\text {ec }} 6$ come under consideration．With the former，White probably would have chosen the same continuation as in the game and with approximately the same effect；but in the second case，the con－ tinuation 48．fxe5 崮e5 49．日d5！，睤4！ 50 ．e5,+ g651．${ }^{[ } \times a 5 \pm$ ，etc．，would have been more unpleasant for the Black．

## 48．fxe5 씁xe5 49．씁e3！

Now the downsides of Black＇s 46th move are clearly evident，since this important queen move can occur with an attack tempo．On the other hand，the immediate 49． g d 5 would fail because of 49 ．．． $\mathrm{m} f 4$ ！ 50．e5＋，g6 51．日d2，日b5，etc．，when Black would have the advantage．

## 49．．．昌c6



 Black was immediately able to force a draw．With the text move，he goes for complications in the hope of withstand－ ing the dangerous－looking attack and then being able successfully to assail the somewhat exposed e－pawn．As the out－ come shows，the plan is far too risky and should ultimately tum out to his disadvantage．

## 50．日月 15 ！

The entire change of attack initiated with move 47 is based on this riposte．The bishop，immobile for so long，finally has his say and as a result，his gamboling on the diagonal bl－h7 will cause the oppo－ nent a series of difficulties．

## 50．．．甾c7 51．e5＋由g8

After 51．．．g6 52．${ }^{\text {．d } 4, ~ w i t h ~ t h e ~ t h r e a t ~ o f ~}$ 53．ght 4 ，would be unbearable．

## 52．習d4

The king needs to remove himself as quickly as possible from the bishop＇s diagonal．By the way， 52 ．．． Bc 5 would obviously be premature because of 53．Me4，etc．

## 53．씁f

With the strong threat 54.8 ge，perhaps together with $55 . \mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{d}} 8+$ ．

## 53．．．te7



## 54．2h7！

A very strong move，whose idea con－ sists mainly of getting the bishop off the back rank without loss of time， which should be of great importance． First of all，there＇s the very strong threat of 55 ． R g8，etc．，forcing the next retreat of the queen．

## 54．．．씁b8 55．씁g3！름 5

Black has to try this counterattack，since with the defense $55 \ldots$ ．．． 8 ，the move

## Cycle I：Round 4

56．9g4！would be very unpleasant；for example， $56 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 657.8 \times \mathrm{g} 6!\mathrm{f} \times \mathrm{g} 6$
 58．Be4！，etc．，with decisive advantage．

## 56．${ }^{\text {ne4 }}$（？ ）

Marshall took advantage of Black＇s cocky 49th move quite nicely，and at last gets the advantage．But instead of choosing an obvious continuation，which would have assured him a favorable endgame， he can＇t resist，considering his style of play，the attempt to go for further com－ plexities－be it also per nefas－in the hope of mating his opponent ．．．

Correct here was $56 .{ }^{\mu} \times \mathrm{g} 7$ ！，with the consequence，say，of $56 \ldots$ ．．．$\times$ e5
 58．${ }^{[8 \times d} 5$ 甾 $\times \mathrm{d} 5$ ，etc．，when Black＇s chances of a draw are not unlikely．

## 56．．．䓢f8！

With that Black avoids the interesting trap 56．．．当h8 57．．．．．f2（the same move would of course win immediately after

 and wins．

## 57．2g6

Ineffective，as is everything else；the real chances utterly disappeared after the previous speculative move．

## 57．．．f5

With 57．．．f6，a draw could be forced： 58．尚f2！घxe5 59．日xe5 甾xe5 60．，尚a7览e1＋，etc．－perpetual check．

The text move is a last attempt at a win．

## 58． 1 d4！

According to circumstances，still the best，since after a rook retreat on the e－ file，58．．．Id5（which wouldn＇t be ad－ vantageous on the previous move be－ cause of $\mathrm{gf4} 4, \ldots \mathrm{gd} 7$ ， $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{f}} \mathrm{f}$ ，etc．），would be to Black＇s clear advantage．

## 58．．．씁 $\times 5$

Of course not 58．．．I ${ }^{\text {Pxe5}}$ on account of $59 . \mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{d}} 7$ ，with a winning position．

## 59．씁h4 씁f6 60．씁g3 씁e5 61．씁h4





## 61．．．씁f6

If Black hadn＇t had only two and a half minutes for the next 18 moves，here he probably would have tried 61．．．巴d5；but
 White threatening 甾c7 or 甾b8＋， Black＇s material advantage would hardly have shined．

62．씁g $3^{\text {Men e }} 5^{1 / 2}-1 / 2$
（12）Nimzovich－Spielmann
Nimzo－Larsen Opening［A03］

## 1．乞f3 d5 2．b3c5 3．D b2 乞c64．e3 ©f6

Why so resigned to relinquish control over e5 to White？At any rate，4．．． 84 or 4 ．．．a6 first，in order to reserve the choice between different plans of de－ velopment，would have been more vig－ orous．

## 5．Dib5 Nid7 6．0－0 e6 7．d3 Re7

He has to settle for this modest square of development，since $7 \ldots$ d6 is answered
 and would hardly be pleasant．

## 8．2bd2 0－0 9．2×c6

This exchange belongs to the overall plan of development，and there＇s no good purpose in putting it off further． The most plausible alternative was 9．씁e2，but after 9．．．昌c8 or $9 \ldots$ ．．． $\operatorname{M}$ c 7 （the consequence of ．．． $0 d 4$ would be advan－ tageous for White），he＇d be out of busi－ ness without the occupation of e5．

## 9．．．8×c6 10．乞e5 望c8

In the game from the next round，Dr． Vidmar chooses（as White）the deploy－ ment 10 ．．．． m c 7 ，．．．日ad8，but then also didn＇t get a fully satisfactory game． Here White unquestionably stands bet－ ter．

## 11．f4 Dd7 12．M ${ }^{-1}$ g 4

A specious but tempting move（after $12 . . f 5$ comes namely $13 .{ }_{\text {M }} \times \mathrm{g} 7+$ ！，etc．）． It has，of course，a fundamental disad－ vantage：from here on White puts all his hopes in a direct attack（and of course in all the material advantages obtained in connection with this），and as a result，an array of his other posi－ tional trumps（like the wonderful diago－ nals for the b 2 ，and the flexibility of the central pawn position）more or less steps into the shadows．With these con－ siderations，I would have favored here the dry follow－up $12.5 \times \mathrm{c} 6 \mathrm{O} \times \mathrm{c} 613 . \mathrm{e} 4$ ． But when all is said and done，it＇s a matter of taste and style：play as he does， Nimzovitch gets in any case a good，
secure game with some winning chances．

## 12．．．0 $2 \times 5$ 13． $2 \times e 5$

13．fxe5 would have been feeble on ac－ count of $13 \ldots$ 昷g5！，etc．

## 13．．．\＆f6 14．gf3 日 $\times 5$

On other moves，Black steps up the pressure with 15．©af1，etc．

## 15．f xe5 씁c7 16．씁h5



16．．．h6

One defensive move too many，after which the opponent finally seizes posi－ tional control．Advisable instead of this was $16 \ldots$ ．．． e ！（not ．．f5，because White would have exf6，with a later ${ }^{\text {M }} \mathrm{g} 4+$ ）， after which the－at first glance－the intimidating，and apparently decisive sacrifice 17. Inf $^{\text {f6！？wouldn＇t really have }}$ led to anything consequential after the natural 17．．．．Ma5 18．©f 3 h6！（19．9 $\times$ h6？ g×h6 20．留×h6 f6 21．exf6 盟c7）．White would have had to settle for the modest continuation 17. 胃h3，which after 17．．．h6 18．$巳 \mathrm{f} 3 \mathrm{f} 5$ 19．븐4 甾d8，etc．， would have lead to absolutely defen－ sible positions．

## 17．留af1 g6？

Now 17 ．．．${ }^{\text {el }} 8$ would have been already less effective than at the previous move， since White would exchange the e5－
 20．${ }^{\mu} f 4$ ！，together with $21 . 乞 f 3 \pm$ ．But for all that，there was no cause for the pawn sacrifice in the text，which leads to an admittedly slow，yet certainly lost endgame．Spielmann must have seen some ghost in the game position

## 18．씁 $\times$ h 6 씁 $\times 5$ 19． 9 f6！씁h5

The only defense against $\mathrm{Ef} 1-\mathrm{f} 3-\mathrm{h} 3$ ．

## 20． m （ $\times$ h $5 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{h} 521 . \circlearrowright f 3$

Also ${ }^{5} h 6 \times h 5$ should have been enough．

## 21．．．習c7！

Again，the only move against the threat 22.0 g 5 ，after which he would just an－ swer 22 ．．．日e7．White must aim for a lowly pawn－reward，after all．

## 

The f－pawn obviously can＇t be pro－ tected．

##  26．ف由 f 2

Not 26．0g6 because of ．．．bg7！，and af－ ter the rook exchange，the knight would go astray．But he＇s not exactly happy now standing on the rim．Because of that，White has a great deal of trouble putting his advantage into effect in the following play－because he can＇t se－ cure a central square for the horse．

## 

After 28．${ }^{6}$ e1！，the following answer， nullifying the problem＂e5，＂would not have yet been possible．

## 28．．．e5！29．9f5

Now useless，because h5 is indirectly protected by the possibility of ．．． $\mathrm{g}_{4}+$ ．

## 

Not the immediate 31 ． i d 2 because of 31．．．d4！．

## 31．．．管e5 32．${ }^{\text {th }}$ d2 b5 $33 . g 3$

The knight should be lead again to busy regions－by the advance of the black e－pawn，the f4－square has opened up for the horseman，and after the following pawn exchange in the center，e3 also becomes free．

## 33．．．Qh3 34．d4！cxd435．exd4 In5  39．9182！

The very strong threat $40 . \mathrm{c} 4$ now forces the bishop to give up guarding g2．
 42． $2 f 4$ 東f743．


## 43．．．te7？

A way to win probably would have been found for White after 43．．．．ac2 as well （44．日d 2 县b1）．For example，gg1，h4， g4，etc．－buteven so，Black could have tried this line．After the loss of the sec－ ond pawn，his situation becomes hope－ less．

## 44． $0 \times$ d3 exd3 45．b4！

Another subtlety：after 45．${ }^{\text {er }} \times \mathrm{d} 3$ gf3 +
 have had some technical difficulties．



 55．h5 1－0

## Round 5

0 Alekhine－Capablanca 1
0 Vidmar－Nimzovich 1
$1 / 2$ Spielmann－Marshall $1 / 2$
Standings after Round 5：
Capablanca 4
Nimzovich $31 / 2$
Alekhine $21 / 2$
Vidmar 2
Spielmann 2
Marshall 1 1／2

## （13）Alekhine－Capablanca

Queen＇s Indian Defense［E15］

## 1．d4 Df6 $2 . c 4$ e6 3．Øf3 b6 $4 . g 3$ Qb75．lg2c56．d5

I made this move，without further con－ sideration，to avoid a draw．It＇s also
pretty good，but requires subsequently precise，purposeful play．Castling or $6 . \mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{C} 5$ would have undertaken less．

## 6．．．exd5 7．⿹h4

According to the method recommended by Rubinstein in Collijn＇s handbook． Also the newer maneuver 7． 0 g 5 ，intro－ duced by V ．Bürger，together with pos－ sibly ©h3－乌f4（orf2），is interesting and full of opportunities．

## 7．．．g6 8．2c3 县g79．0－0

Indeed，some have criticized this rea－ sonable move，and instead advised 9．〇b5．I can＇t share this opinion，since after the simple $9 . . .0-0$ 10． 0 d 6 \＆a6， White would find no use for the infil－ trated knight．No，the actual omission or mistake comes only later．

$$
\text { 9...0-0 10. Qf } 4
$$

Not a happy thought，although White was able to get quite a decent game．The following opportunity－rich continua－ tions came into consideration，however．
（1） $10 . \mathrm{cxd} 5 \mathrm{~d} 611 . \mathrm{e} 4$ Эbd7 $12 . \mathrm{ff} 4 \mathrm{e}$ e8 13．De1 a6 14．a4，and the push e5 hangs in the air（Dr．Vajda－Monticelli，Budapest
 11．．．＠x6？List－Sämisch，Berlin 1927， whereupon $12 . \pm \times g 6!$ ，etc．，follows－with a winning position） $12.0 \times \mathrm{d} 5 \mathrm{~N} \times \mathrm{d} 5$
 positional compensation for Black for the lost pawn；and（3） $10 . \mathrm{f} 4 \mathrm{~d} 6$ 11．f5，with active piece play against weak points on both sides．

Indeed，this compilation of a number of not unfavorable continuations for

White shows well enough that the move 6． d 5 is definitely not to be written off， as the general criticism wanted to con－ vince the larger audience after the game．

## 10．．．d6 11．cxd5

More consistent than $11.0 \times \mathrm{d} 50 \times \mathrm{d} 5$
 with a probable draw，since White wanted to avoid exactly this result．

## 11．．．乞h5 12．月d2 乞d7 13．f4（？）

From here on begins too much artifici－ ality：admittedly the text move dwells in the position，but much more impor－ tant first was 13 ．e4 with the（positional） threat 14 ．©f5！．After 13．．． 5 h5－f6 14. f4 could quite possibly occur，when the opportunities in the center should not be underestimated．Why I neglected the double－step of the e－pawn is now quite inconceivable to me．

## 13．．．a6 14．2f3

A totally weak move，after which the game is hard to save．Losing time，only to place one＇s own piece on a worse square in order to force an opponent＇s to a better one－I＇ve done such team－ work only extremely rarely，even in the beginning of my chess career．

Certainly $14 . e 4$ was no longer as good as on the previous move－for example， 14.

 pletely in keeping；in the case of ．．．c4， White could then have gotten some counter－play through 15．Me3，together with $\circlearrowright \mathrm{f} 3$ ，and occupation of d 4 ．


15．．．c4！
White，through entirely illogical position－ ing，has eliminated any hope of occupy－ ing d 4 with his knight in the event of Black＇s push，so this idea becomes the strategic plan．The first threat is $16 .$. b 5 $17 . \mathrm{axb} 5 \mathrm{axb} 518.0 \times b 5$ ？甾b6＋，etc．

## 16．De3 Me7 17．g4

The explanation for this and the follow－ ing pawn moves consists solely in the fact that，after the 15 th move，I gave the game up as lost，and just dragged myself，not played，through the game． By the way，it＇s clear that here 17．d4 wouldn＇t have helped，because © $2 \mathrm{~d} 7-\mathrm{c} 5-$ b3 would follow．

## 17．．．乞c5 18．g5 Dfd7 $19 . f 5$ gfe8 20．Qf 4 且 5 21．Dg 4

White＇s systematic distancing of his pieces from the protection of the center squares facilitates the work of his op－ ponent．Attempting to bolster his posi－ tion with 21.0 g 2 could have put up more resistance．

##  Q $\times \mathrm{c} 3$

The fate of d 5 is sealed．

## 24．bxc3 씁c5＋ $25 . e 3$ 乞e5 26．．f 3 Dd3！27．©

The beginning of the slaughter．

Here White could safely resign，but felt in too much time pressure to choose the right moment for that．This explains the last moves．



 Me2＋0－1

I feel ashamed of this game，but readily admit that my opponent took impec－ cable advantage of my errors．

## （14）Vidmar－Nimzovich

Bogo－Indian Defense［E11］

## 1．d4 Df6 2．⿹f3 e6 3．c4 Db4＋

 4．D d2 Me7 5．〇c3This natural move is，in my opinion， unjustly blamed by many commenta－ tors：it＇s definitely no worse than 5．g3， for example，perhaps even better with Black＇s chosen reply．

5．．．0－0
In order to control e4（of course with－ out playing 5．．．d5），5．．．b6 was appro－ priate here．But then $6 . g 3$ \＆b7 7．\＆g2 could have followed－and normally in such positions，the vis－à－vis white bishop proves itself somewhat superior．

Black＇s bishop check on the third move does not，however，yield equal play．

## $6 . e 3$（？）

This is a needlessly passive move， which robbed White of prospects for an opening advantage．After the obvious 6． $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{c} 2!$ ，together with e4，\％d3，etc．，it would not have been at all easy for Black to come by a game．

6．．．d6
White＇s previous move was so ill－ad－ vised that the second player，before fianchettoing his queen＇s bishop，per－ mits himself the luxury of flirting with the threat ．．．e5，and so induces his op－ ponent to play the tamer e2（instead of（183）．In contrast，after 6． $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{c} 2$ ，the text move would be unsuccessful be－ cause of $7 . a 3 \& \times 38$ ．$\& \times c 3$ ，etc．

## 



If Black sets great store in the occupa－ tion of e4，then here he should havenow played $9 \ldots \otimes \times 3$ 10．थ $\times$ c 3 气e4．After the text move，the maneuver could be prevented．

[^2]
## Cycle I: Round 5

Since sooner or later, the d -file will open, in general the occupation of that file by the rook is appropriate. But at this point there was another method of play for White, which would have made it possible for him to weaken the pressure on the central squares from the enemy's queen's bishop. This was 10. $D g 5$ !. If after this, 10...h6 11. $\mathrm{d} f 3 \mathrm{~d} 5$, then the simple 12.0 h 3 , and if g 5 , then 13.c×d5!, exd5 (13...g4 14.d6) 14. $\mathrm{g} f 5$, etc. - with a fully equal game.

## 10...8×c3

Black is correct not to make further reinforcing moves, but rather to strike out immediately. In fact, in the current position, he can in no way decide which file his rooks should occupy - and there weren't other wait-and-see maneuvers.

## 11. © x 3 Øe4 12. De1

Considering Black's tangible superiority in the center, the bishop pair embodies White's future chances, although not particularly promising. After 12.0 d 2 © $\mathrm{xc} \times 3$ ! 13. ${ }^{\mu} \times \mathrm{c} 3$ e5, White would remain entirely without counter-play.

## 12...f5 13. 씁b3

If immediately 13.0 d 2 , then 13 .......g 5 , which virtually forces the reply 14.f4. But apparently White wants to avoid this.

## 13...c5

Played in order to force a clearing in the center before he undertakes a flank attack. Certainly the process costs him the d-file, and considering this fact, many would have chosen a different
preparation for e5, like $13 \ldots$... h 8 , for example, instead of the text move, which weakens d6. But... fortune favors the brave.

##  16.dxe5 dxe5 $17 . f 3$

Sooner or later this move is unavoidable. Played at this point, it offers a quite definite leveling tendency: namely, in the case of the reasonable 17...®f6, White's move permits the pin of the knight with 18. W4. He can then exchange these minor pieces, and then already, without difficulty, force general simplification by the pressure on the open file. Nimzovich thwarts this plan in an intriguingly simple way.

## 17...g5!

An unprejudiced, beautiful move, which sets before the opponent the difficult problem of defending himself from now on against two equilateral break-through threats - ...e4 and ...g4. In addition, the knight is protected from an exchange now and later.

## 

With this, Black shows that he absolutely wants to win - and further developments give him that right. The endeavor is so much the more commendable because it's contingent upon the final relinquishing of the open file, a gamble against which many an experienced master would have bristled. My recent experiences with players of the very first class have shown me that in analogous situations, without thinking, they would place both rooks on the file for exchange and afterwards complain
that the art of chess approaches death from draws．．．I have to admit I could neverget used to the thought of such a danger．If one would examine，for ex－ ample，the games of Nimzovich or Bogoljubow－just to name the most successful－from the last few years，one easily becomes convinced that still many，many years will pass until fight－ ers for a draw can feel fully safe！

## 20．Ma4

Black＇s reply brings home the futility of this sortie．Somewhat better here seems 20.0 g 3，with which，first of all， the threat e4 is parried．

## 20．．．da8！

21．${ }^{\text {g d }}$ 7，etc．，was threatened．

## 21． 1 ． 16

An eviction notice for White＇s queen＇s bishop，on its way to c3；no indifferent plan－only White gives it up on the next move．Otherwise，21．Qg 3 still came under consideration．

21．．．씁g7！


A sinister reinforcement of Black＇s break－ through threats！Somewhat premature
would be 21．．．e4，on account of 22.54 － for example，22．．．gxf4 23．h4！f3


## 22．\＆f1？

Inconsistent and weak．He absolutely had to consider the threat ．．．e4，and with this in mind，play 22．\＆e1！．If ．．．e4（？）， then 23．\＆c3，and White would have some play．Therefore Black probably would have favored $22 \ldots . . \mathrm{g} 4$ ，but then the outcome would also not be entirely certain，in spite of his undeniable ad－ vantage－for example，23．fxg $4 \Sigma_{\mathrm{xg}} 4$ 24． $\mathrm{P} \times \mathrm{g} 4$ 甾 $\times \mathrm{g} 425$ ． $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{G}} \mathrm{c} 2$ ，etc．

22．．．e4
Of course．

## 23．\＆ 1

Bleak，like everything else．If 23．fxe 4 ， then $23 . . .2 \times e 4$ ，together with $\quad$ 首 $\times b 2$ ，etc．

## 23．．．exf3 24．Dic3 Me7！

Decisive，since mate would follow 25． $0 \times 56$ in four moves（ 25 ．．．．．．$\times$ e3 + 26．©h $1 \mathrm{fxg} 2+$ ，etc．）．

## 25．E6d3

A sad retreat．
$25 . . . f \times g 226 . \theta \times g 2$ \＆$\times$ g $27 . \rho \times f 6$
Sometimes even＂in－between moves＂
 leads quickly to mate．

## 27．．．씁e4！28．${ }^{\text {日l }} 1 \mathrm{~d} 2$ 且h3 29．2c3 Mg4＋0－1

It＇s mate in two moves．

## Cycle I：Round 5

（15）Spielmann－Marshall Vienna Game［C29］

## 1．e4e5 2．Øc3 $\searrow \mathrm{f} 63 . \mathrm{f} 4 \mathrm{~d} 54 . \mathrm{fxe5}$ Dxe45．Df3 日 5

One of the good moves at Black＇s dis－ posal here．As is well known，sufficient for speedy equality is 5 ．．． e e 7 ，together with ．．．0－0 and ．．．f6．

## 6．d4

Exactly what Black wanted to force with his bishop move．However，the less forthcoming 6．쓸 2 should be consid－ ered；if $6 \ldots \& f 5$ ，then 7.0 d 1 ！，when f 2 would be covered，and White is pre－ pared to dislodge Black＇s central knight by means of d 3 ．

## 6．．． 8 b 4 7．…d3

The queen stands awkwardly here－but after 7.2 d 2 c 5 ，etc．the complications in the center would likewise tum out quite in favor of Black．

## 7．．．c5 8．dxc5 $0 \times c 5$

The c－pawn wouldn＇t run away，and Black could first quietly strengthen his position through further development （8．．．〇c6）．But Black＇s game is already so favorable that his move does well．

## 9．쓸3 乞c6 10．Ob5 Øe6！

Prevents castling and renews the threat of a fork．One has to wonder that White still succeeds in emerging from this position unscathed．

11．a3 Da5 12．b4 Db6 13．씁d3 0－0！

Of course it would be lamentable after 13．．．d4 14．⿹e4，etc．，to allow the op－ ponent to castle short without further ado．The pawn sacrifice is consequen－ tial and good．

## 14．씁 $\times d 5$


 Black＇s advantage；for example，16．c3 \％xe5 17．0－0 a6 18．\％c 4 b5 19．2b3 \＆ b 7 ，etc．

## 14．．．〇ed4

It＇s curious that the attacking player Marshall doesn＇t feel the necessity of his queen＇s cooperation in the calcu－ lated exploitation of the open white king＇s position．Admittedly，14．．．留c7 （or ．．．甾e7）would have been useless with this in mind because of 15 ． y d6－ but after $14 \ldots$ ．．． d 7 ，White would get into an awkward situation；because if then 15．\％d3 or 15．㷐 4 （Black＇s main threat is 15 ．．．$\circlearrowright c 716$ ．当e $4 \triangle \times b 5$ ，together with ．．．.$\times 64$ or ．．．$\searrow \times 5$ 5，etc．）－then 15 ． ．．．）dd4！，with the idea of ．．．8f5，etc．In any case，the e5－pawn would be a con－ demned man，and after his disappear－ ance，the king wouldn＇t be able to find peace anywhere．After the text move， the black advantage totally evaporates， bit by bit．

## 

 17．© b2（！）After 17． $2 \mathrm{~d} 2 \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{xe}}$ 18．0－0－0，the re－ ply 18．．． g 4 would have in fact proven strong．

## 

Perhaps he overlooked the counter－ move，because any other developmen－ tal move of the bishop（18．．．e6 18．．．2f5）would have hindered Black＇s work to level the game．

## 19．De2！\％$\times 2$

 together with \＆$\times$ e5，etc．，clearly leads to nothing．
 22．由b3 家d2＋23．由b2 صc4＋ 24．${ }^{\text {bibl }} 3$ 乞e3

The play for a win is unfounded，since with his pawn superiority，White is ahead by a couple of tempi．Black should have repeated moves．

## 

After 26．．．』d2，White saves himself


##  30．c4 4 （88（？）

Correct was 30 ．．．．ff6，and only after 31．c5，then 31．．．gd8 32．© B 3 f 4 ！ $33 . g \times f 4,5 \mathrm{~d} 5+$ ，etc．Now White gets an advantage．

##  6f7



Obviously there would be no boon from $33 \ldots .0 \times h 2$ ，on account of $34 . \Xi \mathrm{E} h 1$－to－ gether with $\Xi_{\times h} 7$ ，etc．

## 34． 9 f1

Again，one of the many games in this tournament in which Spielmann，in spite of better endgame chances，de－ clares himself in agreement with a draw！Instead of the text move，which is indeed synonymous with an offer of peace，the simple approach $34 . \mathrm{c5}$ came strongly under consideration；for ex－ ample，34．．．h6 35．⿹勹巳 2 פf6 36．Bc4 and now－whether Black now swaps the rooks（ 36 ．．．J． E 8），or whether he plays 36．．．De4（whereupon a4－a5 follows）－ winning chances would always be on the side of the first player．With such a good－natured disposition，one can＇t hope for a reward，of course，in spite of a strong and prudent game．
 क由｜ $61 / 2-1 / 2$

## Cycle II

## Round 6

0 Marshall－Capablanca 1
1 Nimzovich－Alekhine 0
$1 / 2$ Spielmann－Vidmar $1 / 2$

Standings after Round 6：
Capablanca 5
Nimzovich $41 / 2$
Alekhine $21 / 2$
Vidmar 2 $1 / 2$
Spielmann 2
Marshall 1½
（16）Marshall－Capablanca
Torre Attack［A46］

## 1．d4 Df6 2．乌f3 e6 3．Q g5

Perhaps the fashion for tomorrow． These days one still almost always plays 3．c4．

## 3．．．c5 4．c3

Allowing Black an easy equality．The conventional move is $4 . \mathrm{e} 3$－but $4 . \mathrm{e} 4$ deserves more recognition，in my opin－ ion，than it＇s been given up to now．

## 4．．．Mb6 5．Mc2 cxd4 6． $0 \times \mathrm{Cd} 4$

More tolerable would be $6 . \mathrm{cxd} 4$ ，al－ though Black would also stand excel－ lently then after $6 \ldots .0 \mathrm{c} 67 . \mathrm{e} 3 \mathrm{~d} 5$ ，to－ gether with d 7 ，呈c8，etc．After the text move，Black gets a much clearer advan－ tage－a mobile pawn superiority in the center．

6．．．Dc6 7．e3 d5 8．乌d2 是d7 9．52f3？

In the long run，a position cannot en－ dure so many inferior moves．Advisable was 9．${ }^{\text {Q }} \mathrm{cl}$ in order to take the queen back to bl after 9．．．${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{c} 8$ ，then to develop the king＇s bishop and castle short．

9．．．〇e4 10．©f 4 ？
Relatively better was $10 . \mathrm{h} 4$ ．
10．．．f 6


## 11．R d 3 ？

After all，White＇s position wasn＇t so bad that he had to＂sacrifice＂a piece in de－ spair．Either 11 ． e ，or first $11 . \mathrm{g} 3$ ， was possible．What comes now is hor－ rible．
 0－0

Crucial．

## 14．\＆ 8 ？

With 14.0 or $14.0-0-0$ ，he could have retained two pawns for the piece and－in case he still wanted to play on －achieved a longer resistance．

14．．．exd4 15．0－0
 etc．，or $15 . c \times d 4 \& 4^{+}$，with an easy win．

15．．．d×e3 16．a4
Another＂aggressive＂move．

##  Me3 19．씁d1

Since，for reasons difficult to under－ stand，White doesn＇t want to give up in spite of a piece minus，it becomes an amusing cat－and－mouse game．

19．．．Og4 20．日xf2 h5 21．．． 1 f 1

 26．日×g3 是d6 27．ㅆ․ $f 1$ 昌he8


 0－1

Black had a threat that couldn＇t be par－ ried：35．．．．日d1！，etc．

It＇s really unbelievable how self－con－ sciously and weakly Marshall always played against Capablanca！He put up quite a different resistance opposite the other participants in New York－ in spite of his apparently inferior shape．One could compare，for ex－ ample，his games with Dr．Vidmar from the Cycles II and IV！

## （17）Nimzovich－Alekhine

Réti Opening［A05］

## 1．乞f3 Øf6 2．b3 d6

This reply appears to be more logical to me than the usual $2 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 5$ ，with which the
e5－square，whose occupation White ap－ parently strives for with the flank devel－ opment of his queen bishop，is ceded to the opponent without a struggle．

### 3.93

So，the purest＂hypermodemry．＂In the current game，it probably wouldn＇t have brought the first player any laurels if his opponent hadn＇t overestimated the posi－ tion and imagined that such a formation could be finished off in any old way．

## 3．．．e5 4．c4

Otherwise Black has even easier play，with the unimpeded thrust of his central pawns．

4．．．e4
This move is therefore reasonable，be－ cause with it White is as good as forced into the following escapade； since after 5． $2 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 5!6 . \mathrm{cxd} 5$ 甾 $\times \mathrm{d} 5$ $7 . \mathrm{e} 3$ 甾e5，etc．，his position would inspire anything but confidence．

## 5．Dh4 d5

For the moment，quieter and also good is $5 . . .2 \mathrm{e}$ ．But the immediate clearing in the center is more logical．

## 6．cxd5



## Cycle II：Round 6

## 6．．．씁 $\times$ d5

So Black hopes to bring about positions similar to the one mentioned above，but soon has to convince himself that the tempo White wins with © C 3 doesn＇t amount to an awfully lot．More correct was the natural $6 \ldots . .-\times \mathrm{d} 5$ ，which，with simple means，shows the unsoundness of the opponent＇s situation．Because if next 7 ．…c2，then simply 7．．． $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{m}} \mathrm{e} 7$ ！（the same also after 7． D 2 ）8．씁e4 0－0， with unpleasant threats－for example， 9．\＆b2 Ele8 10．\＆ 2 ©b4！，together per－ haps with ．．．ef8！．Anyhow，there could be no talk in this case about a White ini－ tiative，and the＂double－hole＂develop－ ment，proscribed with such reason，by the late opening artist Teichmann would be led again to its absurd conclusion．

## 

To $7 . .$. 界e5，the reply $8 . f 4$ was unpleas－ ant for Black．The text move has，in any case，the advantage of as good as forc－ ing the following white－square weak－ ness in the enemy position．

## 8．e3

To 8．乞g2，Black intended 8．．．e3－for example，9．fxe3 \＆h3 10．日g1 へ． 4 ．

## 8．．．a6

In light of the exposure of the central pawns and the possibility of a later ad－ vance to f5 by White＇s knight on the edge，it was less advisable to allow the queen exchange by means of $8 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 4$ 9． $\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{G}} \mathrm{g} 4$ ！ $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{xg}} 4$ 10． B 5 ，etc．Addition－ ally，the pre－emptive move in the text， which bestows on the opponent a highly important developmental tempo，dis－
tinctly attests that the capture with the queen on the 6th move contained in it more dark sides than light．

## 9． $\mathrm{D}^{\mathrm{b}} \mathbf{~ \$ g} 4$

At least deflects the white king＇s bishop from the planned attack on e4；but now f 5 is uncovered．

## 10．（2） 2 是 211. D $\times 2$ ！

 have had real chances to exploit the weakness of d 3 and f 3 ．

## 

After this，Black gets a disadvantage and has to make great efforts in the fol－ lowing play to get chances for equality． On the other hand，after 12．．． 0 C 5 13．0－ 0 留d7！ $14.0 \times f 6 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{f} 6$ ，etc．，a struggle with mutually strong and weak squares would arise，whose outcome would hardly be foreseeable．

## 13．0－0 R ${ }^{\text {d }} 14 . f 3$

Also $14 . \mathrm{d} 3$ came under consideration． The sharp text move leads to difficult－ to－assess imbroglios，from which Black finally emerges with a sufficient posi－ tional equivalent for the sacrificed ma－ terial．

## 14．．．${ }^{\text {e }} 5$

The introductory move to the follow－ ing interesting sacrificial combination， whose value，by the way，was totally misunderstood by the critics（unfortu－ nately adapting themselves only too often just to the end result of a game）． In any case，less satisfactory was
 $17 . \mathrm{d} 4 \% \mathrm{~d} 618.0 \mathrm{c} 3$ ，together with $4 \pm$ ．

## 15．0．e5

Not 15．\＆a3 M Ma5！，etc．

## 15．．．乞xe5 16．fxe4 乞d3

One of the necessary consequences of move 14 ；obviously deficient would be 16．．．$勹 \times e 4$ ，on account of 17．.$\mu \mathrm{m} 2$ ，etc．

## 

The only move：after 18．Mc2 C b4，the d2－and e4－squares would be unpro－ tected at the same time，and after 18． 0 d 4 ，of course the exchange sacri－ fice $18 . . .{ }^{5} \times \mathrm{d} 4$ would ensue，whose strength is apparent．Now，on the other hand，Black is forced to put still more into the deal．

## 18．．．0×e4！

The other sacrificial combination pos－ sible in this position，18．．．0c5 19．d3 Da4！？，would be unsuccessful in the event that White gives back the won material immediately．20．b×a4 甾×e3＋
 De8 24．Bb1 ©d6 25．Ma7，etc．，with a winning attack．

##  

Until the text，all counter moves by White were as good as forced；but now he had a choice again－and it＇s entirely unsure that he decided for the best．If the correctness of Black＇s positional sacrifice could be called into question at all，then it was now with $22 .{ }^{\text {E }} \mathrm{c} 1$

M $\times$ xe3 +23 ．${ }_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathrm{G}} \mathrm{f} 2$－but even in this case， Black＇s position after 23．．．甾e7！（not 23．．．甾e4，on account of 24 ．．．．甾xf7！，etc．） 24．Df5 甾e5，etc．，would offer chances．

After the move played，on the other hand，Black could have won yet a third pawn，and with that，at least establish a material balance．

## 22．．．씁 $\times$ e3＋23．… f 2 씁d3 24． $2 f 4$

There wasn＇t anything better in view of the threat $24 \ldots . . \mathrm{g} 5$ ．


## 24．．．씁c3

Only after this imprecise move does White get effective counter chances．In contrast，the second player could get an adequate game with the obvious threat to a2 made with 24 ．．． $\begin{aligned} & \text { M．c2．For example：}\end{aligned}$
 $\mathrm{g} \times \mathrm{f} 428.2 \times \mathrm{C} 2 \mathrm{fxg} 329 . \mathrm{h} \times \mathrm{g} 3$ 留a5！，and the queen comes with tempo to d 5 ， whereupon it will no longer be difficult for Black to force a favorable endgame； （2） $25 . \circlearrowright \mathrm{f} 3 \mathrm{D} \times f 3+26$ ． $\mathrm{M} \times f 3 \mathrm{M} \times \mathrm{m} \times 2$ ，like－ wise with full compensation for the sac－ rificed piece．

As one sees，the matter of the knight sacrifice was not so easy by far as the gentlemen critics fancied ．．．

## 25．日e3！

Black underestimated the effect of this good defensive move，and gets in a jam as a result．

## 25．．．．．．．．c1＋

He may no longer take the pawn a2：
 28．$\subseteq d 3$ ，etc．

## 26．© G 2 Mc6＋27．Øf3g5

Through this weakening of the pawn position，the work becomes substan－ tially easier for the opponent．The smaller evil was still 27．．．乞xf3 28．甾xf3 gid $2+29 . 马 \mathrm{e} 2 \mathrm{M} \mathrm{c} 2$ ，etc．

## 28．2d3！Qxf3

A sad necessity，because if 28 ．．．〇e4，


## 

In the long run， $30 . . . \frac{\mu}{\exists} \times 2231 . \mu \times f 7$ ，etc．， would not have been sustainable．

## 

With the last moves，Black did what there was still to do．The following pawn exchange obviously means a boost to his drawing prospects．

## 34．2c4！fxg3（？）

But here 34 ．．． 8 ff （threat：g4）or 34 ．．． $9 g 8$ first had to be tried，because each piece exchange is obviously pleas－ ant only for White．



## 36．${ }^{[7} \times \mathrm{d} 8+$ 씁 $\times \mathrm{d} 8$ 37．h $\times \mathrm{g} 3$ 씁 d 4

A queen exchange is probably not avoidable in the long run，since if the queen leaves the d－file（and Black doesn＇t have many moves），then White can provoke a new weakness through Da5．Anyway，biding time would have prolonged the agony somewhat．

##  40．${ }^{6} \times f 2 \mathrm{~h} 5$

Here b5 still offered a last practical chance．But that was now the 40th move．．．

## 41．${ }^{6}$ e3．

A nuance more precise was 41．${ }^{\text {b }} 3$ 3．In contrast the retreat expected by the majority of the onlookers， $41 . \mathrm{D} \mathrm{d} 2$ ，af－ ter $41 . .$. be 6 －with the threat of con－ quering the pawns on the queenside－ would have at least made victory very difficult．

41．．．c5
To 41．．．b5，White would have the fol－ lowing winning line： $42.5 \mathrm{~d} 2 \mathrm{~h} 443 . \mathrm{g} 4$




$42 . a 4$ b5 $43 . a \times b 5 \mathbf{a x b 5} 44.2 \mathrm{~d} 2$它b6 45．®e4 h4 46．g4 h3 47．${ }^{\text {blf }} 3$ b4

Or 47．．．c4 48．b4，etc．

35．等d2 씁h8
$48.2 \times \mathrm{g} 5 \mathrm{c} 4$ 49．2e4
49．b×c4 also won．


 57．Még $4+1-0$
（18）Spielmann－Vidmar
Four Knights Game［C47］
 $4 . d 4$ exd4 5． $2 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ 2b4 6．2×c6 bxc6 7．Dd 3 d5 8．exd5 cxd5

According to the experience of recent years，Bogoljubow＇s recommended 8 ．．．씁e7＋is here the easiest way to reach a draw；and Black can＇t strive for more in this line，searched in all possible directions．

## 9．0－0 0－0 10． $\mathbf{R g}^{\mathrm{g} ~ \mathrm{c}} 6$

Again Black chooses，to his disadvan－ tage，an entangled method of play in－ stead of comfortably simplifying the position after Capablanca＇s recipe by means of $10 \ldots \times \mathrm{m} 311 . \mathrm{b} \times 3 \mathrm{~h} 6$ ．

## 

In recent years this proved more sustain－ able than the more obvious 12．gfe1，ear－ lier used exclusively．The new idea allows White，after 12 ．．． Eb 8 ，to pull back his knight to d1，without interrupting the al－ liance of his rooks，even for a short while．

## 12．．． de6 13． 2 e2 $^{2}$

In a game Alekhine－Em．Lasker（Mos－ cow 1914）a very similar position oc－ curred－only the king＇s rook was on el
－and play continued $13 . \mathrm{h} 3$ ，with the sequel $13 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 614.2 \times \mathrm{h} 6$（retreat would also come under strong consideration， especially if，as in the current game，the bishop could distance himself to c1）
 17．Mg6，etc．，with an unavoidable draw． But the text move has a lot to be said for it，especially since White only with diffi－ culty could assume the opponent would voluntarily relinquish his bishop pair．

## 13．．．h6 14．D 1 （1）曷g4 15．．．．g3是 $\times 2$

One decides on such an exchange only under severe coercion．Actually，after 15．．．d6 16．M m 4 ，for example，the pos－ sible threat of a sacrifice on h6 would have been rather unpleasant．

## 



## 営xe8

Of course，more than questionable
 ©f6（21．．．g6 22． $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{d} 7$ ）22． $\mathrm{e} \times \mathrm{xh}$ ，etc．
 22．a3 M． g c 723.93


Here the game was given up as a draw －a decision to be rebuked on the part of White．With two bishops and the healthier pawn position，one should have tried to bring the game to a happy end．Both after the queen exchange， 23 ． ．．．…e7 24．씁×e7 昷xe7 25．b4！，etc．，as well as without it，23．．．c524．c3 together with $\begin{aligned} & \text { Mff } \\ & \text {－Black would have a diffi－}\end{aligned}$ cult game，defending for a considerable time．

## Round 7

$1 / 2$ Spielmann - Capablanca $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Vidmar - Alekhine $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Nimzovich - Marshall $1 / 2$

Standings after Round 7：

> Capablanca $51 / 2$
> Nimzovich 5
> Alekhine 3
> Vidmar 3
> Spielmann $2^{1 ⁄ 2} 2$
> Marshall 2
（19）Spielmann－Capablanca
Caro－Kann Defense［B15］

## $1 . e 4$ c6 $2 . \mathrm{d}_{4} \mathrm{~d} 5$ 3．Ec3 dxe4 

As the course of this game shows，a bishop sortie is not to be recommended， because with it the first player is given an easy opportunity to secure the ad－ vantage of the bishop pair．If 5．．．e5 should also fail in this position（see the game Alekhine－Capablanca from the fifteenth round）－which I definitely don＇t think is impossible－then one would have to revert finally to the older


## 6．씁d3！

This was－in connection with the fianchettoing of the king＇s bishop－al－ ready tried with success by Spielmann against Carls in Baden－Baden 1925．In any case，Black doesn＇t have an easy game．

##  9．乞f3 e6 10．g3！

Apart from the future role of g g2，not to be underestimated，it＇s of special importance to secure the f4－square against a possible intrusion from the knight．

## 10．．．\＆d6

Both this，as well as the next develop－ mental moves（up to the＂liberating＂ e5），make a somewhat superficial，sche－ matic impression and are in fact hardly the best．Here，for example，it came under strong consideration to compli－ cate，through $10 \ldots$ ．．．．．a5 $5(!)$ ，the possible fianchettoing of the white queen＇s bishop－with 11.2 d 2 or 11．c3．Exactly through the omission of such details can one all too often get into difficulty．

## 11．Qg2 0－0 12．0－0 씁c7 13．b3

Very correct！Also the mentioned Spielmann－Carls game developed in this manner，by the way．

## 13．．．气hf6 14．0．82e5

After this obvious relief maneuver， White＇s advantage becomes quite clear． Black already had to make up his mind to accept this，since otherwise White would further strengthen his position without difficulty：Iffe1，邑ad1，a3，c4， etc．，with difficult－to－endure pressure．

## 15．dxe5 亿xe5 16． $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{f} 5$ ！

Here and with the next moves，White averts the opposition of the enemy bishop on e5．

## 日xe1＋

In turn，there＇s nothing better than the double rook exchange．

##  21．Qg4！

Spielmann handles this game very nicely up to a certain moment．The text move，for example，contains the strong threat 22 ．${ }^{\mu}$ c8！，and forces the opponent into complex defensive maneuvers．

## 21．．．씁e7 22．．t． 1

Not 22．．． G c8，on account of 22．．．．．．．e1＋， together with 23．．．． 2 c c，etc．

## 22．．． 2 b4 $23 . c 3$

Also，23．Me5 was good，securing an endgame advantage．

## 23．．．乞d6 24．Md3 Da5 25．Da3（？）

But this diversion is certainly contrived． It was much more obvious，through 25．b4 alc7（or 25．．． 2 b6 $26 . c 4$ c5 27． ． m 5 ！，etc．） $26 . \mathrm{c} 4$ ，to re－open the nice diagonal for the bishop！If next 26．Me4，
 more pleasant prospects than in the ＂ending position．＂

[^3]

Here Spielmann made the decisive mis－ take of accepting the draw offered him． The position with the two bishops and centralized king was，without a doubt， worth playing out．Both 29．c5 （29．．．〇b5 30．cxb6，together with 2b2， or $29 \ldots$ ．．． e 430 ． e f3！，etc．），as well as 29. did c5 30．b4，etc．，would have as－ sured him an obvious endgame superi－ ority，and Black would have to fight a long time for an uncertain draw．

Capablanca was therefore able to split the point without a fight in the text po－ sition due only to the halo of his title at the time．
（20）Vidmar－Alekhine
Bogo－Indian Defense［E11］

##  4．${ }^{1}$ d2

In accordance with recent experience， the avoidance of the bishop exchange through 4.9 bd 2 leads to no satisfying result for White；for example，4．0－0 $5 . \mathrm{g} 3 \mathrm{~b} 66.2 \mathrm{~g} 2$ 边 b 7 7．0－0 d5（also ．．． B e8，together possibly with ．．．df8， etc．，comes into consideration） $8 . a 3$ Qe7 9．b4 c5！＝（Rubinstein－Alekhine， Semmering 1926）．

## 4．．．씁e7 5．g3

Nimzovich＇s move，which isn＇t worse than the immediate exchange，since the queen in this line invariably has to be developed to e7．

### 5.93

Dr．Vidmar played 5．0c3 against Nimzovich（see game number 14），and then had to fight against enemy pressure on e4．As is generally known，through flank development，White gets a very se－ cure game－but little initiative．

## 5．．．0－0

With that，Black，on his part，foregoes fianchettoing the bishop，which in such cases is actually the logical counter－play for him．Although his plan，using the queen bishop on the c8－h3 diagonal， proves partially successful in this game， it＇s still hardly to be recommended－ because，as becomes evident from the following，White could have opposed him forcefully．

## 6．\＆g 2 \＆$\times$ d2 $+7.2 b \times d 2$

Here，for example，it would have been more advisable for him，when faced with the intended advance ．．．d6，to－ gether with ．．．e5，to capture with the queen and to develop his knight to c3， with which（1）d5 would be more ef－ fectively guarded；and（2）．the possible opening of the d －file by means of $\mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{e} 5$ would have gained a lot of strength－ but Black would，in this case，have played not ．．．e5，but rather ．．．c5，after appropriate preparation．

[^4]Played in order to develop the queen＇s rook to e8，and in this way to follow through with the move ．．．e4，which didn＇t work yet because of $ص g 5$ ．But this idea could have been carried out at least as well by means of $10 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 6$ ，whereby， in addition，the important retreat square for the knight， h 7 ，would be opened in preparation for f 5 ．

## 11．a3 そae8 12．d5

Played mainly in order to be able to move his knight to d 4 in case of its at－ tack by．．．e4．Moreover，an admittedly rather harmless demonstration on the queenside is planned in order to divert the opponent from the methodical and quiet utilization of his attacking chances on the kingside．

## 12．．．〇d8 13．b4 e4

Although his pieces stood somewhat congested，Black＇s position was com－ pletely capable of development and，the main thing，currently displayed no weak points．Instead of the text maneuver－ through which an outpost is indeed es－ tablished，which is not exactly pleasant for White，but in return a weakness on d6 is accepted－the simple，further in－ tensification of pressure on the kingside， by means of Q 5 ，together with f ，came into consideration．Then the possible ad－ vance of the White queen to c 7 wouldn＇t be feared．For example，13．．．डh5 14．c5
 2b5！，etc．，with a favorable game．

## 14．⿹d4 c6

The quickest liberation of the d8－knight was indispensable．After the immedi－ ate $14 \ldots$ ．．．${ }^{\text {u }}$ es，White would have been
able to force a very favorable file open－ ing－for example，through 15．马ae1， together with f ，etc．

## 15．dxc6 亿×c6 16．${ }^{\text {g fe1 }}$

Aimed at $16 \ldots . . \pm \times d 4$ ：together with e3，etc．

## 16．．．씁e5 17．Øe2！

White wants to keep the key e4－square under fire as many times as possible， which significantly complicates the fur－ ther development of the enemy attack plans．

## 

A clearance move for the king＇s rook， which should be used on the open c－ file．

## 19．h3

Preparation of the offense against the weakling d6．



With 21．．．当e6，White would have been able to get a draw more easily than in the game：22．Dd5 Eee8 23． Df 4 Me7 （23．．．．．．d7 24．c5！土）24． 0 d 5 ，etc．

## 22．f4！

Through this ingenious coup，White escapes any serious danger．With other moves，by contrast，he gets a disadvan－ tage slowly but surely－on the one hand，since the position of the unhappy knight on d 2 would impede the forma－ tion of an effective attack against d6， but on the other hand，because Black＇s pressure on the c－file can be rather eas－ ily strengthened by means of ．．．a6，to－ gether with ．．．日c7，and possibly ．．．e6．

## 22．．．exf3

For his part，Black also has nothing better than to accept the transitional pawn sacrifice，since 22 ．．．．．．．e6 23 ． ． h 2 ， together with $\bigcirc \mathrm{b} 5$（or O e 2 ）－ d 4 would look quite friendly for White．

##  

If instead of this quiet draw offer（after 27．．．Megg，the game would automati－ cally be a draw because of the three－ time repetition of the same position）， White had let himself be tempted into 27． $8 \times \mathrm{d} 6$ ，then he would get a decisive disadvantage after 27 ．．． $\mathrm{C} \times \mathrm{h} 3$ ！ $28 . \mathrm{Df} 4$
 with the threats $31 \ldots .0 \times \mathrm{e}$ or $31 \ldots$. ． D 2 ！ $32.0 \times \mathrm{h} 2$ 思d2，etc．

## 27．．．씁h7

Black decides to play for a win－actu－ ally not incorrectly，since mutual chances at this moment can be regarded as approximately equal（prospects of a king attack for Black，balanced against White＇s pawn superiority queenside）， and further development of the conflict
anticipates many interesting complica－ tions to come．

## 

After 28．．．．〇e4，a later 29.0 d5 would have been unpleasant．

## 

With $30 \ldots \times c 4$ ，White could reply with 31．日c1，as well as with simply $31.0 \times h 7$ and $\curvearrowleft \times f 6+$ ．

## 

Better than obvious 32．Exe6 $\begin{aligned} & \text { Mae6 }\end{aligned}$ 33．$\times$ b 7 ，whereupon Black would have had the choice，either to force perpetual check through $33 \ldots$ ．．．$\times$ h3 34 ．$\times \times$ © 8甾g3＋，etc．，or to play for further com－ plications with $33 \ldots . . .1 \times c 4$ ．

##  Mg6（？）

Black absolutely had to prevent the fol－ lowing exchange，which makes his enemy＇s defense easier，with 34．．．Mg5， after which nothing better would remain for White than to play for a draw with
 But after the text move，he gets the up－ per－hand，and Black will have to fight hard to come to reconciliation．

##  37．씁d5！

Finally，with this important move he＇s secure．Far weaker would be $37 .{ }_{\mathrm{m}}^{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{d} 7$ ， because of 37 ．．．씁 g ！（also threatening ．．．ヨg6）38．M d 3 f5，etc．

## 

Mainly in the hope that White will take the b7－pawn immediately： $39 . \mu \times b 7$
 40．．．${ }^{\text {．}} \times$ e3！！，etc．，would assure Black of an offense leading at least to a draw． But Dr．Vidmar played more accurately：

## 39．${ }^{6} \mathrm{~h} 2!$

－whereupon nothing better remained for Black than a pawn sacrifice leading to a difficult endgame：

## 39．．．学d6！40．씁 $\times$ f7

Again，not $40 .{ }_{\text {筸 }} \times \mathrm{b} 7$ ，because of 40．．． g d2 41．gf4 ©h5！$\mp$ ．

## 

Interesting here would be 41．5f2，for after $41 \ldots . . \Xi \times f 242$ ．${ }^{\mu} \times f 2$ ，together with留f4，etc．，White would plainly stand superior．It＇s questionable，however， whether he would also retain real win－ ning chances after the queen exchange

 0xc4 46．$\Xi \times a 7$ 日b2！！．With this last move，Black prevents the White passed pawn from advancing，and Black，with ．．．Eb3，as well as with the king＇s march ．．． B g－f4，etc．（possibly along with the pawn advance g 5 and g 4 ），threatens to get sufficient counter－chances．After all， the immediate queen exchange in the text would definitely put before him a less－than－easy defense，or differently put，a counter－attack problem．

## 

With this conciliatory counter－sacrifice， White hopes to bring the knight to side paths，which would allow him to assert
his queenside superiority．The results of the other winning attempt，43．9f4， would have been very interesting．With that，the plausible ．．．©f5 would have been highly precarious；for example，
 （the instructive pawn endgame after
 कf5 49．${ }^{\text {© f }} 3$ a6！would，one could be convinced，even be won for Black），
 48．2e4，etc．）48．${ }^{\text {fan }}$ 2！（stronger than
 48．．． 0 d5 49．${ }^{\text {bf }} 3$ ，and Black would hardly be able to successfully oppose the enemy＇s penetration on both flanks （especially dangerous could be the seemingly harmless pawn h 3 ，supported by the bishop）．

Therefore，to $43 . \mathrm{gf} 4$ ，he should not play 43．．．〇f5，but rather 43．．．安g5！－with consequences something like：（1）






 etc．－similar to 1） 45 ．．．日a $1+46$ ．${ }^{\text {bif2 }}$

 since $50 . c 6$ doesn＇t work，on account of $50 \ldots . . \mathrm{E} \times \mathrm{e} 3+51$. ． d 5 g e5 + ，together with $\varsigma \mathrm{d} 6+$ and $乞 \mathrm{~b} 7$ ，etc．－All difficult and at times quite interesting lines！

## 

Through this recent pawn sacrifice， Black secures the f 4 －square for his knight，which permits him the complete use of the enemy＇s pinned position．The final image is quite piquant．

## 

 a5，etc．－draw．

## 47．．．g5 48． 8 g 3 亿f4！

The most stringent．

## 



 ．．． $2 d 5$ ，etc．，Black would of course win．

## 50．．．Ea2！ $1 / 2-1 / 2$

Black threatens 51．．．2h5 checkmate！ Perpetual check with the knight follows 51．h4，and perpetual with the rook fol－ lows a bishop move to $\mathrm{c} 6, \mathrm{~b} 7, \mathrm{a}$ ．But if 51. ． d 1 （in order after $51 \ldots$ ．．．ga3＋，to be able to play 52 ．${ }^{\text {Gf }} 2$ ），then $51 \ldots$ ．．． d 2 ！， with which Black＇s winning chances would obviously be in the past．There－ fore ．．．draw．
（21）Nimzovich－Marshall Réti Opening［A06］

## 1．乌f3 Øf6 2．e3 d5

Since with his second move White has foregone，de facto，the fianchettoing of
his king＇s bishop， 2 ．．．b7，etc．，certainly wouldn＇t be a bad thing here．

## 3．b3 8 g 4

The move is good，since it solves the problem of the queen＇s bishop and at the same time permits White the occu－ pation of e5 only after some effort．On the other hand，the older 3．．．c5 （Nimzovich－Spielmann，Cycle I）is at least very doubtful，because it virtually forces the pinning move bs，so ad－ vantageous in the struggle for e5．

## 4．\＆b2 ©bd7 5．h3

Temporarily not necessary，and－as be－ came apparent，especially in the Nimzovich－Dr．Vidmar game in the tenth round，begun in this way－definitely not harmless．Instead，5．We2 commits to little， together with d 3 ，$₫ \mathrm{bd} 2$ ，©h 4 ，with the further idea of $f 4$ ，etc．

## 5．．．Qh5 6．d3 h6

Probably in order to retain the bishop threatened with exchange through 7．g4 \＆ 68. ． h 4 ，but which was hardly worth the effort．The immediate，and more obvious， $6 . e 6$ appears better．

## 7．⿹bd2 e6 8．Hewe2

Contrived，and hardly worthy of imita－ tion．The proceeding had only partial success because Marshall－as opposed to his usual habit－in the following played merely for simplifications．In－ stead of this， 8 ． 2 would have lead to an equal position－very well known， by the way，with colors reversed．

## 8．．． 0 b4 9.94

With the apparent intention of castling long．The dark queenside squares are very weak however，and this circum－ stance could have had unpleasant con－ sequences for him．

## 9．．．\＆g6 10．亿e5

The temporary control ofe5 is only faint consolation here．

## 10．．． $0 \times 5$ 11．$\% \times 5$ 2d6

Why lose so much time？Immediately consequent was 11 ．．．甾e 7 ，together with $12 . .0-0-0$ ，etc．

## 12．亿f3 씁e7 13．Qg2 0－0－0 14．0－ 0－0



## 14．．． $8 \times 5$（？）

So the white knight comes unexpect－ edly to the longed－for square，and will have to be removed by further exchange －and finally a balanced game results with mutual weaknesses．But instead of this，Black could，with 14．．．a3＋ 15．${ }^{\text {B }}$ b1（15．b2 e5 $\mp$ ） 15 ．．．De8！and a follow－up ．．．f6，finally take the e5－ square from the opponent，which also would have resulted in the exchange of White＇s dark－square bishop（if not，then its blocking：17．g3 e5，etc．）－but with
a tremendous difference，compared to the text continuation．A much greater future would have beckoned to both the black knight（from d6）and his g6－ bishop（on account of possible respec－ tive use on f 7 and on the e8－a4 diago－ nal）．After this omission，the play de－ generates noticeably and consists for considerable time of small，easily clear tactical points．Not until the rook endgame does it become interesting again．

## 

The central knight covers d3．Besides， this move makes possible the queen＇s involvement on the queenside and con－ verts the weakness of the dark squares into a strength（definitely not a rare in－ stance）．
16...乞d7

Otherwise，White would really get an advantage．

## 17． $0 \times d 7$ 日 $\times \mathrm{d} 7$ 18．cxd5

Removes the frontal pressure against d3．

## 18．．．exd5 19．${ }^{\mu} b \mathbf{b} 2!$

Here the queen stands resplendent－and it＇s in no way surprising that her pres－ sure on the center squares completely counterbalances the small weakness of the loosened kingside．

## 19．．．f5

Of course！


Looks likewise very reasonable．But upon further consideration，the pressure on f2 proves harmless．Perhaps，there－ fore，the effects of 20 ．．． ．$h$ hd 8 （intend－ ing d4）would have been more long－ lasting．

## $21.9 \times f 5$

Otherwise Black plays ．．．f4．

## 

The infamous＂over－protection＂－this time bound with some tactical condi－ tional ideas－for example， $23 . \mathrm{e} 4 \mathrm{dxe} 4$ 24．dxe 4 日xd2 25．甾xd2 $2 \times e 4$ ？ 26． $\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d} 7+$ ，together with checkmate in two moves．Therefore，it would have been expedient for Black on the next move to play $22 \ldots$ ．．．a6 to open an outlet for himself．Then he probably would have stood still a nuance better．

## 22．．．씁g5（？）

This failure，however，leads finally to a simplification that is in no way favor－ able．But even now，with halfway care－ ful play，he wouldn＇t need to worry about a draw．

## 23．f4 Mg3 24．Me5！

24．Qd4（if ．．．c5 25. ．lc2，etc．）worked too．But the text move is more compel－ ling．

$24 . . .8 \times h 3$

If $24 \ldots . . c 625$. ．gc2，with the renewed threat 26 ．$\times \mathrm{d} 5$ ．

25． $8 \times \mathrm{d} 5$

The white pieces in the center now threaten many squares，and Black has to seek his salvation in simplification． The exchange of d 5 against h 3 was cer－ tainly not good business．

## 25．．．씁g6

With the threat 26．．．gf5．

##  28．${ }^{\text {g }} 1$

Introduces a small threat to play on the g －file，but which should not have mean－ ingful consequences，given the un－ avoidable bishop exchange．

## 

Here 29．．．g5！was simpler；for example， 30．fxg5 hxg5 31． $\mathbf{I} \times \mathrm{g} 5$ âxe4 32．dxe4 g f 2 －and whether White exchanges a rook pair or not，Black would be able without difficulty to hold a draw．

## 30．dxe4 習d3

An effective and sufficient counter－ play，much more purposeful than the passive behavior by means of 30 ．．． 8 eff ， etc．

##  

The position is a clear draw after the exchange brought about by this．But also 34. ．＂c8 wouldn＇t have been suffi－ cient－for example， $34 \ldots$ ．． $\mathrm{I} \times 4$

 draw．

## 34．．．筧d6！

The simplest－the white king is driven to the edge．




But now Marshall begins to contrive and thereby endangers his play．Simple was 40．．．．${ }^{\text {bec }} 6$ ，because if 41 ．${ }^{\text {ge }} 7$ ，then 41． 9 f2， and the White pawns wouldn＇t advance． But thetextmove spoils nothing for now．

## 41．8e7 b5 $42 . b 4$



If immediately $42 . \mathrm{ff}$ ，then 42 ．．．b4＋
 with ．．．a4，etc．－draw．

## 42．．．a4？

The continuation of an unrealizable dream of mate．Correct was $42 \ldots \times \mathrm{a} 4+$ $43 .{ }^{6} \times b 4$ 日c $4+44.6 \times b 5 \mathrm{c} 6+$ ，together with ．．．${ }^{3} \times f 4$ ，etc．－draw．

## $43 . f 5 \mathrm{c} 5$

Actually contains no threat（44．．．．© 4 ？ 45．${ }^{\text {Bc }} 7$ ，etc．）．

44．f6？
A mistake，but a rather excusable one． In hindsight it was noticed that White
was able to win with 44．e6！．Before the text，this move had the important ad－ vantage that it made possible the ban－ ishment of the king from d 5 with $\mathrm{El} \mathrm{d} 7+$ ， and thereby would have ensured the advance of the passed pawn．The logi－ cal further development of play would then be（ $44 . \mathrm{e} 6$ ！） 44 ．．．${ }^{\text {Inc3 }} 3+45$ ． t b2 c×b4 46．．8d7＋莫c6 47．日d8 a3＋ 48．
 54．＊ic2 a2 55．日a8 晶d7 56．f7（not $56 .{ }^{3} \times 2$ 2？${ }^{\text {E }} 2+$ ，and a draw through perpetual check！），and wins．As one sees，this was in no way an easy line， and therefore one can hardly blame Nimzovich，at the board，for underesti－ mating its strength．

## 

After that，nothing better remains for White－since 46. Ed $^{2} 7+$ doesn＇t work－ other than $46 . f 7$ ，with the result $46 . .$. a3＋
 50．${ }^{\text {did }} \mathrm{d} 3 \mathrm{~b} 351 . \mathrm{axb} 3 \mathrm{a} 2=$ ，etc．Therefore， draw．

## Round 8

$1 / 2$ Capablanca - Nimzovich $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Alekhine - Spielmann $1 / 2$
0 Vidmar - Marshall 1

Standings after Round 8：
Capablanca 6
Nimzovich $51 / 2$
Alekhine $31 / 2$
Vidmar 3
Spielmann 3
Marshall 3
（22）Capablanca－Nimzowitsch Torre Attack［A46］

## 1．d4 亿f6 2．乞f3 e6 3．\＆g h h6

More usual and undoubtedly good is 3．．．c5（compare Marshall－Capablanca from the fourth round）．But in case Black absolutely wants to develop the queen＇s bishop to b 7 ，then the text move has to happen exactly at this time，so that White either immediately ex－ changes on f6（after which Black can choose the pawn configuration corre－ sponding to the piece material reduced in this way），or gets around to e4，but only after some effort．

4．Oh4 b6 5．亿bd2 Db76．e3 皿e7 7．Od3 d6 8．c3 0－0


Before he informs the opponent of his king＇s address，he would have done better，by means of $8 \ldots . . c 5$ ，to initiate play in the center immediately．The bishop check on b5 then wouldn＇t have been at all disturbing，because after $9 \ldots \oplus c 6$ ，he could have guarded the pinned knight three or four times in case of need．Of course，Black＇s somewhat early castling could be exploited only with a fairly energetic，reckless ap－ proach－and Capablanca was accus－ tomed to playing like that only in the rarest of cases．

## 9．h3

At this point hardly suitable，since a possible g 4 before safeguarding the king＇s position would be a strike at nothing－for example，（after 9．．．c5） 10．cxd4 ©d5 11．\＆ 3 Øb47．In con－ trast，far more unpleasant for Black would have been the quiet－but still directed at a kingside attack－further mobilization of the white fighting force； for example，9．щ⿱⺌⺝刂匕匕e2 c5 10．0－0－0 0c6 11．${ }^{\text {b }} \mathrm{b} 1$－and only then（even as a pos－ sible pawn sacrifice）g4，etc．，with a promising fight．Instead the game de－ generates completely after a few moves．

## 9．．．c5 10．0－0 乞c6 11．씁e2 ©h5

Seeking to keep the queen＇s bishop with $11 . .$. bb8 or $11 \ldots$ ．．． have little purpose，since in his solid， safe position，White would find oppor－ tunities for exchanges similar to the following．It＇s indeed a difficult and thankless task to want to fight the un－ bending Capablancan will to draw．

## 12．\＆xe7 씁xe7 13．\＆a6

Naturally！

## 13．．．〇f6 14．gfd1

Played not in the hope of getting an ini－ tiative－he has no more chance of that －but rather merely in an attempt to force the opening of the file in order to trade the difficult pieces．

## 

Prevents e5．
17．日ac1 日l7（！）

A preventive maneuver against possible d （or b）$\times \mathrm{c} 5$ ．

## 18．b4 胃ad8

Of course not 18 ．．．cxb4 19．cxb4 Nxb4？ 20．Qa4，etc．

## 19．씁e2 气． 7

Black distances the knight and queen from the c－file in order to be able to offer quick opposition to the rooks－a drawn game deeply thought through．

## 20．${ }^{\text {ne }}$ e1

Not 20．e5，because of $20 \ldots \mathrm{dxe} 5$ 21． $0 \times \mathrm{x}$ 5 g d 5 F．

## 20．．．乞g6 21．g3 登c8 22．b×c5 d×c5！

After 22．．．bxc5 23．Bb1，etc．，the Black queenside could become weak．

## 23．⿹b3 cxd4 24．cxd4 ${ }_{\text {M }} \mathrm{b} 7$

Finally，an exchange！

 29．씀a6（！）씁c7

Rather more favorable for White would
甾×e4 32．${ }^{\mu} \times a 7$ ，etc．

30．씁e2 씁c3 31．씁a6 씁c7 $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（23）Alekhine－Spielmann
Queen＇s Pawn Game［D02］

## 1．$D f 3$ d5 2．d4e6 3．Qf4

This continuation，especially favored by
Rubinstein back in his day，is doubt－
lessly entirely solid，but has the disad－ vantage of being pointed only in a small measure toward pressure on the center， and so gives the opponent a larger choice between different types of de－ velopment．

## 3．．．c5 4．e3 留b6 5．…c1

White＇s leader made this passive move only because he wanted to try an im－ provement of the usual line；otherwise he would have chosen perhaps the vig－ orous developmental move 5.0 c 3 ， which leads to peculiar play；for ex－

 （2） 5 ．．．c4 $6 . e 4!$ 畄 $\times b 27.2 \mathrm{~m} 2 \pm$ ．After other moves follows 8．马b1，and White will develop unfettered．

## 

This is the mentioned improvement：if White plays 7.2 d 3 ，then he will not be able to prevent the exchange of his valu－ able king＇s bishop after 7．．．อf6 8．h3 （otherwise，of course，．．．©h5，etc．） 8．．．马c8 9．0－0 cxd4 10．exd4 0 b 4 ，and
 13．甾 $\times 2$ 2 2 c 6 ，has to content himself with a position that is still solid，but offers little promise beyond that．With the game move，White＇s thought is to first finish his development undis－ turbed，and only then position the bishop on the important bl－h7 diago－ nal．As we will see，the plan in this game was partly successful．

## 7．．．乌f68．h3cxd4

This exchange certainly wasn＇t neces－ sary yet；but after 8 ．．．〇d2 9．Mb1，to－ gether with 8 d 3 and $0-0$ ，White would
have as good as forced the pawn trade on account of the positional threat $\mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{c} 5$ ： together with e4．

## 国ac8 12．甾b1 ©a5 13．管e1！

This prevents the bishop exchange， since with 13 ．．． 2 b5，simply 14.2 d1 would follow．It becomes more and more clear that Black is biting on a gran－ ite queenside．

## 

Threatens 16．\％g5（16．．．g6 17．0g4）to force $16 \ldots$ h6，probably a decisive weakness．

## 15．．．g6！

Thanks to this appropriate defense plan， the black position soon gets a hold．In－ deed，however，it probably would have been different if White had continued resolutely．


## 16． 2 g 5

A stereotypical thought that cheats White out of the fruits of his rational opening approach．After Black had un－ avoidably weakened his kingside， White was able，and had first and fore－
most，to free his boxed－in queen on b1 （and thus also the queen＇s rook）with b4！， （immediately or after \＆ 3 ，for example）． He must accept the weakness c3，which would be quite easy to defend．

After $16 . \mathrm{b} 4$ Dc6，he could have con－ tinued promisingly with $17 . a 4$ （17．．．Dxe5 18．dxe5，together with وe3－ d 4 ，etc．）or 17.0 b 3 or $17 . \% \mathrm{e} 3$ ，together with f 4 ，etc．After the text move，on the other hand，Black succeeds without ef－ fort in consolidating．

## 16．．．${ }^{\text {bg }} 7$ 17．씁c1

The threat connected with 18.0 g 4 g 8
甾h6＋and Df6 mate，is parried suffi－ ciently through the next retraction．

## 

 f6Through which the main hole is sealed and the actual danger therefore is elimi－ nated，because the weakness on e6 is readily guarded by a number of pieces．

## 

After 22．${ }^{-\mu} \mathrm{C} 2,22 \ldots$ ．．． C c 6 ，would follow， with a gain of tempo（ ．．．〇b4）．

## 22．．．Dc4 23．씁c2 씁d6

Threatens with the not－to－be－underes－ timated counterattack b5－b4（or first a5），etc．

## 24．8×c4

White uses the last moment to get rid of the troublesome knight，without opening the $b$－file to the enemy．

## 

With a double intention－©f 4 and（if ．．．b5？），صc5．

## 25．．．日c7 26．〇d3 Øe7 27．Md2 

But this is surely played too weakly；in better shape I would have made the doubtless risk－free attempt to conquer the e5－square by means of $0 \mathrm{~g} 4-\mathrm{h} 2-\mathrm{f} 3$ ， together with g4－g5．

##  อxe3 32．日xe3 e5 33．dxe5

The try 33 ．f3（！）was a last attempt at a win．But after 33．．． 88 ］，not much would come of it．


（24）Vidmar－Marshall
Bogo－Indian［E11］
1．d4 Df6 2．Df3 e6 3．c4 Db4＋ $4.8 \mathrm{~d} 2 \mathrm{D} \times \mathrm{d} 2+5 . \triangleq \mathrm{b} \times \mathrm{d} 2 \mathrm{~d} 5$

As already noticed（compare the game Capablanca－Marshall from the first Cycle），in this variation luft can be made for the black queen＇s bishop either with ．．．b6 or ．．．d6，together possibly with ．．．e5 －without weakening the dark squares． The text move provides the first player in all cases a certain，if also not entirely con－ vertible，positional advantage．

## $6 . e 3$

The Capablancan 6．g2－g3 is also good．



Rudolf Spielmann

José Raúl Capablanca


Aron Nimzovich

Alexander Alekhine


Frank Marshall

Milan Vidmar, Sr.


This weakening of the kingside is not harmless．After this a move，a more tem－ peramental opponent probably would have tried to orchestrate an immediate offense by means of，for example， Bg 1 ， g4－g5，and castling long．But Dr． Vidmar apparently hopes to hold onto his advantage also through quite simple developmental moves．

## 9．0－0

He could also first play 9.3 c 1 ，in order to make ．．．c5 still more difficult．But this wasn＇t necessary，since after the disin－ tegration in the center that now ensues， he gets a position promising victory．

## 9．．．c5

So it was foreseen with the previous move：The knight was freed from guarding h 7 ，in order to be able finally to attack the white c5－pawn from a6（！） after a curious zigzag movement ．．．But such a plan with a half－developed posi－ tion had to be unsound，and in fact，finds its rebuttal．But Black＇s strategic situa－ tion was inferior at this moment，and the game of defense introduced by the pater peccavi－move ．．．c6 looked like－ wise uninviting．

After these six forced moves，it turns out that Black made no progress in the solution of the queen＇s bishop problem， but opened up files for the action of the opponent＇s rooks．White uses this cir－ cumstance very skillfully．


Looks daring，since the queen in the cen－ ter，where she can be attacked too easily， has only a few squares at her disposal． But on the move 17．．．甾e7，at first glance more natural，White would force a new， probably decisive weakening of the en－ emy kingside：18． m d3 f5 $19 . 〔 \mathrm{e} 5$ ，etc．

## 

What else？

## 19．乞e4

From here on，a vexing position arises， in which apparently several paths lead to Rome，but in fact，more often than not，there＇s barely one single salvation for Black．At this moment，for example， the moves 19.24 and 19．\％e4 appear enormously strong．But in the first case， Black would have pulled himself com－ pletely out of a fix with 19．．．${ }^{\text {M }} \mathrm{d} 6$ ！－and halfway in the second with 19．．．${ }^{\text {mb }} \mathrm{b} 5$ 20． $2 \times$ b7 0 a 4 （20．．．日ab8），with apawn sacrifice．The text move is stronger．

## 19．．．씁b5 20.33

With the main threat 21．0e5！，together with $๑ \mathrm{~d} 6$ ，and wins．

## 20．．． 0 c6！

A bold defensive move，which gives him the most prospects for enemy care－ lessness．


## Cycle II：Round 8

## 21． 2 d 4 （？）

Apparently tired from the struggle against the allure of various will－o＇－the－ wisps of the previous moves，Dr． Vidmar goes astray at this moment， when things weren＇t so hard．He relin－ quishes his whole positional advantage． The precarious position of Black＇s small heaps of pieces queenside，and above all of his queen，could have been taken advantage of here in two ways．
（1） 21. ©e5 $0 \times 4$（if［a］21．．． 04 ？ 22． $0 \times$ a 4 尚 $\times a 423.5 c 5$ ；［b］21．．． $5 c 4$
 with a winning advantage in both cases）
 23． f f3，and now for Black，neither 23．．．2ca4 24．．́．d4，nor 23．Dba4 24. M．c2，etc．，is satisfactory）．In this line， Black would in the long run hardly be able to avoid the loss of a pawn；and （2） $21 . \mathrm{d} 3$ ！（not 21.5 d 6 ，on account of $21 \ldots 5 \mathrm{c} 4$ ！ $22.9 \times \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{D} \times \mathrm{f} 3$ ！，etc．） 21．．．2c4（or［a］21．．． 2 a 4 22．日 $\times$ b5
 25．乞e5土，etc．；［b］21．．．Mh5 22．引g3， together with $23 . \mathrm{h} 3$ or 23 ． 8 m ，and wins）22．Me2 $0 \times e 423$ ．$\times \times 4$ ，and Black wouldn＇t have a sufficient de－ fense against the threats 24.0 D 4 or 24．日d3，together with 等ac1，etc．The weak text move－followed，by the way， by a still weaker one－permits Marshall the only time in the toumament to dem－ onstrate his otherwise so feared tacti－ cal proficiency．

## 21．．．쌉e5 22．f4？

Usually one makes such moves，weak－ ening the entire center position，only if they are connected to a desirable change．So did White spot such a thing
here in the driving back of the opponent＇s king＇s knight to the origi－ nal place？He could have maintained a small advantage with the simple 22．甾b1（unpins and protects！）．

##  Db8！

Indeed the only move（or else 25.5 d 6 ， etc．），but fine，since the knight can very soon get to better squares．Chances now score approximately equal．

## 25．管ac1 0 D5

The beginning of the counter－play in the center，enabled by White＇s careless 22nd move．

## 26．씁f2 a5 27．b5 씁b6

Threatens two pawns，neither of which is good to sacrifice．Therefore，it was now White＇s tum to make unpleasant forced moves．

##  30．g4？

A＂risk－everything＂play，which is un－ like the leader of the white pieces．With 30．h3（preparing the move \＆e4，which doesn＇t work immediately because of 30．．．．）c3！，etc．），he could have kept a balanced game．

## 30．．．Ode7 31．h4

Everything in the same style．The sec－ ond player will determine that White will perish only because of his weak points in the center and kingside，aris－ ing from the many pawn moves．

[^5]The beginning of a long，calculated maneuver，which aims at the conquest of the black center squares．
32.44


To $32 . \doteq a 4, \ldots$ ．．． m b3 would be unpleas－ ant，as would 32．⿹e4 $\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{fd}}$ ．

## 32．．．習d4！

This move signifies the actual crisis of the game－for if Black were compelled here to draw back his rook，then White would get an advantage with the occu－ pation of the b－file．But now he goes downhill rather quickly．

## 33．f5

To his misfortune，White has to con－ vince himself that the instant win of the exchange with 33.0 d 7 would ulti－ mately change into a loss of a piece－

 $38 . f 6 \mathrm{gxf6}$ ，etc．

## 33．．．exf5 34．gxf5 亿e5！

For the knights，which in the first part of the game had to wait so grimly for better days on a 6 or b 6 －bright new horizons are opening up；and in the end it will be their lot to deal the enemy the
deathblow．The end phase makes quite a pleasing impression as an illustration on the subject of＂Crime and Punishment．＂

##  37．$\times \times$ d8 + 씁 $\times d 838 . f 6$

The tendency to simplify is probably un－ derstandable with the overall relaxed po－ sition．But it brings only slight relief，since there are still enough pawns remaining on the board to render a decision．

## 

The attempt $40 . \varrho \mathrm{d} 3$ would also prove insufficient after $40 \ldots . . \pm \times d 3$ 41． $\mathrm{m} g 3+$
 The tragedy for White lies in the fact that the endgame is equally as hopeless for him as the middle game．

## 40．．．Dg6 41．कh h3

Also 41．h5 苗g5＋，together with ．．．ปf4， etc．，would be unpleasant．

## 41．．．M d6！

Threatensto win a piece with ．．．$\searrow \mathfrak{f} 4+$ ，etc．

## 

Forced，since after 43.0 d 3 ，Black wins


## 43．．．쌉e5 44．훕f1

He already begins to hope for a ＂miracle＂：44．．．．．．$\times$ xe4？ 45. ．．．$\times f 7+$ ！，to－ gether with $46.0 \mathrm{~d} 6+$ ，etc．，draw！

44．．．2f4
The bishop will soon be compelled to keep company with the knight in exile

## Cycle II：Round 9

（see White＇s 47th move）．The position， which represents the complete triumph of the strategy on the black central squares，deserves a diagram．


With the threat $47 \ldots$ ．．．${ }^{\text {Ma }} 1+-\mathrm{b} 2+\times \mathrm{b} 7$ ．
47．Da6 Ma1＋48．씁e1 甾b2！ 49．씁e3

If 49．畄f2，then 49．．．㘳c1＋，together with ．．．．${ }^{\text {M．c6，}}$ ，winning a piece．

In order to be able to answer 51．．．䏣c6 with 52 ． $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{G}} \mathrm{f} 1$ ．A truly heroic resistance！

## 51．．．乌g2＋52．Wf1 ŋef4！

Threatens 53．．．苗c1＋54．冒f2 甾e1 checkmate．

## 53．${ }^{\text {big }} 1 \Delta \times h 4$

Finally comes the harvest！

## 54．쓰f 1 甾 $\times$ e4 55．©c5 Me3＋ 

Spite chess．
 in three．

57．．．f5 0－1

## Round 9

$1 / 2$ Vidmar－Capablanca $1 / 2$
1 Alekhine－Marshall 0
0 Spielmann－Nimzovich 1
Standings after Round 9：
Capablanca $61 / 2$
Nimzovich 61／2
Alekhine $41 / 2$
Vidmar $31 / 2$
Spielmann 3
Marshall 3
（25）Vidmar－Capablanca Queen＇s Gambit Declined［D30］

## 1．d4 ©f6 2．.$f 3$ e6 3．c4 d5 4．e3

With the voluntary confinement of his queen＇s bishop，in my opinion White abandons the hope of getting an advan－ tage in the opening．Oddly enough，in New York against Capablanca（see also Nimzovich－Capablanca，Round II），the best opening moves（ 4.0 g 5 or 4.0 c 3 ） were missed for mysterious reasons．

4．．．2bd7
Against Nimzovich，Capablanca played 4．．．．e7，together with ．．．0－0，which I also like better，because with that，Black reserves for himself the developmental possibility ．．．c5，together with ．．．©c6．

## 5．${ }^{d} 3$

But the Merano line isn＇t so strong for Black that White has to waive the nor－
mal move 5．Nc3 just to avoid it！To the text move，Capablanca tries a new，note－ worthy developmental maneuver．

## 5．．．d×c4 6．\＆xc4 c5 7．0－0 0 b6（！

Enables a quick queenside mobilization． Inexpedient with this system would be the zwischenzug 7．．．a6，since after $8 . a 4$ ©b6 9．．id3，Black would always have to take into account a5．

## 

Here 10．d×c5 $0 \times \mathrm{c} 511 . \mathrm{e} 4$ looks more natural．After the queen move，Black probably would have been able to make the push of the enemy e－pawn some－ what more difficult．

## $10 . . . \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 411 . \sum \times \mathrm{d} 4$

The isolation of the central pawn through 11．exd4 didn＇t come under consideration，since in conjunction with it，White couldn＇t expect a halfway se－ rious attacking game．

## 11．．．${ }^{\text {D }} 4$

As the answer reveals，the developmen－ tal square for the bishop isn＇t selected very happily．It was appropriate to look at the d4－knight with $11 \ldots$ 昷c5，in or－ der possibly to lead him astray；for ex－ ample，12． D b3 m e7 13．e4 e5 14.44 0－ 0 ！15．fxe5 ©g4 16．昷f4 昷g5 17．日g Me8！－and with good play，Black would take back the e5－square．

## 12．e4 e5

Not $12 \ldots \times 63$ 13．b×c3 e5（otherwise 14．e5 $\pm$ ） $14 . \dot{\mathrm{Df}} 3$ ，together with $\$ \mathrm{~m} 1-\mathrm{a} 3$ ，
with excellent play for White，thanks to the might of his black－square bishop．

## 13． 5 c 2 （？）

But here either 13.2 f 3 ！or 13.2 b 3 is preferable．If in this last case， $13 \ldots \times c 3$ $14 . \mathrm{bxc} 30-0$ ，then 15 ．a a ${ }^{\text {a }} \mathrm{e} 816.0 \mathrm{c} 5$ －rather in favor of White．But other－ wise he would avoid the weakness on c3（\％）d2 or also possibly 气d5）and keep a small developmental advantage．

## $13 \ldots$ ．．$\times \mathrm{C} 314 . \mathrm{b} \times \mathrm{c} 3$ 0－0

Now Black is again at the helm．

## 15．乞e3 〇a4！

It＇s true that this permits White to change his weakling c3 into a passed pawn that＇s sound at the core－but at the cost of further weakening the entire area on the left side of the board．Only a few players probably would havecon－ ceived this idea．

##  Ma5

Threatens to win an exchange （19．．．$\Delta x d 3$ ，etc．）．

## 19．${ }^{\text {Ind }} 1$



## 19．．． $2 \times \mathrm{d} 3$（？）

Strangely，Capablanca foregoes the ob－ vious move 19．．．\＆a 4 ，which would have assured him leading the game ei－
 22．${ }^{\text {I }} \times \mathrm{d} 3$ 日c 4 （c2），together with dou－ bling the rooks and moving the king to d7－or also after $20 . \Xi \mathrm{g} 2$ 2 0 d 3 21．甾xd3 ac3．On the other hand，fol－ lowing the hasty exchange，he can count only on a draw．

## 20．씁 $\times \mathrm{d} 3$ 留c3

If now $20 \ldots$ a 4 or $20 \ldots$ ．．． cc 3 ，then 21． m d2！．

21．De3 M M $\times$ d3 22 ． 日l $^{2}$ d3 $3523 . a 4$是c4 $24 . f 3^{1 / 2}-1 / 2$

Now suddenly White stands better， since after $24 \ldots$ ．．．ama4 25．Q b6．he wins back the pawn，whereupon White＇s guarded d－pawn would have greater value than the Black pawn on b7．But the game，of course，was not to be won against proper defense．

## （26）Alekhine－Marshall

 Queen＇s Gambit Declined［D30］
## 1．d4 乞f6 2．$\searrow \mathrm{ff} 3 \mathrm{e}$ 3．c4d54．2g5 h6

The praxis of the last tournament seems to suggest that White will have no trouble securing a lasting initiative af－ ter this move．Usually Black plays the move only out of＂fear＂of White＇s later plans of development recommended by Capablanca－according to which the knight on d 2 must be developed in or－ der to take again on c4，in case Black plays ．．．d×d4．It＇s very questionable， however，whether this system can se－
cure White a significant advantage，if Black，instead of the passive move ．．．c7－ c6（necessary if White develops his knight on c3），at the right moment lib－ erates the play in the center with ．．．c7－ c5！．In any case，this line still has been examined too little to be dismissed．

## 

Relatively the best．If Black tries to thwart the exchange of the bishop with 6．．．c6，then 7．7．Mb3！，together with e4， etc．，with superior play for White （Bürger－Sir Thomas，Hastings 1927）．

## 7．씁b3c5

If this counterattack were correct，then we would be forced to regard as insuf－ ficient the White maneuver from 4．Q g 5 on．But in reality，the double step of the c－pawn gives some counter chances only in case of imprecise play on the part of the first to move，as was the case， for example，in the game Bogoljubow－ Marshall，Moscow 1925．On the other hand，the simple liquidation of the ten－ sion in the center ensures White a real advantage－either positional or material．

## 8．cxd5

This move，also used by Bogoljubow in the mentioned game，is probably not the strongest．More correct is $8 . \mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{c} 5$ ！ 5c6 9．cxd5 exd5 10．a3！n $\times \mathrm{c} 3+$ ！（or $10 \ldots 2 \times c 5$ 11．e3，etc．）11．b×c3，and Black will have great difficulty winning back the gambit－pawn．

## 8．．．c×d4

An interesting idea，which promises Black more than 8 ．．．exd5 anyway
（Marshall－Bogoljubow），whereupon White would have replied not $9 . a 3$ （Bogoljubow），but rather simply 9． $\mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{C} 5$ ，etc．，as in the previous com－ ment．

## 9．${ }^{\mu} \times \mathbf{b} 4$

 etc．

9．．．d×c3 10．d×e6


The only possibility to play for a win，
 12．${ }^{[1} \times \mathrm{c} 3$ ©c6，etc．，White would have only a quite insignificant advantage．

## 10．．．8×e6

Apparently Marshall was already de－ moralized to such an extent at this point in the toumament that he chose to avoid all complexities，even at the cost of a pawn．More corresponding to his style －and also better objectively－was
 13．日×b2 日c8！（and not 13．．．0c6
 upon White must continue with great caution in order to keep his material advantage and convert it to a win．

## 11．씁 $\times \mathrm{c} 3$

White has nothing more to fear，and the only question posed is the following： whether or not Black＇s small advance in development suffices to offset the advantage of the extra pawn，which White kept after the gambit move 7 ．．．c5．

## 11．．．＠c6

This move－a kind of trap－is illogi－ cal，since Black has to swap queens anyway．A little better was 11 ．．．．．．$\times$ xc3 $3+$ 12．bxc3 乌d7！，so that this knight could participate in the attack on the White c－ pawn（via b6 or f6－d5 or a4，etc．）．

## 12．e3！

The simplest，and better than 12．$\times \mathrm{Gx} \times 6$ gxf6 13．a3，（preventing 乌b4）13．．．0－0－ $0!$ ，when Black＇s pressure on the open files（ d －and g －）could become unpleas－ ant．

## 12．．．씁 $\times$ c3＋

Or 12．．．0－0 13．${ }^{\mu} \times x 6$ gxf6 14．a3 $\pm$ ，etc．

## 13．bxc3 管c8 14. Qd3

In order to be able to play $\searrow \mathrm{d} 4$ ，which now，because of 14 ．．． $5 \times d 4$ 15．cxd 4 El2，etc．，would be premature．

## 14．．．0－0 15．乌d4 Q d $^{2} 16 . f 3$

Of course not $16.0-0$ ，because $\circlearrowright \mathrm{e} 5$ ，etc．

## 16．．．〇e5 17．家d2 昌c5 18．e4

Black＇s pressure on the c－pawn has be－ come rather unpleasant－above all， since White，for now，has no real counter chances．White tries with the text move to bring about a simplifica－
tion，which will allow him to occupy the d－file just in time to neutralize the opponent＇s impact on the c－file．

## 18．．．8．c4 19．© $\times 4$

If 19.8 d 2 ，then $19 \ldots \mathrm{fc} 8$ ，with the threat \＆a6！，etc．

## 19．．．管fc8

The previous move of the knight was excellent，since it impeded a possible counterattack on the b－file，and so lim－ ited the possibilities for White to come to the defense of his c－pawn．But here Black doesn＇t pay attention and permits the enemy to keep his material advan－ tage through a concealed maneuver． The correct move was 21 ．．．g6！，prevent－ ing the penetration of the knight via 55 ， after which White would still have great tactical difficulties asserting his advan－ tage．

## 22．〇f 5！管8c7

After 22．．．${ }^{\text {fid }}$ ，White＇s next move would be stronger yet．

## 23．首hd1！©b5


 28．${ }^{\text {Exf }} \times$ ，and White＇s passed e－pawn would obviously be superior．With the text move，Black hopes finally to cap－ ture the c－pawn，without ceding the sev－ enth rank to White．

## $24 . c 4$ Da3



## 25．2e3！

The point of the maneuver begun with the 22nd move：the c－pawn，which can－ not be taken now because of the reply 26． 5 d 5 ！（winning the exchange），will turn out to be a terrible weapon after some moves，against which Black will have no defense whatsoever．The final phase doesn＇t lack a certain piquancy．

## 25．．．형h7

Practically forced．

## 

White threatened 28．®a ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ，et al．

## $28 . c 5$ b4

In order to steer the knight to c3－via b5．

## 29．乞f5 管g6 30．乞d4！

Prevents the plan mentioned above and prepares the triumphant pawn march．
 33．${ }^{\text {昌 } \times \mathbf{2} 7!}$

And not $33 . c 7$ immediately，because of 33．．．b3！34．$\searrow \times b 3$ Øb5，etc．，with some prospects．

33．．．b3
Despair！

## 34． $\mathbf{2} \times \mathrm{b} 3$ 乞c2

 because of 35 ．．．${ }^{\text {E }} \times \mathrm{d} 4+$ ，etc．）．



Or immediately $39 . \mathrm{b}^{\mathrm{b}} 6$ ，etc．On the other hand， 39. ． c c 2 would be mistaken because of ．．． $8 \times 66+$ ！．



（27）Spielmann－Nimzowitsch Nimzovich Defense［C02］

## 1．e4 亿c6 2．乌f3 e6 3．d4 d5 4．e5

If Black can＇t devise something good after 1 ．．．． $0 c 6$ in order to avoid the cur－ rent position，then certainly this move has no future．In fact，the black pieces are allocated to desperately few squares， and a demolition of the debilitating white pawn complex lies far in the fu－ ture．Nimzovich＇s next queenside op－ erations are admittedly debonair and original，but remain without success， because his opponent attacks on the other side．

4．．．b6

Since without ．．．c5，this idea isn＇t pos－ sible，I would try $4 \ldots .$. － 5 ！？here－and only with $5 . \mathrm{c} 3$ ，then ．．．b6，etc．At the next move， 5 ．．．©a 5 therefore also came under consideration．

## 5．c3 0 － 7 （？

One can only waste time speculating about the occupation of＂outposts＂when the occupying pieces can actually be driven from such squares by enemy pawn moves．In the present case，for example， f 5 will serve White merely as an attack－ point，and therefore it offers absolutely no strategic value to waste time occupy－ ing．If Black didn＇t want to cast his lot in with $5 \ldots .$. ©a5，then $5 \ldots$ ．．a5，with the aim ．．． e a6，came under consideration．

## 6．Dd3 15

The move has no success because of the obvious reply，and so could have been better replaced with the immediate 6．．．c5．But Black＇s position was not sat－ isfactory anyway．

## 7．

Threatening $9 . \mathrm{g} 4$ and forces the counter move，which further immobilizes Black＇s kingside．

## 8．．．h5 9．－Dg5



## Cycle II：Round 9

## 9．．．g6？

Until now，the position could perhaps still have withstood the eccentricities， because they caused no irreparable weaknesses in their own camp．（The light squares queenside are certainly easy to＂fill，＂like a bad tooth）．But such a nasty weakening of ff （and as a con－ sequence，of its neighbors：since the squares of the same color have a com－ mon inner life－the fate of one most often exerts a corresponding influence upon the others），together with the ab－ sence of stabile and effective squares for the black pieces，transforms Black＇s situation into a hopeless one．The way Spielmann resolves the situation，up to the unruffled winning position he ob－ tained，is instructive．

Instead，with 9．．．פge7．together with ．．．. g 6, ．．．\＆e7，etc．，the position could be given a face，although White＇s chances in this case would also be de－ cidedly more favorable．

## 10．乞d2！Əge7

$10 \ldots .0 \times \mathrm{h} 4$ is prohibited because of 11．${ }^{\text {b }} 5+$ ．

## 11．Df1

With the irrefutable plan to oust 2 ff through f 3 ，together with g4．

## 11．．．c5 12．f3 c4 13．Dc2 b5

The last three pawn moves form only a pseudo－demonstration，since the fate of the combat must be decided on the other flank．But even a halfway satisfactory defense set－up wasn＇t to be found there．

14．g4！ 0 g 7
After $14 . . . \mathrm{hxg} 4,15 . \mathrm{fxg} 4 \mathrm{D} \times \mathrm{h} 4$ 16． m f2， etc．，rupturing f7．

## 15．乞g3 乞c6 16．씁g！

Very nice：after the opening of the g－ file，unavoidable for Black，the queen will unfurl a deadly operation from here．

## 16．．．${ }^{\text {Be }}$ ？

With this，Black makes the team play of the defending pieces still more diffi－ cult．But also after the relatively better 16．．．』a7，favorable combinations would have stood at White＇s disposal； for example，17．gxh5 $0 \times h 5$（or 17．．．gxh5 18．Nh7！$\pm$ ）18． $0 \times h 5$ 日xh5
 21． $2 \times f 7+$ © $\times f 722$ ．${ }^{\text {g }} 1 \pm$ ，etc．

## $17 . g \times h 5 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{h} 5$

Forced，of course，since after $17 . . . \circlearrowright \times h 5$ ？，the exchange on h 5 ，to－ gether with $\emptyset_{x} \mathrm{ff}$ ，would immediately decide for White．

## 18．日g1

From here on，different paths lead to Rome－and it＇s really Spielmann＇s bad luck that he thought of almost the only line that brought him，instead of to the eternal city，directly to hell ．．．Instead of the reasonable amplification of pres－ sure on the g －file，the immediate sacri－ fice on f 7 ，as well as the simpler 乞h7－ f6＋，came under strong consideration．

[^6]

## 19． $2 \times f 7$

Although this sacrifice－as proved un－ der later examination at some length－ also should lead to a win，in my opin－ ion it in no way deserves an exclama－ tion mark，because it certainly isn＇t the simplest way to a win．From the stand－ point of economical reasoning，19．${ }^{\text {eb }} \mathrm{e} 2$ ！ is certainly preferable here，which would leave the opponent completely without a halfway satisfactory counter－ move，and whereby all the sacrificial twists lying in wait in the text position would be maintained－but in decidedly intensified form．After 19．．． 8 f 8 ，White would have $20.0 \times f 7$ ！，etc．，but after other moves，the knight sacrifice on f 7 also follows rapidly．

## 19．．．${ }^{\text {b }} \times \mathrm{f} 7$ 20． $2 \times h 5$ ？？

The relative weakness of the previous moves was precisely that they con－ nected with many enticements and side lines，and so placed unnecessary，heavy demands on White．Certainly the text move actually didn＇t come under con－ sideration at all，because it is based on quite a gross oversight．In contrast，it wasn＇t at all easy to assess which of the four reasonable attacking continuations
is the best：（1）20．0．g6＋；（2）20．0e4；


The palm branch falls to the last method of play－with the rationale（20．0e2！）

 together with mate in some moves．It may be that White also could win with any of the other above moves in a com－ plicated way．But in my opinion，this assessment wouldn＇t have had any sig－ nificance for the aesthetic value of the sacrificial combination．

## $20 .$. 昷 $\times$ h $4+21$ ．${ }^{\text {be2 }}$

A tad better was 21. did（compare Black＇s 25th move）；but this probably wouldn＇t have had any effect on the outcome of the game．

## $21 . . .2 \times h 522.2 g 6+$ 直 7 23． $2 \times h 5$ कd7！

Strange that Spielmann overlooked this actually natural，indeed sole，escape move．In the following，Black had quite an easy task and could have played dif－ ferently in various places．

 28．씁h7 Hb6 29．昆g8 씁c7 30．씁h8乞d8 31．是g6 笪g2

Still simpler was immediately 31．．．b4．

##  

The return of the piece is actually the quickest way to checkmate．

 $39.8 \times h 4$ M 41． $\mathrm{m}_{\boldsymbol{g}} \mathrm{b} 8+$ 气b7 0－1<br>\section*{Round 10}<br>$1 / 2$ Capablanca - Alekhine $1 / 2$ 0 Nimzovich - Vidmar 1 $1 / 2$ Marshall - Spielmann $1 / 2$

Standings after Round 10：
Capablanca 7
Nimzovich 61／2
Alekhine 5
Vidmar 4½
Spielmann 31／2
Marshall 3½
（28）Capablanca－Alekhine
Semi－Slav Defense［D47］

## 1．d4 Df6 2． $2 f 3$ d5 3．c4 c6 4．e3

Hasn＇t the move 4．〇c 3 ，used almost exclusively earlier，been placed into the archives somewhat too early？After 4．．．dxc4 5．a4 alf5 6．0e5 e6 7．f3！，to－ gether with e4，etc．，White appears to get a game full of opportunity．

## 4．．．e6

Safer than 4．．．男5 5．cxd5！cxd5（or 5．．．$\dot{0} \times \mathrm{d} 5$ 6．$\dot{\mathrm{D}} \mathrm{bd} 2$ ！） 6 ．Mb3，with initia－ tive for White on the queenside．

## 5．2c3

This leads to the equalizing Meran variation．（I don＇t believe in the sup－ posed strengthening for White found in the very nick of time in this method of play．）Probably 5．\＆d 3 promises some－ what more，in order possibly to develop the queen knight to d 2 ．

5．．．乌bd7 6．\＆d $3 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{c} 47.8 \times \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{~b} 5!$ 8．2e2

In case White wants to pass on the double－edged 9．e4（after 8．and3 a6）， then it＇s certainly most expedient for him not to interfere on the d－file with his bishop．Rubinstein also pulled his bishop back to e2 against Lasker（Mos－ cow 1925）．

## 8．．．a6 9．0－0 \＄${ }^{\text {b }} \mathbf{6}$ 10．a3

In the game mentioned，10．b3 occurred instead of this，whereupon Black pre－ ferred to first mobilize his kingside，and only after $10 \ldots$ e 7 ，to play 11.2 b2 $0-$ 012.0 e 5 c 5 ．On the other hand，after the text move，the immediate advance of the c－pawn is most advisable－since White，having prevented the possibil－ ity of ．．．b4，threatens 11．e4．

## $10 . . . c 511 . d \times c 5 \triangleq \times c 5(?)$

Fearful fumbling for a draw as a result of inferior shape and unfavorable tour－ nament standing！Full－value was only to be had in $11 \ldots$ ．$\times \mathrm{c} 512 . \mathrm{b} 4$ 皿 e 7 13． l b2 0－0－and Black，who would have more chances than White to make the most of c 4 with the corresponding c5－square，would stand with more promise．The position would，by the way，have similarities to the 21 st match game in Buenos Aires，where the pres－ sure on the c－file soon provided the Black with a superior position．

After the illogical moves which occurred， White wins a couple of tempi and，as a result，gets greater freedom of space．


## 16．Eac1 0－0 17．©e5 昌fd8 

Capablanca doesn＇t seem content yet with a draw－and justifiably，since Black still has to play carefully in or－ der to equalize completely．After the exchange of the second rook，for ex－ ample，White would certainly stand
 21． $\mathfrak{c} 6$ ！，together with 22 ． $8 \mathrm{f} 3 \pm$ ．

19．．．dd6 20．．$f 3$


## 20．．．乞d5！

As a result， c 6 is sufficiently defended （21． 2 c 6 ？Ec8 and wins），and conse－ quently the winning chances of the op－ ponent are neutralized．More amusing than this position，and even the whole game，is the fact，however，that－ap－ parently as a result of an error in the telegraphic transmission of the game－ the South American and European chess newspapers and columns described the text move as 20．．．2e4？？．And all－but all－assumed it as quite a matter of course that Black，in doing so，didn＇t anticipate the quite obvious decisive countermove 21．©c 6 ，and that White likewise didn＇t notice it ．．．

## 21．2d3

It＇s not hard to see that this move，which after［the erroneously reported，ed．］ 20．．．$勹$ e 4 would have been a blatant er－ ror of omission，is here the most rea－ sonable．

## 21．．．tbry 22．乞c5 \＆xc5 23． $8 \times c 5+$

Also 23．bxc5 fac6，etc．，would have been hopeless for the purpose of a win．

## 23．．．由e8

If the knight had stood on e4 after White＇s 23 rd move［as in the false re－ ports，ed．］，then 23．．． $2 \times \mathrm{xc} 524 . \mathrm{bxc}$（or

 कe7，etc．，provides Black a superior rook endgame．But also this consider－ ation awakened in the gentlemen com－ mentators no doubt about the correct－ ness of the text of the game．

## 

In the European chess columns－and also in the Russian toumament book－ the moves appear as 26．flee 4 \＆ $\mathrm{m}=4$ and in thenext move－27．．．fd3．So all is in beautiful order！

##  $1 / 2-1 / 2$

（29）Nimzovich－Vidmar
Réti Opening［A06］

##  4．Db2 0 bd7 5．h3

Nimzovich played like this against Marshall in the seventh round．But if in the following play fl e 2 was deliberate， then h3 could calmly be omitted，and

## Cycle II：Round 10

the bishop move take place immedi－ ately．Because after 5． 2 e $2 \times 53$（？） 6．© $\times$ f3 e $57 . \mathrm{d} 3$ ，together with $\hat{\mathrm{D}} \mathrm{d} 2$ ，etc．， White could have put a lot of faith in his white－square bishop．

## 5．．． d 56. e2

In the game mentioned，6．d3 occurred here，which in my opinion absolutely belongs to the system and must come sooner or later．White gets a disadvan－ tage in this game only because he com－ pletely omits the move．

## 6．．．e67．De5（？）

In connection with the following，this serves the development of the oppo－ nent．Still appropriate was 7．d3，to－ gether with $\circlearrowright b d 2$ ．

## 7．．． $8 \times 2$ 8．

A sad necessity，since $9 . \mathrm{f} 4$ is prohibited because of $9 \ldots$ ．．．$\times 5$ 10．fxe5 $\sum$ e4干，etc．

## 9．．．${ }^{-1} \times \mathrm{d} 710 . c 4 \mathrm{c} 611.0-0(?)$

It isn＇t serious that the castled－short position is weakly defended right now －because Black isn＇t quite ready for attack．But what＇s really bad is that，in the future，there＇s no sensible way ap－ parent for the white minor pieces to play across to the other flank in order to help their king．Therefore White would do much better to wait and see where the opponent castled－and with this idea， first play $11 . 今 \mathrm{c} 3$ ．
11...0-0-0!


## 12．0c3？

This actually rather reasonable move is branded by the opponent in a very con－ vincing way as a positional error of se－ rious consequence．After the previous small omission，White＇s position no longer looks very good，but after 12．d3！， it would perhaps still get a face．
 14．f4，with a center in need of protec－ tion，it＇s true，but flexible，and－which is the main thing here－with the real hope of co－operation from the bishop and knight．

Dr．Vidmar leads the following attack －as，by the way，the whole game－with great panache and precision．

## 12．．．\＆c7！13．d4

Rather forced，for if $13 . \mathrm{d} 3$（or 13．Mad1），then 13．．．…d6 $14 . f 4$（14．g3 h5） $14 .$. d4，etc．，with a clear advantage．

## 13．．．h5 14．c5？

But now his best chance is in a pawn sacrifice： $14 . e 4!\mathrm{dxc} 4$（after $14 \ldots \mathrm{dxe} 4$
 etc．，White has defenses）15．Iffl！（not $15 . \mathrm{e} 5$ ，since after ．．．乌d5，exchanging
and winning back a pawn， d 4 remains miserably weak） $15 \ldots . . . \times \mathrm{b} 316 . \mathrm{axb} 3$ ， with a pawn center，open files and frol－ icking pieces．Instead of this，the bishop is demoted to a sleeping extra，and the knight will be scouting around in vain for useful squares．So the game is no more to be saved．

## 14．．．g5 15．b4 h4

Also 15．．．g4 16．h4 g3 17．fxg3 פg4， etc．，was strong．But the text move seems more aesthetic because of its in－ ner consistency．

## 16．b5 登dg8！

Threatens ．．．g4 and，at the same time， allows the king the invulnerable d8－ square．A powerful move！

## 17．b×c6 b×c6 $18 . f 3$

As a result，the threat ．．．g 4 is deferred only a very few moves．But，anyway， the rest would be hopeless as well．

## 18．．．乞h5 19．e4 f5！20．exd5 exd5 21．日ae1

Black no longer has to consider even this threat to swap queens．

## 21．．．g4！22．h×g4 f×g4 23．f $\times$ g4

If 23 ． m e6，now or on the next move， ．．．h3！decides．

## $23 . . .8 \times 84$



## $24.2 \times \mathrm{d} 5$

Ingenious，but not hard to refute．Black was even able to take the sacrificial animal－for example，24．．．cxd5 25．c6！
 27．．．h3！，etc．－but his reply is more compelling，since it wins the queen．

## 24．．．h3！25．乞е7＋（ \＄b7 26．日f3

Black threatened 26．．．h2＋，etc．
26 ．．． $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{l}} \times \mathrm{g} 2+27 . \mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{g}} \times \mathrm{g} 2 \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 228 . \mathrm{d} 5$
 31．d6

Otherwise，mate．

## 

The last trump，and a very little one （33．．．．．．．e4＋34．©h2 씁xd4？？35．gb $8+$ ！$\pm$ etc．

## 33．．．贝xe7！34．dxe7 留xe7 35．Df2 Me4＋0－1

A truly flawlessly implemented bout by Black．
（30）Marshall－Spielmann Sicilian Defense［B80］

## 1．d4e6 2．⿹f3 c5 3．e4

Also $3 . c 4$ comes under strong consid－ eration here．

## 

To 5．2d3，5．．．2c6 is good（see Spielmann－Alekhine，Cycle I）．The so－ called＂Scheveningen＂position，originat－ ing after Black＇s next move，contains a series of interdependent，and therefore not easy to fathom，strategic problems．

##  <br> Ebd7 9．Me2（？）

Marshall doesn＇t belong to those who， in the space of 64 squares，seeks to solve riddles．He＂develops＂his pieces gradu－ ally in their own camp－apparently without worrying in which exact se－ quence these should be moved．There－ fore，as preparation for f 4 －which ob－ viously is intended after \＆d3－8．©h1 comes much more under consideration according to Maróczy＇s recipe，because on e3，the bishop can possibly serve the opponent as an object of attack，and after all，stands in the way of White＇s own pieces．So instead of the text move，9．f4 has to happen immediately in order to then lead the queen－via f 3 or el －in two tempi to g 3 ．As the outcome shows，this loss of time will be bitterly avenged．

## 9．．．a6 10．f4 씁c7 11．씁f3 b5 12．${ }^{\text {Gae1 }}$

White had time for this later．More pressing was the strategic yet necessary 12．a3．It＇s clear，by the way，that $12 . \mathrm{e} 5$
would be unfavorable because of 12．．．ab7．

12．．．D b7


## 13． H g 3（？）

An adventure as a consequence of White＇s discontent with what he has achieved so far in this game．In fact， after 13.33 〇c5，Black would gradually have assumed control of the game－as he mostly succeeds，by the way，in the Sicilian in the case of a fortunately sur－ vived opening battle．But there was re－ ally no cause for White to grab at such desperate means．And Spielmann was completely correct in accepting the only apparently poisoned gift．

## 13．．．b4 14．2d5

The point－but a harmless one．

## 14．．．D×d5

As the outcome teaches，even this is sufficient to secure a positional advan－ tage for Black．But why not simply $14 \ldots \times \mathrm{d} 5$（of course not $14 \ldots \mathrm{exd} 5$ 15．0f5 $\pm$ ） $15 . e x d 5$ ©xd5，whereupon 16．Mh3 would be easily and readily parried by 16．．． 27 f 6 and $16 . f 5$ by 16．．．$勹 \times 3$ ，etc．

Much worse things occur in the follow－ ing，by the way．

## 15．exd5 $0 \times \mathrm{d} 5$ 16．f5！

This must now be answered exactly， because 17．hh and 17 ． G h 3 are threat－ ening－and if $16 \ldots$ ．．e5，for example，then 17．f6！\＆$\times \mathrm{ff}$ 18．Wh could have fol－ lowed，with disconcerting threats．

16．．．Df6
Precisely and well calculated．

## 

An important tempo．

## 19．$D \mathrm{f} 3$ 安h8 20 ．씁 $\times h 5$

Or 20．Ac1 g6 ．

## 

White did win back the pawn，but mean－ while Black＇s positional advantage－ central pawns and the strong king＇s bishop－emerged critically．Unfortu－ nately，Black soon stumbles into a po－ sition technically easy for White．

## 

Not $23 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 5$ ，because after 24．Ee3（e2）， he would not get around to the advance of the e－pawn（24．．．e5？25．0xe5 \＆ $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{xe}} 5$ $26 . f 6 \pm$ ，etc．）．

## 24．${ }^{\text {Effe1 }}$ e5

Now，of course，．．．d5 is threatened，to－ gether with ．．．e4；and after the defen－ sive move 25.54 e 2 ，Black would find
comfortable play on the c －and g －files． Black stands brilliantly．

## $25 . c 4$ b×c3 26．bxc3 d5

Good，but also necessary，because oth－ erwise， $27 . c 4$ ．

### 27.34 e3



## 27．．．！日8？

A regrettable oversight，thanks to which the advantage acquired through excel－ lent play gets lost without a trace．In－ stead of this， $27 . . . e 4$ was necessary and strong．If $28 . c 4$（what else？），then 28．．．씀8！29．⿹e5！？M5！（29．．．』xe5？
 and wins easily．Other lines would hardly be better－White was already on the wrong track with his sacrificial attack，and only by this accident gets away with a black－eye－draw．

## $28.2 \times 55$

Spielmann must have calculated impre－ cisely the results of this obvious reply， because otherwise he certainly would have chosen 27 ．．．e4．

[^7]In this way he saves not only the exchange, but subsequently wins a pawn. But since now and then there is justice, in the rook endgame this advantage turns out to be insufficient for a win.

##   © ${ }^{6} 7$ 34. 198 d 4 !

Quite correct: in the end, the Black rook succeeds in placing himself behind the passed pawn, whereupon the draw is unavoidable. A rather lively game.







Of course he can afford all that, but the question is what for?
 50.a7 日a1 $1 / 2-1 / 2$

## Cycle III

## Round 11

1/2Capablanca - Marshall $1 / 2$
1 Alekhine - Nimozovitch 0 $1 / 2$ Vidmar-Spielmann $1 / 2$

Standings after Round 11:
Capablanca $71 / 2$
Nimzovich $61 / 2$
Alekhine 6
Vidmar 5
Spielmann 4
Marshall 4
(31) Capablanca - Marshall

Modern Benoni Defense [A62]

## 

Hardly the best, because with this stiffening of the pawn position in the center, an all-too-great a choice between different plausible plans of development is left to the opponent. More flexible is $3 . c 4$ with good prospects of getting sovereignty over the center squares.
3...e6

I would prefer 3 ...d6 with subsequent development of the bishop to f5 or g4.

## $4 . c 4 d 6$

The intended mobilization plan is not to be condemned off-hand; it has, after all, the advantage of bringing the black king's bishop to a gleaming diagonal. The disadvantage of the line is in the ceding to the opponent the important strategic square c4-a circumstance, which would be energetically taken advantage of especially by Nimzovich against Marshall (Round XVII). On the other hand, the manner of development chosen here by Capablanca lacks any particular sting.

## 5.5c3 exd5 6.cxd5 g6 7.83

In the game mentioned, Nimzovich played 7.2d2.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 10.2 \mathrm{~d} 2
\end{aligned}
$$

Now the maneuver is not at all so effective, since the knight - even with the defense chosen by Marshall, in my
opinion definitely not best－ultimately can＇t hold his ground on c4．But White has no other reasonable plan．

## 10．．．乌bd7 11．h3

A＂psychologically＂preventive move： In case of ．．．乌e5，White can now play f 4 ，without the reply ．．．〇g4，and wants to suggest to Black that the knight move to e5 doesn＇t work anyway ．．

## 11．．．2b6（？）

Marshall actually lets himself be influ－ enced！But on impartial reflection，he would have easily been able to recog－ nize that it was decidedly in his favor to provoke the move f4，because as a result，the White center position would be weakened without proper compen－ sation．Without f4，however，after ．．．De5，White would not have been able either to occupy the 44 －square，or to complete his development well at all． Therefore，11．．．De5 $12 . \mathrm{f} 4$ Ød7 was the right path for Black．

## 12．a4 0 ${ }^{1} d 7$

The move 12．．．a5 would have had pur－ pose only if the knight were still on b8 and had，via a6，an easy way to b4．

## 13．a5 ©c8 14． 0 c4 씁c7 15．e4

Apparently White convinced himself that he can＇teffectively prevent the lib－ erating move ．．．b5（15．M b3 b5！ 16． $2 \times \mathrm{b} 5$ ？ m 尚8，etc．）－and now tries to engage the opponent in the center．In any case，the game doesn＇t make a uni－ fied impression．

15．．．b5！16．a×b6 $\searrow \times$ b6 17． $\mathbf{D a 3 ~ a 6 ~}$ 18．日e1

With the threat 19．e5，etc．

## 18．．．党ab8 19．



## 19．．．乞c8（？）

Marshall，who up until now had acquit－ ted himself quite well after a dubious opening，begins now to play in an af－ fected manner，allowing his opponent ultimately to get a material advantage in a purely tactical way．Correct here was 19．．．．c8！！with the double inten－ tion：（1）to keep a6 covered；and（2）to open the way to e5（possibly c5）via d7 for the knight．If $20 . f 4$ ，then 20 ．．．$\triangle f d 7$ ， and Black can，after 21．e5，accept the pawn sacrifice and also first answer with $21 . .$. b $b$ ．In any case，it was in－ consistent for him to cede the c4－square again to White without a fight．

## 

Threatens 23．g5，etc．－certainly a sur－ prising turn，but one which bears only the smallest intrinsic relationship with the course of the struggle up to now．

[^8] Ag7，etc．，b2 would remain unsecured． But White has－everything a result of 19 ．．． $0 \mathrm{c} 8($ ？）－strengthening moves．

## 23． 2 c 4 昷b5

With 23 ．．．－Sh7，the h7－pawn would be held for the moment．But in this case， White would stand decidedly better． （Weaknesses on a6 and d6 because of the unhappy positions of the black knights！）

## 24．©a5 筸d7 $25.0 \times h 6$ O $\times$ h6 26．甾 $\times$ f 6 Dig7 27．自f3 Db6 28．${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{g} 2$ 乞a4？

In spite of the loss of the pawn，the Black position was definitely not yet hopeless，if here he had played，for ex－ ample，28．．．c4．After the incomprehen－ sible text move，on the other hand，a second pawn is lost，and with that，the game actually should have been over．

## 29．0×a4 $8 \times 1430.2 c 4$

With the simultaneous，indefensible threats $30 . \varrho \mathrm{b} 6$ and $30.0 \times \mathrm{d} 6$ ．

## $30 . .$. 回ab8 $31.0 \times \mathrm{d} 6$ 皆 $\times \mathrm{d} 6$




## 34．目e2？

This oversight（compare also Capablanca－Vidmar，Round IV）sub－ stantiates，among other things，that his mistake in my twelfth match game in Buenos Aires with Capablanca was ab－ solutely not such a rare exception，as many wanted to suggest．

After the loss of one of the extra pawns and the queen exchange，the endgame here is most likely a draw，thanks to the opposite－color bishops．However，no special immersion in the diagrammed position is needed in order to be con－ vinced that White is headed for a win， and that more than one road leads to Rome for him：both 34.9 a4 and 34．d6 were good enough，but most forceful was 34.5 a 7 ！－for example，34．．．f5（or 34．．．घе7 35．घxe7 甾xe7 36．月c4，to－ gether with $\Xi \mathrm{e} 2$ ，etc．） $35 . \mathrm{d} 6!$ 留 $\times \mathrm{d} 6$（or 35．．．fxe4 36．留f7＋，皆h737．日e7！，etc．）

 38． 1 f7，etc．Black could play differ－ ently，but in all cases White would maintain，besides the material advan－ tage，an attacking position promising a win．

 38．tif3 3 昌d4．

Now the white passed pawn is never allowed to go further，and White＇s kingside superiority can＇t be made tan－ gible without additional，leveling pawn exchanges．The following attempts at a win are therefore nearly hopeless．


Absolutely appropriate，since sooner or later，on account of the eventual threat of ．．．f4＋（together with ．．．h6），he forces the fixing of the pawn position with f 4 ．

41．Dd3 De7 42．月d7 由f8 $43 . f 4$


After 45．g4，45．．．Eँb4，etc．，suffices for a draw．

 $50 . d 6$

The last attempt．

目b4 53．h5 g×h 5 54．日e 5 甼d4




## （32）Alekhine－Nimzovich

Nimzo－Indian Defense［E32］
1．d4 Df6 $2 . c 4$ e6 3．Dc3 Db4 4．M M 2 d6

In this position，various moves stand at Black＇s disposal，but none seems to lead to an entirely satisfactory result．（1）
 d68．f4，together with $9.9 \mathrm{f} 3 \pm$ ；（2） 4 ．．．c5
 7． $1 \mathrm{~g} 5 \pm$ ，together with－as the case may be－e4 or e3，etc．；and（3）4．．．d5 5．Фf3 c5 $6 . \mathrm{cxd} 5$ exd5 $7.2 \mathrm{~g} 5 \pm$ ，etc．The text move is not much better，as the continu－ ation shows．

5． 2 g 5 －bbd76．e3

The＂occupation of the center＂by means of $6 . e 4$ would obviously have only limited the effectiveness of his own pieces．

## 6．．．b6 7．Dd3 \＆${ }^{\text {b }} 8 . f 3$ ！

In any case，less clichéd than 8. Df3， with which a position，occurring rather often in recent years and notably against my opponent，was brought about．In fact，with the current flexibility of the enemy pawn position in the center，it＇s not easy for Black to work out a further plan of development that promises suc－ cess

8．．．$\times \mathrm{Cc} 3+$
And already from this moment on，his play begins to suffer from a certain vac－ illation；for example，he in no way needed to surrender readily his bishop pair to the opponent．Probably 8．．．c5 9.0 ge 2 gc8，together possibly with ．．．cxd4and ．．．d5，etc．，would have been a continuation full of opportunity．

## 9．씁 xc 3 c 510.2 C 3！

Surprising at first glance－but the only correct thing；to the more reasonable 10．©e2（or 10．©d 1 ），Black would have been able to force a simplification with a likely drawn conclusion by means of ．．．乞d5！．

## 10．．．h6 11．\＆f4

And not 11 ． D 4 ，because of the possi－ bility of the tactical sortie ．．．g5－g4，etc．

[^9]Threatening 12．．．e5 13．dxe5 dxe5 $14 . \log 3$ ！，etc．

## 12． 8 g！

But with this simple retreat，White re－ tains his positional advantage．

## 12．．．e5（？）

The lesser of two evils was still castling short（but not 12．．．こ̃c8 13．씁a3！）， whereupon it wouldn＇t yet be easy for White to intensify his pressure decid－ edly on the enemy dark squares．

## $13 . d \times e 5!d \times e 514.0-0-0$

On the other hand，now Black will not be able to withstand the enemy pres－ sure on the central file in the long run， since in addition，his pieces are com－ mitted to guarding the pawn，which has become weak．

## 14．．．g6

Not immediately $14 \ldots 0-0-0$ ，because of
 gether with $18.0 \times f 6$（or $\$ \times h 8$ ），etc．土． It＇s evident，by the way，that castling short would be at least as questionable as the chosen continuation，with which the king can function not merely as at－ tack object，but also as a defensive piece （eventual guarding of the d6－d8 squares）．

## 15．${ }^{[8} \mathbf{c} 2$

The bishop must obviously move to the a4－e8 diagonal，where he can accom－ plish a lot．

## 15．．．0－0－0 16．日a4 管he8 17．乌f2 씁e6

The bishop should be opposed on c6． To Black＇s misfortune，this can＇t hap－ pen without longer preparation，and White calmly uses this time to inten－ sify his pressure on the d－file．Likewise unsatisfactory would be $17 \ldots$ ．．．h5 18．${ }^{\text {and }} \mathrm{d}$ ，etc．

## 18．今d3 冝e7

 h5 21．Ind1，etc．，eventually winning a pawn．

## 

Finally，this unpinning move can be played，since e5 is sufficiently guarded． But after the following retreat，another， still more serious evil comes into being －d6 has become incurably weak in the meantime，and with the impossibility of finding protection for it，Black is put at a difficult material disadvantage．

## 21．日l 2 ！气h5



Also with other moves，a knight－discov－ ery，together with ${ }^{\text {In }} \mathrm{d} 6$ ，would have fol－ lowed．

## 22． $2 \times \mathrm{c} 5!$

With this，the fight is actually decided， because White wins the queen and a pawn for a rook and knight．Why the game still lasts so long is explained by the fact that this type of endgame usuallyrequires very many moves－and especially if，as here， the stronger party possesses no passed pawns，and the opponent initially has no assailable squares．

##  

In order to bring about a further sim－ plification，since the retention of the current piece－material would only con－ cede chances to the opponent．

##  

This pawn exchange is clearly favor－ able，since it crucially simplifies the later penetration of the king．

## 

32．甾h8＋，甾xh6 was threatened．But now everything is protected，and White will have to aspire to somehow assert his pawn superiority on the kingside． But this process is very laborious，since this superiority exists only in the form of a doubled pawn．

## 32．a3

Or also immediately $32 . e 4$ ，etc．

[^10]Also good was 36． m f 2 ，together with日g1－h2，etc．，（see below）．But Black pursues another plan，which likewise certainly leads to a win．

## 36．．．目c3 37．a4 回c2 38．筸e7 思c7 39．씁f 6

Temporizing．

## 39．．．昌c2 40．씁e7 留c741．씁d6！

That＇s the correct way－the queen should be put on d5，whereby Black is doomed to total passivity on account of the threat ${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{d} 5-\mathrm{a} 8+$ ，etc．

## 41．．．乌e6＋42．t．be5

The winning procedure could also go：数4－e3－f2－g1－h2，together with f3－f4－ f5，．．．g6xf5，e4xf5，capturing the h－pawn with the queen，and finally advancing both g－pawns．White＇s plan to win is essentially the same．But the king im－ mediately plays an active role－which， however，permits the opponent some harmless counter threats．

## 42．．．乞d8 43．씁d5！臽c6

The continuation $43 . . . a 544$ ． b a8＋，to－ gether with ．．．b5，would have led to similar positions as the one reached by White after the 52nd move．

## 44．bef！

Not immediately 44．f4，on account of 44．．．a5！，which in this case would re－ ally be unpleasant．




Practically forced，because after 50 ．．．日c6 51．f5！a5，the queen sacrifice already prevails： $52 . \mathrm{b} \times \mathrm{a} 5 \mathrm{Ec} \mathrm{c} 5$ 53．f×g6 fxg6 54．axb6
 5xa5 59．d6 0b7 $60 . \mathrm{d} 7 \mathrm{~g} 561 . \mathrm{d} 8$ 甾 ©xd8 62．＊xd8，etc．－with a winning pawn endgame．

## 



The current confinement of the queen by means of $52 \ldots$ ．．． b 7 would clearly have proved futile after 53． ． $\mathrm{f} 6!$ ！

## 53．f5！

This advance finally occurs，which forces the winning of a second pawn． By the way，an awful trap here would be 53．Mb8？ŋe6！，with mate or the win of the queen！

## 53．．．f6＋54．安d4 管d7＋55．宣e3 

This good knight position offers only temporary solace for the additional loss of material．



62．Mb7 Dd7 63．…c6＋कe7
 66．M M 1

Temporizing．



After 69．．．．dd8 would follow 70．${ }^{\text {M．}} \mathrm{g} 8+$ ， g4，etc．
 Dd7 73．g4！

Decisive！


 81．씁a8＋1－0

This check was sealed by White at ad－ joumment，since he saw a forced rep－ etition of moves and didn＇t feel like further contemplation after the strenu－ ous，five－hour game．However，on re－ sumption，Nimzovich resigned the game immediately－because further details are already quite clear：81．．．＊＇${ }^{\text {ch }} 7$
 84．g7，etc．；or（2）83．．． $2 \times f 684$ ．mad6＋，
 $\mathrm{gxf8} \mathrm{~g}+$ ，together with winning a rook in another three moves．
（33）Vidmar－Spielmann
Semi－Slav Defense［D46］
1．d4d5 2．c4e6 3．乌f3 Dd74．e3

The move ．．．〇d7 is probably not so strong that it demanded self－restraint． As it became convincingly apparent in other games in this tournament，the natural move 4．0c3 is quite favorable for White．

## 4．．．〇gf6 5．日d3 c6

Black appears to want to bring about by all means a difficult line of the Slav Defense，not unjustly unpopular in gen－ eral．Easier means of equalizing were offered by 5 ．．．c5．

## 6． 2 bd2 © 0 d6

Even now－after White waived early pressure against d 5 by means of the development of the knight to $\mathrm{d} 2-\ldots \mathrm{c} 5$ still came under consideration．

##  10． $8 \times 4$

With this，a well－known position is reached，in which White＇s space advan－ tage is brought to bear only with exact play．

## 10．．．씁c7 11．日ic2

This withdrawal would occur also on $10 \ldots \mathrm{c} 5$ or $10 \ldots$ ．．．ff6．It has the dual pur－ pose of not only preventing Black＇s possible win of a later tempo（．．．〇f6， ．．．f5），but also especially preparing an attack against $h 7$ ，which should force a change in the pawn position disadvan－ tageous to Black．

## 11．．．h6



Black is clearly determined，in the case of $\mu \mathrm{g} 33$ ，to accept the weakening of e6． The idea is more active，and therefore probably more promising，than the moves attempted by Bogoljubow in this position： 11 ．．．c5 or 11 ．．．Ẽd8（together with ．．．$勹 \mathrm{f} 8$ ）．

## 12．b3

Owing to this restrained method of de－ velopment，Black gets time to eliminate the main disadvantage of his position－ the unemployment of the queen＇s bishop－and to reap sufficient counter－ play in the center．And 12 ．Md3 would be inexpedient，since it would force a move（．．f5）that Black wants to make anyway．More logical would be，on the other hand，12．Iel！（with the intention of $\begin{array}{ll}\text { M d }\end{array}$ ），which would probably have caused a change in the opponent＇s plans －for example，12．．．冗๊d8，in order to protect h7 with the aid of ．．．Уf8．But just after that，White would have been able to position his queen more effec－ tively than in the game on the a1－h8 diagonal－for example，13．\＆d c5 14 ． $\mathrm{dxc} 5!2 \times \mathrm{C} 515$ ．Me2，together with pos－


In the following，White makes only small difficulties for the enemy．

## 12．．．b6 13．Db2 Db7 14．Md3 f5 15． g fe1 吕ae8 16．乞e5（？）

With that，the opening advantage is definitely given away．Correct was 16．Iad1，which would have prevented both $16 . . . c 5$ and $16 \ldots$ ．．．e5（17．c5！，etc．）． But if 16．．．อf6，then 17．c5，bxc5 18. Mc4！，etc．with complications favorable to White．
16...c5!

A small combination，the only one in this dry game，by the way．If namely 17． $0 \times \mathrm{d} 7 \mathrm{M} \times \mathrm{m} 718 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{c} 5$ ，then，to be－ gin with，18．．．．．．．6！，together with ．．．${ }^{2} \mathrm{~d} 6 \times \mathrm{c} 5(+) \mp$ ，etc．

## 17．日ad1 Øf6

After 17．．．${ }^{\text {en }}$ e4，White would probably sacrifice the exchange： $18 .{ }^{[3 \times e} 4 \mathrm{fxe} 4$
 with an attack guaranteeing a draw．

## 

With this，e5 is finally secured－but at the price of e4．The mutual strong knight positions now prevent（as often occurs with Stonewall formations）the development of a halfway promising fight．Considering this，the decision to draw appears justified after a half dozen moves．

 25．〇e5

## Round 12

> 1 Capablanca - Vidmar 0
> $1 / 2$ Marshall - Alekhine $1 / 2$
> $1 / 2$ Nimzovich - Spielmann $1 / 2$

Standings after Round 12：
Capablanca $81 / 2$
Nimzovich 7
Alekhine $61 / 2$
Vidmar 5
Spielmann $41 / 2$
Marshall 41／2
（34）Capablanca－Vidmar
Ruy Lopez［C98］
$1 . e 4$ e5 $2.2 f 3$ 乞c6 $3.2 b 5$ a6 4．耳a4 2 f 6 5．0－0 鸟e7 6．日e1 b5 $7.2 \mathrm{D} 3 \mathrm{~d} 68 . c 3$ 乞a5

Lately $8 . . .0-0$ has become more usual， whereupon，as is generally known， White＇s best is $9 . \mathrm{h} 3$ ．

## 9．\＆c2c5 10．d4 씁c7 11． 2 bd2 0－0

Since White omits 11．h3，here 11．．． 24 came under consideration first．As Black plays，we come to a position（with transposition of moves）from the match Lasker－Tarrasch，long since known and analyzed．

## 12．h3 ©c6 13．d5

Certainly more solid than Lasker＇s pawn sacrifice 13． $0 \mathrm{ff} 1 \mathrm{cxd} 414 . \mathrm{cxd} 4$ exd4！，etc．（Leonhardt－Rubinstein，San Sebastian 1912）．On the other hand， $13 . \mathrm{dxc} 5 \mathrm{dxc} 514.0 \mathrm{f} 1$－which was tried initially by Bogoljubow and then by Wagner－is absolutely not as harmless as it appears at first sight．

## 13．．．〇d8 14．a4！

A timely move，which should bring about at least one critical queenside position；for example，14．．．⿷b8 $15 . \mathrm{axb} 5 \mathrm{axb} 516 . \mathrm{c} 4$ ！，or $14 \ldots \mathrm{a}$ a 7 15．筸e2，etc．－but Black chooses a greater evil．

## 14．．．b4（？）

Relinquishes the highly important square c 4 to the opponent without com－ pensation．Of course，Capablanca doesn＇t leave the favorable opportunity unused．

## 15．50c4a5



Otherwise 16.95 ，among others，would be unpleasant．The text move is rela－ tively the best，since Black actually doesn＇t need to fear the following tac－ tical diversion．

## 16．2fxe5

This much－admired exchange combina－ tion leads to a certainly somewhat more favorable，but not absolutely won endgame，which Black finally loses only by imprecise play．More sustain－
 in order first to temporize until the
dominating knight position on c 4 forces the opponent into unfavorable operations．

## 16．．．昷a6

The zwischenzug is not a bad thing． Only Black doesn＇t use his tactical con－ sequences properly in the following．

##  

Why voluntarily surrender the weapon of the bishop pair to the opponent？

Obvious was 20 ．．．gb8，and if 21．． m c4，
 with a definitely defensible game．

## 

A further omission．Good was 22 ．．．a×b4 23．f3 皿a6！，together possibly with ．．．c4， with sufficient counter－play．

## 23．f3 ${ }^{\text {g fd8 }}$（？）

Black＇s position has become unsure because of the weakening of the dark squares．But it simplifies victory for the opponent by a quite haphazard defense． A better defense opportunity was of－ fered here，for example，by 23．．． 0 d 7
 25．．．＊f8，etc．

## 24．© 3 h 6

To what end？

##  27．क由f2

Also，27．b6 could also occur．But White doesn＇t need to hurry，since 昷a5 can＇t evade him any longer．

## 

 30． $0 \times 35$ © C 5 ，etc．

## 29．．．\＆${ }^{\text {d }}$ ？

A last mistake，which has as a result an immediate loss in material．After 29．．．${ }^{\text {fif }}$ ，for example，the agony prob－ ably would have lasted longer．

## 30．\＆b6 \＆ 6

Or $30 \ldots$ ．．．a8，then 31.0 昷c7，etc．

## 31．$\times \mathrm{xe} 6 \mathrm{fxe6}$

If $31 \ldots$ 号c2＋32． course $33 .{ }^{\text {In }} \mathrm{d} 2$ ，etc．

## 32．日l8 34．是 $\times$ a5 2 c5 35．b3！

In distinctly winning positions， Capablanca plays always most accu－
 2b6 37．笽d6 ©d7 38．©e3，etc．，also wins easily．

35．．．2×b3 36．是×b4 2d4 37．a5 1－0
A generally clear and consistent game by Capablanca－on the other hand， quite weakly played by Dr．Vidmar．
（35）Marshall－Alekhine
French Defense［C01］

## 1．e4 e6 2．d4d53．0．c3 \＄b44．exd5

Interesting but not recommended here
 7．bxc3 ©c6 8．©f 3 £f6－and White is
hardly likelyto find a successfuluse for his bishop pair．

4．．．exd5 5．Dd3 亿e76．2ge2
More solid than 6． m f 3 ，recommended here by various commentators，where－ upon Black could very well play 6．．．c5！ $7 . \mathrm{dxc} 5 \mathrm{~d} 48 . \mathrm{a} 3$ Ma5，etc．But，on the other hand， 6 ．․․ h5 came under strong consideration．

6．．．อbc6 7．0－0 $\log 4$
In the attempt to fashion more involved play where possible．Simpler－but drier still－is the usual 7．．．昷f5．

### 8.33 国 5

Again，the bishop retreat to d6 was sim－ pler and healthier，and would certainly allow the trade for the enemy knight （9．〇b5）．With the text move，Black suc－ ceeds in making his own imprint on the game，but hardly in his favor．

## 9．h3 具e6

Also after 9．．． m h5 10．f4！，White＇s game would be favored a bit．

## 10．024！

With that，the opponent＇s king＇s bishop is condemned sooner or later to disap－ pear from the battlefield．

## 10．．．县b6 11．c3 M．M7 12．算e1 0－0 13．0f4 $2 f 5$

So Black is forced into this exchange of bishops，with which it is once again demonstrated that in this dreary line， neither of the opponents can allow him－
self escapades from the theoretical path to a draw，if he doesn＇t want to risk be－ ing put at a disadvantage．

## 14．b4

With the threat $15 . \mathrm{b} 5$ ，together with Exe7，etc．

## 

Actually，the quickest way to unite the rooks．

## 

Forced．If $17.9 \times \mathrm{g} 2$ ，then $17 \ldots . .0 \times f 4$ 18．国x4 $0 \times \mathrm{x} 3$ 19．当xd3 $0 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ ！，etc．， winning a pawn．

## 17．．．昌e8

It would be more exact to exchange the knights initially，thus preventing the next sortie．But in the end this also works．


## 18．Oh5！

Threatens to win immediately with 19．Wh6！，etc．，and there＇s nothing else for Black to do than the following with－ drawal，in which he frees the opponent＇s queen from the little worry over the
knight on the rim．With more initiative on the part of White，the game could have now become quite interesting．But an inglorious deforestation followed．

## 昷e6 21．．ㅡㅂe2 もce7 22．Og5

Why not at least 22.0 ff 4 ©xf4 23．． $2 \times f 4$ Dg6 24．g3（24．．． 5 h4 25．Mg4 $\pm$ ），in order possibly to keep the bishop pair？
씁g 25 ．씁 $\times 55 \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 526.94$ De7
27．且e2 ${ }^{\text {bigf }} 8$

Preparation for a possible ．．．g6．
$28.2 \times b 6$
Finally！Certainly he still could have temporized until Black played ．．．孟d7， for example．But，of course，nothing really would have changed．

## 28．．．a×b6 29．是d3 乞c8 30．乞g3

The knight must go to e 2 in order to make f 4 possible

30．．．乞d6 31．乞e2 कe7 32．f4 gxf4 $33.0 \times f 49534.0 \times e 6$

Otherwise，Black would get somewhat of an advantage with $34 \ldots f 5$ ，etc．

 Db6 40．흡d2 be7 41．be2 $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（36）Nimzovich－Spielmann
Four Knights Game［C48］
$1 . e 4 e 52 . \searrow f 3$ Df6 3． 2 ch Dc6
4．Db5 2 d 4 5．$D \times \mathrm{d} 4$ exd4 $6 . \mathrm{e} 5$

## dxc3 7．exf6 M Mf6 8．dxc3 县e7

Since the very popular 8 ．．．．．．e5（see Vidmar－Capablanca，Cycle IV），actu－ ally doesn＇t force the queen exchange （9．㐌e2），the text move appears simpler and more logical．In fact Black achieves complete equality very soon．

## 9．0－0 0－0 10．${ }^{\text {D }} \mathrm{d} 3 \mathrm{~d} 611$ ．Me2

A let－down，of course，would be 11． m G 5 h 6 ，etc．

## 11．．．号e8 12．씁e4

Forces ．．．g6，but which here has no great significance，since the queen stands too exposed to elude the exchange（and con－ sequently killing any chance of offense）．

## 12．．．g6 13．是e3 씁e6 14．씁f3 씁g4（！）

With that，the game actually could have already been given up as a draw．Curi－ ously，Black subsequently still gets small chances，but only because Spielmann，who apparently is all too confident，treats the position somewhat carelessly．

## 15．씁 $\times$ g 4 皿 $\times$ g 4 16．h3 县e6 $17 . c 4$ d5？



He wants to immediately resolve the position and underestimates the reply． The idea of ．．．d5 was adequate，but only after 17．．．c5！18．⿷ad1 घad8，etc．

## 18．c5！

Secures d 4 for the bishop and at the same time gets a real chance at a pawn storm on the queenside．Whether this chance could suffice for a win，of course，couldn＇t be foreseen at this point －but in any case，from here the game again gains some content and interest．

##  c6

A mistake would be 20 ．．．d4 21．cxd4 Mxd4 22．थ m ！！，winning a pawn．

##  $23 . c \times d 4$

The first consequence of the omission on the 17 th move：after the undoubling of the White c－pawns，the pawn com－ plex c6，d5 finally is fixed，and White needs only to follow the plan that the position itself dictates：a pawn attack against c 6 （therefore $\mathrm{b} 4-\mathrm{b} 5$ ，and some－ times a4－a5－a6），bound with the threat of opening the file and the infiltration of the rook．On the other hand，Black has to invent something．

## 23．．．df5（1）24．${ }^{\text {fif1 }}$

If $24.2 \times x 5 \mathrm{gxf} 525$ ．巴e e ，then 25 ．．．f4， etc．，with quite easy play to draw．

## 24．．．h5 25．h4

The threat of ．．．h4 was not so danger－ ous as to lose a tempo and in addition
give the opponent the chance at a welcome pawn exchange. Therefore, correct here appears to be 25. .ge1 (not immediately $25 . \mathrm{b} 4$, on account of 25...2c2!, together with ... \& a 4 and ...a6), together with $\mathrm{b} 4, \mathrm{a} 4$, etc.


 (?)

It really wasn't worth playing on so long after the drawish opening phase for this! If something was to be gotten from the position, it was of course not through the rook exchange, but rather through the systematic continuation of the suggested plan. After $33 . \mathrm{mb}^{\mathrm{m}} 1$ ! g4 34.fxg 4䁅×g4 (34....马e4) 35.a5!, Black would still have to exert himself in order to force a draw. The further moves are reasonable.
33...훕×e8 34.b×c6 b×c6 $35 . \mathrm{g} 3$ the7 36.g×h4 g×h4 37. 훕e3 a5(!)
 Qd741. \&a6 \&f5 42. \& $7^{1 / 2-1 / 2}$

## Round 13

> 1 Capablanca - Spielmann 0 $1 / 2$ Alekhine - Vidmar $1 / 2$
> $1 / 2$ Marshall - Nimzovich $1 / 2$

Standings after Round 13:
Capablanca 91/2
Nimzovich $71 / 2$
Alekhine 51/2
Vidmar 51/2
Marshall 5
Spielmann 41/2
(37) Capablanca - Spielmann

Queen's Gambit Declined [D38]

##   7.…a4(!)

In any case, stronger than $7 . \mathrm{m} \mathrm{b} 3$, which occurred in game 1 . But whether the queen sortie is more compelling than the simple $7 . e 3$ wasn't yet established by this game, in my opinion, since Spielmann offers inadequate resistance.

## 7... $8 \times \mathrm{c} 3+($ ? $)$

Already this exchange is very questionable. Why not $7 \ldots$... $e$ e 7 , with the idea of leading the game along the track of a well-known variation of the Orthodox Defense - for example, $8 . e 3 \mathrm{c} 69$. 2 d 3
 Mf8, etc. - with only minor difficulties. After the text move and the following advance of the c-pawn as far as c4, the dark squares in his position become pitifully weak.

## 8.bxc3 0-0 9.e3 c5(?)

Weakens d 5 without apparent benefit, and occurs evidently only in the attempt to somehow justify the maneuver ... 8 f8-b4xc3. But with other continuations as well, the pin of ©f6 remains uncomfortable. For example, 9… Me8 came under deliberation, to answer 10.2d3 with 10... ©e 5 !; but White would have first played 10. ${ }^{(\mu \mathrm{G}} \mathrm{C} 2$.

## 10. Dd3c4 11. © c2 Me7 (?)

This unpinning process costs too much time, and, in addition, the queen will have to suffer as an object of attack.

Instead of this，the odd maneuver $11 . .$. 号e8 12．0－0 登e6！，together with ．．．．9a6－b6，etc．，aimed at ousting the troublesome white queen，could have been tried．

##  15．Ma5



## 15．．．De4？

An awful move，after which White eas－ ily succeeds in busting up the enemy pawn chain and deciding the game by means of an obvious sacrificial com－ bination．After the downright self－evi－ dent development 15．．．盢D7（16．Mc7昷c6 or16．．．… ${ }^{\text {che }}$ ），this wouldn＇t have been so simple，in spite of White＇s po－ sitional superiority．

## 16．Dxe4 dxe4 $17 . \mathrm{a} 4$ M M d5

Otherwise，the many threatened squares were no longer able to be protected－

 a×b5 22．盟a4，etc．

## 18．axb5！씁 $\times 5$

Likewise，18．．．昷b7 19．b×a6，etc．，was hopeless．

## 

Please note the line 19．．．．๊a7 20．b6 $M \times a 521 . b \times a 7!$ ，and White remains with

 23.18 留 $ض \times a 824$ ． $0 \times 28$ ，etc．，with a material advantage．

## 20．bxa6！gb5

After the queen exchange，the a－pawn would immediately cost him a piece． But the text move is also hopeless．

## 21．Mc7 亩b6 22．a7 县h3 23．Ineb1！

The most exact．

##  26．exf4 1－0

For this game，impeccably carried out by Capablanca，he receives the first spe－ cial award for the best played game－ when the judge specifically declared at the concluding banquet that，if the award had been a brilliancy prize，he would have chosen a different game．
（38）Alekhine－Vidmar
Queen＇s Gambit Declined［D35］

## 1．d4d52．0f3e63．c4 ©d74．0c3 Egf6 5．cxd5

The best move is probably 5．日 g 5 ，since White has no reason to avoid the line


## 5．．．exd56． $\mathbf{f 4}$

The move introduced by Sämisch．In my opinion，it leads to a game with about equal chances．

## 6．．．c6 7．e3 Le7

Simpler and better than 7 ．．．$\circlearrowright$ h 5 （played in the game Alekhine－Lasker，New York 1924），when White can continue advan－ tageously with 8．\％ e f6 9．\％g 3，etc．

## 8．Ind3 0－0 9．h3

Sooner or later necessary，after all，be－ cause of the possible threat ．．．宀h5．

## 9．．．国e8 10．0－0 0 f8 11．Øe5

As the outcome shows，a daring plan of assault．But to any other move，Black would continue his development with－ out difficulty with $11 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{~g} 6$ ，together with ．．．ed d ．

## 11．．．昷d6 12．D h2

When White decided on this move，he had to calculate in the end the follow－ ing sacrificial combinations．Instead of this，with the retreat of the bishop to g 3 ，he wasable to prevent Black＇s next move（if $12 \ldots . . \varrho 6 \mathrm{~d} 7$ ，then $13.0 \times \mathrm{xf}$ ，etc．）， but in any case，after 12．g3 the reply $12 . . . c 5$－which immediately introduces a counterattack in the center－appears unpleasant to him，because he would then no longer command（as in the game）a direct kingside attack that in－ cludes the advance of his g－pawn．

## 12．．．D6d7

Dr．Vidmar wants to be rid of the un－ pleasant knight immediately！As the consequence shows，this maneuver leads to a forced draw．It＇s very ques－ tionable whether more was to be got－ ten from the position with 12 ．．．c5．

## 13．f4 f6 14． 2 g 4 h 5



Otherwise，White would quietly further strengthen his position with 15 ． m f 3 ， 16．${ }^{\text {aee1，etc．}}$

## 15．乞e5！

A positional sacrifice；after 15 ．．．fxe5 $16 . \mathrm{fxe} 5$ ，and the retreat of the bishop on d6，17．莳 $\times$ h5，etc．，White would have no direct threats，but it＇s clear that in this case，two pawns and a continuous attacking position would offer him far more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece．

## 15．．．fxe5 16．fxe5 且xe5！

 18． $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{G}} \times \mathrm{h} 5$ and wins．

## 

The point of the first sacrifice，whereby an immediate draw is reached．

> 18... 훕 $\times f 8$ 19. 씁 $\times$ h $5 ~ D \times d 3$ 20.ef1+

Unfortunately there＇s nothing better， because both 20． m h8＋क्ष f7 21．gf1＋ ＊g6！and 20．M m 7 Mg5！are insufficient．

20．．．東g8 21．씁f＋क्由h8 22．씁h5＋

（39）Marshall－Nimzovich French Defense［C01］

## 1．e4 e6 2．d4 d5 3．©c3 0 D $44 . e x d 5$ exd5 5．Dd3 乞e7 6． D ge2

As is well known，here 6． m 5 5 is not very comfortable for Black．Therefore，5．．．©c6 is preferable to the move chosen．

## 6．．． 8 f5 7．0－0 0－0

After 7．．．〇bc6，the position from my first match game with Capablanca would arise，in which White，instead of 8． $\mathrm{P} \times \mathrm{f5} 5$（？），would probably play 8.5 g 3昷g69．0ce2，etc．，with similar results as in the game．

## 8．乞g3 Lg6 9．乞ce2

Obviously influenced by the loss in the first cycle to the same opponent，at the first opportunity Marshall withdraws his knight from the exchange on c 3 ．But in an enterprising mood，he would per－ haps have tried 9．日 g 5 ，in order to get out of the way as quickly as possible of the bleak，symmetrical piece－forma－ tions．

##  

A position has arisen which，for pur－ pose of a win，is hopeless for both sides， since each can nearly force the ex－ change of both rooks on the only open file．But to his misfortune，Marshall al－ lows himself the luxury for a moment of affecting a plan，and thereby incurs
a clear，if not necessary decisive，dis－ advantage．

## 13．．．0c8

From d6，the knight would like to be able to have an effect on e4 and c4，re－ spectively．The idea is good，but of a harmless nature－especially if White， instead of unnecessarily pulling back his bishop，would have chosen the ＂symmetrical＂move 14.0 c1（or per－ haps first h3，in order to prevent pos－ sible ．．．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{g} 4$ ）．It would have come very quickly to a peace settlement．

## 14．De3 乞6e7 15． $\mathbf{~ f f} 4$

But this also had to go rather pain－ lessly．．．

．．．if only White hadn＇t lost this impor－ tant tempo and thereby allowed ．．．f5． Correct was immediate 18．${ }^{2} \mathrm{~d} 2$ ，for example，18．．．〇d6 19．日®xe8＋登×e8
 and in spite of the momentary awkward－ ness of his bishop，White would have nothing serious to fear．

## 18．．．f5！

Since the invasion points on the e－file（e5－ e8）are sufficiently protected，this aggres－ sive move has only bright sides here．

## 19．是d2笪xe1 20．${ }^{-1} \times \mathrm{e} 1 \mathrm{f} 4$

The additional restriction stands to rea－ son and is apparently also forced．But White defends himself quite imagina－
tively in the following．Perhaps consid－ ering the subsequent surprising windup， the more cold－blooded 20 ．．． 5 b6 would offer somewhat better chances；but to anticipate－let alone calculate in ad－ vance－this was really not easy．

## 21．〇e2 怕f5



There is no more time for $21 \ldots . \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{b}} 6$ （21．．．c6），because White threatens 22． $0 \times 44$ 0xf4 23． $2 \times f 4$ g 524 ．Mg 3 ！，etc． －also $21 . . .0$ h4 would have been un－ successful because of 22．㘳h5，etc．

## 22．c4！

Strange，but true－in spite of the obvi－ ous flaws that come about in the White camp as a result of this move（ d 4 ，the half－dead bishop on c3），it forms White＇s only，and perhaps sufficient counter－chances．It was uncommonly important for him，exactly at this mo－ ment（Black threatened ．．．씁 2 ，as well as possibly ．．．〇h4）to free the e4－square for his queen，and，if possible，also to exchange the idle knight．If ．．．c6 had occurred at an earlier moment，then the White game would stand completely at a loss．But here， $22 \ldots \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{c} 4$ 23． $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{g} \times \mathrm{b}} 7$ ， etc．，would merely weaken Black＇s pawn position，without compensation．

## 22．．．乞b6 23．cxd5 $\circlearrowright x d 5$

 （25．．．〇b4 26．⿹b5！）24．．．घd8，with a positional advantage for Black that is likewise hardly sufficient．

## 24． $2 c 3$ 亿xc3 25． $2 \times \mathrm{c} 3 \mathrm{c} 6$

Of course Black still stands better，al－ though his direct chances of offense are significantly diminished as a result of the release of the e4－square．For this reason，he should have tried in the fol－ lowing to utilize the prospects of the ideal d 5 －square for the knight after the queen exchange．Instead of this，he maneuvers too long－until his oppo－ nent gets the chance to rid himself of the isolani in a favorable way．

## 

The first missed opportunity to ex－ change of queens．But a couple of oth－ ers are coming．

## 28．a3 h6 29．g3！

In the correct understanding that $f 4$ is here more a weapon of restriction than a target of attack，White seeks to dis－ pose of it by exchange．But Marshall probably didn＇te ven dream atthis point that he would succeed in exchanging the pawn on f 4 ，of all things，for the weakling on d 4 ．

##  

At the previous move，the swap was offered；now it is avoided again．Ad－ mittedly nothing is spoiled by that yet， but it is inconsistent．By the way，after
 36．巴e8＋＋
 positioning the king toward d 5 ，it would have come to an interesting，and for Black，unassailable，endgame．That Nimzovich avoided it so persistently can probably be explained only by time trouble．

## 34．f 3 肖 5 ？

He should have pulled the queen back to f5 or d7．

## 35．Q d2！

An embarrassing surprise for Black．

## 

Threatens 38．e5．Instead of the next move by Black，the immediate 37 ．．．． m d8 would have made the crossing over of the bishop to the al－h8 diagonal some－ what difficult．

## 37．．．

White＇s advantage is now clear：a won－ derfully lively bishop，the pinning of the knight，otherwise powerless on open board；finally the possibility to force the queen exchange at any time．And yet， all this appears not to suffice for a win with correct counter－play！Truly one must at times make very many mistakes in order to completely ruin a position．

##  Md7！

White threatened 42．${ }^{\text {\＃}}$ b4，which would have forced a fateful weakening of the Black pawn position．

This reasonable pawn move makes Black＇s later draw combination pos－ sible．But so does its omission：42．马e8， gd1 43．Ea8 a6 44．日b8，and if Black simply replies 44 ．．．${ }^{\text {Id }} \mathrm{d} 5$ ，a win for White would not be evident either in the middle game or in the endgame．

## 42．．．h5 43．国e8 甼d1！

The introductory move to the follow－ ing handsome twist．
44.9 ar a6 $45.9 \mathrm{gb8}$（？）


Black was lying in wait just for this． With 45 ．．．．e4，White would still be able to play a while for a win，but hardly with success：Black would most simply re－ ply $45 . \Xi \mathrm{d} 5$ and further merely make rook moves on the fifth rank（ $\mathrm{d} 5-\mathrm{ff}$－d5）． In case of the queen exchange on e8， the rook would come to d 7 on the other hand，and then the knight to d5 via e7． The conclusion in the text is more fun．

## 45．．．甼h1！

A nice final effect，which surprised Marshall in such a way that he thought an hour before it became clear to him that the game was now an unavoidable draw．In fact，his next move is forced， as emerges from the following varia－
tions：（1）46．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{D} 0 \mathrm{~h} 4+47 . \mathrm{gxh} 4$
畑h2＋，together with 49．．．．쓴b8，and wins；（2） 46. 甾e8 $\bigoplus f 4+$ ！ $47 . \mathrm{gxff} 4$ 岁h3＋
崮 $\mathrm{d} 5+$ ，together with mate in three moves．

##  

A game with small jokes，small mis－ takes，small commotions．Indeed the boring opening variation gives very little room for unfettered flights of imagination ．．．

## Round 14

1／2 Alekhine－Capabanca $1 / 2$
1 Vidmar－Nimzovich 0
1 Spielmann－Marshall 0
Standings after Round 14：
Capablanca 10
Alekhine $71 / 2$
Nimzovich 71／2
Vidmar 61／2
Spielmann 51／2
Marshall 5
（40）Alekhine－Capablanca
Caro－Kann Defense［B15］
1．e4 c6 $2 . \mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 53.0 \mathrm{c} 3 \mathrm{dxe4}$ 4．$\partial \times 4$ e 2 f 6

Black usually has fewer difficulties with the development of his queen＇s bishop with 4 ．．．afs．

## 5．乞g3 e5

Not quite risk－free，because d6 becomes somewhat weakened by the following
exchange．The whole line needs a fur－ ther practical inspection，however．

## 6．Df3 exd4 7．씁 $\times$ d4

On account of the weakness mentioned， especially noticeable in the endgame， White was not wrong to seek simplifi－ cation．The more involved $7.0 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ probably would only be strong if Black answered with 7．．．．Ac5．Then 8．Me2＋！ could quite well follow－as happened in my Kecskemet game with Dr． Tartakover－with the idea of at least nailing down the advantage of the bishop pair after $8 . .$. 甾e7 9．${ }^{\mu} \times{ }^{2} 7+$ Ame7 10.0 df 5 ，etc．But if on $7.0 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ ， Black continues quietly with 7．．．\＃e7， then on the other hand，middlegame chances are likely to be estimated as mutually balanced．

## 7．．．… $\times \mathrm{d} 4$ 8． $2 \times d 4$ 2 $\mathbf{2} 59.2 d f 5$

Of course not immediately 9 ． A e3，be－ cause of $9 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{~g} 4$ or $9 \ldots$. ．．．d5，etc．

This knight maneuver appears affected and，in fact，puts Black at something of a disadvantage．In any case，simpler was 13．．．De8，together with ．．．〇b6，etc．

## 14．\＆xe6 Əxe6 15．Dgf5 Əe4

Other defensive moves against the in－ filtration of the knight to d6 also have their downsides．

## 16．${ }^{\text {ghf }} 1$

To 16. Dd7，Black would have had a comfortable defense in 16.04 c 5 17． Be 7 g fe8，etc．


## 17.0d6 (?)

Superficial, weak play! With 17.f3!, White was able to maintain a clear positional advantage, since after $17 \ldots . . \mathrm{gxf} 5$ 18.fxe4 fxe4 (18...f4 19. Df5, etc. wouldn't be better) 19. 2 f 5 , he would have quite easily won back the pawn and Black would be left with a seriously disrupted kingside. Theref ore, on 17.f3!, it still would have been best for him to decide on $17 \ldots .04 \mathrm{c} 5$ 18. ©d6 a5 19. 0 ec $4 \pm$, etc. In Buenos Aires, as a rule, I didn't miss such opportunities ...





This move was transmitted telegraphically to Europe as $26 . c 4$ - which certainly made little difference here. But in general one should arrange in future American tournaments more precise wired information to the foreign press. Already in 1924, for example, a similar error lead to quite a false assessment of Marshall's interesting won game against Rèti. And regarding this tournament, it suffices to point out the quid pro quo in game 28.

[^11](41) Vidmar - Nimzovich Catalan Opening [E01]

## 1.d4 ©f6 2. Df3 e6 3.93

Even though this move isn't entirely worthless, even so it causes the opponent no problems in development anyway. Generally, in my point of view, the moves 1.d4 2. 543 and $3 . \mathrm{g} 3$ go together badly, since altogether they don't accomplish anything at all either for pressure on the central squares (such as 3.c4) or for defense of the same (e4 unprotected!)

It's even stranger that Nimzovich gets a decisive disadvantage so quickly in the game at hand.

## 3...d5

Other than this somewhat old-fash-ioned-seeming reply, a series of other manners of development - such as 3...c5 (4.c4!) 3...b6 or even 3...b5 came under consideration, but they were hardly better than the one chosen. Already at the next move, Black had to look for compensation for the weakening (whether momentary or lasting can't be determined here) of e5 in aggressive conduct in the center - either in the next moves by means of ...c5 or somewhat later by ...e5. But since he intends to go without both, the move ...d5 loses any internal substance.

## 4. gl $^{2}$ Qbd7

4...c5 5.c3 ©c6 6.0-00 d6, etc., was good.
5.0-00 d6

Also，5．．．c5 was playable here．
$6 . b 3$


6．．．c6（？）
Can one as Black really hope through such half－development moves－which even for purposes of defense don＇t have absolute value（．．．c6 strengthens d 5 ，but weakens d6，a circumstance which can be of greater importance in the open－ ing of lines）－to get an advantage，and because of them to forego simple equal－ izing（not drawing）continuations？Such a move existed here in $6 . . . e 5$ ；if there－ upon 7．Db2，then 7．．．e4 8．De5 Me7； but if $7 . d \times e 5$ xes 8 ．b2，then $8 . . .5 \times f 3+$ ，together with－depending on how White takes back，9．．．0－0 or 9．．．c6 －with a full－value game．But if Black wants to play more complicatedly，then this is also possible：6．．．〇e4 7．c4 c6， together with ．．．f5－a kind of Dutch Stonewall－certainly not to everyone＇s taste，but probably playable．

## 7．Obd2

Prevented the last mentioned possibil－ ity，but still allowed ．．．e5，even though with somewhat less favorable circum－ stances（ $\partial \mathrm{d} 2$ is an unavoidable tempo， ．．．c6 is，on the other hand，not always necessary．）

## 7．．．0－08．\＆b2

With that，a line of the Réti Opening is just about reached（it lacks only c4，fol－ lowing in the near future）－but on what detours and thanks to what bizarre（be－ cause clichéd ideas，if they are managed ad absurdum，do make the same impres－ sion as eccentric ones）counter－play by Black！

## 8．．．씁e7 9．c4

After that，9．．． 103 ． G c1 $\times \mathrm{b} 2$ 11．甾 $\times b 2$ would lead to a distressing weakening of the dark squares in Black＇s camp－and 9．．．e 5 to the ulti－ mate isolation of d 5 ．But all this would be more tolerable for Black than the move he found：

## 9．．．b5？

Considering the bishop on g2，to weaken the squares in such a way on the long diagonal certainly takes cour－ age－but also momentary blindness．

## 10．乞e5！

The rebuttal．

## $10 . .8 \times 5$ ？

With that he already gets into a lost position．More bearable－although very unpleasant at any rate－was 10．．．日b7 11．e4！，etc．

## 11．dxe5 0 g 4 12．e4！

From here on and up to the conclusion， Dr．Vidmar plays always the most ac－ curate move．

## 12．．．今gxe5 13．exd5 exd5

If here or in the next move ．．．$) \mathrm{d} 3$ ，then


14．cxd5 cxd5 15． $8 \times d 5$ 覴b8 16． $\mathrm{g}^{\mathrm{B}} \mathrm{e} 1 \mathrm{M} \mathrm{H} \mathrm{d} 6$

Again，forced．

## 17．乞f3！

Through its simplicity，an amazing deci－ sion：Black has to trade the central knight， and his remaining pieces stand undevel－ oped or committed．The end is very near．

## 

Among others，the move 19．Be8！，etc．， was threatened．

## 19．日ac1 管b6



The agony would have lasted a couple of moves more with 19．．．f6．

## $20.9 \times c 8!$

Beautiful，even though obvious．

## 20．．． $\boldsymbol{B} \times \mathbf{x} 821 . \mu \times f 7$ 씁g6

Or 21．．．ปf6 22．Axf6 gxf6 23．${ }^{\text {Be7 }}$ ，etc．

Upon 22．．．gf8，23．Af7，etc．，now wins most easily．

A horrible debacle！
（42）Spielmann－Marshall Scotch Game［C47］
 $4 . d 4$ exd4 5． $2 \times d 4$ 昷b4 6． $0 \times \mathrm{c} 6$ bxc6 7．\＆d 0－0

Occasionally one first plays 7 ．．．d5．But Black can still defer this a tempo，since White can obviously undertake nothing real before he castles．

## 8．0－0 ${ }^{\text {g }}$ e8

Already playing with fire！
The known 8．．．d5 9．exd5（or 9．e5 $\emptyset \mathrm{g} 4$ 10． $\mathrm{ff} 4 \mathrm{Be} 8 \pm$ ） 9 ．．．cxd5，together with a $\times \mathrm{c} 3$ ，etc．would have led to equaliz－ ing lines．The tendency to organize a piece attack against e4 contradicts，on the other hand，the spirit of the position and is punished accordingly．

## 9．留f3 h6

Now already upon 9 ．．．d5 could follow 10． g 5 ！，keeping the tension in the cen－ ter．

## 10．Df 4

In order to be able to answer the present $10 .$. d5 with 11．e5．

10．．．d6 11．h3
Should serve among other things as preparation for the following knight maneuver．

## 11．．．8b7（？）

Consistent，but－mainly in light of the position of b 4 －played rather care－ lessly．Black still had the opportunity， by means of $11 \ldots \times c 3$ ： 12 ．$b \times c 3$ ©d7（！），etc．，to bring about an approxi－ mately balanced game．

## 12．乞e2！

With this move，the inadequacy of the following enemy maneuvers must have already been recognized．

## 12．．．c5 13．－Dg3



## 13．．．c4？

Apparently Marshall overlooks the sec－ ond move of his opponent＇s response． As a result，Black loses the exchange without any compensation．He was still able even here，in spite of the inferior－ ity of his position，to defend himself tenaciously and，indeed，most simply， with $13 \ldots$. ．．d7，together possibly with ．．．M m 6 ，etc．On the other hand，riskier would be 13 ．．．． E b8，because of $14 . \mathrm{c} 3$ Qa5 15．0f5！，with various sacrificial turns for White．

I believe，by the way，that even against best defense，Spielmann would have won
the position in the diagram；but even so， it would have been interesting to see how he＇d have executed the attack victoriously －so within his style of play．

## 

Thereupon，Black could have actually given up confidently，since the realiza－ tion of the advantage of material in open positions－where one can so easily get rid of dispensable wood－has become child＇s play with present－day technique．

## 15．．．d5 16．\＆b5 Qd6 17．\＆$\times$ d6官b8 18．씁a4！

As one sees，White had to foresee his the results of his 12th and 13th moves far and exactly．But to his bad luck，the combination can＇t make much of an impression on the reader，because it is based on an adversarial blunder．

 22．씁 $\times 27$ 甾e5 23．…a5

In order possibly to offer opposition to el．

## 23．．．씁 $\times$ b2 24．씁 $\times$ c 7 登c4 25．씁 $\times f 7$

A real slaughter！

Upon 27．．．Dh5，28．马e7 씁5 29．h4甾g4 30． $\mathrm{m} \times \mathrm{d} 5$ ，etc．，clinches things．

## 28．h 4

Forced queen exchange or win of the knight－which mean the same thing here．

[^12]
## Round 15



Standings after Round 15 ：

Capablanca 11
Alekhine 8
Nimzovich 71／2
Vidmar 71／2
Spielmann 6
Marshall 5
（43）Nimzovich－Capablanca
Caro－Kann Defense［B12］

## 1．e4 c6 $2 . \mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 5$ 3．e5 $854 . \mathrm{D}^{\mathrm{R}} \mathrm{d} 3$

## 

Most often played here is 6．』e2，where－ upon Black，through ．．．．Ma5＋－．．．…a6（or ．．．Mbb），trades or displaces the enemy queen．The text move，which aims at quick piece development in the midst of mutually eliminated tension in the center by means of $\mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{c} 5$ ，should lead， with the correct continuation，to a game with equal chances－but probably not any more．The move $3 . e 5$ simply obli－ gates White too much，and Black will always find the necessary time to adapt himself to the rigid position in the cen－ ter．

##  9．0－0

Upon 9．…g3 could have likewise fol－
日xg2干）

9．．．气e7 10． 2 a 4

This obvious exchange is indeed suffi－ cient for equality，but 10．a3（！）came into consideration，whereupon Black had nothing better than first to occupy the knight c6－square with the queen （10．．．Mc7 11．Db5！，etc．）．Anyhow，the alternative move would have intro－ duced some disturbance in Black＇s mobilization plans．On the other hand， the attempt to take by surprise，10．b4， leads to nothing good： $10 \ldots$ ．．．．．．$\times$ b 4 ！ 11．Db5 气a6 12．日a3 甾a5 13．$\times \mathrm{C} 5$

 etc．，with advantage for Black．

## 10．．．씁c6 11． $2 \times c 5$ 씁 $\times c 512.2 \mathrm{Q} 3$ Me7 13．f4

A necessary reinforcing move，but which weakens still further the light squares in the central region．Ulti－ mately，White loses only because he doesn＇t recognize this curse in his po－ sition in time and doesn＇t seek to rem－ edy it by immediately opening files．

## 13．．．2f5 $14 . c 3$（？）

This and the next move are based in my opinion on a total misjudgment of the situation，which absolutely had to be treated dynamically because of its weak points．Therefore，14．®ac1！©c6 15．．．f2 h5 16．c4 dxc4 17． 18．日fd1，with $0 \mathrm{c} 3-\mathrm{e} 4$ ，when White in no way should lose．

## 14．．． 0 c6 15． 月ad1（？$^{\text {（？}}$

What＇s the rook looking for on the d－ file？White could still play 15 ．f2 h5 16． Bac 1 ，etc．，as preparation for the above，outlined plan．

## 15．．．g6



## 16．g4？？

An unbelievable maneuver for a player of Nimzovich＇s class．White deprives himself of any prospect on the kingside， frees the enemy from a possible con－ cern about his dark squares－and gives him a completely free hand on the queenside as a result，where he ulti－ mately must break through on the c－file！ From here on White＇s game is to be re－ garded as strategically lost，although it still requires good technique on the part of Black in order to establish the win． By the way，the correct thing for White in this somewhat disadvantageous po－ sition was 16 ． C f $2 \mathrm{~h} 517 . \mathrm{g} \mathrm{d} 2$（unfortu－ nately not $17 . \mathrm{c} 4$ ，because of $17 \ldots$ ．．． b 4 ， etc．－a result of the imprecise 14th and 15 th moves），together with $18 . \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{c}} \mathrm{c} 1$ ， with the intent c 4 ，etc．

## 16．．．Dxe3 17．씁 xe3 h5

Almost taken for granted．

### 18.95

Or 18．h3 h×g4 19．h $\times \mathrm{g} 4$ 0－0－0（or im－ mediately $19 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 5$ ），with the threats


[^13]A new weakening，but one which Black is always easily able to force．

## 21．．．筸c7 22． ． 1 d 3

Perhaps in order to ease the situation somewhat by exchanging knights．


## 22．．．Da5

Contrary to his habit，Capablanca here tries to solve the problem of playing for the win in a combinative way，and only loses time．The correct procedure was －as happened also in the following－ $22 \ldots$. e7，and，if White should take up the best defense position $\Xi \mathrm{d} 2$ ，ฮ̈d 3 ，甶f2－Black would proceed with ．．．马ac8，．．．씁a6，．．．b5，．．．甾b6 ．．．a5；then the threat of the breakthrough ．．．b4，in connection with the possibility of ．．． Df 5 ，etc．，which was carried out in the game，would ultimately decide the day．

## 

Apparently Black convinced himself that the winning a pawn with $23 \ldots$. ． 0 c 4 24．萷f2 $0 \times 3$ 3！？，on which he had based his moves，would not be absolutely safe because of the reply $25 . f 5$ ！．Therefore the preventive moves in the text．

[^14]A far better practical chance at a draw was offered here by the continuation
 b6 27．管a6 Ea 8，etc．），when the oppo－ nent would be punished to a certain degree for his imprecision on the 22nd move．In this case also，he would cer－ tainly have had to win with best play．

## 25．．．思ec8 26．国e2

The opportunity for a facilitating ex－ change was still there．

## 26．．．〇e7！

Now begins the final phase，which is finished by Capablanca without mis－ step．For students，the game has con－ siderable didactical value．

## 27．（1）ed2 日c4 28．．ㅂ․ $h 3$（？）

As already said， 28 ．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{f} 2$ was appropri－ ate here；the queen has nothing to look for on h3．

## 

 $31 . \Delta \times f 5+$The game would have lasted somewhat
 Exd4 33．cxd4 日c4 34．省e3 a4 $\pm$ ，etc．

## 31．．．g×f5 32．${ }^{\mu}$（f3

 with a winning position．

Here $36.9 \times c 4$ M $\times$ x 437.9 g 4 could still to be tried，which Black probably would have answered with $37 \ldots$ ．．．b3 3 ．

## 36．．．昌cxd4 37．cxd4

Obviously forced（37．9×d4 me 2 ，etc．）

## 

The pawn moves occur in order first to eliminate the superfluous elements for the victory．A typical train of thought for the Cuban grandmaster．

##  Mc1 42．${ }^{\text {G／g3 }}$

It＇s clear that with other moves also， White would finally perish of zugzwang．

##  

Upon king moves，47．．．．ฮ̈c1－c2 wins．
46．．．甼f1 0－1
（44）Spielmann－Alekhine
French Defense［C09］
1．e4 e6 2．d4 d5 3．乞d2
Apparently Spielmann wants to avoid the dull line 3．Фc3 4 b4！，proven suc－ cessful in this tournament．But as is generally known，Black can also easily obtain equality with the text move，with some caution．

## 3．．．c5！4．dxc5 \＆$\times$ c5 5．\＆ d 3

If 5．⿹b3 \＆b6 6．exd5，then 6．．．乞f6，etc．
5．．．乞c6
Probably easier than 5．．．〇f6 （Spielmann－Nimzovich，Cycle IV），
which not only allows the constricting e5, but even provokes it. Besides the text move, certainly 5...0e7 comes under deliberation, in order to take again with this piece in the case of $6 . e \times d 5$. Anyway, Black doesn't have a difficult opening game here.

## 6.exd5 exd5

In contrast, this isolation of the central pawn is neither necessary nor pleasant. With the simple $6 \ldots$... $\times \mathrm{d} 5$, Black would have emphasized not only the inexpediency of the knight development to d 2 (the impossibility for this knight to bother the queen from c3), but also provide himself a flexible pawn position in the center (...e5!) for the coming middlegame. Then neither 7.乞e4 D b6
 Qd49. $\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{G}} \mathrm{g} 3$ 〇f6, etc. would have led to worthwhile complexities for White.

## 

Again artificial. The usual development of the knight to f 6 in such positions is also the most suitable, since the pinning move g5 would have led at the most to an early exchange of this bishop for the knight, and as a consequence to the intensification of the pressure of the b6bishop on the respective squares. In addition, as we will presently see, the knight position on e7 makes the rational development of the queen's bishop difficult for a purely tactical reason.

## 9.0-0 0-0

If $9 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 4$, then after 10.8 e 1 , for example, castling would not be feasible because of $11.0 \times h 7+$. On the other hand, for the same reason, the move
$11 \ldots$ g 4 would be impossible. So Black had to choose between two - albeit minor - evils.

## 

It stands to reason that any exchange can be desirable only for White, since only after the disappearance of the enemy opportunities for a kingside attack will White be able to proceed to play against the weakling d5 (whether through direct threat or, as in the game, indirectly).

## 

For the reasons discussed, Black had to take pains whenever possible to complicate the game - and to this aim, $13 . .$. Df 4 was undoubtedly more advisable here, since the knight could be ousted from this square only at the price of weakening the white kingside, and this would have had a disturbing effect.

## $14.8 \times 96$

At the precise moment.

## $14 . . . f \times g 6!$

This truly difficult decision (on account of the weakening of e6-square and thereby indirectly the entire e-file, which soon turns into a mighty base of operations for the white rooks) is justified because the apparently secure $14 . . . h \times g 6$ would have left absolutely no chance of even halfway promising counter-play for Black. And the weakness on d 5 would ultimately have been ruinous to him. On the other hand, as he plays, a small consolation remains for him in the open f-file.

## 15．h3 \＆ L 5

As becomes immediately apparent，the attempt to keep both rooks for a while involves a great deal of danger．But fur－ ther simplification，by means of $15 \ldots \times f 3$ ，etc．，already appeared all too emasculating．

## 16． 2 bd4 4 ad8

Even less worthwhile were the conse－ quences of $16 \ldots$ ．．． 4 －for example，
 gether with 19．f3 $\pm$ ）18． $5 \mathrm{e} 7+$ 甾xe7


## 

With that begins the pressure on the open file．Of course both here and in the next move，．．．d 4 would be unsatis－ factory because of $19 . \Xi \mathrm{d} 3$ ，etc．

## 18．．．白df8 19．色 1 ．Mc5

Black＇s position has become very dif－ ficult．At this point，the queen has to depart d 6 without fail，in order to make possible ．．．h6，which here would be bad obviously，because of $\Xi \mathrm{g}$ e，etc．；and it wasn＇t easy to decide which of the two queen moves－to c5 or f 4 －is the cor－ rect one．Finally，Black decides on the text move，because in so doing，he has in mind the hidden defense square in the seemingly most dangerous line．

## 20．曷e8 h6 21．씁e6＋東h722．씁c8！

With that he threatens 23 ． $4 \times 67$ ，and 22．．．b6 loses immediately because of 23．b4，etc．


## 22．．．d4！

By this surprising double sacrifice （pawn plus tempo），Black obtains ex－ cellent chances at a draw．The point of the pawn move lies in the fact that it enables the queen move to d 6 ，which at this point would be insufficient because of simple $23 . . \mu \mathrm{M} \times \mathrm{b} 7$ ，threatening 芭e6．

## $23 . c \times d 4$ M $\begin{aligned} & \text { M } \\ & \text { 6！}\end{aligned}$

Not 23．．．． e b4，24．a3，etc．But now ev－ erything is in order，since neither
 etc．，would lead to anything tangible for White．In addition， 24 ．．． Se 7 is threat－ ened，which causes White to decide on the following windup．

## 24． $9 \times$ f8 $8 \times f 825$ ．씁e6 甾b4！

Again the most promising，since White， if he now wanted to avoid the queen exchange，would have to decide on the unclear sacrifice 26．Me4．The result

 sufficient defense，since 30.5 e 5 would be answered with $30 \ldots$ ．．．$\times \mathrm{b} \times \mathrm{d} 4$ ．

## 26．Mb3

But now in the following endgame, Black has sufficient counter chances for a draw in White's weakened pawn position.

##  

Preventing $31 .{ }^{\text {eve }} 2$ - whereupon obviously 31 ...a4! would follow - and in this way compelling the opponent to the following rook move, which allows the black king to cross over the center.

##  

More exact than $34 \ldots$... d 6 (it was reported thus by mistake in the European chess press - with the result 35 . Me 3 De7, etc.), because of the possible reply 35.0 d 2 !,

## 35.). ${ }^{\text {en }}+$



The winning attempt 39. De5 would remain without success because of $39 \ldots$... mb 3 40.5c4+ Bc7 41. 2 E 5 2 b 6 !, etc.

##  1/2-1/2

(45) Marshall - Vidmar

Slav Defense [D13]
1.d4 $2 f 62 . \unrhd f 3 \mathrm{~d} 53 . c 4 \mathrm{c} 64 . \mathrm{cxd5}$ cxd5 5.乞c3 乞c6

The "Slav Four Knights Game" is hardly appropriate for securing White
a noteworthy advantage; since with it, although Black is nearly forced to leave his queen bishop at home in contrast to the enemy's, his position remains unweakened, and prospects for development are therefore quite favorable.

## 6. Qf4e6 7.e3 id6

In New York 1924, Dr. Lasker twice played here 7... \&e7, but without success. With the text move (which, by the way, Spielmann originated versus A. Nilson), the advance of the e-pawn, which totally changes the overall picture of the position, had to be planned - because with other continuations, the drawbacks of the exchange gradually emerge more and more clearly. (The king's bishop is actually destined with this pawn constellation to guard against the possible penetrating of the White knight - to e5 and especially c5.)

##  e5!

Although this move, like Black's whole game layout, is definitely not to my taste, Black can count on a draw (but no more) with counter-play halfway agreeable with the position. Despite the isolated pawn and the absence of a bishop to protect the neighboring squares, I have to admit, that the text position promises Black a wood-exchanging draw in the easiest way. The occupation of the central squares. in connection with the open c-file, normally forces White to exchange the most pieces he can, soon.
11.2b5

Now something really odd occurs：up to the 18 th move，Marshall follows the （uncertain）train of thought of Nilson in the previously mentioned game，and just like him，very quickly gets into a lost position！Instead of the－not di－ rectly bad，but affected－text move，the simple 11．dxe5 气xe5 12．\＆e2，etc． came under primary consideration．

## 

White is playing with fire；since ${ }^{2} 2$ was after all positionally unavoidable， it should have occurred immediately．

## 13．．． 2 g 4

A good move－but actually self－evident．


## 14．品c7？

A sickly idea，which doesn＇t at all re－ semble Marshall．The now necessary defensive move－ 14. e 2 －would still secure him a comfortable equality．

## 14．．．留d8

Thereupon White is already without a good reply，since ．．．a6 is threatened， winning a piece，as well as ．．． $0 \times f 3+$ ， followed by ．．．h3，with a mating at－ tack．

15． $\mathrm{g} \times \mathrm{b} 7 \quad \varepsilon \times f 3+16 . g \times f 3$ Qh3
17． ge 1
Always in the same suicidal style．The exchange sacrifice 17 ．${ }^{\text {© }}$ 1（！）would pose Black a somewhat more difficult problem．

## 17．．．ŋe4！

With the threat of mate in two．The re－ ply is forced．

## 18．f4 Mh4（？）

Less convincing anyway than the move chosen by Spielmann against Nilson，

甾xa7 23．e4 Md7！24．exd5 Le6，and White，in spite of the pawn material， must perish because of his disrupted king position．

19． $8 \times 4$
Forced，since 19．Meff gc5 would now win quite easily．

## 19．．．dxe4 20．2d4 Gac8



## 21．${ }^{\text {ab }} \mathbf{b} 5$ ？

Obviously on this day，Marshall was struck with chess blindness．Instead of
using the imprecise 18th move of his opponent to persistently defend now with 21 ． $\begin{aligned} & \text { enc } 2 \text { ！，he falls victim to a trans－}\end{aligned}$ parent，one－move trap！

After the queen move，Black would have had to slave away before he would have strengthened his attacking posi－ tion：if $21 . .$. ．gc5，then $22 . f 3$ ！；and if $21 \ldots \mathrm{f} 5$ ，then $22 . ⿹ \mathrm{e} 6$ ！ g f 623.0 g 5 ！， when ．．． $\mathrm{E}^{2} 6$ or ．．． g g would be a deci－ sive mistake－ 24. ．．c c $4+$ ！．So Black would have had to devise more com－ plicated attacks，for example，21．．． Efd 8 22．f3 Ed6，whose irresistibility White absolutely should have made Black prove．Now it＇s over，of course．

##  Dg4 24．${ }^{\text {g c }} 1 \mathrm{~h} 6$ 0－1

## Cycle IV

## Round 16

0 Marshall－Capablanca 1
$1 / 2$ Nimzovich－Alekhine $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Spielmann－Vidmar $1 / 2$
Standings after Round 16：
Capablanca 12
Alekhine $81 / 2$
Nimzovich 8
Vidmar 8
Spielmann $61 / 2$
Marshall 5
（46）Marshall－Capablanca
Caro－Kann Defense［B18］
1．e4 c6 $2 . \mathrm{d}_{4} \mathrm{~d} 53.2 \mathrm{c} 3 \mathrm{dxe4}$ 4．2xe4 且5 5．ضg3 日g6 6．f4（？）

Through the advance of the f－pawn，a number of central squares are critically
weakened．Therefore it can then be goodonly if it serves attacking purposes which are concrete，clearly definable， and mostly connected with file open－ ings．That＇s absolutely not the case here， and the move－curiously enough no more inferior than that recommended by the classicist Maróczy－in my opin－ ion，didn＇t come under consideration at all．But it requires the refined opening technique of a Capablanca to reduce it to absurdity．

## 6．．．e6 7．⿹f3 0 d 6 （！）

With the correct idea of developing the knight to e7 and consequently making still more difficult the possible advance of the f－pawn．

## 

A＂preventive move＂（against what？）， which here means a loss of tempo．Instead of this，White should have abandoned the idea of f 5 and first centralize the king＇s knight again（10．⿹e4）．After 10．．．c7 11．c3，together with Me2，d2，Eae1， and possibly －e5，White＇s position would still possibly develop validity－sufficient， anyway，to face any danger of loss．

## 10．．．씁c7 11．〇e5

Serves，among other things，as prepa－ ration to the following exchange，which should displace 乞e5．White has to ac－ quiesce，since the opening of the h －file after $\widehat{0} \times \mathrm{g} 6$ or $\mathbb{A} \times \mathrm{g} 6$ would obviously be still worse business for him．

## 12．Me2 $2 \times d 3$

 with a splendid attacking game for White．

## $13.8 \times d 30-0$



## 14．D d 2

The results of the＂pseudo－classical＂ line are quite unsavory for White．With－ out any prospect of initiative，he stands， moreover，with awkwardly covered central squares，before the threatening specter of a fairly catastrophic endgame，in which the enemy would seize the only open file and perhaps the shining knight square f5！Under such conditions，one has to decide on heroic means，for better or for worse－and I catch sight of such a one in the certainly unaesthetic－looking move 14．b4！， which，in that it directly would have prevented ．．．c5，would initiate play on the left side of the board．This play per－ haps would have led to some pawn ex－ changes and consequently the threat of file openings，which would have in－ creased White＇s chances．That Marshall does not take this and other possibili－ ties into account（in the following）－ shows me that he was not at all aware of the latent danger he was already in．

## 14．．．c5 15．乞e4（？）

And now this crude snare，which right－ fully turns against him！Advisable was
 17．gad1（！），etc．，with a tenable game．

## 15．．．乞f5！

So comes the knight to this key square， from which he has a powerful effect on the whole board．Of course，15．．．cxd4 didn＇t work because of $16 .\lceil\times d 6$ ，to－ gether with 17．b4．But now，on the other hand，White must not play 16． $2 \times \mathrm{d} 6$ ，on account of $16 \ldots . .5 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ ，with the win of a pawn．Therefore White has to cast his lot with a repeated exchange under deteriorated circumstances．

## 16．dxc5 $\partial \times c 517 . \sum \mathrm{dxc} 5 \Omega \times \mathrm{C} 5$ 18．\＆ C 3

Flirts with the＂threat＂19．乌f6＋，which， by the way－if it would come to that－ would be quietly answered by Black with 19．．．th8．However，18．c3（where－ upon Black would simply double his rooks on the d－file）would have its downsides as well．

## 18．．．\＆d4！

Everything simple and forced．

##  

Not yet 21 ．．． 5 d 4 because of 22 ．．． ， 4 ！
 25． D 5 ）；but now Black threatens the knight move．

## $22.5 c 3$



## 22．．．M b6（？）

Until now，Black has handled the game quite flawlessly；but here，in my opin－ ion，he commits a hasty move that should substantially simplify the de－ fense．Why not first 22．．．h6，which would once and for all prevent the op－ position of the enemy rook？Thereupon a viable defensive plan would not be entirely obvious．

##  25．씁 2 ？

Permits the following strengthening of Black＇s position and gives his king luft， along with the fortification of the knight．And it meanwhile places his own queen on a bad square！No won－ der that after this，a pawn and conse－ quently the game are lost under duress． Necessary was $25 . \mathrm{g} 3$（ $25 \ldots$ ．． 0 d 4 26．．．．d3！），since the opening of the hl－ a8 diagonal－which before the rook exchange would probably evoke a de－ cisive attack－was，with the two re－ maining pieces，connected here with no real danger．Probably the game would be a draw after $25 . \mathrm{g} 3$ ，whereby Black＇s omission on the 27th move would have found its just retribution．But in New York，Capablanca fought under an es－ pecially lucky star ．．．

## 25．．．h5！26．a3

Here everything is already bad：if，for example， $26 . g 3$ ，then 26 ．．．씁d6！ $27 . ⿹ \mathrm{~S} 3$ b5！ $28 . a 3$ a5！$\mp$ ，etc．

## 26．．．씁d6 27．乞c3 씁d4！

Decisive，since White，in order not to die of asphyxiation，（for example，

28．
 32． t h 2 h4！，etc．）gets himself into an endgame，which is hopeless in the long run．

##  30．乞d6 乞e3

With this Black definitely secures for himself the material plus（ $31.5 \times b 7$ ©c4，etc．）．

### 31.94 ©d5 32． $2 \times b 7$

Despair，since it wasclear that the black king can be played to the queenside sooner than its colleague．Butalso $32 . g 3$
 36．




 $\Delta \times b 5$

Marshall probably could have saved himself the rest．
47．乞c6 乞c8 48．乞b8＋䓢e7
49．乞c6＋कf7 50．乞d8＋由e8 0－1

Here the game was adjourned and－af－ ter he had convinced himself that his pieces can be forced back quite easily －White resigned．
（47）Nimzovich－Alekhine
Alekhine＇s Defense［B02］

[^15]In the Dresden toumament game be－ tween the same opponents occurred here 2．．．c5 3．c4 ปc6 4．©c3（4．f4 im－ mediately is probably more consistent） 4．．．e6 5．f4 d5 6．e5 d4 7．0e4 5xe4 8．dxe4 g5！，etc．，to Black＇s advantage． The text move was applied（among oth－ ers）in the game Maróczy－Dr．Alekhine （New York 1924）．

## 3．f4 0 c6

This interesting move was examined thoroughly by Oscar Tenner，the Berlin master living in New York and，on his advice，successfully tried in a corre－ spondence game played in 1923 be－ tween the Capital Chess Club in Wash－ ington（White）and Manhattan Chess Club in New York（Black）．Whether it is the best in this position certainly re－ mains anyone＇s guess．Under strong consideration comes，for example， 3．．．d5 4．fxes $0 g 4$ ！，winning back the pawn with excellent development．

## $4 . f \times e 5$

Besides this obvious capture，only 4．$\triangle 153$ comes under deliberation，which was also played in the mentioned origi－ nal game of this line．There followed 4．．．d5 5．exd5 $0 \times \mathrm{d} 5$ 6．fxe5 8 g 4 7．Me2 alc5（also good is $7 \ldots \times f 38$ ． $12 \times f 3$畑h4＋，which occurred in the game Maróczy－Alekhine：for example 9.93 ！甾d4 10．씁e2 0－0－0 11．c3 甾xe5 12．0－0甾xe2 $13.2 \times 2 \mathrm{f} 6=$ or $13 \ldots$ ．．．选 $7=$ ，etc．） 8．\＆g5？（a move unfavorable to the po－ sition，which spoils everything；correct
 ©xf3＋11．甾xf3 \＆ D d6！12．0－0 0－0， whereupon Black likewise would stand quite well－for example， $13 . \varrho \mathrm{d} 2 \mathrm{c} 5$ ！， etc．－White＇s game would be kept alive）

8．．．．씁d79．乌c3（now $9 . c 3$ would have been able to be answered with the deci－ sive file opening 9．．．f6，etc．）， $9 \ldots . .(\mathrm{e} 3$

 White resigned，because after $15 \ldots . .5 \times \mathrm{e} 5$ ， his game collapses like a house of cards． As will be seen，the text moveposes Black more difficult problems．

## 4．．．$\searrow \times 5$ 5．$\searrow \mathrm{f} 3!$

After 5．d4 $勹 \mathrm{~g} 66 . \mathrm{e} 5$ פe4，etc．，things would obviously be going very well for Black．

## 5．．． $2 \times f 3+$

The results of 5．．．פg6 6．． e e2（also 6．c4 would come under consideration）， 6．．．d5（otherwise the pawn position in the center remains too strong）7．e5 $\subseteq d 7$ 8．d4 f6 9．0－0！fxes 10．⿹g5 气f6 11．Wh5， etc．，seem unsavory for the second to move．

## 6．씁 $\times f 3$

Better than $6.9 \times f 3$ Sh 5 ，etc．
6．．．d5！
This counterthrust，which works only in connection with the following queen move，is already the only chance for Black to come to the game to some ex－ tent；because after $6 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 67.2 \mathrm{e} 2$ \＆ g 4 8．씁f2 $2 \times 2$ 9．${ }^{\mu} \times \mathrm{e} 2$ ，together with $0-$ 0 ，etc．，White＇s position soon becomes overpowering，thanks to the open f－file．

## 7．e5 Me7！8．d4

With his previous move，Black had been concerned mostly with 8 ． l f4，which at
first glance looked unpleasant for him． But ultimately he relied on the follow－
 ©h5 11．甾 $\times$ g 4 ป $\times f 4$－with comfortable equality because of the threat $12 \ldots . .0 \times \mathrm{d} 3+$ ， etc．Following the text move，the black knight even comes to e4，which for Black is certainly pleasant．

## 8．．．〇e4 9．皿d3 Mh4＋

So he forces an approximately equal endgame．But possibly there was still more to obtain with 9．．．f5 10．0－0 \＆e6 （11．．．xe4 dxe4！12．Mg3 留d7 7 ），to－ gether with ．．．0－0－0，etc．The quieter text continuation is explained by Black＇s striving at the end of the toumament to further risk，under no circumstances，the loss of the initiative he fought so hard for opposite his main competitor．

### 10.93 Mg4 11．Od2

To avoid the queen exchange would be inadvisable－for example，11．．ㅂㅂg2 （11．．．．e3 \＆e7，etc．），11．．．0g5 12．皀xd5 c6！（not $12 \ldots$ 甾×d4？，because of 13．b5 + ，etc．），together with $14 . .$. 乌f3！+ and $. . . \circlearrowright \times d 4 \mp$ ，etc．

## 11．．．씁 $\times$ f $312.2 \times f 3$ 㱏e7

Now，in case of 13．© $\times$ xe 4 dxe 4 14．$勹 \mathrm{~g} 5$ ， Black can force a definitely favorable endgame，in spite of the bishops of op－ posite color，with ．．．$\times \mathrm{g} 5$ ，together with ．．．g 4 and ．．．$f 3$ ，etc．

## 13．De3 \＆h3 14．$\times$ e4

With that，a double－edged position is again brought about：Black keeps the bishop pair，besides the chance of suc－ cess－promising pressure on the weak
light squares in the opponent＇s camp． In turn，White will try repeatedly to at－ tack the exposed black e－pawn．On the other hand， 14.0 d 2 ，together with a knight exchange，would presumably lead speedily to a drawn ending．

## 14．．．dxe4 15．$勹 \mathrm{~d} 20-0-016.0-0-0 \mathrm{f} 6$

Played in the knowledge that the e－ pawn still needs head－on protection． The attempt to play on the d－file by doubling the rooks，together possibly with ．．．c5，would probably be unsuc－ cessful．For example，16．．．日d7
 （threatens g4，etc．），19．．．h5 20．c3，to－ gether with 21 ． $\mathrm{f} 2 \pm$ ，etc．

## 国 6

Black hopes to be able to activate the rook on the sixth rank，but it doesn＇t come to that．More cautious therefore was 19 ．．．．8e7，in order not to allow the opponent to gain a tempo with d 5 ．

## 

In order to provoke where possible ．．．g5，to weaken squares on the f－file in Black＇s camp．

## 22．．． $8 f 5$

And yet the pawn move would have been more logical，because after $22 . . . \mathrm{g} 5$ 23．© 3 c5！，White would have been able to execute the redeployment ma－ neuver ©f1（c4）－e3 only under unfavor－ able circumstances．If，for example， 24． g 1 ff 25.0 c 4 （ 0 f 1 ）and Black continues with ．．．g $4-\ldots$ df3，etc．Af－
ter the text move，White should actu－ ally get something of an advantage．

## 23．d5！

At the right moment，since the rook must now leave the sixth rank： 23．．．昌a6？24．0xe4
 $28.2 \times c 7$ ！，together with $29 . d 6$ ，and wins．

## 23．．．腮6e7 24．h4

The immediate $24 . \mathrm{d} 6$ would have shown itself to be a let－down after 24．．．昌e6！25．d×c7 g5．together with ＊$\times \mathrm{B} 7$ ，etc．But now Black undertakes something against this threat．

## 24．．．b5！

The rescue－move：upon $25 . a 4$ now fol－ lows simply 25 ．．．a6 and upon $25 . c 4(!)$ ， then 25 ．．． 9 d8！suffices（not $25 \ldots$ ．．．bec 4
 26． $0 \times 4$（ bxc 4 ！ $27.0 \mathrm{~d} 6+$（or $27.0 \times f 6$
 29．${ }^{\text {M．xe }} 7$ I 7 ，etc．，suffices－just barely －for a draw．

### 25.16

This tempting advance，in fact．opens some files to Black＇s advantage．Cor－ rect was 25． Df 1 －（£e3），in order at least to block the passed pawn，which appar－ ently isn＇t to be won．Only after this maneuver would White have been able to try to gain the initiative on the queenside－for example，through＊is2， a4，together with the occupation of the a－file．On the other hand，the text move brings him into danger．

25．．．cxd6 26．日 $\times$ d6 望e6 27．Dc5


Also，after 27． $2 f 4$ b4！28．c4 Eొc6，etc， White would get into difficulties．

## 27．．． 6

Now it＇s Black who misses a favorable opportunity：after 27．．．a5！，he would have held on to some winning chances， because upon $28 . \varrho f 1$ ，then $28 \ldots$ ．．． Bc ！ 29． $2 \mathrm{f} 2 \mathrm{~b} \mp$ ，etc．，could have followed． And after 28.5 b 3 ，the following com－ bination would have been possible： 28．．．g 4 29．日e3（otherwise ．．．e3）， $29 \ldots g 530.0 d 4 \mathrm{gxh} 4$ ！31．0xe6，when $31 .$. ． $9 \times 6$ now wins upon 32. ．$\times$ xe 4 $8 \mathrm{~g} 5+$ ，together with ．．． 8 f 5 ，etc．，and after $32 . \mathrm{g} \times \mathrm{h} 4 \mathrm{Q} \times \mathrm{h} 4$ ，Black recaptures the exchange with ease and keeps with his two passed pawns and splendid chances for a win．After the tame text move，White succeeds in evading the danger．

## 28．乞f1！Dg4

If now 28．．．日c6，then 29．2b4！，etc．

## 

The interesting move $30 . . . e 3$ doesn＇t work because of 31 ． 9 D 5 ！．

## 31．Qe3 皿e7 32．Qf 4 Qc5 33．气e3

With that，the knight has reached the correct position，and a draw is unavoid－ able for Black．

## $33 . . .8 \times 3$

Otherwise the knight comes to d5 or （with ．．．f 3 ）to f5．

34．$\times$ e $3^{1 / 2-1 / 2}$
（48）Spielmann－Vidmar
Ruy Lopez［C65］
 4．d4 exd4 5．e5 气e4 6．0－0 De7 7． $0 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ 0－0 8． $2 f 5 \mathrm{~d} 5$

Until now，everything as in the first match game（Dr．Lasker－Marshall）， where the American innovator contin－ ued here with $9.0 \times c 6$ bxc6 10． $0 \times \mathrm{e} 7+$ ， etc．，and was soon at a disadvantage． Dr Tarrasch，who annotated the games of this competition，was of the opinion that the white game，after $9.0 \times \mathrm{xe} 7+$ Sxe7 10．\％d3，would have had a valid face because of the two bishops and the pawn on e5．（Collijns＇textbook recom－ mends，on the other hand， $10 . \mathrm{f3}$ ©c5 11．f4，etc．，with double－edged play．） But，as the present game seems to es－ tablish，this face can be called anything but beautiful．The downsides of the Barry line consist precisely in the cer－ tainly exaggerated hopping around of the king＇s knight during the neglected development．

## $9.2 \times e 7+乞 \times e 7$ 10． 2 d 3

The developmental move 10.5 d 2 of－ fered better chances of equality．

10．．．乞c5 11．Qe2
And now the third move with this bishop！No wonder that Black soon gets a meaningful positional advantage with－ out eff ort．

11．．．c6 12．c3（？）
White treated the opening rather uneconomically，and now，instead of becoming aware of the danger in his position and thinking about the protec－ tion of his advanced central pawn，with the text move he makes a direct tactical error．Here or in the next move， f 4 should occur nolens volens．

## 12．．．Mcy 13．b4？

Very weak，as the reply shows．

## 13．．．乞e4！14．国3

Clearly White overlooked that upon 14．f3？，Black would win with $14 .$. ．Mb6 $6+$ 15．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{d} 4 \mathrm{D} \times \mathrm{c} 3$ ！．Now he has to be happy that he doesn＇t lose a pawn ．．．but the helplessly weakened queenside！

## 14．．．씁×e5 15．昌e1 씁f6

The simplest，since the opponent，in order to establish the material balance， has to exchange his＂Spanish＂bishop and remains behind in the development．

## 16．Dxe4 dxe4 17．日xe4 是f5 18．壁4 4 万 5

Threatens $19 \ldots \times b 1$ ，and thereby com－ pels the white bishop to a very unob－ trusive post．

19．Qb2 日ad8 20．2d2？


Another oversight，after which Black should have quite an easy game；for better or worse，probably 20．0a3 had to happen here．

## 20．．．乞b6？

So everything vanishes into thin air；on the other hand，entirely natural and in－ stinctual was $20 \ldots 5 \times \mathrm{c} 321$ ． $\boldsymbol{\square} \times \mathrm{d} 8$ 昌 $\times \mathrm{d} 8$ 22．씁3 ©e2＋23．협h1 Me6！，etc．，with a sound pawn majority in the endgame． It＇s really remarkable that Dr．Vidmar did not take into account this simple opportunity．

## 21．乌b3 气c4 22．Me2 b5 23．留e1 $1 / \sim^{1 / 2}$

Discontinued as a draw at Black＇s sug－ gestion．Actually．in the last couple of moves，Black spoiled his prospects to such an extent that one can regard the game as balanced．

## Round 17

（49）Spielmann－Capablanca Caro－Kann Defense［B19］
$1 . e 4$ c6 $2 . \mathrm{d}_{4} \mathrm{~d} 5$ 3． Ec 3 dxe 4
乞d7 $7 . h 4$

1／2 Spielmann－Capablanca $1 / 2$<br>1／2 Vidmar－Alekhine $1 / 2$<br>1 Nimzovich－Marshall 0<br>Standings after Round 17：

Capablanca $121 / 2$
Alekhine 9
Nimzovich 9
Vidmar 81／2
Spielmann 7
Marshall 5

This pawn move，in connection with castling long，is probably one of the oldest systems for White in the Caro－ Kann．Chigorin，Pillsbury（for example， against Caro，Vienna 1898）and others played in this way－and not without success．But later it was proven that Black can easily free himself by a timely counter－thrust in the center（．．．c5），and the whole line gradually went out of style．Strangely，in this game Capablanca doesn＇t use the mentioned possibility for exoneration，and consequently gets a clear disadvantage．By the way，I would play in lieu of $7 . \mathrm{h} 4(?), 7.0 \mathrm{P}$ 3，with the fur－ ther plan of development $0-0$ ， $\mathrm{y} \mathrm{g} \mathrm{e} 2, \mathrm{c} 4$ ， together with d2－c3，etc．

## 7．．．h6 8．日d3 且 $\times$ d3 9．甾 $\times$ d3 亿gf6 10．D d2

If 10.0 昷f 4 ，Black could develop the queen with tempo to a5．
10...e6 11.0-0-0 皿d6

With this and the next moves，Black as－ pires now to an exchange－an inclina－ tion that is in no way in harmony with the given position．Obvious and good was $11 . .$. ․ㅡㅂ $C 7$ ，together with ．．．0－0－0 and pos－ sibly ．．．C5，with initiative in the center．

##  14．日he1 乌f6

What＇s more，immediate 14 ．．．0－0－0 was still simpler and better here．

## 

What did the harmless bishop d2 do to him？On the other hand，the black bishop guarded，among other things，e5， from which the white knight otherwise can be driven only with effort．

##  18．嫘f 3 ！

As a result of the imprecise enemy treat－ ment of the opening，now White exer－ cises a bothersome pressure against f 7 ， and all of his pieces have more room in general than the black ones．

## 18．．．

With the intent of $19 \ldots .$. d7（ $20.0 \times \mathrm{ff}$ ？ Db6），but he doesn＇t have time for it．

## 19．씁3 g6？



One commits tactical errors more eas－ ily in inferior positions than in good ones．The pawn move，which at first glance looks so unprejudiced and there－
fore impressive，is believed to have been based on some oversight．Instead of this，there was nothing better than 19．．．日g8．

## 20．…a3？

If Spielmann had been a little less hyp－ notized by the idea of Capablanca＇s in－ vincibility，then he probably would have decided on obvious 20．岩f4！．If then 20．．．Oh5 21．．．．$\times \mathrm{h} 6$ 睹a5，then simply 22．${ }^{6}$ b1，with the follow－up $\left.{ }^{( }\right)$e3，etc．； but if $20 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{~g} 8$ ，then 21. ge 3 ！（intend－ ing 22．घf3）21．．．ธe7 22．घa3，where－ upon both black comer pawns would be attacked．After the inconsistent text move，White＇s advantage rightfully evaporates completely，and Black ulti－ mately even comes to a counter－attack．

## 20．．．．협88 21．日e3

Here this move has little power． Capablanca immediately utilizes the first opportunity given him for risk－free counter－play．

21．．．g5！22．h×g5 h×g5 23．gf3 亿e4


Capablanca is especially great with knight maneuvers．From d6，the horse covers f 7 and，at the same time，threat－ ens d 4 （．．．Ob5）．

25．c3
With that，the white queen is question－ ably cut from the main battlefield．Af－ ter his unhappy 20th move，White ap－ pears to have lost the thread altogether．

[^16]

## 27．．．乞f5

Capablanca settles for a draw through move－repetition just at the moment when excellent chances of victory were waving at him with 27 ．．．．${ }^{\text {eld }}$ ）（reserv－ ing all threats for himself）．Indeed，even with this half point，it became math－ ematically certain that the first prize was his（ $31 / 2$ points advantage with three re－ maining rounds）．

## 28． gg 4 乞d6 $29 . \mathrm{gg} 3$ 乞f5 $5^{1 / 2-1 / 2}$

（50）Vidmar－Alekhine Queen＇s Indian Defense［E16］

1．d4 ©f6 $2 . \searrow f 3$ e6 $3 . \mathrm{c4}$ b6 4.93
 7．… $\times$ d 2 0－0 8．0－0 d6 9．乞c3

Until this，everything has already been seen before．Instead of the text move，
 etc．），which at best is answered with 9 ．．．．${ }^{\text {en }}$ ．White already lost the open－ ing fight concerning the e4－square，and afterward has to aspire to at least mak－ ing up for the failure in the next phase of the game．

9．．．乞e4！10．씁c2

Capablanca plays in a similar position against Nimzovich（19th round） 10． $0 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4$ 11．©e 1 ，and finally got an advantage，but only thanks to the imprecise play of his opponent．Better than the text move，which throws away a tempo，is probably the immediate ex－ change．

## 10．．． $\mathrm{E} \times \mathrm{c} 3$ 11．… $\times \mathrm{c} 3$

Of course not 11．. g 5 ，on account of $11 . . . D_{x} \times 2+$ ．

## 11．．．乞d7 12．日ad1 Me7 13．Mfe1 f5！

With that，Black threatens，by means of ．．．e5 or possibly ．．．f4，to gather a dan－ gerous attack；therefore White strives for the most immediate simplification．

##  16．f3 elae8

Prepares the advance of the e－pawn， which White can＇t prevent in the long run．

17．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{C}$ c2 g6


Here the game was given a draw at White＇s suggestion．That the players in the approximately balanced position at the end of the strenuous tournament
were peacefully disposed is not incon－ ceivable．But it was much more aston－ ishing that the tournament management （or more correctly，a reputable member of the tournament committee，Mr． Walter Shipley，to whom Dr．Vidmar appealed on this occasion against the decision by master Maróczy）－although according to plan，they had the com－ plete right to force a master to play un－ til the 40th move－permitted a prema－ ture conclusion in this way with a crowded board．．．

As far as the position itself is concerned， the chances are approximately equal． It＇s true that in the diagrammed posi－ tion，White could hardly play $18 . e 4$ on account of 18 ．．．fxe4 19．fxe4 e5 20．d5 Dg4 21． $\mathrm{gf1} 1 \mathrm{mg} 5 \mp$ ．But，for example， after 18．a3 e5 19．e3 e4 20．f4，together with b 4 ，etc．，he would have secured himself an initiative of sorts on the left side of the board as compensation for the unhappy knight position．

## （51）Nimzovich－Marshall Modern Benoni Defense［A61］

## 1．c4 $2 \mathrm{ff} 6 . \mathrm{D}^{2}$

Otherwise，Nimzovich almost never makes this move at such an early stage． But justagainst Marshall，who in this tour－ nament defended insecurely against the Queen＇s Gambit and Queen＇s Pawn Game respectively，the choice of this old form of development was deliberate．

## 2．．．e6 3．乌f3 c5

Whether the move is a chess mistake remains undecided－but it is a psycho－ logical one，surely enough．Marshall
had to have known that his opponent as good as never played a proper Queen＇s Gambit（that is，with Mg and pressure on d5），and as a result in this opening hardly can feel especially at home（compare also the game Nimzovich－Capablanca，Round 2）． Therefore 3．．．d5 is here the＂correct＂ move－that＇s something that the older masters of our chess generation（Dr． Lasker excepted），the current forty－ year－olds（approximately）－have to profess．

It＇s not guile，which only too often is evidence of character weakness，but rather the conviction acquired through experience that in chess，in chess battles，insight into human nature and penetration into the opponent＇s psyche is necessary above all．Earlier one played only with pieces－we play how－ ever（or aspire at least）with the oppo－ nent，the enemy－with his will，his nerves，his special propensities，out－ landishness，and－not in the least－with his vanity．Marshall had to lose the game at hand because he sought only to bring disorder to the enemy pieces； his opponent，however，in addition sought to rattle the psyche of the black army＇s commander and not in a small way．And that＇s how it happened．

## 4．d5 d6 5．亿c3 exd5 6．cxd5 g6 7．乞d2！

This appears more logical to me than the Capablancan 7．g3，because with it， in the midst of marking the weakness d 6 ，the battle is immediately initiated around the center－point c4．Certainly， however，Black＇s opening is hardly re－ futed with the move．

## 7．．．乞bd7

In order to sour the c4－knight right away．

## 8．2c4

Wasn＇t first 8．e4 more expedient here？ If $8 . . . \varrho \mathrm{b} 6$ ，then $9 . \mathrm{a} 4$ ，and White expels the knight or（after 9．a4）conquers the b5－square．Otherwise，White has time for the maneuver $0 \mathrm{c} 4-\mathrm{e} 3$ ，which in the game－but per nefas－brought him an advantage．

## 8．．．2b6 9．e4 9g7？

He had to take the knight，with a game with mutual chances．（Black would have the nice al－h8 diagonal，but d6 would remain weak．）

## 10．2e3！

The result of purely strategic，impec－ cable reasoning；at the appropriate time， a4 will happen，whereupon one of two things occur：（1）either Black allows a5， when the knight on b 6 is repulsed to d 7 （possible c8）and his white colleague gets c4 again；or（2）Black plays ．．．a5， thereby surrendering b 5 ，and weakens the knight position on b6，which， through 甾b3！，in this case，could be at－ tacked forcibly．

White＇s whole set－up is logical and thereby aesthetic．Only too bad that with the imprecision of the 8th move，the overall picture became somewhat dis－ torted．

## 10．．．0－0 11．\＆d3 乞h5

The occupation at the moment of the dark squares brings no blessings upon him，since the main disadvantages of the position－the weakness of d 6 and above all，the unhealthy development of \＆c8－are in no way eliminated by that．Instead of this，the leading concern should be first quite a modest one－ namely just to secure the connection of the rooks；for example，11．．．．\＆d7 12．0－0甾c713．a4 Eae8 14.25 ©c8，with a con－ stricted，but still rather solid position．

## 12．0－0 De5

To expose the bishop in this way was careless；because if it comes to exchang－ ing it，the kingside loses any stability ．．．more consistent therefore is the im－ mediate $12 \ldots . . \mathrm{df} 4$ ．

## 13．a4 Df4 14.05 亿d7 15． 2 c 4乞×d3 16．${ }^{\mu} \times \mathrm{d} 3 \mathrm{f} 5$

Much resembles an act of despair．

## 17．exf5 登xf5 18．f4！

Also good was the move 18．De4，given by Nimzovich．But he has to go all out， absolutely right psychologically，even sacrificing material．With an undevel－ oped queenside and compromised king position，Black＇s position has to col－ lapse quite quickly after a simple file opening．

## 18．．．${ }^{\text {D }}$ d4＋

The white bishop has to be provoked to e3，where he blocks the main file and takes an important square from the knight．Quite shrewd－if it weren＇t al－ ready too late to play subtly ．．．

## 

Very strong also was the immediate $20 \ldots . .5 \times d 5$ ：among others， $21 . \mathrm{f} 5!\mathrm{gxf} 5$ 22． $\mathrm{gf3}$ ，etc．

## 21．…b3！

A well considered positional move， which is connected superfluously with some tactical ideas．Therefore，rela－ tively best for Black is $21 . . . g 4$ ，in order to ensure a retreat for the rook；but he would always stand awkwardly．

## 21．．．日 $\times$ d5？



This move is refuted neatly．Upon $21 \ldots . .0 \times \mathrm{d} 5$ ，which looks somewhat bet－ ter，Nimzovich indicates the strong file occupation 21．Dae1！as sufficient for a win．

## 22．f5！

This move all of a sudden makes the rook and bishop vital．If Black takes the pawn with the bishop，then he remains likewise without defense after 23．g5．

## 22．．．g×f5 23．Qg 5 gd4

 and wins．

## $24 . 乞 b 6+c 425$ ．̈ㅡc3 axb6 

With ideas of mate．

##  tog8 30．Dh6 1－0

The game received the third special award．

## Round 18

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 1 / 2 \text { Vidmar - Capablanca } 1 / 2 \\
& 1 \text { Alekhine - Marshall } 0 \\
& 1 / 2 \text { Spielmann - Nimzovich } 1 / 2
\end{aligned}
$$

Standings after Round 18：
Capablanca 13
Alekhine 10
Nimzovich $91 / 2$
Vidmar 9
Spielmann 71／2
Marshall 5
（52）Vidmar－Capablanca Four KnightsGame［C48］
 4．Db5 气d4 5． $0 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ exd4 $6 . \mathrm{e} 5$


The entire line was played for the first time by Capablanca against me in St ． Petersburg in 1914．It leads to an easy draw for Black，if White immediately exchanges queens－but this is definitely unnecessary．Under consideration comes instead 9．e2 es 10．0－0 0－0 11． f 3 －with the idea of causing，in contrast to the text game，the exchange of the black－square bishops，whereupon the mutual pawn set－up would be rather favorable to White．

9．씁e2 留xe2＋10．Dxe2 d5 11．0－0
More cautious probably was first 11． d 3 ，in order to prevent the follow－ ing move by Black，which nearly forces the bishop exchange．

## 11．．．\＆f $512.8 b 5+$

Was it really worth the effort，to spoil the opponent＇s castling？He was assured of a simple draw with 12. ff 4 ！0－0－0 13．d3，etc．

12．．c6 13．日e1＋की d7 14．Dd3是 $\times$ d 3 15．cxd3 是d6

Black kept the correct bishop，that is， the one that can possibly attack the fixed pawns on the white queenside．This means only a very smalladvantage here， but is better than nothing．

16．d4 思he8 17．Dd2 f5 18.93 g6



The game was given up as a draw in this position－in my opinion，somewhat prematurely，since Black possessed some chances of forcing a file－opening queenside in his favor（if now 22．${ }^{\text {ª }}$ a 1 ， then 22 ．．．${ }^{\text {Bb }} \mathrm{b} 8$ ！）．Anyway，a couple more moves could have been made．
（53）Alekhine－Marshall
Queen＇s Pawn Game［A46］

## 1．d4 乞f6 2．c4 e6 3．乞f3 气e4

A move that stands in contrast to all principles－both with the older formula （＂don＇t make different moves with the same piece in the opening＂）as well as the modern notion（＂pressure on the central squares is generally more effec－ tive than their occupation＂）．In addition， Black has the disadvantage of unneces－ sary voluntary agreement，which allows the opponent already to elaborate the en－ tire further battle plan with the next moves．In short：it forms a characteristic opening mistake，which I label as＂ille－ gitimate disturbances of the balance．＂

## 4．$\triangle$ fd2！

The logical reply，whereby the oppo－ nent is forced either to give up the fight for e4 immediately，or to decide upon the＂Stonewall＂setup，which will seri－ ously weaken his dark squares．

## 4．．．${ }^{\text {Pb }} 4$

A typical Marshall trap：if now 5．a3， then 5 ．．．．${ }^{\text {b }} \mathrm{ff}$ and wins！

## 5． $\mathrm{M} \mathrm{g} \mathrm{c} 2!\mathrm{d} 5$

If 5 ．．．f5，then $6 . a 3$ ，forcing the exchange of the developed black pieces．

## 

White＇s further operations are pre－ scribed clearly through the situation which has arisen：first e4 should be eliminated by means of $f 3$ ，then a pos－ sible e4 forces a file opening，and fi－
nally, follow up with the utilization of the weakness e6, exposed in this way. In fact, Black loses in something of a different way - but only because he tries to face the plan with forcing, combinational means.

## 7...f $\times$ e4 8. \&f4

This bishop development destroys all Black's hopes of a kingside attack, of which he otherwise could dream. based on the open f-file.
8...0-0 9.e3 c6

Otherwise White would have forced the exchange of Q b4 through $10 . a 3$ (10... d 6 ? 11. \& $\times \mathrm{d} 6$, together with cxd5 exds $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{xd}} \mathrm{d}$ !, etc.).

## 10. De2 ©d7

Or 10 ... थd6 11. थx $\times$ d6 mad6 12.0-0, together with f 3 , etc. Also, the attempt to take advantage, in a tactical way, of the somewhat exposed position of the bishop on f 4 would have ultimately proved insufficient - for example, 10...c5 11.a3 a5 12.dxc5 d4 13.b4
 with $0-0 \pm$.

## 11.a3

This seemed to me to be easier than the line 11.0-0 صf6 $12 . \mathrm{f} 3$ פh5 13.fxe 4 (13. Me5 甾g5) $13 \ldots . .2 \times f 414.5 \times f 4$ Exf4 $15 . e x f 4 \mathrm{dxc} 4$, etc.

## 11...de7

Following the exchange, the dark squares would be left quite unprotected, and White, without difficulty, would
have achieved a strong attack on the king by means of castling long, together with opening the g -file with $\mathrm{f} 3, \ldots \mathrm{exf3}, \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{f} 3$.

## 12.0-0 Rg 5

There probably isn't anything better.

## 13.f3! © $\times$ f 4 14.exf4 $\mathbf{l} \times f 4$

To be sure, Black's position was unenviable also without this - but with
 queenside development, he would still have been able to carry out extended resistance. Obviously, the text move already prepares the following forcible liberation attempt in the center.

## 

Leads to dramatic complexities. After 16... $\mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{c} 4$ 17. . $\times \mathrm{x} 4$ 包 b 6 , White would get an advantage with 18 . m f 2 .

## 17. 씁d2!

The beginning of the decisive combination. It's clear that both $17 . \mathrm{dxe5} \mathrm{~d} 4$ and $17 . c x d 5$ (or exd5) 17...exd4 would not yet directly contribute.
17...c5


There was actually no choice for him， since any exchange in the center clearly would be only grist for the opponent＇s mill，and against 17 ．．．樂b6，I had pre－ pared the following winning line： $18 . \mathrm{c} 5$留a5 19．exd5 exd4 20．b4！dxc3 21．Mg 5甾c7 22．d6，etc．

## 18．dxe5！d4 19． m f 4 ！

Doubtless the quickest and surest path to a win．On the other hand，question－ able on move 18 was $18.0 \times d 5 \mathrm{cxd} 4$ 19． $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{b} 4$ ，on account of 19．．．．ff6！，and on move 19 －19．©d 5 ，because of 19．．．＇ปxe5：，together with ．．． y （d6，etc．

19．．．dxc3
Forced．

## 

This＂quiet＂move is the actual point of the whole combination．With the natu－ ral 21．e6，the following defense would be at Black＇s disposal：21．．．9f6 $22 . \mathrm{e} 7$



## 21．．．씁g8 22．씁e7 h6

This protects him at least from one of the threats（23．e6 ©f6 24．e5 ©h7！）．

## 23．\＆h 5

The death blow．
23．．．a5
 24．e6 ๑b6（24．．．乌f6 25．gxf6）25．gf8 and wins．

## 

The arbiter，Mr．L．Mayer，declared this game the most beautiful in the tourna－ ment，but it nevertheless received only the second special award，because the quality of the Capablanca－Spielmann game was said to be supposedly higher．
（54）Spielmann－Nimzovich
French Defense［C07］
1．e4 e6 2．d4 d5 3．2d2 c5 4．dxc5 \＆×c5 5．\＆ d 3 气f6

An active move，which just as 5．．．〇c6 （see Spielmann－Alekhine，Cycle III），is pretty playable．Only Black mustn＇t lose a single tempo during the center battle in the opening phase，which in the cur－ rent game－as will become convinc－ ingly clear－absolutely isn＇t the case．

## 6．e5 乞fd7 7．乞gf3 乞c6 8．쓸e2



## 8．．．乌b4（？）

There we have it！Instead of capturing the central point e5 with 8．．．f6！－even at the cost of some more superficial weaknesses（given by Nimzovich him－ self after the game）－Black loses time to eliminate the seemingly innocent white king＇s bishop．At the same time，
a valuable protection of the d 4 －square （ $\boxed{\mathrm{c}} 6$ ）disappears．After $8 . . . \mathrm{f} 69 . \mathrm{exf6}$ щxf6 10．Øb 3 h6（simplest） $11.0 \times \mathrm{cc} 5$ $5 \times \mathrm{c} 5$ ，the Black position would even be favored because of the central pawns＇flexibility．Against correct counter－play，White＇s knight move to d2 can＇t be advantageous！

## 9．0－0 亿xd3 10．щ …d3 0－0 11． $2 b 3$

 De7Otherwise $\circlearrowright \mathrm{g} 5$ ，etc．

## 12． $\mathbf{D e}^{\text {en }}$ 乌b6 13．乌bd4

In the good old，pre－war times（San Sebastian 1911 to St．Petersburg 1914）， where many of his opponents didn＇t yet grasp well that this－ceteris paribus－ already meant half the victory， Nimzovich himself had invested enough games with such a central posi－ tion for the knight and won most of them． No wonder that，here a defender，he doesn＇t feel comfortable and gets more and more into a jam．In contrast， Spielmann＇s following positional play appears very aesthetic．

## 

The knight seeks in vain for halfway reasonable squares．Black＇s move con－ fines him in such a way that he can in no way secure his dark－square bishop from the exchange，and so has to aban－ don the hope of the bishop pair．

## 16．a3 气c7 17．Db4 气a6 18．Dxe7 씁xe7 19．b4 亿c7（？）

Permits a further strengthening of the white position on the queenside： namely，Black can never profit from the
open c－file，since his own pieces stand in the way of each other．For defensive purposes，first 19．．．a4 would have been more useful．

## 20．a4！县8

After $20 \ldots$ ．．．$\times$ b4，White would get $s$ clear advantage with घ̈e1－b1－b7：，etc．

## $21 . c 3 \mathrm{f} 6$

No heroic resolve，but rather an avowal that there＇s no other way to conduct business．In fact，if Black pernits the opponent a couple of tempi－for ex－ ample，in order to double the rooks on the e－file for the purpose of preventing the text move－then he would soon fall victim to a direct attack on the king．Cer－ tainly，the wonderful animals on d 4 and e5 look formidable now，but a direct path to a win is more difficult to find．

## 22．exf6 씁×f6 23．씁e3 씁f4！

Again the lesser evil，since after $24 . \mathrm{M} \times \mathrm{X} 4$
 get more than sufficient compensation with 26 ．．．Efc $4!$ ，etc．，for the loss of a pawn．

## 

The threat was ．．．〇d3－c5，etc．

### 26.93

With the apparent purpose of finally making the weakness on e6 permanent by means of $f 4$ ．As the reply shows，the way chosen was not correct，and the preparatory move $26 . \mathrm{h} 4$（！）was recom－ mendable．If after that， $26 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 6$ ，then 27．g3，when 27 ．．．g5 wouldn＇t work be－ cause of 28.0 g 4 ，etc．Small omissions
of that kind usually suffice to transform a totally superior position gradually into an equal one．

##  29．日be1

In spite of the imprecision of the 26th move，White still has a position that prom－ ises a win，since three to four pieces of the opponent are in stalemate．Instead of the text move，which threatens to win a pawn（30．⿹g4），also 29．gb4 comes un－ der consideration here－albeit with a dif－ ferent plan－if after that 29 ．．．． B d8（in or－ der to prevent c 4$)$ ，then first 亩 g 2 ，together with $\mathrm{B} \mathrm{e} 1-\mathrm{al}$ and finally，if Black still conductshimself passively（and what else can he do？），a5，opening a file．

29．．．a6


Quick－witted and bold，yet in the case of a proper answer，inadequate．Since 29．．．${ }^{\text {Be }} 7$ still works in the short term， for example，（1） 30.0 g 4 Eg6 31．2f5 +

 He should have chosen this move，for better or worse，to cover e6．

## 30．b×a6？

With that，in my opinion，Spielmann misses out on a win．Correct was 30．a5！，
with the following lines：（1） 30 ．．． B b 8 31．Ddc6！ B b 7 （after 31．．． $\mathrm{O} \times 6$ 32．b×c6！ wins the exchange） $32 . b \times a 6$ © $\times a 6$

日xd739． 9 c 6 E bb 740 ． Be e ，etc，with an easy win；and（2） 30 ．．． $0 \times 6531 . \mathrm{axb6} \mathrm{~h} 5$ （otherwise，Dg4）32．®al $0 \times \mathrm{d} 4$ 33．cxd4 Qb5 34． B b3，with a winning position， since he threatens，among other things， \＃$\times \mathrm{b} 5$ ，together with b7 and $\Xi \mathrm{a} 8$ ．After the text move，Nimzovich，with his des－ perate ．．．a6，is proved right．

## 

Now quite harmless，since after 32．．．gg6，the pawn can＇t be taken：
 ＊g7，and wins．

## 32．．．日g6 33．乞e5 昌6 34． 2 g 4

Otherwise Black generates counter－play with ．．．乞c5，etc．Too bad for the game， which up to achieving a winning posi－ tion，was implemented so well by Spielmann！
34. 国 $^{1 / 2}-1 / 2$

Round 19
$1 / 2$ Capablanca - Nimzovich $1 / 2$
1 Alekhine - Spielmann 0
$1 / 2$ Vidmar - Marshall $1 / 2$

Standings after Round 19：
Capablanca $131 / 2$
Alekhine 11
Nimzovich 10
Vidmar 91／2
Spielmann $71 / 2$
Marshall 51／2
（55）Capablanca－Nimzovich French Defense［E16］

1．d4 ©f6 $2 . 乞 f 3$ e6 $3 . c 4$ b6 $4 . g 3$ Qb7 5．\＆ 2 \＆b4＋6．\＆ 2 \＆$\times \mathrm{d} 2+$ 7．${ }^{\mu} \times \mathrm{Cd} 20-08 . 乞 \mathrm{C} 3$

Up until now，everything is identical with the game Vidmar－Alekhine from the 17 th round，in which White played 8． $0-0$ here．The text move permits the following exchange，facilitating it for Black．

## 8．．．De4 9．乞xe4 Dxe4 10．0－0 d6 11．亿e1

A simplifying initiative，necessary sooner or later，which has the advan－ tage of pledging the knight on g2 inter－ esting evolutionary possibilities（e3， f4）．And yet here I would have preferred first 11．gfd1，in order to hamper，if possible，the strategic counterattack ．．．c5．

## 11．．． $8 \times \mathrm{g} 2$ 12．$乞 \times \mathrm{g} 2$ 亿d7

An imprecise developing move，which reveals an inadequate assimilation of the details of the position－certainly a rare case with Nimzovich！Correct was 12．．．．．e7！，in order to answer $13 . e 4$ with $13 \ldots$ ．．．5！and $14.8 f d 1$ with ．．．f5！，which in both cases would have secured full counter－play for Black．

## 13．e4 e5？

A move entirely contrary to position which weakens d 5 and f 5 without com－ pensation -13 ．．．c5！is still possible；for example，14．d5 Əe5！，or 14．Bad1 日c8 15．Øe3 甾c7 16．d×c5 $0 \times c 5$ ，etc．

## 14．乞e3 乞f6

Probably 14．．．exd4 15．씁xd4 $\begin{aligned} & \text { Mff } 6 ~\end{aligned}$ 16．Mxf6 ©xf6 17．f3，etc．，offers a bet－ ter chance at a draw－with only a small positional advantage for White．

## 15．f3c5？

With that，he hurls the game at the op－ ponent．For better or worse， $15 \ldots . \mathrm{g} 6$ ， together with ．．．Me7，etc．should be played．

## 16．dxe5 dxe5 17．日ad1 Med2

Or 17．．．．씁 7 18．$\smile f 5 \pm$.

## 18．${ }^{\text {回 } \times d 2}$

Control of the only open file，in con－ nection with the penetration point for the knight，should now decide the con－ flict in White＇s favor without consider－ able difficulties．

## 

It would be useless to play $19 \ldots . . . d^{2} 4$ 20． .95 ，etc．

## 



20．．．${ }^{\text {fif }} 8$ doesn＇t help because of 21．${ }^{\text {Md }} \mathbf{d}$ ！，etc．

## 21．tif 2 ？

With this move，we see most clearly that Capablanca had absolutely no interest in the outcome of this game．Otherwise he wouldn＇t have possibly overlooked the entirely obvious invading move 21． $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{d}} \mathrm{d}$（not 21.0 d 5 because of 21．．．皃g7！）．Now against 21．．．${ }^{*} \mathrm{~g} 7$ ， Capablanca would have the choice of either first bringing the king to the cen－ ter－or by means of $22.9 \mathrm{~d} 5 \mathrm{D} \times \mathrm{d} 5$
 etc．），bringing about an endgame not technically difficult to win．

## 21．．．${ }^{\text {bef }} 22.2 \mathrm{~d} 5$

On the other hand，White gets nothing more now from 22． B d 6 ，on account of $22 \ldots$ ．．．te7！，since then 23 ． B c 6 ？would be a direct mistake because of 23．．． 9 e8！， together with ．．．${ }^{\text {B }} \mathrm{d} 7$ ．

## 

Actually，after 24 ${ }^{2} \times \mathrm{d} 5$ 亘×d5 $25 . \mathrm{exd} 5$ （or $25 . c \times d 5$ b5！，etc．） 25 ．．．f $526 . g 4$ 宴e7 27．g×f5 gxf5 28．＊itf tid6 29．tig3 te7 30．＊h4 h6！31．＊h5＊d6，etc．，White can＇t win the pawn endgame，since his king can＇t move forward because of ．．．e4．But that could have been shown to the New York public．
（56）Alekhine－Spielmann
French Defense［Cl3］

## 1．e4 e6 2．d4d53．乞c3 亿f64．皿g5 Qe7 5．exd5

A quite harmless variation．Whether Black recaptures with the knight or with the pawn，he can always achieve equal－ ity without effort．

##  Mb4

This move，which has already been made here occasionally，forces an ap－ proximately equivalent endgame－but only just approximately．And by the way，why should Black be in such a hurry for simplification？Playing first 7．．．0－0，and，for example，not until 8．0－ $0-0$ ，playing $8 \ldots$ Mb4，etc．，would have spared him the following unpleasant－ ness．

##  

In the games Schlechter－Maróczy and Schlechter－Spielmann（San Sebastian， 1911）10．．．${ }^{\text {bif }} 8$ occurred，and in both cases Black reached a draw，although not without a certain effort．It＇s hard to comprehend why Spielmann－who therefore was not unfamiliar with this position－decided on the self－pinning of the bishop．

## 11．0h3！

Very strong，since the knight will be able to develop versatile activity from f4：（1）pressure on d5 and e6；（2）im－ pact on c 5 or e5 respectively via d3；and
（3）possibility of the flank attack，Df4－ h5．

11．．． 0 c6
Gradually Black gets a decided disad－ vantage．But also 11．．．0－0 12．Df4 ©c6
$13 . c 3 \mathrm{a} 6$（otherwise P b 5 ），皿e2－f3，etc．， was of little benefit to him．

##  कd ${ }^{6}$

All this is as good as forced．

## 15．c5＋क्రd7 16．${ }^{\text {E }}$ e5

Another likewise more promising con－ tinuation was 16. Be3，when Black couldn＇t very well play $16 . . . a 6$－for example，17．是×c6＋宣xc6 18．She1亘d7（after 18．．． 1 d 7 ，White wins by means of $19 . \Xi_{\times e 8}$ ，together with 0 h 5 ， etc．）19．$勹 \mathrm{~h} 5$ 马hg8（or 19．．．马eg8） 20． g g 3 ，etc．；but after 16 ．．．f6 17． $0 \times \mathrm{ec} 6+$ ！ bxc6 18． 9 a3 5b8 19． $0 \times 6$ 宙xe6 20．${ }^{\text {en }}$ e $1+$ ，etc．，it would ultimately have come to similar positions as in the game．

## 16．．．f6 17．日xe6 睤xe6 18． $0 \times 6$ \＄×e6 19．\＆xc6 bxc6



White brings about a rook endgame， which indeed must be winning，but still requires quite precise handling．

## 20．81e1＋

In almost every endgame，it＇s important to drive the enemy king out from a cen－ tral position；but especially here，where
the rook can be lead to both flanks，ac－ cording to need，to attack the enemy pawns．

## 20．．．bd7

Relatively better than 20 ．．．try，where－ upon White would have won by imple－ menting the following plan： 21. © c 3 ！ Ib b 22．\＃e 3．Now the black rook has to watch the b－file，and Black cannot prevent the following moves：a3！，家c2， f 3 ！，榿3，after which the rook would penetrate the enemy position following ．．．${ }^{\text {B }} \mathrm{e} 8$ ，首d2，etc．It＇s also interesting to find out that even with the white king＇s position on c2，Black can＇t oppose the rook，because then the pawn endgame also would be lost．

For example，．．．马e8；品xe8，．．．${ }^{\text {b }} \times \mathrm{e} 8$ ；
 f3！（or，in case the pawn is already on f3－b4！）．Now．after the exhaustion of the kingside pawn moves on both sides （for example，．．．h5；f4！，etc．），Black will have to move ．．．a6（after ．．．tb8；宣a6， etc．，the White win is easier still）， whereupon b3！，．．．ta7；b4，．．．宵b7；a4， ．．．宣a7；b5，．．．a×b5；a×b5，．．．cxb5；家 $\times \mathrm{b} 5, \ldots$ ．．．tb7；c6＋，etc．follows，with a clear win for White．An instructive pawn endgame！

## 21．${ }^{\text {b }}$ c3

Corresponding to the foregoing imple－ mentation，21．${ }^{\text {E }}$ e 3 could also be played immediately，because after that 21．．．${ }^{\text {Ie }} 8$ doesn＇t work．But 21．．．gb8， etc．，would just amount to a transposi－ tion of moves．

[^17]
## Cycle IV：Round 19

From here on，White starts to become somewhat indecisive；the correct way is－as also happens further on－ 24．8ึh3．

## 24．．．昌e7 25．b．bc3

After 25．${ }^{\text {a }}$ a5，the counterattack 25 ．．．尚e2！ $26 . \Xi \times \mathrm{g} 7+$ 亩c8．，etc．，would probably lead to a draw．

## 

Threatens 28．8a3，against which Black actually has no defense，since upon ．．．t．c8－b7，the rook infiltrates to e8 via e3；and after 27．．．．af8 28．Ea3 Eb b（or
 Black would finally perish by zugzwang．

## 27．．．昌e7

An attempt．


## 28．堅 3

With the logical move 28 ．$\Omega$ e3（in－ tended with the previous maneuver）， White could have compelled a victory－ promising pawn endgame．Because af－ ter 28．\＃e3！घxe3 29． g6（30．．．g5＋？31． $\mathrm{\theta}$ g4，etc．）31．g4，Black
obviously will not be able to prevent the total barricading of the kingside，and White penetrates finally on the queenside．For example， $31 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 5+$ 32．te3 tid7（32．．．f5 33．f3）33．tid3
家b737． ta a6（in case of White plays＊⿴囗⿻㐅⿳丶⿰丶丶丶⿴囗十心 b 5 ，and after ．．．c6×b5，a $\times \mathrm{b} 5$ and b6， with an easy win） $38 . a 4$ tea7 39．b3！
家b7！43．b6！（White had not sufficiently appreciated exactly this point in his cal－ culations；after 43．b×c6＋？晏b7－b8－a8， etc．，the game is already a draw）
 $46 . \mathrm{d} \times \mathrm{c} 5 \mathrm{~d} 447 . \mathrm{b} 7 \mathrm{~d} 348$. ®b $^{\mathrm{b}} 6 \mathrm{~d} 249 . \mathrm{c} 6$ d1甾 50．c7\＃．

Not a very easy variation－but in bet－ ter shape，the leader of the White pieces doubtlessly could have and should have figured it out．Now comes an endgame on quite a different track．

## 

With the corner position of the enemy rook，White promised himself some－ what too much with his 28th move．

## 31．h3 혀b7 32．${ }^{\text {te }}$ e3 f5！

The correct way to free the rook，since White can＇t really prevent ．．．f4＋，to－ gether with ．．．${ }^{\text {M }} 44$－h $5-f 5$ ，etc．

## 

With other moves as well，for example， Eb3，nothing much more might result after 34 ．．．f4＋，etc．

34．．．g5（？）

From here on, Black, for his part, starts to take great pains. Simplest, of course,
 36. gb 3 (36.a5 a6) 36....gf5 37. gd d $\mathrm{gf7}$
 with ...a5!, with a dead draw.

## $35 . a 5 \mathrm{~g} 4$

After the previous mistake, probably still the best practical chance. Because after 35...a6 36. .bf2!, Black's rook would remain perpetually closed off after White, through the threat g 3 3-h2, together with g 3 , etc., would force Black to play ...f4, and finally the playing of the rook on the e-file, together with its unavoidable infiltration, would bring White a decisive advantage.

## 36.h $\times$ g $4 \times \mathbf{~} \mathbf{g 4} \mathbf{3 7 . a 6 ! ~ g \times f 3}$

Upon 37...g3 38.f4, etc., wins.

## 

With his 38th move, Black probably overlookedthat 39...日a1 would now be baneful because of $40.9 \times a 7$ ob8



The counterattack on the d-pawn forms therefore his only chance of salvation.

## 40. ${ }^{6}$ f4!


 was to be won, but not the game.

[^18]This pawn exchange occurs in the correct knowledge that the white king will succeed in rendering both enemy passed pawns harmless, as well as effectively supporting his own f-pawn. The final phase is instructive in technical respects.

##  46.a7! h5



Or 46...d4 47.te4 h5 48.b3 gal 49.f5 *e7 50.**d4 h4 51.*e5, and wins.

## 47.b3!

The winning move; since it's clear that White's main task consists in standing sentinel with the king over the dangerous d-pawn - the h-pawn can be stopped in a pinch with the rook by sacrifice of the a-pawn. And b3 allows the king to move to e5, which would be obviously pointless at the moment because of $47 \ldots$... $e^{2+}$.

## 

Gaining time on the clock.

##  

Forced, because of the deadly threat ff, etc.

#   

A difficult decision．But upon 57．．．h3

 with an easy win．

##    65．b4

Now the approach of this pawn imme－ diately decides．

##  68．b5 cxb5 69．bb4 1－0

（57）Vidmar－Marshall
Queen＇s Pawn Game［A46］

## 1．d4 Df6 2．Df3 e6 3．c4 De4 4．M M $\mathbf{G} 2$

A good move，but which can＇t be re－ garded as a strengthening compared to 4．Dfd2（Alekhine－Marshall），since it＇s clear that the e4－outpost must be at－ tacked at least by the knight．It＇s less clear，on the other hand，that $\begin{aligned} & \text { ul } \\ & \text { c } 2 \text { be－}\end{aligned}$ longs in all variations．

4．．．d5
More precise seems first ．．．f5，and pro－ vided 5．0c3，then 5．．． ab 4 ，with the eventual threat of causing for the weak white pawn complex c3，c4，d4 so typi－ cal of the Dutch game．It＇s strange how little importance Marshall places on the nuances of the opening phase！

## 5．乞c3 f5 6．\＆f4 Qd6 7．e3

A well known idea with the Stonewall， which supposedly originated with Pillsbury．Following the exchange on f4，White should press against e6．But as a rule，Black doesn＇t need to swap at all，and in the text game he could also avoid this easily．

## 7．．．c6 8．2e2 0－0 9．0－0 Me7（？）

When one takes a back seat in the de－ velopment，one can＇t miss the opportu－ nity to lead new fighting forces into the battle．Here for example，9．．．厅d7 is tactically possible（10．⿹xe4 $0 \times f 4$ ），and ought to happen immediately．Then， upon 10．c5，the bishop would have had a comfortable retro move ．．．\＆b8．After the text move，White gets an advantage．

## 10．c5！\＆$\times 4$

If 10．．．ac7，then simply $11 . \mathrm{b} 4$ together with a 4 ，b5，etc．－using the circum－ stance that Black in this case couldn＇t develop his queenside further．But now White has a still easier play－ousting or encircling the knight on e4．

## 11．exf4 乞d7 12．b4 Még6

Black attempts not incorrectly to get some kingside counter－play，because with a simpler continuation，for ex－
 © $\times$ c3 15 ． $\mathrm{M} \times \mathrm{x} 3$ ，together with $\mathrm{a} 4, \mathrm{~b} 5$ ， etc．，he would have perished anyway， slowly but surely．

## 13．Ad3

A clearance move for the queen＇s knight．

[^19]

## 15．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{C}$ c1（？）

From here on，White starts to play hyper－fine chess．Indeed his position is strong enough to endure all kinds of artificiality－but gradually he lets the win get away from him．On the other hand，the crystal－clear plan to drive away knight on e4 with f3 would strengthen his positional advantage without greater effort．We examine 15．De5：（1） 15 ．．．g5 16．f3 gxf4 17．fxe4
 20．Eaf1，with a technically easy win thanks to White＇s complete control of the dark squares；（2）15．．．פh5 16．f3 ¿ef6 17．M d2！，with the unstoppable threat，without drawbacks，of 18．g4．

## 15．．．Oh5 16．a4 a6 17．马a3（？）

And now still 17．©e 5 ，together with f 3 ， was tremendously strong．

## 17．．．Def6 18．\＆b1

Now 18．〇． 5 could have been met with 18．．．〇d7．In this way Black survived the worst．

## 18．．．〇g4！

In order to take h3－square away from the white rook．

## 19．h3

Not 19．ひe5？Эg3！，and wins．

## 19．．．Dgf6 20．乞e5 乞d7 21．乞d3 Dhf6

Now Black＇s fighting forces（up to the a－pawn）stand exactly as if he had on the 14th move played ．．．De4－f6．But what＇s strange is that White，during this whole time，not only took no step for－ ward，but，to the contrary，rather wors－ ened both his piece positions（ $\Omega$ d 3 instead of $\mathfrak{G} 3$ ，b1 instead of d3），and his pawn configuration（h3 instead of h2）！－ Dr．Vidmar didn＇t have a good day．

## 22．Me3 皆h8

The most economical protection of e6．

## 23．日e1 甼g8 24．De5 Dxe5 25．dxe5？

Already White＇s previous move was somewhat premature（since... g 5 ，to lib－ erate the f4－square，wasn＇t to be feared by the White knight anyhow），and could have been betterprepared，for example， by the maneuver ${ }^{6} \mathrm{fl}$ ，together with Dg1－f3．But the repositioning of the d－ pawn，grounded in the clear overesti－ mation of the worth of the d 4 －square， robs White of his high trump－the fron－ tal pressure against e6，and the use of the e5－square．Therefore，decidedly preferable would have been 25 ．${ }^{\mu} \times \mathrm{e} 5$ ， together with $0 \mathrm{cl} 1-\mathrm{d} 3$ ，and the occupa－ tion of e 5 by the knight－or，in the case of ．．．De4，White has exe4，together with $\mathrm{f} \pm \pm$ ．

## 25．．．乞e8 26．씁d4 Rd7 27.94

The white pieces have too little coordi－ nation to be able to support effectively this pawn attack；it must lead at best to a further obstruction of the position．But White＇s advantage disappeared some time ago－he remains with merely a somewhat greater freedom of space， which can only inspire elusive hopes， given the lack of attack targets．

## $27 . . \mathrm{g} 628.95$ 留f8 29.25

Black，on the one hand，can quite eas－ ily prevent the breakthrough b 5 （．．．อc7， ．．．…e8），and can even ogle the counter threat ．．．a5－therefore，this obstruction is justified．But it＇s curious that this game，which already here begins to make such a bleakly drawish impres－ sion，still has to last more than 60 more moves！
 $32.9 \times h 6$

The only possibility to play on．But now h 3 is at least as weak as g6．

##  

With that he gets the prospect，sometime or another，of bringing the bishop in the open with the pawn sacrifice ．．．d4．

##  

One plan for White would be to bring his king to d 4 and then，with the help of the knight watching the squares h 4 and g 5 from f ，to force a favorable liq－ uidation by means of h4－h5．Regretta－ bly for him，the opponent has the com－ plete possibility of organizing counter－
play on the h －file during this long－ winded maneuver．

## 官h6 44．씁g2 Mg7 45．협f 1 씁h7 

As one sees，he is very far from his ideal －king position on d 4 －and must un－ avoidably dissolve the tension on the kingside．The endgame that follows contains a couple of tactical finesses， to be sure，but Black easily holds the draw．In any case，it wasn＇t worth strug－ gling along to the 93 rd move．

##  g×h5

 51．M h 2 g 5 52．日h7＋日g7 53． $\mathrm{\Xi} \times \mathrm{g} 7+$
 with a winning position．
 $52 . \triangleq \times e 6$ क由f7 53．乞d4 कg6
 D 6


This is the position where White can undertake the only，and as one will see， inadequate，attempt at a win－begin－ ning with © ${ }^{\text {d } 4, ~ e t c . ~ A t ~ f i r s t ~ h e ~ d o e s n ' t ~}$ decide on it，and prefers to undertake a
new trip with the king．And only when this proves useless in the face of the always threatening advance of the Black central pawn，brings about the diagrammed position again（on the 87th move！）．As a consequence，it＇s advised the less patient readers spare themselves the next 30 moves and play over only the final moves（from 88 on），starting with the diagrammed position．







 76．bh4 Dc6 77．0．D2 dd7 78．헌3 是c6 79．${ }^{\text {thh2 }}$ 是d7 80．tg3 \＆ 2 c6 81．bh 4 是d7 82．${ }^{\text {dg }} 3$

 \＆ 66
（See previous diagram．）
安f891．e6 ${ }^{\text {Gg }} 7$

Simpler still was $91 \ldots$ ．．．e7 with the same next move．

## 92．be5d4！

So it was nevertheless granted the bishop to take some fresh air，even if only a moment before the end of the game！

## 

## Round 20

$1 / 2$ Capablanca－Alekhine $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Nimzovich－Vidmar $1 / 2$
$1 / 2$ Marshall－Spielmann $1 / 2$
Final Standings
Capablanca 14
Alekhine $11 / 2$
Nimzovich 101／2
Vidmar 10
Spielmann 8
Marshall 6
（58）Capablanca－Alekhine
French Defense［Cl3］
1．d4e6 2．乞c3 d5 3．e4 Øf64．\＆g5 dxe4

In connection with the next move，good and secure．Anyway，none of the oppo－ nents against whom I played this varia－ tion（these were Aurbach，Bogoljubow， Euwe，Yates and here Capablanca），suc－ ceeded in getting an advantage in the opening．

## 5． $0 \times 4 \mathrm{Cl}$ e7！

This and not 5 ．．． $0 \mathrm{~d} 7 \times \mathrm{x} 6$－as was ear－ lier mostly played－is correct in my opinion．On the contrary，meanwhile the black queen knight should remain on d7，in order perhaps to be able to sup－ port the advance ．．．c5 or ．．．es．

## $6.2 \times f 6+$

Interesting is here $6.0 \times 6 \times \times 67.0 \mathrm{e}$ ？？ analogous to the Wolf－Bogoljubow variation of the MacCutcheon．

##  9．c3

Better anyway than 9 ．2d3 c5 10．0－0 cxd4 11． $5 \times d 4$ gld ！，（Euwe－Alekhine， Amsterdam 1926），whereupon Black would even get some advantage．

## 9．．．〇d7 10．月．2

Since White can＇t prevent the follow－ ing emancipation of the opponent，noth－ ing better remains for him than to bring his king quickly to safety．

## 10．．．e5 $11 . d \times e 5 ~ \Delta x e 512 . \Delta \times e 5$ 

The play is dismally equal，and must sooner or later come to liquidation on the open central file．

## 15．Ma4

Not a trap，rather actually the invitation to a somewhat artish draw－dance．But Capablanca himself basically avoids the shade of unnecessary complications．


16． 2 ad1

More amusing for the public would have been the following little inter－

 winning back the pawn and ultimate equality－for example，20．．．瞷8 21．h4 Ee7 22．थxc6！，etc．；or 20．．．b6 21．．$\times$ x6日d8，together with 22．．${ }^{\text {en }}$ e．

## 16．．．씁c5

Avoids the unpleasant weakening of $b 6$ （after 16．．．a6）．



Naturally not $20 \ldots \times \times 2$ ，on account of


 26．質d8
（59）Nimzovich－Vidmar Sicilian Defense［B22］

## 1．e4c5 2．$£ \mathrm{f} 3 \mathrm{e} 63 . \mathrm{c} 3$

With that Black easily gets a balanced game．But Nimzovich，who in accord with the toumament standing aspires only to a draw，probably wanted to reach a clarification of the pawn posi－ tion in the center as quickly as possible．

3．．． 2 f 6
Otherwise，only 3．．．d5 4．exd5 exd5 $5 . \mathrm{d} 4$ ，etc．，comes under consideration， with quite easy strategic challenges．

4．e5 ©d5 5．d4 cxd4 6．cxd4 皿e7

With such indifferent moves，there＇s no hoping to obtain winning chances！If Black didn＇t want to decide on the fianchetto 6 ．．．b6（or even ．．．b5）－which incidentally would not be very favor－ able for him on account of 7．C4 b7 8．๑c3，etc．，then he could，and should， immediately bother the opponent in the center with $6 \ldots . . \mathrm{d} 6$ ．Then he＇d have the chance to make either the advanced e5－ pawn or the d4－isolani an object of at－ tack．At least that would have been more promising than drawing the enemy pawns to the center through exchange， as he does in the next move．

## 7．乞c3 Əxc3 8．bxc3 d5（？）

In contrast，this move is all too provok－ ing and hardly correct．How did Black want thento defend his kingside against the stereotypical attack 9．ed3，h4，to－ gether with h5，gh3－g3，etc．？The course of action would have been strong even without his castling．More correct， in any case，is $8 . . . \mathrm{d} 6$ ．

## 9．exd6

Only explained by a decided tendency to draw．

## 9．．．씁×d6 10．\＆ C 2

The bishop doesn＇t go to d3，in order not to hamper a frontal guard by d 4 in case of c 4 ．

## 10．．．0－0 11．0－0 乞d7

This move was decorated with an ex－ clamation point by some annotators，in my opinion incorrectly．In any case，the natural move was $11 \ldots . .0 c 6$ ，which，af－
ter the possible c4，would have threat－ ened to trouble White somewhat with the quadruple attack against d 4 （follow－ ing ．．． $\mathrm{m}_{6}$ and ．．． B d 8 ）．

## 12．a4 씁c7 13．씁b3 b6

The mighty thrust $13 . . . e 5$ would have led ultimately only to the opening of the central files，which，with the undevel－ oped bishop on c8，wouldn＇t be harm－ less to Black anyway．But the flank de－ velopment entails the early pawn ex－ change on b6，which provides for a welcome object of attack for White as compensation for the pawns c4 and d4 in need of protection．The mutually stra－ tegic trains of thought are transparent and lack sharpness，right up to the con－ clusion（of peace）．

## 14．c4 置b7 15．a5 是f6

It＇s clear no boon would come from tak－ ing on a5．Then 16．ff（if 16 ．．． a b6
 followed．

## 16．axb6 axb6 17．De3 h6 18．h3 

With that he hopes to achieve a com－ plete simplification at the cost of a tem－ porary pawn sacrifice．The combination is long and correct，which is： $19 \ldots . .3 \times 1$


 פe6 28． $0 \times 6$ fxe6，together with
 meanwhile，Black keeps up the excite－ ment．

19．．．昌cb8 20． $1 \times$ a8

The aim of this file sacrifice is not ob－ vious，on the other hand，since ．．．〇c5 would surely be a letdown because of皆c2．Therefore，more reasonable was immediately $20 . \frown \mathrm{d} 2$ ．Of course，the text also works．

20．．．昌×a821．乞d2 且e7 22．Qf 3

 d． 3

A result of both time pressure and the impossibility of finding a winning idea against the rock－solid white position． It＇s all the more commendable that Dr ． Vidmar finally finds a not decisive，yet correct and surprising，witty reply， which for a moment enlivens the other－ wise very bland game．

## 品 3

If 30 ．．．．．．．ea8，then 31．c5！，etc．As a re－ sult，he therefore surrenders the hl－a8 diagonal to the white queen．

## 31．씁e4 Df6 32．씁c6



Next comes the previously mentioned wit．White could prevent it with 32 ．甾c2 but didn＇t need to．

## 32．．．量×e3！

The last chance at the prize！

## 33．$\mu$ 씁 $\times$ d $6!1 / 2-1 / 2$

After the acceptance of the exchange sacrifice，Black would actually still have chances，for example－ $33 . \mathrm{fxe} 3$当a3 34．ge1 M3 35．gf1 甶xe3＋ 36．\％h 1 De47．He could continue play－ ing some more（if he hadn＇t been in awful time pressure）after the text move as well－because he was not at a disad－ vantage after the refusal of the sacri－ fice either．That is to say，that after $33 \ldots$ ．．． 2 ！，the apparently strong reply $34 . c 5$ would have found a fully sound defense in 34．．．…a3！，and 34．d5 b5！， etc．，and was not to be feared by Black either．According to this，after 33．．．巴e2， a fight with approximately equal chances could still have developed，but which didn＇t have to end so certainly in a draw．
（60）Marshall－Spielmann
Scotch Game［C47］
1．e4 e5 2．$\searrow \mathrm{f} 3$ 气c6 3．乞c3 乞f6
 bxc6 7．d d 3 d5 8．exd5 cxd5 9．0－0 0－0 10． 2 g 5 c 6

We most often play like this，although statistics in recent years（thanks mainly to Spielmann＇s efforts）force a rather favorable verdict to be conceded to White．Simpler（though of course， bound only with thoughts of a draw） appears the Capablancan relief system：
 Dg4！－Spielmann－Alekhine，Baden－ Baden 1925）12．．．ge8，which would
prevent $13 .{ }_{\text {m }}^{\mathrm{m}} \mathrm{f} 3$ ，because of $13 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 5$ ，to－ gether with ．．．${ }^{\text {g }} 4$ ．

## 11．씁f3 h6

Through this strange move，Black ex－ presses his peaceful intentions quite openly． He is after a drawn endgame， without costing himself a debasing of his pawn position．The move is sup－ posed to stem from Rubinstein，albeit certainly an after－the－war－Rubinstein． Otherwise 11．．．\＆（see game Spielmann－Vidmar，Cycle II）was the move．

## 12． $\mathrm{Q} \times \mathrm{f} 6$ 씁 $\times \mathrm{f} 613$ ．쓸 $\times \mathrm{f} 6 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{f} 6$ 

Beginning of artificial maneuvers，less appropriate because Black＇s position， given his many pawn weaknesses，can still in no way be regarded as secure． With 15．．．．d6 16．b4 c5，etc．，he would have spared a very important tempo here，and in addition，kept the knight on f 4 at bay．On the other hand，it will soon turn out that the bishop has little to do on b6．

## 16．b4 昷b6 17．c3

Prepares 0 d 4 ，if need be．

## 17．．．c5 18．乞f4！

But after Black weakened d5，this spot is systematically undermined．Up to the 27th move，the game is Marshall＇s best achievement in this toumament，in my opinion．

18．．．c4 19．是e2 昷e6 20. 昌ad1 Ebd8 21．${ }^{\text {g fel }}$

Not yet 21． Cl 3 ，on account of $21 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 4$ ． But now White threatens the move．

21．．． de7 $^{2}$


## 22．g3！

The key move to the entire attack for－ mation against d 5 ：it＇s clear that Black must not swap on f 4 ，because in this case，a rather easy path to a win，in a technical regard，would stand at White＇s disposal．He would namely－at first through multiple threats on $\mathrm{d} 5(\mathrm{Ed} 4$ ， af3；Black rooks on the d－file；in the case of ．．．घd6，White first plays a4）－ in connection with the possibility f 5 ， force the move ．．．f5，；then bring the king to e3，move Ed $4-\mathrm{d} 2$ ，and finally occupy the central d4－square with the king．The remainder would be the exchange of rooks under threat of penetration on one of the open files（e．g．，or on the queenside）－and finally the utilization of the surplus pawn on the left side．

The way chosen by Spielmann is natu－ rally less hopeless，because he secures himself bishops of opposite color，but not yet sufficient to produce a balance again．

## 22．．．昷e5 23．昷f 3 国 $\times 3$

With $23 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 4$ as well，he would have lost a pawn without compensation．

## $24.2 \times e 6!$

 have been favorable for Black．

## 24．．．fxe6 25．日 $\times$ e6 d4 26．${ }^{\circ}$ c6！

One sees that the entire attack was cal－ culated deeply and correctly His main goal consisted much less in obtaining a material gain as in securing White the following positional advantages：（1）the spreading of his pawn surplus on both flanks，a circumstance which makes al－ most illusory Black＇s hope of a draw based particularly on the opposite col－ ors of the bishops；（2）The isolation and need for protection of the remaining black pawns；and（3）the uncertainty of the black king＇s position，which can be successfully utilized through a poten－ tial doubling of the white rooks on the seventh rank．One would think，there－ fore，that after he had reached all this， according to plan，White would solve just as successfully the final phase of the problem of winning．

26．．．d3
Or 26 ．．．${ }^{\text {g }} \mathrm{C} 827.8 \times \mathrm{C}$ ，together with ad5＋－c4，etc．

## 27．${ }^{\text {alxc4 }}$ 昷b2



## 28．${ }^{\text {日ld }}$ ？

It＇s really a shame from the standpoint of the art of chess that Marshall，after playing so well up until now，suddenly begins to see a ghost．The doubled－ and unfounded－fear of（1）the oppo－ site bishops，and（2）the passed pawn on d2，causes him to totally underesti－ mate his chances on the queenside and to play for further simplification．

Correct，however，was the simple 28．a4！ －with the threat simply to advance the a－and b－pawns－for example，28．．．d2 29．b5 Efe8（what else？）30．a5 Ele1＋
 थ．c1 34．日c7 Ile1 35．b6！axb6 $36 . a \times b 6$ Ixd1 37．b7 $\mathrm{Ig}^{2}+38$ ． Gh 3 ，and wins． Black can also play differently after 28．a4！，but a satisfactory defense is not obvious for him．On the other hand， after the contrived text move，the win， if still possible at all，is in any case ex－ ceptionally difficult．

## 

Could Marshall possibly have over－ looked this only defensive move in his pre－calculations？With other continua－ tions，after the bishop exchange，he would have captured the a－pawn and prevailed easily．




34． 9 学 6 （？
The rook has no business on the sixth rank，since f 6 is quite easy to guard．On the contrary，he should occupy the fifth （34．9a5！），with the idea of possibly us－ ing the king as an attack piece kings ide （via h3 to h5）．To prevent this，Black would have had to allow small weak－ nesses（．．f5），and the outcome still would have been doubtful．

After the text move，a dead－drawn po－ sition arises very quickly．

## 34．．． 号d5！

Spielmann immediately exploits the neglect of his opponent．


Obviously a further relief for Black． 38．bxa5 䈍×a5 39． 40．日g8


What can one still hope for here？





Finally，White loses his extra pawn．But perhaps he played on this far only be－ cause he wanted to show his opponent that in the position，he could afford a blunder．


前f561．\＃b

## Index of Players

Numbers refer to game numbers
Bold numbers indicate the player had White

| Alekhine | $\mathbf{2}, 5, \mathbf{8}, 11, \mathbf{1 3}, 17,20, \mathbf{2 3}, \mathbf{2 6}, 28, \mathbf{3 2}, 35, \mathbf{3 8}, \mathbf{4 0}, 44,47,50,53,56,58$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Capablanca | $\mathbf{1}, 4,7, \mathbf{1 0}, 13,16,19, \mathbf{2 2}, 25, \mathbf{2 8}, \mathbf{3 1}, \mathbf{3 4}, \mathbf{3 7}, 40,43,46,49,52,55,58$ |
| Marshall | $\mathbf{3}, \mathbf{6}, 7, \mathbf{1 1}, 15, \mathbf{1 6}, 21,24,26, \mathbf{3 0}, 31, \mathbf{3 5}, \mathbf{3 9}, 42,45,46,51,53,57, \mathbf{6 0}$ |
| Nimzovich | $3, \mathbf{4}, 8, \mathbf{1 2}, 14, \mathbf{1 7}, \mathbf{2 1}, 22,27, \mathbf{2 9}, 32, \mathbf{3 6}, 39,41, \mathbf{4 3}, \mathbf{4 7}, \mathbf{5 1}, 54,55,59$ |
| Spielmann | $1, \mathbf{5}, 9,12, \mathbf{1 5}, \mathbf{1 8}, \mathbf{1 9}, 23, \mathbf{2 7}, 30,33,36,37, \mathbf{4 2}, \mathbf{4 4}, \mathbf{4 8}, \mathbf{4 9}, \mathbf{5 4}, 56,60$ |
| Vidmar | $2,6, \mathbf{9}, 10, \mathbf{1 4}, 18,20, \mathbf{2 4}, \mathbf{2 5}, 29, \mathbf{3 3}, \mathbf{3 4}, \mathbf{3 8}, \mathbf{4 1}, 45,48, \mathbf{5 0}, \mathbf{5 2}, \mathbf{5 7}, 59$ |

## Index of Openings

Numbers refer to game numbers

Alekhine's Defense 47<br>Bogo-Indian Defense 7, 14, 20, 24<br>Caro-Kann Defense 19, 40, 43, 46, 49<br>Catalan Opening 41<br>English Opening 8, 10<br>Four Knights Game 6, 18, 36, 52<br>French Defense 3, 35, 39, 44, 54, 55, 56, 58<br>Modern Benoni Defense 31, 51<br>Nimzovich Defense 27<br>Nimzo-Indian Defense 32<br>Nimzo-Larsen Opening 12<br>Queen's Gambit Declined 1, 2, 4, 25, 26, 37, 38<br>Queen's Indian Defense 9, 13, 50<br>Queen's Pawn Game 23, 53, 57<br>Réti Opening 17, 21, 29<br>Ruy Lopez 34, 48<br>Scotch Game 42, 60<br>Semi-Slav Defense 28, 33<br>Sicilian Defense 5, 30, 59<br>Slav Defense 45<br>Torre Attack 11, 16, 22<br>Vienna Game 15

## Alekhine's Controversial Masterpiece Finally in English!

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Why Alekhine's work was published in German, in Berlin in 1928, and not in English, is unclear. But now, after more than 80 years, it's finally available to the largest audience of chessplayers. It's about time.



[^0]:    21．．．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{d} 5!$

[^1]:    
    

[^2]:    10．Mad1

[^3]:     M．$\times$ e2＋28． ．$\times$ e 2 b6 $1 / 2-1 / 2$

[^4]:    7．．．d6 8．0－0 e5 9．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{c}$ c2 Dc c6 10．e3 Dd7

[^5]:    31．．．孯d5！

[^6]:    18．．．昌a7

[^7]:    28．．． 295 29．씁 $\times \mathbf{g} 5$ ！

[^8]:    22．．．h6

[^9]:    11．．．씁e7

[^10]:    32．．．目c7 33．씁e8＋©d8 $34 . \mathrm{e} 4$
    

[^11]:     2c5+1/2-1/2

[^12]:    28．．．씁g4 29．씁 $\times$ f6 1－0

[^13]:     $21 . a 3$

[^14]:    24．©g 2 亚c6 25．

[^15]:    1．e4 乞f6 $2 . \mathrm{d} 3 \mathrm{e} 5$

[^16]:    25．．．日h8 26．日e1 anh 27．日g3

[^17]:     24．${ }^{\text {bb }} 4$

[^18]:    習d143.9×a7!

[^19]:    13．．．Mh6 14．乞e2 乞df6

